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A b str a c t
Although the laws of error and misrepresentation have a decisive impact on contract and 
contractual relationship, existing studies of Islamic jurisprudence, and the CISG have 
occasionally discussed or considered these fundamental topics. These legal systems do not 
assume the obvious approach found in comparison with their counterparts, English and 
Scottish contract laws, which form independent and comprehensive concepts in their legal 
research and argument. This thesis fills the gap in the literature by a comparative, critical 
analysis studying error and misrepresentation in Islamic contract law and the CISG, with 
the purpose of developing these concepts based on English and Scottish contract law in 
general and English law in particular as the main guidance, from which the organisational 
structure is derived for clear definitions of the categories of error and misrepresentation.
This thesis investigates the linguistic and historic streams of the concept of error and 
misrepresentation in Islamic contract law “relying on the Qur’anic context”, thus creating 
entirely different approach to both concepts, and giving further guidance to other 
researchers to develop and improve their view of these significant concepts.
Based on the existing studies and theories, this thesis analyses and criticises in particular 
the views of English and Scottish law with respect to the categories of error and 
misrepresentation. At the same time, this study builds a new approach to the concepts of 
error and misrepresentation by analysing and criticising relevant case law arguments, and 
by synthesising some types of error. This thesis offers a thorough comparison especially 
between Islamic and English contract law. These views are designed to introduce the legal 
systems cited in this thesis closer to each other and will establish an interactive approach, 
especially between Islamic and English contract law. Therefore, this thesis establishes a 
new Islamic-Anglo approach to misrepresentation as a result of actual interactivity 
between these legal systems.
As a result, the author of this thesis offers an extensive critical analysis of the concepts of 
error and misrepresentation in the Palestinian Draft Civil Law, producing academic 
recommendations to be taken into consideration by its draftspersons. These 
recommendations can also be applied to Egyptian and Jordanian civil law.
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Chapter One
Introductory Chapter
Contracts and contractual re lationships p la y  im portant roles w ith in  people’ s d a ily  liv e s. 
Co ntractual effects are s ig n ifica n t and need to be studied and understood, e sp e c ia lly  w ith 
regard to co m m ercia l relations. C o m m e rcia l contracts are u su a lly  connected to fin a n c ia l 
com m itm ents, w h ich  are potentially  expected to generate disputes between the contracting 
parties. O ne o f the essential issues w hich  m ay occur between the contracting parties is  
error. E rro r is  a m ajo r issue o f dispute w ith regard to contracts. T h is  thesis w ill  concentrate 
on the concept o f error and its categories, w ith relation to contracts. M o st o f its d iscu ssio n  
w ill  be w ith regard to co m m e rcia l contracts, in  particular, to trading contracts for the sale 
o f goods. In  addition, this thesis w ill d iscuss disparate m anifestations o f error w ith in  
vario u s form s o f contract, such as, construction contracts, em ploym ent contracts, credit 
contracts, m anufacturing and partnership contracts. T h e  thesis w ill  not, how ever, scrutinise 
in  depth at the le g is la tiv e  fram ew orks sp e cific  to these types o f contracts, but rather at the 
concept o f error itse lf, w ith in  those contracts. T h e  quantities o f m oney in v o lv e d  and the 
co m p lex ity  o f vario u s fin a n c ia l transactions in  m an y o f these contracts leads to an 
im portance in  understanding the concept o f error itself. The form s o f these transactions are 
changing, d eveloping ra p id ly  and continuously.
It can be said that contracts can be expected to becom e in v o lv e d  w ith error or m istake. I f  
this occurs, it can create a devastating effect on the contracting parties. E rro r is  a c ru c ia lly  
im portant issue to be anticipated b y  the parties during the contracting process. E rro r can
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occur w ith regard to the contract’ s technical, fin a n cia l, or leg al aspects. It w ould  be 
expected that these issues w ould  be d iscussed b y  the parties. T h is  does not im p ly  that the 
parties w ill  n ecessarily  alw ays m ake the right d ecisions. It is  g en erally  accepted, how ever, 
that the parties to a contract, p a rticu la rly  a co m m e rcia l and fin a n c ia l contract, know  best 
where their ow n interests lie . It is  also apparent that the parties m ay m ake m istakes, due to 
im perfect inform ation and/or uncertainty as to the future. There is  a chance that at least one 
o f the parties w ill  m ake a m isca lcu latio n  o f the cost or benefit o f the contract, based on 
inaccurate or incom plete inform ation.
T h e  concept o f error carries different m eanings. T h is  re lies on understanding o f the 
im plem ented legal system  and its legal d efin itio ns. E rro r w ill  be addressed fo llo w in g  the 
law  applied to the contract. D ifferences w ould be expected when d ealing  w ith  error under 
the Is la m ic  law  o f Ottom an Journal o f E q u ity  as applied in  P alestin ian  contract law , to the 
w ay the same quandary w ould  be addressed under either the Scottish or E n g lis h  contract 
law s. Furtherm ore, d ifferences w ould  be im ag in ed  between the Ottom an Journal and the 
current contract law  o f Palestine, the D raft o f P alestin ian  c iv i l  law  and the intended future 
law . Further variations are, for exam ple, the Scottish law  o f error and the roots o f that 
Scottish law  and the R o m an law . M a n y  o f these differences can be retraced to the different 
roots and o rig ins o f different leg al system s. In  addition, m odem  attempts to bridge legal 
system s, such as b y w ay o f the International law  o f the Sale  o f G o o d s ( C IS G ,  1980) 
contracts have differences w ith the legal system s w ith in  w h ich  the C I S G  is  to be 
im plem ented.
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The Main Focus of the Study
In  th is thesis, a central focus is  to develop a theoretical concept o f error and explore the 
m isrepresentation under Is la m ic  contract law  com pared to the E n g lis h  and Scottish 
contract law . T h is  thesis demonstrates some o f the k e y  notions o f error and the 
m isrepresentation concepts in  the cited leg al system s, ap p ly in g  the com parative method as 
a k e y  point to analyse and crit ic ise  these concepts. U sin g  E n g lis h  contract law  as a fo cal 
m odel, this thesis demonstrates the key differences and s im ila rit ie s  w ith  regard to error and 
m isrepresentation between the cited legal system s. T h is  thesis re lies on the structure o f 
E n g lis h  contract law  o f error and m isrepresentation to understand the m ain  aspects o f error 
and m isrepresentation under the C I S G  and the draft o f the P alestin ian  C iv i l  La w . In  this 
case, the k e y  law s to be referred to as a general ground o f the com parison are E n g lis h  and 
Scottish contract law s, w ith  greater focus on E n g lis h  contract law .
Historical and Geographical Brief
There is  presently not an y know n history in d icatin g  that the Is la m ic  contract law  has an 
articulated or co d ified  independent act or code. It p re v io u sly  re lies on vario us Is la m ic  
schools or doctrines, w h ich  are st ill referred to b y  m an y o f the M u s lim  scholars in  m ost o f 
the A ra b /M u s lim  countries when d iscuss an issue related to contract and its leg al effects. 
H is to r ic a lly , there are fo ur doctrines represent the m ain  Is la m ic  ju risp ru d en ce  schools 
Hanafi, Shafe ’ai, Maliki and Hanbali. E v e ry  doctrine gained m any lo y a l scholars to fo llo w  
their understanding and interpretation in  re lation to the Qur'an. N one o f these doctrines 
have co d ified  their own interpretation to be reflected in  a code or an independent act. T h is  
situation continued u n til the Ottom an law m akers decided to c o d ify  the ru les o f the contract 
and the contractual re lations under a u n ifie d  code, this is  ca lle d  the O ttom an Journal o f 
E q u ity  w h ich  was enacted on (186 9 ) and started to be im plem ented on (18 7 6 ). T h is  code
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re lied  m a in ly  on the Hanafi doctrine; how ever, it derived some o f its articles from  the other 
m ain  Is la m ic  doctrine. T h e  articulation and the c la ss ifica tio n  m ethod o f this code were 
derived from  the Fre n ch  leg al system s, as the m ost in flu en tia l O ttom an law m aker (Rashid 
Basha) gained received h is education in  Franc and had good m anner in  Fre n ch  language. 
T h e  Jo urnal applied on a ll the A ra b  countries w h ich  were under the Ottom an E m p ire  rule. 
Palestine w ith its both parts (W est B a n k  and G a z a  Strip ) was also under the Ottom an R u le  
u n til the B r it is h  mandate era, where the E n g lis h  law  was applied in  both parts. W h e n  the 
B r it is h  term inated their mandate on Palestine, W e st B a n k  becam e under the Jordanian rule 
and G a z a  Strip  becam e under the E g y p tia n  rule. In  relation to contract and its effects, both 
Jordanians and E g y p tia n s applied the Ottom an Journal o f E q u ity  after 1948 in  the W est 
B a n k  and G a z a  Strip . T h is  situation continued even after 19 67 were the W est B a n k  and 
G a z a  S trip  becam e under the Isra e li rule. T h e  Isra e li m ilita ry  rule  continued w ith the 
O ttom an Journal, ap p ly in g  it in  both W est B a n k  and G a z a  Strip  w ith regards to contract 
and related issues. W h e n  the P alestin ian  A u th o rity  was established, accord ing  to O slo  
A cco rd  in  19 9 3, the Journal kept its position as o f f ic ia lly  applied b y  the P alestin ian  courts 
and s t ill rem ains under the current situation. R e ly in g  co m plete ly on E g y p tia n  and 
Jordanian c iv i l  law , the Palestin ian  A u th o rity  suggested a new draft o f c iv i l  law  to be 
applied in  W est bank and G a z a  Strip , how ever, the draft is  s t ill in  the drafting stage, as it 
w ill  be illustrated in  the fo llo w in g  chapters o f this thesis.
Section 1: The Importance of the Study, its Objectives and Methods
1.1. The Importance of the Study
E rro r or m istake, a llie d  w ith  the issue o f m isrepresentation, is  a problem atical and
interesting area o f contract law  w hich  has draw n the attention o f m an y leg al w riters from
va rio u s leg al system s. E rro r or m istake as a concept was not a leg al focus o f the Is la m ic
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law  or the Is la m ic  law  w riters. Is la m ic  ju risp ru d en ce  concentrated on issues s im ila r  to 
error, although error itse lf, u sing  its c la ss ica l m eaning from  E n g lis h  and Scottish law  was 
never m entioned d irectly . T h is  study derives its im portance from  in vestigating  whether 
Is la m ic  law  recognised error, and how it is  presented. In  addition, th is study w ill  exam ine 
i f  there are different term inologies em ployed b y  the M u s lim  scholars to indicate error. T h is  
study w ill  explore i f  the Is la m ic  jurisp rud ence has developed any theoretical fram ew ork for 
error, as the E n g lis h , and Scottish contract law  has accom plished. Furtherm ore, this study 
w ill  investigate the a llie d  concept o f m isrepresentation, one o f the closest concepts to error, 
and it w ill  investigate whether this concept has also been established under Is la m ic  
contract law . T h is  w ill  be exam ined b y  testing w hether the Is la m ic  ju risp ru d en ce  d iscusses 
m isrepresentation d ire ctly , or whether it uses other term ino lo gy to express the m eaning o f 
m isrepresentation; s im ila r ly , its close connection w ith error and fraud. T h is  study w ill  then 
continue to exam ine w hether the D raft o f P alestin ian  c iv i l  law  has its ow n independent 
v iew  w ith regard to error and m isrepresentation. O ne o f the prom inent issues w ith in  this 
study is  m odernising the Is la m ic  contract law  concept o f gharar. Gharar as m eaning o f 
m isrepresentation w ith its relation to error, this w ill  be discussed from  a com pletely new 
perspective and w ith in  a new theoretical fram ew ork. T h is  study w ill  gain  the m ajo r part o f 
its im portance b y  establish ing  a new legal theory o f error (khata ’a) and m isrepresentation 
(gharar) under Is la m ic  contract law . T h is  fram ew ork w ill  be approached and com pared to 
the concept o f m isrepresentation, as used w ith in  E n g lis h  and Scottish contract law .
1.2. The General Objectives of the Study
T h is  study is  designed to explore the concept o f error and m isrepresentation under Is la m ic  
law , and to b u ild  a new theory o f both o f these concepts when com pared w ith  E n g lis h  and 
Scottish contract law . T h is  study also aim s to explore the concept o f error and 
m isrepresentation under the C o nven tio n  for the International S a le  o f G o o ds 1980,
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otherwise know n as the V ie n n a  Sales Co nven tio n , or the C I S G .  T h e  C I S G  w ill  be
com pared w ith  E n g lis h , Scottish, and Is la m ic  contract law . T h is  study w ill  c r it ic a lly  
analyse the concepts o f error and m isrepresentation as being developed for the new 
P alestin ian  c iv i l  law , it w ill  provide recom m endations for im provem ent o f the draft law  in  
developing the concept o f error and its c la ss if ica tio n s for use w ith in  Palestine. Th ro u g h  
further c rit ic a l an a lys is  o f a ll o f the leg al ju r isd ic tio n s  to be exam ined, this study aim s to 
m ake the understanding o f the concept o f error and m isrepresentation under the targeted 
legal system s to be more approachable. O f  im portance in  this process is  the use, not o n ly  o f 
com parative crit ic a l leg al study, yet s t ill developing a h isto rical and lin g u istic  study, in  
p articular w ith regard to error under Is la m ic  contract law . A s  the researcher background is  
in  Is la m ic  law , the a im  is  to create va luab le  and deeper understanding o f the concept o f 
error and m isrepresentation, e sp e c ia lly  under Is la m ic  law . T h e  intention is  to develop a 
broader understanding for law yers, scholars, and other interested readers in  Is la m ic  
contract law .
T h is  thesis a im s to achieve an understanding o f how Is la m ic  law  and the C I S G  precepts 
pertain to each element o f error and m isrepresentation structures, in  com parison w ith 
E n g lis h  and Scottish contract law . S im u ltan eo u sly , as abovem entioned, the d iscu ssio n  
leads to the co n clu sio n  that provides greater certainty that w ould  be achieved b y  creating a 
new structure and a new approach to error and m isrepresentation under Is la m ic  law  and the 
C I S G  rules.
1.3. The Specific Objectives
T h e study w ill  be guided b y  the sp e cific  fo llo w in g  objectives:
1 -  T o  exam ine the nature and characteristic o f Is la m ic  concept o f error and 
m isrepresentation com pared m a in ly  w ith these concepts under E n g lis h  contract 
law .
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2 -  T o  exam ine the Q u r’ an ic concepts o f error (khata’a) and m isrepresentation 
{gharar), thereby analyse them in  com parison w ith E n g lis h  and Scottish contract 
law .
3 - T o  exam ine the legal im p lica tio n  o f gharar under Is la m ic  law  and its conventional 
m eaning in  Is la m ic  ju risp ru d en ce  and develop a new concept on the b asis o f 
lin g u istic  and h isto rical context.
4 - T o  review  thoroughly the alternative concepts and form s o f error and 
m isrepresentation under C I S G  in  com parison w ith the cited legal system s 
e sp e c ia lly  E n g lis h  contract law .
5 - T o  analyse and crit ic ise  the concept o f error and m isrepresentation under the 
P alestin ian  D raft C iv i l  L a w , and to recom m end the P alestin ian  law m akers to adopt 
recom m endations that derived through studying E n g lis h  and Scottish contract law .
6 -  T o  establish a new concept w ith a new structure o f m isrepresentation as a 
com bination between Is la m ic  and E n g lis h  contract law .
1.4. The Research Methods
T h is  study is  a theoretical com parative c rit ic a l a n a lys is  o f the concept o f error under the 
targeted leg al system s. It re lies on c r it ic is in g , an alysin g , com paring the academ ic literature 
and the understanding o f case law  decisio ns. In  addition, this study re lies on the lo g ica l 
reasoning o f a n alysin g  the targeted law s o f error and m isrepresentation. T h is  study w ill 
co m p arative ly and c r it ic a lly  exam ine the a v a ila b ility  o f the concept o f error under Is la m ic  
law  when com pared to the other leg al ju r isd ic tio n s  exam ined. E n g lis h  contract law  is  the 
m ain  reference to ap p ly that. T h is  process w ill  also be applied to International Contract 
L a w , under the C I S G  and the draft o f P alestin ian  c iv i l  law . T h is  study w ill  a n a ly tic a lly  
investigate the case law  related to error and m isrepresentation under Scottish and E n g lis h  
contract law , exp lo rin g  the concept o f error and m istake. B u ild in g  on that, this study w ill
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subm it new d efin itions for some types or categories o f error and m istake; it w ill  exam ine 
some o verlapping areas between error and m isrepresentation. In  addition to that, this study, 
in  order to support the com parative c rit ic a l an a lys is  method, w ill  use descriptive  and 
deductive methods together in  order to m ake the concept o f error and m isrepresentation 
more approachable between the different ju r isd ic tio n s  and ju risp ru d en ces in  general, and 
between Is la m ic  and E n g lis h  law  in  particular.
R e ly in g  on the m ethodological instrum ents o f the com parative c rit ic a l a n a lys is , the first 
task is  to achieve both a com prehensive understanding o f error and m isrepresentation o f 
the relevant Islamic p rin c ip le s  and a precise understanding o f how those p rin cip le s 
com pared, m o stly  p o in t-b y-p o in t, E n g lis h  and Scottish law  concepts. B ased  on that, this 
thesis w ill  provide detailed description o f how the concept o f error and m isrepresentation 
w ould  be structured under E n g lis h , and Scottish law  m odel, in c lu d in g  descriptions o f the 
im portance and legal effect o f each structural elem ent. T h is  thesis, in  turn, w ill  provide a 
s im ila r  description o f how  the concept o f error, and i f  any, m isrepresentation w ould  be 
structured under the Is la m ic  contract law , w ith s im ila r  explanatory m aterials.
There  is  a considerable reverse and forth in  a rriv in g  at a com parative outline o f the two 
structures o f Is la m ic  and E n g lis h  law , in  ach ie vin g  a b asic  understanding o f Is la m ic  m odel. 
T h e  thesis then w ill  investigate the leg al p rin c ip le s  pertaining to each elem ent o f the 
Is la m ic  law  structure in  the context o f error and m isrepresentation. T h is  thesis w ill  attempt 
to answ er general questions: does Is la m ic  law  demonstrate the concept o f error and 
m isrepresentation w ith respect to a g iven types o f E n g lis h  and Scottish contract la w ? W hat 
is  the nature o f the concept o f error and m isrepresentation under Is la m ic  law  in  com parison 
w ith E n g lis h  contract la w ? H o w  are the concepts o f error and m isrepresentation form ed 
under Is la m ic  contract la w ? W h at are the relevant concepts and im p lica tio n  o f each o f
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them com pared to E n g lis h  and Scottish contract la w ? Is there an y p o ss ib ility  to have the 
concepts o f error and m isrepresentation structured as in  E n g lis h  contract la w ? W h a t are the 
Is la m ic  and C I S G  equivalents o f a g iven E n g lis h  and Scottish law , i f  any, and v ice  ve rsa? 
W o u ld  a different structure o f the concepts under the Is la m ic  law  better serve the 
requirem ents o f the concepts o f error and m isrepresentation?
T o  ap ply the theoretical methods abovem entioned, the thesis exam ined each category o f 
error and m isrepresentation under E n g lis h  and Scottish contract law  co m p risin g  their 
relevant Is la m ic  precepts w ith respect to each such category. Categories includ ed : option 
o f defect, option o f description, option o f inspection, and gharar or taghreer. A l l  types 
connected to these concepts that fa ll into m ultip le  categories were appropriately analysed. 
A s  the m odel o f m isrepresentation {gharar) developed during  the research, the thesis 
expanded the com parative crit ic a l a n a lys is  method from  the d escriptive  and deductive to 
includ e lin g u istic  and h isto rica l context o f A ra b ic -Is la m ic  understanding.
Section 2: Literature Review
N one c la rity  o f the concept o f error under Is la m ic  contract law  causes an a m b ig u ity  am ong 
M u s lim  scholars in  d efin in g  this concept and its position com pared to the other s im ila r  
concepts. M a n y  reasons introduced to ju s t ify  this situation; one o f these reasons related to 
the im portance o f error under Is la m ic  law . E x p la in in g  this reason, {Arabi 19 9 5) argued that 
error (ghalat), is  the least prom inent o f contract defects in  Is la m ic  contract law , 
co nsidering  it as the m ost subjective type o f defect. In  D isc u ss in g  different reasons o f none 
c la rity  o f error under Is la m ic  contract law  (al-Sanhuri 19 5 2) suggested that the theory o f 
error in  Is la m ic  law  is  fragm entary and distributed between khiyar al-wasf (option o f 
description), khiyar al-ru'ya (option o f inspection), and khiyar al-'ayb (option o f defect). In  
support to al-SanhurVs o p in io n  (Arabi 19 95) suggests that khiyar al-wasf, khiyar al-ru'ya, 
and khiyar al-ayb are a ll c lo se ly  related to the theory o f error.
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A s  a notable in d icatio n , com paring the rules o f Is la m ic  contract w ith its counterparts under 
E n g lis h  contract law , under the title o f “P ro hib itio n  against Ghalat (m istake)”, w ithout an y 
referencing to h is statement, (D a v id  20 0 7) suggested that there is  a consensus v ie w  am ong 
M u s lim  scholars uphold  that i f  error is  related to the subject matter o f the contract, such 
contract w ould  be voided. T h e  reasoning to that is  an absence o f the “m eeting o f m in d s” in  
respect o f subject matter.
N ot in d icatin g  an y relation w ith error or m isrepresentation {Ahmad 2 0 10 ) defines khiyar 
al-ayb as an option to rescind  the contract, where is  the defect d iscovered in  the item  sold. 
Another o p in io n  b y  {Mian 200 3), indicated, im p lic it ly  to a re lation between khiyar al-ayb 
and fraud or m isrepresentation b y  stating that i f  the buyer d isco vers a defect after the 
contract is  m ade, and w as any in d icatio n  that the seller knew  about the defect before 
entering the contract, the contract w ould  be in v a lid . S im ila r ly , {Mannan 19 9 3) d elivered  an 
o pin ion w ho argued that the d isclosure  o f defect is  an o b ligatio n under Is la m ic  contract 
law , and suggested that i f  the seller does not d isclo se  a ll defects in  the item  sold  w ould  
render the contract in v a lid . In  the same context ( B a illie  1980) suggested that the b u yer has 
the right to rescind  the contract i f  he d iscovers a defect (M a jo r or M in o r) and this defect 
existed in  the item  bought w hile  this item  was w ith  the seller. {Hussain 200 4) not 
m entioning m isrepresentation or fraud, she c la ss if ie d  the no ne-d isclo sure  o f defect in  the 
item  sold under the option o f defect {khiyar al-ayb), where the buyer has the right to 
rescind  the contract w hen he d iscovers the defect, i f  it  existed in  the item  sold at the tim e 
o f contract. {Khan 20 0 3) adopted s im ila r  v iew  b y co nsidering  khiyar al- ayb, as the right to 
rescind  the contract on d isco v e ry  the defect on the subject o f sale.
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N either m entioning error nor m isrepresentation, but in d icatin g  to khiyar al-ayb as a 
technical issue, (Tadamon Is la m ic  B a n k  19 9 2) stated that option o f defect m eans that the 
com m odity contracted upon is  m anufactured in  a defective w ay. D e a lin g  w ith  khiyar al- 
yab from  the same perspective, w ith no in d icatio n  to m eaning o f error or m isrepresentation 
(Ayub 200 7) considers khiyar al-ayb as a technical issue b y  itself. C o n firm in g  the same 
context o f the previous studies (Razali 2008) suggested that khiyar al-ayb is  about the 
option g iven to the custom er to cancel or annul the contract w hen a defect on the goods 
sold is  found. U sin g  alm ost the same w ording and in d icatin g  the same context (Rosly, 
Sanusi and Yasin 2006) pointed out that khiyar al-Ayb is  about the option g iven  to the 
custom er to cancel contract when the defect is  evident.
C o n firm in g  that khiyar al-ayb is  used as a technical fault b y  itse lf, not as a m eaning o f 
error or m isrepresentation (Rosly, Sanusi and Yasin 2006) suggested that to warrant that 
the contract rem ains v a lid , the bank is  expected to m ake sure that the defects are rem oved 
and damages are rectified. T h e y  added that it w ill  be a breach o f Is la m ic  law  i f  the bank 
im poses a co nditio n to m o d ify  the option o f defect to its side. E m p h a sis in g  the idea o f the 
technical m eaning o f khiyar al-ayb, they suggested that Is la m ic  Jurisprudence agrees that 
the option o f defect is  one o f the options that w ould  be transferable to the inheritors as it is  
attached to the subject o f the contract. C o n sid e rin g  khiyar al-ayb as a technical issue under 
Is la m ic  law  but w ith  different approach, (Kamali 1998), used the va lid atio n  o f the option 
o f defect (khiyar al-ayb) in  Is la m ic  law  as a p ractical m anifestation o f the m a x im  addarar 
uozal “H a rm  m ust be e lim inated” w h ich  is  designed to protect the b uyer against harm . 
(.Kamali 1998) stated an exam ple o f car sale, w hen A  buys a car and d isco vers it 
substantia lly  defective; he has the option to annul the contract. Khiyar al ru’yah (option o f 
inspection) is  a lso treated as a technical term, m ostly, w ith in  the contract o f sale; (Razali
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2008) defined this option to m eans a choice g iven to the b uyer either to continue or not 
w ith the contract seeing the contract subject matter.
A p p ro ach in g  khiyar al-ayb d ifferently than the p revio us studies (Dupret, B erger, and Al- 
Zwaini 1999) indicated e x p lic it ly  the direct re lation between khiyar al-ayb and 
m isrepresentation. T h e y  suggested that who know s about the hidden defect and does not 
d isclose it to the other party w ould  be in v o lv e d  in  m isrepresentation. N ot different from  the 
previous o p in io n  {Hussain 2004) m entioned khiyar al wasf as the right o f re sc iss io n  when 
the desired description is  absent from  the item  sold. A d o p tin g  the same cle ar approach, but 
w ith khiyar al wasf, and m akin g  it c loser to the concept o f khiyar al-ayb, b y  list in g  the 
“categories o f option {khiyar)” under Is la m ic  law , {Obaidullah 2 0 0 1)  m entioned khiyar 
alwasf as an option b y  m isrepresentation, in  this w ay, he w ould  be one o f few w riters to be 
found m entioning khiyar alwasf as an e x p lic it  m eaning o f the concept o f m isrepresentation 
am ong hundreds o f w riters who wrote and explained about khiyar alwasf F o llo w in g  the 
same d irection but, im p lic it ly , {Ayub 20 0 7) considered khiyar alwasf as part o f the concept 
o f m isdescriptio n where the party d id  not receive the sp e cific  description he desires in  the 
item  bought. T h e  B ased  on disagreem ent w ith some o p in io ns that considered khiyar al- 
alyb, khiyar alwaf and khiyar al ru ’yah as the most c lo se ly  terms to the concept error or 
m istake, but agreeing w ith other opin ions considered these terms p a rtia lly  as technical 
issues, this thesis w ould  be fu lly  in  agreement w ith the v iew s that considered these terms 
as technical issues and as the most c lo se ly  or equivalent to the concept o f 
m isrepresentation, rather than to error.
Gharar has been approached b y  m an y M u s lim  scholars from  different perspectives. Som e 
w riters c la ss if ie d  the concept o f gharar as unstable concept w ith no c le ar or u n ified  
understanding. In  this respect {Zaki Badawi 1998) suggested that there is  uncertain and
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precise m eaning o f gharar the. H e  added that the studies do not provide an agreed 
d efin itio n  o f gharar and scholars depend on sp e cify in g  in d iv id u a l illustratio ns o f gharar as 
an alternative for a p articular characterization o f this term. (F ra n k  V o g e l 1998) agreed w ith 
the argument o f (Zaki Badawi 19 98), and he states a s im ila r  op in io n b y  suggesting that 
scholars do not provide an exact extent o f gharar. T h e  fact abovem entioned co n firm s that 
scholars approached gharar d ifferently, in  m any studies; they introduce different view s 
and contradicted m eanings.
M a n y  o f these scholars introduced gharar as uncertainty; accord ing to (R o d n ey W ils o n
200 7) gharar is  the contractual re lationship  com prises uncertainty. (Hassan 2005), 
considered gharar under the same m eaning; not far from  this v iew , (.Arabi 1999) 
m entioned that gharar is  a transaction o f sale contains uncertainty. (Al-Jarhi, Iqbal 2 0 0 1) 
fo llow ed the sam e o p in io n, but (Obaidullah 1999) added speculation to uncertainty to 
mean gharar. B y  adding an elem ent o f the unreasonableness or excessive to uncertainty, 
(L e w is  20 0 7) considered gharar unreasonable uncertainty or excessive  uncertainty. T a k in g  
broader approach to the m eaning o f gharar, (Tag el-Din 7996) suggested that gharar 
w ould be about uncertainty related to any element o f the objects o f exchange, sum  o f price 
for sp e cific  goods, or to the nature o f the goods bought at a g iven price. (Saleh 1986) 
adopted narrow  and conventional v iew  b y co n sidering  gharar as uncertainty and 
speculation. W ith o u t sp e cify in g  h is  d efin itio n  accurately (Ismail 2008) stated that gharar is  
termed as a gross uncertainty and in  the same paper he then added that gharar represents 
unacceptable le v e l o f uncertainty in  the p rin cip le s o f Is la m ic  law . {Mohamad 2009) 
fo llo w s the same route and defines gharar as uncertainty sales and excessive  speculation.
A d o pting  the same d efin itio n  w ith additional elem ent ( C M S  von E rla c h  H e n r ic i 2009), 
defines gharar as uncertainty w ith  am biguous subject matter. T h is  op in io n is  supported b y
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(.Al-Darir 19 7 7 ) who considered gharar as a m eaning o f doubtfulness or uncertainty as not 
kn o w in g  i f  som ething w ill  happen or not. A s  m an y others, (Bakhshi 2006) described 
gharar as uncertainty and speculation, but contradicting h is  own o p in io n  {Bakhshi 2006) 
suggested that an exam ple o f gharar is  the agreement to sell the lost goods. Gharar is  
defined as uncertainty b y  (H arvard  B u sin ess S ch o o l); and b y  (Obaidullah 200 8), as w ell as 
b y  (Jobst 20 0 7), and the same w ith  (B irm in g h a m fin an ce  200 5) but adding excessive 
speculation. T h e  same d efin itio n  delivered b y  {Khan, Bashar 2008) and (Trum bull 2006).
Gharar is  also interpreted as a r is k  b y  m any w riters and scholars, {El-Gamal 2 0 0 1) 
suggested that the sale o f gharar is  forbidden because it m eans “trading in  r is k ”. 
Contradicted what he suggested in  different p laces in  relation to the m eaning o f gharar, 
{Obaidullah 2008), also referred to gharar as a s im p le  m eaning o f settlement r isk , {Khan, 
Bashar 2008), (Tm m bull 2006), {Al-Misri 19 93), and {Saleh 1986), a ll o f them  introduced 
gharar as a r isk , in  spite o f some o f them considered it as uncertainty or speculation.
E sta b lish in g  different and new m eaning o f gharar, some studies approached it as a 
m eaning o f ignorance. B y  co n sidering  that, {Ibn Hazm N .D .) , stated that gharar as 
ignorance w ould  occur w hen the buyers do not know  about what they have bought and the 
sellers do not know  about what they have sold. {Norzrul, Ridza and Hassan, 2005) 
suggested that gharar is  the am b ig u ity  in  the contracts. {Saleh 1986) equated gharar w ith 
an uncontrolled subject-m atter, such as se llin g  or b u y in g  a b ird  in  the a ir  or fish  in  the 
water. Gharar is  also considered as ambiguous outcomes {Tariq 2004).
Som e w riters and scholars considered gharar as a m eaning o f g am b ling, as an exam ple 
{Suwailem 2000), suggested that gam b lin g  is  the pure presentation form  o f gharar. {Tariq 
2004) also suggested that gharar is  cru sh in g ly  considered gam bling. In  the same context 
(B irm in g h a m fin an ce  20 0 5) stated that the concept o f gharar based on the Q u r’ an ic rule
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against gam bling. R eferring  to (Mustafa Al-Zarqa), (El-Gamal 2006) established a lin k  
between uncertainty, r isk , and g am b ling; stating that the sale o f gharar is  a probable 
articles whose existence are uncertain, and the r is k y  nature w h ich  m akes the transaction 
p ara lle l to gam bling.
Few  w riters interpreted gharar as m isrepresentation or deception as it  is  approached b y  
this thesis. A cco rd in g  to (D a v id  20 0 7) taghreer (verbal noun or action o f gharar) w ould  be 
considered as deception. H e  argued that i f  taghreer occur in  respect o f the contract subject 
matter, this w ould render the contract voidable up to the choice o f the deceived party. (Al- 
Shamisi 2000) gave gharar the same m eaning as used under E n g lis h  contract law  b y 
suggesting that gharar is  in d u cin g  the other party to enter the contract where he w ould not 
enter w ithout using it. A g ree in g  w ith the p revio us interpretation (Obaidullah 2008) 
suggested that gharar implies deceit. Relying on the comparative critical analysis with English 
contract law as the main comparative model in this thesis; the last three opinions would the most 
closely to the view of the thesis.
S im ila r ly , d iscussing  the concepts o f error and m isrepresentation under the C I S G  rules, 
g ives an im pression that these concepts have not been considered w ith in  the scope o f the 
C I S G  rules. A rg u in g  that the C I S G  has not dealt w ith the concepts o f error and 
m isrepresentation (Flechtner 1999) suggested that these concepts have to be established 
and interpreted w ith in  the C I S G  rules to solve any dispute occur between the international 
contractual parties. C o n firm in g  the previous o p in io n, (K a z im ie rsk a  19 9 9 -20 0 0 ) argued that 
the concepts o f error and m isrepresentation can be derived from  “w arranty as to the q u a lity  
o f the goods” and “the q u a lity  o f the goods or c la im s  n o n -co n fo rm ity o f the goods” under 
the C I S G  rules. H a v in g  said  that, (R u d o lf L e ss ia k  1989) argued that, the C I S G  rules w ould 
not be ap plicab le  i f  m istake as to the q u a lity  o f goods occurs. D isa g re e in g  w ith this
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opinion, (Lessiak 1994) saw the issue differently; he suggested that the scope of Article 
4(a) of CISG corresponds with mistake as to quality of the goods under some national 
laws. Declaring that mistake is not existed or classified in the CISG rules (Landgericht 
Aachen Court 1994) agreed with this suggestion and argued that there is a possibility to 
consider mistake of the quality of goods within the scope of the CISG; relying on the rules 
of the defective goods. Indicating the absence of mistake as in English and Scottish 
contract laws, (Legislative History 1980) suggested dealing with mistake as an alternative 
to lack of conformity.
Arguing that, the CISG rules have not considered mistake or misrepresentation within its 
scope. As an example, to their argument, (Ferrari, Verona 2007), states that, the CISG 
discusses the issue of the goods description in contracts governed by the CISG; but no 
indication to mistake and no evidence to any remedy related to it as, rescission, avoidance, 
as used in many domestic legal systems. This direction of reasoning used as an actual case 
in the court, where (Landgericht Court 1997), refused to consider any link between CISG 
rules and the concept of mistake under national rules. Supporting this position, 
(Kazimierska 2007) argued that there is no need to consider any relation between the CISG 
rules and the concepts of mistake and misrepresentation under national legal systems. In 
spite of some implicit indication to good faith to include the concept of error, but (Charters 
2005), argued that this might cause more confusion; this is because good faith itself is not 
clear or defined concept under the CISG rules.
Section 3: The Structure of the Thesis
This thesis will discuss the different concepts underlying error, which will then leads to a 
discussion on a selection of discussions in which the concept of error is implemented, 
namely the English and Scottish legal systems, international law under the CISG, Islamic
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legal system as developed by the Ottoman Journal of Equity, and as they influence the laws 
of the Palestinian territories, of the West Bank, the Jordanian legal system, and the laws of 
the Gaza strip, the Egyptian legal system. In addition, the draft Palestinian civil law, which 
is to be implemented throughout Palestine, will also be examined.
3.1. Mistake in English Contract Law
The English law of contract uses the word “mistake” and not the word “error”. “Error” is 
used by the Scottish law of contract, both words are used interchangeably. The thesis 
therefore uses the words “error” and “mistake” as interchangeable when discussing the 
relevant laws of contract in the various chapters in this thesis. This however does not imply 
that the concept of error has the same meaning within the discussed legal systems. In 
general, the doctrine of mistake is recognised under the English legal system, occupying an 
important position under the English law of contract. From a historical view, the English 
doctrine of mistake and its categories or typologies, are strongly related to its origins in 
Roman law. The doctrine of mistake internationally is very much influenced by the type of 
the essential mistake.1 The doctrine of mistake within the English law of contract has 
attracted a lot of discussion. It is claimed that the mistake doctrine is not stable, especially 
with relation to the formation of the contract at issue.2
Mistake raised many controversies. Despite this fact, it is noticed that the doctrine and its 
related cases are an important portion when they do arise. There are several types of 
mistake within the doctrine of mistake. In addition, these types are usually divided into 
various categories. Despite all the debates and discussion about mistake, it is believed that
1 K Zweigert. International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law. Volume VII, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1981. P13. 
ISBN 9028602712.
2 Goodhart. Mistake as to Identity in the Law of Contract. (1941) 57 LQR. P 228.
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mistake under English contract law is still narrow. Based on this fact, it is considered that 
rules of misrepresentation are meant to be complementary to the rules of mistake.3
One basic rule of the doctrine of mistake is that the mistaken party is responsible about 
what he/she has said or written where there is no logical reason for him or her not to know 
about the mistake.4 Furthermore, some legal writers have suggested that English law does 
not possess a doctrine of mistake.5 One or both of the contracting parties would be 
expected to fall into a mistake for the mistake rules to apply. Since the doctrine of the 
mistake is categorised into different types of mistake, the remedies for mistake would be 
applied differently as different circumstances arise. There is also a possibility for mistake 
to occur which is not applicable to one of the specified categories.6 In some cases a mistake 
can occur at the time of contracting, if the parties expressed themselves poorly by 
incorrectly indicating their intent in their phrasing of the terms of the contract.7
Generally speaking, a serious mistake occurs when the subject matter contracted for turns 
out to be substantially different from the subject matter that was expected to be contracted 
for.8 The level of mistake would be expected to render the contract void or voidable, 
although, some mistakes do not have the same effect.9 This thesis will analyse the 
categories of mistake in English law under the following headings.
3 Hugh Beale. Contract Law. Hart Publishing. 2002. P333. ISBN 1841132373.
4_ Ibid. P363.
 ^ J C Smith. Contracts, mistake, frustration and implied terms. 1994). 111 LQR 400. 408 et passim. And C J Slade. The 
myth of mistake in the English law of contract" (1954) 70 LQR 385.
6 Beale, op. cit., P343.
7 It known as an error as to expression under the Scottish Contract Law. More details will be explained within the concept 
of error under the Scottish contract law.
8 See Bell v. Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161 at 218, [1931] All ER Rep 1 at 28 per Lord Atkin, as adopted and confirmed 
by this court in Great Peace Shipping Ltd v. Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1407. [2002] 2 All 
ER (Comm) 999. [2003] QB 679.
9 Beale, op. cit., P363.
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3.2. Common Mistake
Common mistake imply that the contract is entered into by the parties is prepared under the 
same incorrect beliefs which they bear in their minds,10 although, both believe that they are 
acting in accordance with their beliefs. In general they think that they are contracting 
according to an existing fact; however, this is not the case.11 In this situation the contract 
would be void.12 Common mistake has no effect on the consensus as the parties have 
absolutely agreed to contract, although their consensus was based on a false assumption.13 
It is noticed that English common law does not consider mistake to be actionable where the 
principle of caveat emptor is involved.14 One of the main elements to consider with regard 
to mistake is whether it is operative or not and, whether the non-existence of the fact is as a 
result of one of the contracting parties. This non-existence must render the contract 
impossible to be implemented.15
3.3. Mistake as to Subject Matter
Mistake as to subject matter is usually considered as a type of common mistake. This type 
of mistake under English law is mostly related to the perishing of the subject matter itself. 
The rules dealing with this issue are to be found in the Sale of Goods Act 1979. According 
to these rules, common mistake occur where the goods did exist; however, for some reason 
or other they have perished. Relying on the approach of the Sale of Goods Act, mistake as 
to subject-matter would be established where the parties do not know that the subject- 
matter has perished before they entered into the contract.16 If the contracting parties do
10 Rupert Haigh. legal English. Routledge Cavendish Law. 2004. P156. ISBN 185941950X.
11 Paul Richards. Law of Contract. 7th Edition, Pearson Education Limited. 2006. P214. ISBN 1405812214.
12 Beale, op. cit., P366.
13 Coram: Harms, Mpati, Brand, Nugent JJA and Lewis AJA. In the matter between: Vanreenes Steel (PTY) Limited 
Appellant and ERROL JOHN BARNES SMITH NO First Respondent .Richard Rosso Second Respondent. Heard: 14 
March 2002. Delivered: 25 March 2002 .Subject: Mistake in contract; common assumptions -  their effect. P10.
14 Prof. William Tetley, Q.C. Good Faith in Contract Particularly in the Contracts of Arbitration and Chartering. McGill 
University. 35 JMLC 561-616. 2004. P17. http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/comparative/goodfaith.pdf.
1’’ Ruth Sefton-Green. Mistake, Fraud and Duties to Inform in European Contract Law. Cambridge University Press. 
2005. P82. ISBN 0521844231.
16 M. P. Furmston. At Al. Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston's Law of Contract. 15th Edition, revised. Oxford University 
Press, 2006. P284. ISBN 0199287562, 9780199287567.
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believe that the subject matter is available at the time of the contracting process, in fact the 
subject matter does not now exist or never existed, this might render the contract void.17 In 
general the court has the authority to declare the contract voidable according to the equity 
principles.18
3.4. Mutual Mistake
A mutual mistake can be established if the contracting parties misunderstand their 
intentions, they intend two different things and they are at cross-purposes.19 English law 
does not consider the contract enforceable under a mutual mistake. Nevertheless, where the 
hazard of mistake is allocated appropriately to one party, the contract would be 
enforceable.20 In general; mutual mistake renders the contract void.21 Where there is a 
mutual mistake ‘there is no binding contract’.22
3.5. Unilateral Mistake
Two different situations give rise to unilateral mistake. The first occurs if the other 
contracting party knows or is supposed to know of the mistake of the other party. This 
would make the contract void ab initio.23 The second case occurs where the other 
contracting party does not know, or he is not supposed to know about his contracting 
party’s mistake. In this latter situation the contract would not be considered void based on 
the caveat emptor principle.24 A unilateral mistake might not be a ground of considering
17 Olivo. Laurence M. Et AL. Fundamentals of Contract Law. 2nd Edition. Emond Montgomery Publication, 2005. P75. 
ISBN 1552391612, 9781552391617.
18 The English law of Equity deals with the contracts which involve unconscionable conduct such as misrepresentation, 
mistake, and fraud.
19 Haigh, op. cit., P156.
20 Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman and Steve Thel. Of Equal Wrongs and Half Rights. Vol. 82:738. June 
2007.P95. http://www.law.nyu.edu/joumals/lawreview/issues/vol82/no3/NYU303.pdf.
21Ibid-22 Robert W. Emerson, J.D. Emerson Robert W. Business law. 4th Edition, Barron’s Educational Series. 2003. P98. ISBN 
0764119842, 9780764119842.
23 G. Treitel. An Outline of the Law of Contract. 6th Edition. Oxford University Press, 2004.P137.
24 G. Treitel. The Law of Contract. 10th Edition. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1990. P 361.
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the contract void when it relates to the subject matter.25 A unilateral mistake that is known 
by the other party would be grounds for relief if it is related to the contents of the 
contractual terms.26
3.6. Mistake as to Law
A mistake of law arises when the parties do not realize their legal responsibilities or 
obligations under the contract and they carry it out mistakenly. This means that the party 
cannot pretend that he or she did not realise the contract terms or contents and regard it as 
voidable. It implies that, the parties are committed and are bound by definite legal 
obligations. In general, mistake as to law is connected usually to the money paid by 
mistake which would then be recoverable.27
3.7. Mistake as to Fact
A mistake of fact could occur where the contracting parties believe mistakenly that they 
are contracting on a real subject, although in fact this subject is incorrect and they build the 
contract on this mistake.28 In general, where the contract is entered under a mistake as to 
fact, the contract would be considered void ab initio. Connected to this point, there is no 
general rule under the English contract law enforcing the unmistaken party to inform the 
mistaken party that he or she is acting under a mistake as to fact.29
3.8. Mistake to Identity
Mistake as to identity can be classified as a unilateral mistake. This type of mistake occurs 
where one of the contracting parties makes a mistake regarding the identity of the other
25 P. S. Atiyah. Essays on contract. 2nd Edition, reprint, revised, illustrated. Oxford University Press. 1990. P253. ISBN 
019825444X, 9780198254447.
26 Beale, op. cit.. P364.
' 7 Preparation and Review Guide for Auctioneer and Apprentice Auctioneer Licensing Examinations. Developed by the 
Alabama State Board of Auctioneers 2002. P12.
28 Michael P. Furmston. How Modem is English Contract Law?. Centro di studi e ricerche di diritto comparato e 
straniero. diretto da M.J. Bonell. Saggi, Conferenze Seminari. 39. Roma. 2000. P2.
29 Reiner Schulze. New features in contract law. Sellier. European law publ. 2007. P 359. ISBN 3866530366, 
9783866530362.
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party at the time of contracting. This arises when the contracting party deals with the other 
contracting party thinking he or she is the person he would like to contract with, although 
in the reality, they are dealing with someone else.30 Where the innocent party proves that 
the other party’s identity is crucial to the contract and he was mistaken with regard to the 
identity of the other contracting party, the contract would be considered void.31 The 
contract would be void if the mistake, as to identity is a result of misrepresentation,32 or 
fraud.33
3.9. Mistake as to the Title
Mistake as to the title is treated similarly to a mistake to the existence of the subject- 
matter. Mistake to the title arises when it is unknown to the parties that the purchaser was 
the owner of which the vendor declares to put up for sale to him. This is when the parties 
anticipated making effective transfer of the ownership where this kind of transference is 
not possible according to the rule of naturali ratione inutilis.34
Section 4: Misrepresentation in English Law of Contract
4.1. Legal Background of Misrepresentation
For misrepresentation to be established, must comprise a false statement.35 With regard to 
non-fraudulent misrepresentation, English law does not treat the statement of fact as the 
statement of opinion. If non-fraudulent misrepresentation is not related to an existing fact it 
would not be actionable. The false statement of opinion would not be actionable unless it is 
made fraudulently.36 According to section 2(1) of Misrepresentation Act 1967,
30 Kenneth Smith, Denis J. Keenan. Smith & Keenan's English law. 14lh Edition, Pearson Education. 2004. P312. ISBN 
0582822912, 9780582822917.
31 Haigh, op. cit.
32 Beale, op. cit., P366.
33 [1961] 1 QB 31.
34 B e ll  v. L e v e r  B r o th e r s  L td  [1932], Lord Atkin at P 218.
35 Haigh, op. cit.
36 J. Cartwright. Misrepresentation, Mistake, and Non-Disclosure. Sweet & Maxwell. London.2002. PI 10.
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misrepresentation would be mostly connected to the fact. The effect of the statement in the 
pre-contractual stage is a central point of misrepresentation.37
Misrepresentation is a false statement of fact that is made by the representor to bring the 
other party, the representee, into the contract.38 The effective inducement of the 
misrepresentee is central to considering misrepresentation as being operative.39 
Misrepresentation would not be actionable unless the misrepresentee built his or her 
decision to enter the contract in reliance on the misrepresented fact.40
4.2. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Under the English contract law of fraudulent misrepresentation is considered to be 
imperative, when compared with the other types of misrepresentation. Under English law, 
fraudulent misrepresentation would entitle the misrepresented party to claim damages from 
the other party, the misrepresentor, when he or she suffers a loss.41
4.3. Innocent Misrepresentation
According to s.2 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 of England, the responsibility that 
occurs under a non-fraudulent misrepresentation, otherwise known as innocent 
misrepresentation, would be excluded.42 Under innocent misrepresentation, the court would 
have to act according to its discretionary role in deciding whether or not to entitle the
37 Furmston. op. cit., P303.
38 Geoffrey Samuel. Law of Obligations and Legal Remedies. 2nd Edition. Routledqe Cavendish. 2001. P325. ISBN 
1859415660.
39 Bradgate, Browns word and Flesner. op. cit.. P33. Footnote 19.
40 Furmston. op. cit., P79.
41 Zhou. op. cit.. P84.
42 Bowen, op. cit.. P7.
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misrepresntee damages in lieu of rescission.43Usually in cases of innocent
misrepresentation, there is a shared mistake with the other contracting party.44
4.4 Negligent misrepresentation
Under English law liability for negligent, misstatement can be established only if there is 
an adequate closeness between the contracting parties and, if there is a reasonable level of 
duty of care.45 In general, if the misrepresentation is not fraudulent, the plaintiff, the buyer, 
must submit evidence that he relied on the misrepresentation and, that he had reasonable 
grounds for believing and relying on the misrepresentation in entering the contract.46
Consequently, misrepresentation requires reliance on a false statement, even though there 
is some mystification as to whether real reliance has to be made known47 or just should be 
reasonable.48 As a conclusion, if there is no reliance on the statement that is released by the 
representor, it cannot be an actionable misrepresentation. This implies that where an 
actionable misrepresentation is proven, the contract will be voidable and the 
misrepresentee will be permitted to withdraw or rescind the contract, and/or seek damages. 
It is worth noticing that rescission as a possible remedy of misrepresentation is optional.49
In general where the action of deceit is established, the representor is responsible for his or 
her misrepresentation if he or she knowingly or recklessly, lacks caring whether the 
statement is true or false, provides a false statement to another person, the representee, 
with the intention that it shall be acted upon by the representee, who then does act upon it
43 Edwin Peel. The Law of Contract. 12th Edition. Sweet & Maxwel, 2007. P383.389. ISBN 978 0 421 94840 2.
^ F A R  Bennion. Mistake in the Construction of Contract. Doc. No. 1961.002 Site Map Ref. 2.7.1. 24 MLR 4 (July 
1961) 426. www.francisbennion.com
45 Financial Markets Law Committee. Issue76 working group. Transparency Obligations Dirictive Liability. Legal 
assessment of the proposed statutory liability regime in the Companies Bill in relation to Transparency Obligations 
Directive disclosure. Bank of England. Sebtember 2006. Para 3.2.
46 Richard Williams. What is the Rule of C a v e a t  E m p to r  and to What Extent Does Part V of the Housing Act 2004 
Undermine the Rule? Hertfordshire Law Journal 6(1). P7. 14-41 ISSN 1479-4195 Online / ISSN 1479-4209.
47 M u s e p r im e  P r o p e r tie s  L td  v. A d h il l  P r o p e r tie s  L td  [1990] 2 E.G.L.R. 196.
48 P a n  A tla n tic  In su ra n ce  C o. L td . v. P in e  T o p  In su ra n ce  C o . L td . [1995] 2 AC 501.
49 Bradgate. Brownsword and Flesner, op. cit.. P69.
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and thereby suffers damage.50 Clearly the three types of misrepresentation, fraudulent, 
negligent, and innocent, possess the possibility to be treated under the rescission rules. The 
right to seek rescission, however, they would be subject to the representee’s claim and not 
subject to the court initiative.51 Both fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation would 
arise to a liability in tort, which is not available in the case of innocent misrepresentation.52
Section 5: Error in Scottish Contract Law
The theoretical basis demonstrates contradictory tendencies. Much of the case law has 
given rise to confusion for a variety of reasons: ( 1) the inadequacy of the judicial analysis 
and, the absence of academic commentary on the law at its formative stage during the 
nineteenth century; (2) the debatable impact of the mixture of influences on the 
development of Scottish law, from Canon law, Roman law and local Scottish thinking; (3) 
a tension between the subjective and objective approach with respect to contractual 
consent; (4) the effect of the process of civil jury trials on the development of the law; and 
(5) the inherent difficulty of the subject.53 Some problematic issues also occur over the 
relevant time period due to insufficient illustrations connected to the subject of marriage, 
the contract of sale and an uncertainty related to the concept of substantial error.54 The 
Scottish law calcified the error into different categories, to include essential error, mutual 
error and unilateral error and so on; which are derived from Roman law.55
Under Roman law error had the effect of nullifying the contract. Where error has 
influenced the contract, it would be considered void due to a lack of consent. In general, 
under Roman law, a contract would be considered absolutely null and void if one of its
50 D e n y  v. P e e k  (1889) 14 App. Ca. 337. At Zhou. op. cit., P85.
51 T SB  B a n k  p i c  v. C a n f ie ld  [1995] 1 WLR 430, CA, 438.
32 Peter Cane. The Anatomy of Tort Law. Hart Publishing. 1997. P195. ISBN 1901362086, 9781901362084.
53 McBryde. W: Error, chapter3 in Reid.k. And Reinhard Zimmermann, A history of Private law in Scotland, Vol 2 
Obligations, Oxford University press. 2000, P73. ISBN 0-19-829928-1.
54 William W.McBryde, the Law of Contract in Scotland. 2nd edition, W.Green.Edinburgh 2001.p 352.
x3Ibid, P352 and after.
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formative essential elements was lacking.56 Under the Scottish legal system there is more 
concentration on essential error and its categories than on the other types of error. Under 
the Scottish law of error, there is a distinction between the error of law and error of fact.57 
In theory both are subject to the same degree of control.58 Under Scottish law, there are 
some disparities between essential and inessential error, collateral or concomitant error,59 
mutual error60 and unilateral and bilateral error.61 It is also clear that the Scottish law of 
error distinguishes between misrepresentation and error. This thesis will concentrate on the 
concept of error by discussing the main categories of error under the Scottish law of 
contract, by critical analysing institutional and academic writings, as well as the case law 
related to this area.
Under Scottish law simple definitions define error as a wrong belief or wrong 
understanding,62 or the dissuading error as a misunderstanding;63 or misapprehension.64 In 
general, under Scottish contract law the contract would not be void due to error, although, 
it would be considered void if contractual consent is excluded. This would result in the 
contract never existing or being formed by the parties.65 If the error was caused by a third 
party, this would not enable the reduction to be operative.66 Under Scottish law, error is one
56 E. Sabbath. Affects of Mistake in Contract A Study in Comparative Law. International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly [VOL. 18] .JULY 1964. P804.
'l7 David Walker. BE, QC. The Law of Contracts and related Obligations in Scotland. 3rd Ed.T&T Clark, Edinburgh 1995. 
P229. ISBN 0  567 29275 4.
58 Beatson, J.The Scope of Judicial Review for Error of Law. Oxford Journal of Lefml Stodlo VoL 4, No.l. p25.
59 Walker, op. cit., P232.
60 Ibid, P244.
61 Ibid, P248.
62 Road Safety Act 2006, Sections 53 and 54. A note for guidance from the Department for Transport. November 2007. 
Para 12.
63 John A.K. Huntley, John Blackie, and Craig Cathcart. Contract, Cases and Materials. 2nd Edition. Thomson and Green. 
Edinburgh. 2003. 193.
64 Walker, op. cit., P I4.1.
65 Bowen, op. cit., P26.
66 Y ou n g  v. C ly d e s d a le  B a n k  P ic . (1889) 17 R 231.
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of the most complicated subjects within the law.67 Under Scottish law, error has attracted a
plethora of debate and controversy between academic writers.68
5.1. Un-induced Error
The Scottish law of contract discussed this category of error under a variety of headings, to 
include error in expression, error in intention, error in motive, error in transaction, 
unilateral error, common error, mutual error and essential error.
5.1.1. Error in Expression
This type of error occurs where the final form of the contract did not express the exact 
intention of the contracting parties.69 This could occur when the parties agree to contract on 
specific items, yet by mistake they contracted on something else. There are no restrictions 
on utilising any related evidence which could lead to the affirmation of a clerical error, 
whether written, oral or of any other substance.70 Under Scottish law, it is allowed to 
correct a written contract that did not express the parties’ intent.71 The court has a wide role 
to correct the contract equitably and bring the parties’ intention back to the right track.72
5.1.2. Error in Intention
This type of error occurs where the parties to the contract (one or both) establish their 
consent on the basis of an error. The consent would not be binding; as the intention to bind 
them was not available, which would lead to a situation where there is no consensus ad  
idem. The contract would be void  ab initio (from the beginning).73 This type of error is
67 Chris Willett, Aidan O Donnell. Scottish Business Law. 2nd Ed, Blackstone Press Limited. London, 1996. P89. ISBN 
1854314408.
68 Hector L MacQueen, Joe Thomson. Contract Law in Scotland. 2nd Edition. Tottel Publishing, 2007. P I59. ISBN 13 
978 1 84592 147 7.
6 9 Green, op. cit., P I2 0 .
10M ’L a ren  v. L id d e l l ’s  T rs ., 1862, 24 D. 577.
71 The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985. Section 8 .
72 William Gloag. The Law of Contract. 2nd Edition. W. Green & Son Ltd. Edinburg. 1929. P435.
73 Green, op. cit., P I20.
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related to the parties’ mistake regarding the nature of the contract.74 Two types of error are 
classified under the error in intention; error in motive and error in transaction.
5.1.3. Error in Motive
This type of error occurs in relation to the circumstances surrounding the actual deal.75 The 
remedy of this type of error will not be available, unless that the mistaken party is induced 
by the other party. Under this type of error, the contract formation would not be affected 
unless the error is a fundamental one.76
5.1.4. Error in Transaction
This type of error occurs where the contracting party misunderstands the other party’s 
commitment, or where the contract is interpreted differently from what the other party has 
understood as being his or her duty or responsibility.77 To find the remedy for this error, the 
question to be answered is what the exact intent of the parties when they entered their 
contract, but which they have now expressed incorrectly.78
5.1.5. Unilateral Error
Unilateral error under the Scottish law of contract79 follows the rules of cavea t emptor, or 
let the buyer beware. The situation would be different when one party knows about the 
other party’s error, even without misrepresentation being involved;80 in this situation the 
contract would be void.81 The contract validity would be affected if unilateral error is 
fundamental. This is due to the parties would not meet the enquiries of consensus in idem
74 Walker, op. cit., P 14.47.
75 Andreas Rahmatian; Codification of private law in Scotland: observations by a civil lawyer. Edin L. R. 2004.P37.
76 Green, op. cit., PI 19.
77 Ibid, P I20.
78 Rahmatian. op. cit. P37.
79 John A. K.Huntley. Contract, Cases and Materials. W. Green/Sweet & Maxwell, Edinburg, 1995. P I89. ISBN 0 414 01010 8.
80 S e cu r in ' P a c if ic  F in a n c e  L td  v . T  & I  F ils h ie 's  T r  1994 SCLR 1100.
81 S te u a r t ’s  T ru s te e s  v. H a rt. (1875) 3 R 192.
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which renders the contract not existing from the beginning. In other words, the contract 
would be void.82
5.1.6. Common Error
This type of error occurs where the parties share the same error. It is an actual action of 
error as the consent between the parties has existed already.83
5.1.7. Mutual Error
This type of error occurs where the parties fail to understand each other. This type of error 
would also occur where the parties establish different beliefs with regard to the contract, 
such as the subject matter or the price.84 Mutual error prevents the existence of consensus 
in idem }5
5.1.8 Essential Error (error in substantialibus)
This type of error is typically connected to the core of the contract. Under this type of 
error, the consensus would not initially exist, this makes the contract void.86 There are 
various conditions which provide the essential error its legal effects, such as, proving that 
this error is induced by misrepresentation, or that this error is common between the two 
parties, or that it was mutual, or was created by fraudulent concealment.87 In general 
essential error is divided into five categories: error as to subject matter, error as to the 
identity of parties, error as to price, error as to the quality of item and error as to the nature 
of the contract.88 These categories of error are all derived from Roman law.89
82 Hector L MacQueen, Joe Thomson. Contract Law in Scotland. 2nci Edition. Tottel Publishing. 2007. PI 59. ISBN 13 
978 1 84592 147 7.
83 Huntley, op. cit., P I89.
84 MacQueen, Thomson. Op. cit.. P I64.
85 M a th ie so n  G e e  (A y r s h ir e ) L td  v. Q u ig le y  1952 SC (HL) 38.
86 Walker. Op. cit.. P 14.11-14.20
87 S te in  v. S te in  1914. S.C. 903, 908.
88 MacQueen, Thomson, op. cit.. P I64.
89 Rahmatian, op. cit.. P36.
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Section 6: Unilateral Error Induced by Misrepresentation of the Other Party
Under the Scottish contract law, the rules of induced error by misrepresentation are 
developed and influenced by the misrepresentation rules under English law.90 In general, 
where error as to motive or transaction is established by the inducement of 
misrepresentation by the other party; the party who is induced has the right of reduction.91 
If the error is not substantial, the consent will not be broken or destroyed unless the error 
involves fraud.92
Section 7: Misrepresentation in Scottish Contract Law
Misrepresentation under the Scottish law of contract in many of the court cases and 
academic opinions is almost identical as the English law of misrepresentation. 
Misrepresentation made by the misrepresentor, in order to be considered, should not be the 
only reason behind the conclusion of the contract; however, it needs to have enough 
influence on the conclusion of the contract.93
7.1. Misrepresentation by Way of Silence
Under Scottish law, when the seller fails to explain the real situation and condition of the 
goods, this would be considered to be misrepresentation.94 In some cases, half truth would 
be deemed to be misrepresentation, such as when a party chooses to maintain silence with 
regard to an incomplete statement, despite a misleading indication. This situation has 
arisen in a case when one party failed to read a substantial part of the contract document, 
which led the other party to sign it.95
90 Ibid. P40.
91 Ibid, P40.41.
92 Hec. Bum Murdoch English Law in Scots Practice. The Juridical Review. 1909-1910. P60.
93 Rahmatian, op. cit., P41.
94 P a tte r s o n  v. L a n d s b e r g  (1950) 7 F 657.
95 C o u sto n  v. M ille r  (1862) 24 D 607.
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7.2. Non-Disclosure
Two situations would be excluded from the previous non-disclosure rule. The two cases 
are well established under the English law of contract.96 The non-disclosure would be 
completely demanded in the insurance contracts, where the insured party should disclose 
all the material facts for the insuring party. The non-disclosure duty would include any 
material facts, whether or not this fact is major or minor.97 The same duty would be 
demanded in regard of the contract where there is a fiduciary relationship between the 
contracting parties. This is demanded under Scottish law of contract98 as well as under the 
English law of contract.99
7.3. Opinion and Misrepresentation
The concept of misrepresentation in Scottish contract law is distinct from the statement of 
opinion.100
7.4. Negligent Misrepresentation. Non-Fraudulent Misrepresentation
It has been suggested that negligent misrepresentation could be a reason behind claiming 
damages if it has caused financial loss.101 It was held102 that since the misrepresentor 
released a statement that is vital to the contract, he pretended to be knowledgeable with 
regards to this vital matter, or he has some special expertise, this would put him under a 
responsibility to take reasonable care to ensure that his representation is accurate. If the 
other party, as a conclusion of his representation, was induced to enter into contract, he
96 Dr B. Soyer. Reforming Pre-contractual Duty of Utmost Good Faith in Insurance Contracts- An Economic Perspective. 
Dr B. Soyer. © 2007. P9.
97 Moira MacMillan. Sally Lambie. Scottish Business Law. 3rd Ed, Pitman Publishing, London, 1997. P90. ISBN 
0273620355.
98 Ibid.
99 Roger Halson. Contract Law. Pearson Education. London. 2001. P 94-119. ISBN 0 582 08647 7.
100 Hector L MacQueen. Good faith in the Scots law of contract: an undisclosed principle? in A.D.M. Forte (ed). Good 
Faith in Contract and Property Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford, (1999), 5-37. P19.
101 H e d le v  B y rn e  v. H e lle r . [1964] AC 465.
102 P e tr o le u m  C o  v. M a rd o n  [1976] QB 801; 2 All ER 5.
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would be responsible to pay damages as he induced the other party to enter into contract by 
his negligent misrepresentation.103
7.5. Innocent Misrepresentation
This type of misrepresentation occurs where it is made innocently.104 It would be 
established where the party presents a statement honestly and in good faith, without 
knowing that the statement is misleading. For innocent misrepresentation to be considered, 
the innocent misrepresentor should have reasonable grounds to justify the reason for 
believing that the statement was true.105 The induced party, the misrepresentee, has the 
right to seek the reduction of the contract.106 The innocent misrepresentation does not 
create a right for the misrepresentee to seek damages.107
7.6. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
This will transpire when the misrepresentee provides a statement fraudulently, knowing 
that the representation is false, and not believing it to be true.108 Similarly, this is true when 
the party represents part of a material fact intending to make another statement misleading 
in order to induce the other party for entering into a contract.109 In general, fraudulent 
misrepresentation would be established if the statement is wrong and fraudulent.110 Under 
Scottish contract law the damage would be available as a remedy if the contract is 
concluded or otherwise came into existence.111
11)3 Lord Justice Clerk, Lord Hamilton. Lord Mamoch. Second Division, Inner House, Court of Session. [2005CSIH74] 
A283/01. Para [50]. http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/2005csih74.html.
1IM L e e s  v. T o d d  (1882) 9 R 807.
llb Willett. O Donnell, op. cit., P81.
106 L e e s  v. T o d d  ( m 2 )  9 R 807.
107 M a n n e rs  v. W h ite h e a d  (1898) 1 F 171; 36 Sc LR 94; 6  SLT 190.
108 D e r r y  v. P e e k  (1889) 14 App Cas 337.
I0y MacQueen, Thomson, op. cit.. P172.
110 McBRYDE, op. cit., P326. Paral4-12.
111 C le l la n d  v. M o rto n , F r a s e r  a n d  M ill ig a n  WS 1997 SLT (Sh Ct) 57.
32
Section 8: Error and Misrepresentation in Islamic law, under the Ottoman Journal of 
Equity
Under the Islamic law of contract there is no definition of the concept of error, whether 
between Muslim scholars or in the Islamic literature on commercial contracts. Different 
Arabic words can be used to indicate what is more commonly known as error or mistake. 
According to some well known English-Arabic dictionaries, mistake or error in Arabic 
means K h a ta ’a or G halat.nl There is even a detailed classification of mistake and error 
using the K h a ta ’a and G halat terminology.12 13 The Q u r’an does not use the word G halat in 
its verses, or any in purpose. The Q u r’an uses the word K h a ta ’a, which has its linguistic 
roots and branches in many verses, to mean error or mistake.114 The Q u r’an indicates error 
using Khata ’a word in three locations.
For a deep critical analysis of the Islamic concept of error or mistake, this thesis will trace 
the Ottoman Journal of Equity’s115 approach to this subject. It is useful to know that the 
Ottoman Journal is the first and the only formulated, or codified and organised civil law to 
be based completely on the Islamic doctrines or schools. The Journal relies in most of its 
articles and materials, on the Hanafi doctrine.116 The Journal does not make reference to 
mistake or error under any used Arabic accent or term, neither the popular ghalat nor the 
classical kh a ta ’a, except in one location, which is referred to below. In this case, it is worth 
mentioning that the Journal utilised different terms which encompass the concept of error 
or mistake, and similar concepts and terminologies, such as misrepresentation, fraud, 
deceit and frustration. It must be noticed that the Journal has one direct reference to error
112 M u n ir  B a  'a lbaki. A l-M c iw rid , A Modem English-Arabic Dictionary. 40 th Ed. Dar El-Ilm Lil-Malayen. Beirut -  
Lebanon. 2006.
113 H a rith  F a ru q i. Faruqi’s Law dictionary, English-Arabic.5lh revised Ed. Librairie DU liban, Beirut. 2005. PP254, 460.
n4 Q u r 'a n  2:286,4:92, 33:5.
U:' It is called (M a ja lla t  A l-A h k a m  A l-A d liy a h  A l-O th m a n iyc ih ) which is the civil code of the Ottoman Empire, this code is 
still applying officially in Palestine and affected many of the Arabic civil codes of the Arabic countries such as Syria, 
Jordan, Egypt.
116 The introduction of the Ottoman Journal of Equity. PP8 . 9.
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in just one article.117 It is worth noticing that the Journal uses the Arabic word “kh ata’a ”. 
The thesis will discuss the concept of error under the Islamic law of contract under the 
following headings.
8.1. Khiyar Alwassf
K hiyar A lw a ssf denotes an option of description, using an accurate and literal translation 
from Arabic to English. The situation is different when it comes to its legal context and its 
connotation. This can be derived after discussing the articles that discusses K hiyar A lw a ssf  
in the Journal. Two main articles have discussed this option with a heavy emphasis on the 
details. The first article118 considers the option of description if the seller sold the goods or 
commodities with a specified preferable description. If it discovered that the goods lacked 
the elements of such a description, the buyer has the right to rescind the contract, or to 
accept it at the nominated or agreed value. The second article deals with the cancelation of 
this option, which suggests that if the buyer deals with the sold object as an owner, the 
option of description would be null and void.119 A li H aydar120 12discussed this option based 
on two divisions. The first allows the option of description to be part of the terms of 
conditions of the contract, although under another restriction, this condition should be free 
from a l-gharar,ni which is considered to be the probability of nonexistence. In this case of 
misdescription, if it is established as part of the contract, the buyer has the right to cancel 
the contract and leave the sold item to the seller since the important elements of the 
description are missing. The other choice for the buyer is to accept the contract with its
117 Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article 72.
118 Ibid, Article 312.
119 Ibid. Article 313.
1211 He is the most important author or scholar who interpreted and explained the Ottoman Journal in his famous and wide 
spread book (D u r a r r  A lh u k k a m  f i  S h a rrh  M a ja l la t  A l-A h k a m ). Which has been mentioned above.
121 A l-G h c ira r  or G h a ra r  considered by another authors and scholars as uncertainty or an excessive risk.
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whole nominated price or value. Simultaneously, the buyer has no right to accept the 
contract by reducing the agreed price due to the missing description.122
The second division of A li H aydar analysis suggests that the option of description is part of 
the sale process and the sold item, with no need to situate it as a condition. This could be a 
well known commercial custom between business people when dealing with specific 
descriptions. Under this case, when the buyer discovers the misdescription he has the right 
to cancel the contract.123
8.2. Khiyar Al-Ayb
This option or right has been discussed by Journal in greater depth and detail than is the 
case with K hiyar Al-W asf. This can be taken as an indication of the importance of this 
option and its strong relation with the contract. The Journal has nineteen specialised 
articles124 within its texts, which discuss this option directly. The Journal also makes 
numerous indirect references to it in a multitude of locations.125 According to the Journal, 
the sold items should be free from defect when the sale is unconditional.126 This is when the 
sales transaction is implemented without anybody mentioning any existing defect, which 
leads to transaction being free and empty from defects.127 It is clear that the seller should 
bear legal responsibility by guaranteeing that the sold item must be delivered to the buyer 
without the defect.128 Furthermore, it is argued that, if the seller did not disclose the defect 
in the sold item, this is considered to be misrepresentation (taghreer), which is
122 A li  H a r d e r .  D u r a r r  A lh u k k a m  f i  S h a rrh  M a ja l la t  A l-A h k a m . The translation of the topic(Rulers Pearls for Explanation 
of the Journal of Equity). Investigated and translated from Turkish to Arabic by F ih m i A lh u sa y n i. D a r  A lk u tu b  A l-  
I lm iva h . V2.1991. Beirut-Lebanon. PP126.127.
123 Ibid. P I29.
124 The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Articles 336-355.
123 Ibid, Articles 85,360, 362,364,406, 513-517, 529, 579. 671. 693, 1026, 1037, 1153-1356, 1378, 1461. 1486, 1489. 
1548. 1746, 1782.
126 Unconditional here means that, no conditions have been mentioned by the seller that would make him not reliable for 
hidden defects.
127 Ottoman Journal, op. cit.. Article 336.
128 S a ifu l A z h a r  R o s ly ,M a lv n o o d  S a n u si a n d  N o rh a sh im a h  M o h d  Y asin . The Role of K h iy a r  A l-A y b  in A l-B a y  B ith a m a n  
A jil  Financing. I n te rn a tio n a l J o u r n a l o f  I s la m ic  F in a n c ia l S e n d e e s  Vol. 2 No.3. PI.
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impermissible or forbidden (haram ).129 The definition of Ayb  is different from that of error 
(ikhata ’a ), as error implies that someone intended to do something and discovering that he 
or she did something different unintentionally.130
Any contracting party is normally expected to disclose any defect or fault that could affect 
the intended purpose of the goods negatively.131 In Lisan A l-Arab  (the Arab tongue) 132 the 
meaning of tadlees is interpreted as fraud, as a general meaning; however, it has also been 
interpreted as defrauding by hiding the item’s defect from the buyer, as a particular 
meaning. This leads to another point mentioned by the Journal that decided “if the seller 
discloses the defect in the sold item at the contracting time. Up to that, if the buyer 
accepted the item, then he has no right to use the option for defect” .133 Under the Journal if 
the defect happened after the sold item being in the hands of the buyer and, the buyer 
discovers another old defect before the sold item came under his control.134 If the buyer 
discovered the defect in the sold item and the defect has been removed before returning the 
item, there is no option of defect. If the buyer insisted on using this option he will be 
obliged to cover the expenses of delivery and transportation.135
As a principle, the option of defect would result in extremely different meanings or 
concepts. This implies that any contracting party is normally expected to disclose any 
defect or fault that could affect the intended purpose of the goods negatively.136 According 
to this principle, it is clear that the defect itself is not an error or the mistake; however, it is 
connected to error where the parties that do not realise or know about the defect. If the
129 H a r d e r , op. cit., P I91.
130 Ib in  M a n th o u r . L isa n  A l-A ra b  (the Arab tongue). Dar Al-Ma’aarif. Cairo. PI 193.
131 Susan E. Rayner. The Thoery of Contracts in Islamic Law. First Published. Graham & Trotman Ltd.. 1991. P205. 
ISBN 1-85333-617-3.
132 Ib in  M a n th o u r , op.cit., P1408.
133 The articles from 341.
134 The articles from 345.
135 H a r d e r ,  op. cit., P I94.
136 Rayner. op. cit., P205.
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party identify the defect and they do not disclose it, then the case would be deemed to be 
misrepresentation. It is understood from what A li H aydar suggests that the defect itself is 
not misrepresentation (taghreer); however, the non-disclosure of the defect is 
misrepresentation. As has been understood by an Arab law writer, tadlees which translates 
into English as fraud, and that fraud has been interpreted as intending to induce the other 
contracting party into error by using cheating and fraud.137 The Islamic definition of 
misrepresentation is not fixed or stable, whether amongst the early or modem Muslim 
scholars.
Some contemporary Islamic law authors suggest that the option of defect under Islamic 
contract law is established to achieve fairness between the contracting parties. According 
to this suggestion, no justice or fairness could be achieved with fraud or cheating. They 
connected defects to cheating or fraud, which is forbidden by God (A llah).13* The four key 
Islamic doctrines do not mention the issue of error/mistake (khata ’a or ghalat) under any 
category. K h a ta ’a as a concept has been established in the Q u r’an in the context of a 
mistaken murder. According to Al-Sanhuri, error is a defect of a contract which occupies 
very little room for discussion by Muslim scholars.139
A literal formulation of the Ottoman Journal defines taghreer as “describing the sold item 
for the buyer against its real description.” 140 14It defines taghreer as type of fraud (kh ida’a). 
On that basis, the creator of the fraud is the misrepresentor (m ugharrir) and the person who 
falls for the fraud is the misrepresentee (m aghroor)ux or (m ogharrar bihi). A li H aydar 
explained that taghreer examples would occur when the seller tells the buyer that the sold
137 M a s h a e l  A . A lh a je r i . Obligations &  Evidence, the Defects of Consent. Kuwait University, School of Law. 2004.
P2.http://law.kuniv.edu.kw/mashael/obli_hand.htm. Accesses at 12/6/2008.
138 R o sly , S a n u si  and Y asin , op. cit., P6 .
139 A l-S a n h u ri, M a s a d e r  A lh a q  f i lf iq h  A l-I s la m i  (the resources of the right in the Islamic F iq h  (jurisprudence). The 
Islamic Arabic Scientific Association. Muhammad Addayah Publications. 1955. PI 12.
140 Article 164.
141 H a y d e r , op. cit., P264.
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items are worth specific amounts of money, much more than its real value, whereas in fact, 
it is not. Similar, this is true when the buyer tells the seller that the sold items are worth 
less than their true value.142 The modem Muslim scholar’s definition of taghreer is for one 
part to deceive “the other contractual party by fraudulent means, either by verbalising or 
acting which induce the other party to enter the contract that he would not give his consent 
without these means.”143
A generally speaking, khiyar a l-ayb  (option of defect) has taken a broadly within the 
Islamic law (share ’ah) doctrines, it is actually covered by all of the main Islamic schools 
or doctrines. Generally speaking, khiyar a l-ayb , used in a general context, can touch the 
borders of error in some areas and can touch upon misrepresentation in others. In some 
cases, khiyar a l-ayb  does not fit within. Therefore, khiar a l-ayb  is understood separately 
from the core of error and misrepresentation and has many points of difference. Generally, 
the Journal focuses on the general concepts of error and its belongings, without providing 
any clear categories or clarifications, such as, essential, inessential, unilateral, bilateral or 
mutual mistake and so on. It should be very clear that the Journal does not use error in 
literal expressions within the relevant articles,144 such as ones which are employed in 
modem legal systems.
8.3. G h a r a r and Misrepresentation
G harar is a forbidden conduct for Muslims believers as Islamic law states that there is a 
danger of fraud and deceit, requiring people to abandon it, as it is against God {Allah). 
Allah  describes those who defraud or deceive as a people with diseased hearts, both
143 Ibid.
143 N a s s ir B in  M u h a m m a d  A ljo u fa n . Taking the belongings of the people by the Ih tiy a l, or the T a g h r e e r  or by both of 
them. 10/7/2006. http://islamtoday.net/questions/show_articles_content.cfm?id=71&catid=73&artid=8013. Accessed on 
3/7/2008.
m A q ee l, F a r e e d . Obligations Theory in Syrian Civil law and Islamic Jurisprudence. 4 th edition. Damascus University, 
1994-1995. P37-38.
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ethically or behaviourally. The Qur'an  connected deceit and fraud with the habit of lying. 
All these conducts and behaviours are brought together to be described as a corruption, 
with the people who practice them as corrupters.145 The Qur'an  encourages the people to 
avoid dealing with delusions146 147implying khida'a, gharar, tad lees.ul The meaning of a 
delusion here (khida'a , tadlees) is indicated as elements of gharar  or taghreer in the 
Arabic-Arabic dictionary, in addition to considering taghreer as an action of gharar.148 
The Qur'an  is aligned by teaching Muslims how they must avoid gharar or anything 
related to it, due to its connection to Satan’s behaviours.149 The Qur’anic teaching continues 
with regard to gharar, encouraging people not to rely on gharar in their life.150 This suits 
the definition of the verbal noun of gharar, when the Journal states that “taghreer: is 
describing the sold item for the buyer against its real description.” 151 152*This brings us back to 
khiyar al-wasf, which is misdescription. G harar as misrepresentation includes fraud, 
deception, beguiling and delusion. As illustrated, all of these words or terminologies are 
founded in the Qur'an  and are forbidden (H aram ). The Qur'an  strongly emphasises and 
insists that gharar and all its belongings are not acceptable at all from human beings. This 
is implicitly obvious when the Q u r’an connects gharar and the wickedness of the devil, 
describing gharar as the continuous and practiced job of Satan.
In light of the above, it is therefore difficult to deal or to accept the notion that a definite 
amount of gharar is permissible, and then to develop a discussion which then focuses on 
how to determine this amount of gharar . l32 Most authors who have written about gharar
145 Q u r ’an  2:9.10.11.
146 Ibid, 45:35.
147 B a ’a lb a k i. op. cit., P259.
148 Ib in  M a n th o u r , op. cit., P3232-3234.
149 Q u r ’a n  4:120.
150 Ibid. 57:14.20.
15'Article 164.
152 Dipl. Ing. O sa m a  A b d e h v a h a b . Developmental Perspectives on Financial Innovation in Forward and Futures
Derivatives-A Critical Discussion with Special Consideration of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions, genehmigte
Dissertation. Promotionsausschuss: Vorsitzender: Prof. Dr. Frank Heinemann. Berichter: Prof. Dr. Gemot WeiBhuhn. 
Berichter: Ass. Prof. Dr. Seif Tag el-Din. Tag der wissenschaftlichen Aussprache: 2.5.2007. Berlin 2007.D 83. P99.
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have described it as being unacceptable risk, and usually they add that the avoidance of 
gharar is an essential principle within all the Islamic contracts or transactions that rely on 
Islamic financial/commercial rules. Also, they considered the importance of preventing 
gharar, seeing it as a type of gambling,153 which is also referred to directly in the Qur'an  
using a completely different meaning from gharar?54 The forbidding (tahreem ) of gharar 
is very clear from all Qur’anic evidence, this builds on a very logical background that 
prevents Muslims dealing with any transaction which includes fraud, deceit, or cheating. 
The translation of the English-Arabic dictionaries of misrepresentation use khida ’a, tadlees 
(fraud) and kathib (lying), or releasing a false statement with regard to the fact to induce 
the other to achieve the misrepresentor’s desires.155 This notion has been translated to also 
mean “misleading” .156 5718 Some writers attribute the prohibition of gharar to Prophet 
M uham mad?51 which is correct, as he understood the Qur'an  in the most appropriate 
manor, and very few of Muslim scholars understand his point with regards to his 
prohibition of gharar. Some authors included the element of deception as a part of the 
definition when they defining gharar?5* Also, others traced a closer line to the Q u r’an, and 
the logical construction of gharar, when they included uncertainty as an element of gharar 
as well as deceit; yet not allocating gharar in the meaning of uncertainty itself,159 such as, 
using deceit to evaluate or describe the level of uncertainty in the contract; with one 
implying that “gharar means deceptive misrepresentation and the use of misleading ways 
and means.” 160
1X1 Christopher F. Richardson. Islamic Finance Opportunities in the Oil and Gas Sector: An Introduction to an Emerging 
Field. Texas International Law Journal Vol. 42:119. 2006. P I27
134 More and deep details will be discussed later on in this chapter to explain the gambling 
1x5 F a r u q i , op. cit., P460.
156 Ibid, P459.
l570 u s s a m a  A r a b i. Early Muslim Legal Philosophy: Identity and Difference in Islamic Jurisprudence. UCLA 
International Institute.G E von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies. (University of California, Los Angeles). 
Paper 1 Year 1999. P29.
158Islamic Capital Market Fact Finding Report. Report of the Islamic Capital Market Task Force of the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions. July 2004. P7.
159 The 4 Major Forbidden Elements in Islamic Finance. Shirkah. Year I. Issue 1 - July/August 2006. P49
160 Dr. Y ah ia  A b d u l-R a h m a n . Riba-Free (Islamic) Banking & Finance in the United States. A Window for Interfaith 
Cooperation Leading to United and Prosperous Communities. Delivered at The 2007 INCEIF Global Forum. Leadership 
in Global Finance- The Emerging Islamic Horizon. August 30th 2007. PI
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The CISG 1980, otherwise known as the Vienna Sales Convention, is also worth 
examining in this context. It is rare to find substantial material discussing the concept of 
error under the CISG. There are no consistent instances or understandings in this regard. 
The existence of a uniform interpretation of an international contract can easily contribute 
in resolving disputes in international contractual relations, which are governed by the 
CISG.161 The issue of error under the CISG could have two faces. The first could be the 
question of the validity and the use of avoidance as a remedy under many of the national 
laws. The second is the question of the fundamental breach, again using avoidance as a 
remedy, under the CISG. This would be expected where a mistake or innocent 
misrepresentation occurs with respect to “the quality of the goods or claims [with regard 
to] non-conformity of the goods”. There is a question whether the CISG rules or the 
domestic rules should be applied. This issue will be critically examined in the chapter 
entitled “The Concept of Mistake-Error under the CISG” .162 The following issues will 
arise.
9.1. Mistake as to Quality
In many of the national legal systems, where the mistake occurs, this could render the 
contract void. This is not the case under the CISG. It is pointed out that the CISG rules, for 
instance, are not applied where the mistake occurred with relation to the quality of the 
goods.163 It is proposed that mistake as to the quality of goods under some national laws 
would fit with the scope of Article 4(a) CISG.164 Article 4 is considered to be a legal 
remedy for the mistaken party who has made a mistake regarding the quality of the goods.
161 H. M. Flechtner. 'The UN Sales Convention (CISG) and M C C -M a r b le  C e r a m ic  C e n te r  Inc. V. C e r a m ic a  N u o v a  
D 'A g o s tin o , S.p.A.: The Eleventh Circuit Weighs in on Interpretation, Subjective Intent, Procedural Limits to the 
Convention's Scope, and the Parole Evidence Rule' in (1999) 18 J o u r n a l o f  L a w  a n d  C o m m e rc e  259.
162 Anna Kazimierska. The Remedy of Avoidance under the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods. Pace 
Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Kluwer (1999-2000). PP 158,159.
163 Rudolf Lessiak, U N C IT R A L  K a u fre c h tsa b k o m m e n  u n d  Ir r tu m sa n fec h tu n g , 111 Juristische Blatter 487. 492 (1989):
164 Lessiak. Osterreichische Juristische Blatter JBI) 1989,487 ff.; N e u m a \e r ,  Recht der In te rn a tio n al Wirtschaft (RIW) 
1994 ,99 ,101 .
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This approach is based on the rules on defective goods.165 It may be possible to build an 
approach that brings mistake within the scope of the CISG rules; although, relying on the 
proposition that the erroneous party, on the point of the quality of goods, would be allowed 
to use the norms of defective goods as a refuge and there find a legal solution.166 Mistake, 
as such, was not absent during some of the discussions leading to the drafting of the CISG, 
where the approach to mistake was, in the view of the Italians, lacking conformity.167 There 
are no indications of any type of mistake within the CISG rules. There are no express 
suggestions for any remedies for mistake, such as rescission or avoidance. Equally, there is 
no treatment of the issue as to how to deal with mistake under the contracting member 
states domestic legal systems.168 Some have even suggested that there is no necessity to 
discuss this subject as there are no serious implications to be discussed.169
When discussing good faith with the CISG, some writers implicit mutual mistake as being 
found in the CISG rules. They did not state how this situation is to be treated, or what are 
its legal effects in relation to the existence of subject matter.170 It is added that good faith 
contains the duty to disclose a defect, which is connected to non-conformity, according to 
Article 40 CISG.171 Some Arab-Islamic countries suggest that good faith implies the 
prohibition of fraud and fraudulent dealings. According to this argument, the good faith
1(0 Stefan Kroll. Selected Problems Concerning the CISG’s Scope of Application .J o u rn a l o f  L a w  a n d  C o m m e rc e . [Vol. 
25:39 2005-06], P55.166 C lo u t  Case No. 47 [Landgericht Aachen (Regional Court). Germany. 14 May 1993]. p u b li s h e d  in R e c h t D e r  
In te m a tio n n a le n  W ir tsc h e ft (R IW ) 760. 761 (1993).
167 Legislative History. 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference. S u m m a ry  R e c o r d s  o f  M e e tin g s  o f  th e  F ir s t  C o m m ittee . 
P r o p o s e d  n e w  a r t ic le  4 8 (a )  [relates to the provision that became CISG article 4 (a)], (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.175). 24lh 
meeting. Wednesday, 26 March 1980, at 3 p.m. http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/link4.html.
168 Franco Ferrari, Verona. The Interaction between the United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods and Domestic Remedies (Rescission for Mistake and Remedies in Tort Law). Rabels Zeitschrift fur 
auslandisches und intemationales Privatrecht Vol.71.January 2007. P70.
169 Kazimierska, op. cit., P I89.
170 Joseph Lookofsky. In Dubio Pro Conventione? Some Thoughts About Opt-Outs, Computer Programs and Preemption 
Under the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (CISG). Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law [Vol 13:258 
Special Issue 2003], P280.
171 Fatima Akaddaf. Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries: Is the CISG Compatible with Islamic Law Principles. Pace International Law Review. 
Vol XIII, N ol. Spring 2001. PP33.34.
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concept in Islamic law would be the direct counterpart of the concept of good faith under 
Article 7(1) CISG.172
There is another clear line of argument that could be taken as an obvious signal for 
enhancing the position of fraud, as a basic factor to be included in the concept of good faith 
concept under the CISG. This is based on Scottish contract law considering fraud as one of 
the essential factors that break good faith.173 Simultaneously, it is noticed that error could 
be considered to be an essential factor that good faith based on.174 Good faith is also 
considered to be a mechanism to control a mistake which is un-induced; however, it is 
known to the other party.175 Some writers have raised the issue from a different point of 
view, an interpretative point of view. This arises where the CISG rules create disputes due 
to the differences between legal systems which should be expected to seek different 
remedies according to national laws.176 The CISG does not deal with mistake or 
misrepresentation in the same way as the national English and Scottish contract rules do, as 
will be examined later. Even when the remedies are provided by domestic and CISG rules 
there is still a problem in deciding which rules should be implemented.177
9.2. Mistake as Dealt with by Academic Commentary
Many different suggestions have been made, with substantial differences arising in the 
commentaries on mistake, together with its effects and remedies under the CISG rules. 
Some others observe that mistake is an issue of validity of the contract and, that it should
172 Akaddaf, op. cit., PP31.32.
173MacQueen, op. cit., PP5-37.
174 Ibid.
175 Tetley, op. cit.
176 Rodrigo Novoa. Culpa in Contrahendo: A Comparative Law Study: Chilean Law and the United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (CISG). A r iz o n a  J o u r n a l o f  I n te rn a tio n a l &  C o m p a r a t iv e  L a w  Vol. 22, 
No. 3, 2005. P608.
177 For further discussion see: Lookofsky, op. cit., P283-285.
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be restricted to being dealt with under national legal rules.178 Some say that the CISG 
drafters did not clearly indicate in Article 79 CISG whether the domestic rules on validity 
would be applied in the case of mistake.179 Some writers suggest that mistake as to the 
quality of goods is not to be regarded as being connected to validity, this provides 
commentators with evidence to state that remedies under domestic law are not 
applicable.180 Following the historical legislative route, no signal has been given for 
interpretive methodologies other than those that are mentioned in Article 7(1) CISG. This 
leads then to the issue that validity can be interpreted independently.181
It has been added that the buyer would be able to rely just on rules dealing with the 
conformity of the goods, if the buyer wants to make a compliant on the basis of mistake.182 
There is an attempt to combine the CISG rules and their domestic law counterparts under 
the classical examples of mistake. In these combinations some examples have been 
presented for consideration under the same categories. For example, the CISG’s rules on 
initial impossibility and, its remedy can be applied as ‘a cross-reference’ for mistake as to 
the existence of the goods. The cross-reference of the mistake as to quality of the goods 
would be the breach of contract rules on the conformity of the goods under the CISG. 
Mistake as to the character of the contracting party has also been paired with the ‘CISG’ 
rules’ on the ‘lack creditworthiness of the other party’ .183
178 Checklist on the CISG. Written in collaboration with Axel H. Baum. Adapted excerpt from Albert H. Kritzer ed.. 
Guide to Practical Applications of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(Kluwer Law International (1994). Reproduced with permission of the author. Available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kritzer2.html. Accessed on 12/01/2009.
179 Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, 18 Yale J. Int'l L. 1.51 (1993).
180 Patrick C. Leyens. CISG and Mistake: Uniform Law vs. Domestic Law the Interpretative Challenge of Mistake and 
the Validity Loophole. October. 2003. Available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/leyens.html.
181 Ferrari, Verona, op. cit., P63.64.
182 Edited by John Felemegas. An International Approach to the Interpretation of the United Nations. Cambridge 
University Press, 2007. P172^. ISBN 0521868726. 9780521868723.
183 Leyens, op. cit.
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9.3. Misrepresentation in the CISG
The CISG does not deal with the misrepresentation directly; however, it could be seen that 
some writers could not adapt misrepresentation as it is presented in national law within the 
CISG rules. They suggested that the best option is to retain misrepresentation outside the 
range of the CISG. The academic writers concluded that the CISG itself has no answer for 
misrepresentation cases.184 Article 40 CISG presents non-conformity to be understood as a 
misrepresentation. Article 40 reveals that negligent sellers are less protected when 
compared with negligent buyers; it is justified that the seller’s failure to disclose could be 
counted as a fraudulent misrepresentation.185
Section 10: Error and Misrepresentation under the Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law
The discussion of concept of error in the Draft Palestinian civil law will focus on studying 
the concept of error within three legal systems. These are Jordanian and Egyptian civil 
laws, as well as in the Draft Palestinian civil law. The Gaza Strip is influenced by the 
Egyptian legal system, with its lawyers and practitioners obtaining most of their training, 
legal education and experience in Egypt.186 The same relationship has developed in the 
West Bank towards the Jordanian legal system, as Jordan ruled the West Bank until 
1967.187
The draft of the Palestinian Civil Law is completely dependent on Jordanian and Egyptian 
civil law as it contains specific provisions for dealing with error. In addition, Palestinian 
courts rely on the Egyptian and the Jordanian civil law codes and academic commentaries
lx4Teija Poikela. Conformity of Goods in the 1980 United Nations Convention of Contract for the International Sale of 
Goods. Nordic Journal of Commercial Law. issue 2003 #1. PP62.63.
185 Alejandro M. Garro. Journal of Law and Commerce. The Buyer’s “Safety Valve” under Article 40: what is the Seller 
Supposed to Know and When? [Vol. 25:253 2005-06]. P260.
1X6 A d d a h d o o h , S o lim a n , A n n a ja r , F a h m i, A b u  G h a ith , G h a ith -  Palestinian Uniform Law. Roaia Journal, third year, issue 
number 28. P94.
1X7 Ibid, P95.
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when deciding cases. In particular the Palestinian Court of Cassation188 has issued a 
decision189 on contract law relying on the Jordanian Court of Cassation.190 The same 
Palestinian court, in the same decision also chose to rely upon Article 104 of the Jordanian 
civil law code191 to explain the concept of acceptance within the contract. The Palestinian 
Court of Cassation referred to Jordanian Court of Cassation precedents three times and 
also to the Jordanian civil code articles three times.192 Beside that the Palestinian Court of 
Cassation has also relied on Article 753 of the Egyptian Civil Code, in order to explain 
reasoning the level of discretion of the court in the same case.193
The Palestinian courts also follow the precedents of the Egyptian courts to explain their 
decisions. For example, the Palestinian Court of Appeal in Ramallah, in order to develop 
its decision regarding a contract of sale case,194 has built its judgment on Egyptian court 
decisions, in particular the Egyptian Courts of Appeal in Cairo195 and Alexandria.196 In 
addition, in the same judgment, reference was also made to a ruling of the court of Banha 
city.197 This provides clear evidence that the Palestinian Draft of Civil Law would be 
expected to be interpreted in light of both Jordanian and Egyptian academic and judicial 
comments. Palestinian courts have an equal preference for Egyptian and Jordanian 
precedents. It would be expected that the courts would chose the precedent that fits best 
the case that is presented before the court. The case of error would probably be interpreted 
in a similar way as it is by Egyptian and Jordanian legislators, commentators and courts. 
Academic Palestinian commentators would be dependent on what has been written by
88 It is the highest court in the Palestinian judicial system that specialised in the civil and criminal cases. All the 
decisions of this court are binding for all other lower Palestinian courts.
189 Palestinian Cassation Court, Civil Cassation No 70/2004. Decision No 8 8 . 4/6/2004
190 Ibid, P4.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
194 Ibid. P5.Civil Appeal. No 19/2004. 21/9/2004
'Ibid. P5.
| Ibid.
Ibid, B a n h a  is an Egyptian city, and the court has been given the name of the city.
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Egyptians and Jordanians, as it is the current practice in the Palestinian courts with regard 
to judicial precedents.
The Egyptian legal system depends on Islamic law as one of the main sources of its civil 
law.198 However, it simultaneously relies on the French legal system for theoretical and 
practical applications and interpretations. Therefore, the legislative process in Egypt is in 
fact a mixed legal system, as many of the articles of the Egyptian civil law that were issued 
in 1948 relied on rules established under French civil law, in addition to Islamic 
Jurisprudence.199 The same situation can be applied on the Jordan, where the Civil law 
relied on Islamic Jurisprudence and Syrian law. Syrian law derived its legal rules from the 
French legal system.200 In this way, Jordanian law indirectly would be a mixed legal system 
as is the case of Egyptian legal system.
The Draft of the Palestinian Civil law discussed the concept of error as Jordanian and 
Egyptian Civil laws did. This thesis will illustrate how this Draft followed the Jordanian 
and Egyptian civil in classifying and defining the concept of error and misrepresentation. 
Furthermore, this thesis will discuss the concept of error under the Draft of the Palestinian 
Civil law under the following headings.
10.1. Meaning of Error
The understanding of error in Palestinian law is that of a psychological situation that leads 
a person to have an incorrect belief with regard to a fact.201 According to another definition, 
the error exists or occurs when a person believes something as a fact and in reality it is not,
198 Egyptian Constitution 1971, Article 2 (modified) 1980.199 A b d u lla h , F a tlie  A b d u r r a h e e m . Studies in the Liability of Default. M a n s h a a t  A lm a a r e f . Alexandria, Egypt. 2005. P6 . 
ISBN977-03-1369-6.200 A b d a lla h  K h a rsh u m . The Sources of the Legal Commercial Rules under the Jordanian Commercial Act. Mu’atah 
Journal for Researches and Studies. Issue 4, 2009. PI 1.201 A m in  D a w w a s .  Voluntarily Sources (The Contract and The Unilateral will), A Comparative Study. 1st Edition. 
Darrishurouq. Ramallah. 2004. P93.
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or vice versa.202 It is also defined as an incorrect belief of a fact that leads to the entering of
a contract.203
10.2. Categories of Error
Various types and cases of error are discussed in the Palestinian Draft; these are 
classified into three categories of error which can be found in the Palestinian Draft, as 
well as under the Jordanian/Egyptian civil codes. These categories will be discussed 
under the following headings.
10.2.1. Error that Prevents Consent
The first category is error that prevents the consent of the parties.204 Three cases of this 
category of error can be found through studying the Jordanian civil code205 and the 
Egyptian civil code,206 and the Palestinian draft.207 Since all have the same articulation, 
they agreed that this error has three types.
The first is error as to nature of contract. This type of error can occur when one party 
believes that he has entered a tenancy contract and the other party believes that he has 
entered a sale contract. The second is as a condition or reason for contracting. This can 
occur as example if a person has shared an inheritance with other inheritors and, it is 
found that this person is not in fact an inheritor. This situation can also occur if a person 
made a donation to another person thinking that the other person is a relative, as it 
subsequently transpired that this in fact was not the case.208 Here, error is connected to 
the reason that motivates the parties to create the contract. It is also built on the
202 The Memorandum of the Jordanian Civil code. P143.144.
203 A b d u n n a s ir  A b u -A Ib a sa l:  Studies in the Jurisprudence of the Jordanian Civil Law. l sl Edition. Darunnafa’es for 
Publishing and Distributing. Jordan. 1999. PI 39.
2(14D a w w a s ,  op. cit.. P95.
205 Article 152. The Jordanian Civil Law.
206 Article 121. The Egyptian Civil Law.
207 Article 120. The Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
208 The Memorandum of the Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. P81.
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availability of a condition, so, if the reason or condition does not exist, it implies that 
there is no consent at all. This therefore indicates that the contract has not been 
established from the beginning.209
10.2.2. Error which Defects the Consent
The second category of error is the one that renders the parties’ consent defective, 
although it does not prevent the contract from existing. This error arises after the 
contract has been established. Here, the contract would be voidable, but not void.210 
There is a requirement for a substantial or essential error for the contract to fall under 
this classification.211 The Palestinian Draft relies on the objective standard or 
circumstantial judgment in order to establish a substantial error, which is usually a 
matter of a judicial decision. Article 119 of the Palestinian Draft does clarify that this 
type of error is to be considered as being shared between the two contracting parties, as 
well being an error of just one of the parties. To consider this type of error as being 
operative, it should have been induced by the other party, who either knew about the 
error, or it would have been easy for him to know about it.212
Three cases can be concluded under this error category. The first case is connected to 
the substantial description of the subject-matter of the contract. This can occur if the 
party intended to buy a specific item with a specific description, although he realised 
that the item he was provided by the seller is the same kind or sort yet it does not 
possess the specific description that he specified.213 Here, consent would be affected, 
due to the buyer entering the contract of which he intended to have an item with the
209 A n w a r  S u lta n . Sources of Obligations in the Jordanian Civil Law (Comparative Study with the Islamic 
Jurisprudence). 2nd Edition. The Legal Office. 1998. P96.
210 Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. Article 119.
211 D a w w a s , op. cit., P95.
212 Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. Article 119 (1).
213 A b ii-A lb a s a l. op. cit.. P I49.
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specified description. If this description is missing it means that the buyer would no 
longer be motivated to enter the contract; however, here, the specific description 
motivated him.214 In general, all the principles of this category of error closely follow 
the same line in the Ottoman Journal of Equity.215 The Draft provides that; ‘To consider 
the error as an operative error it should be induced by the other party, or he knew about 
the error, or it is easy for him to know about it’ .216
In the second case, error is as to the identity of parties. This type of error can occur when 
the identity of the parties plays a crucial role in the contracting process. This type of error 
can occur regularly in gratuitous contracts when the person is intended to make a donation 
to another specific person.217 The third case is error as to a substantial feature or 
characteristic of the other party, and this type comes under one condition which is 
connected to the motive for contracting between the parties. It implies that the specific 
characteristics of the party were the only reason behind the contract.218 In this situation, a 
key factor in determining whether or not an error is essential is the good faith of the party 
in error. In order to determine good faith, the surrounding situation of the contract must be 
examined, which would then rely on objective standards. Clearly the understanding of this 
case would then be a mix between the personal standard of good faith on the one hand, and 
its objective evaluation on the other.219
214 A li  A l-K h cifeef. The Shari’ah Rules of Deals. 1st Edition. D a r  A l-F ik r  A l-A ra b i, Egypt. 2008. P325.
215 Article 310 of the Ottoman Journal of Equity and its explanation by A li  H a y d a r . D u r a r r  A lh u k k a m  f i  S h a rrh  M a jo l la t  
A l-A h k a m . The translation of the topic(Rulers Pearls for Explanation of the Journal of Equity). Investigated and translated 
from Turkish to Arabic by F ih m i A lh u sa yn i. D a r  A lk u tu b  A l-I lm iya h . V2.1991. Beirut-Lebanon. P129.
216 Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. Article 119 (1 ).217 A b d u l-Q a d ir  A l-F a r . The Sources of Obligations. Dar Athaqfah for Publication, Amman-Jordan. 1998. P80.218 E zu d d e en  A d d n a so u r i, A b d u l  H a m e e d  A l-S h a w a r b i. The Practical Problems and the Disputes of the Sale Contract. 3rd 
Edition. A d d a r a  A l-A ra b ix a h  for the Publishing and Distributing. 2003. P30.
219 Ibid.
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10.2.3. Error that has no Effect on Consent
The third category of error under the Palestinian Draft is that error does not affect the 
consent or the contract at all. Article 122 of Palestinian Draft, Article 155 of the 
Jordanian civil code and Article 123 of the Egyptian civil code all deal with this 
category of error under mistake as to calculation, as well as mistake as to writing. No 
effect could have occurred under this category and thus the error should be corrected. 
The clear example of this could occur when the contractor takes the measurement for 
land or a building in square meters, and when he transmits this to the contract, he does 
not put the sign of the square meter, or when the accountant decreases or increases the 
zeros, instead of 100 put 10 or vica versa.220 The Palestinian Draft,221 the Egyptian civil 
code,222 and the Jordanian civil code,223 have all stated that the erred party should not 
insist on the error of the other party in bad faith, the contracting party should keep 
himself committed to the contract that he intended to enter, if the other party has shown 
his willingness to implement the contract. The third case of error is error as to an object 
or subject-matter of the contract. This sort of error can occur with regard to the place of 
contract, like when a person intends to buy a flat on the first floor and the owner 
thought he is selling a flat on the fourth floor. It could also occur with regard to the type 
of item, like when the seller sells rice and the buyer thinks he is buying wheat.224
10.2.4. Error as to Law
Despite the fact that the Palestinian Draft did not discuss the error as to fact explicitly, it 
is in fact clear that the Draft has established a special position225 for error as to law. It has
220 A l-S a n h u ri. A lw c is ie t f i  S h a rh e  Iqan ou n  A l-M a d a n i. The Labour Contracts. Part7.Vol 1. D a r-A m ic ih d a h  A l-A ra b iyc i. 
Cairo. 1964. P54. The topic translation (the mediator for explanation the Civil Law).
221 Article 123. The Palestinian Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
222 Article 124. The Egyptian Civil Law.
223 Article 155. .The Jordanian Civil Law.224 D a w w a s , op. cit., P95.
225 Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. Article 121.
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followed the same line as the Jordanian civil code,226 and the Egyptian civil code.227 It is 
possible to notice that the three legal systems focus directly on error as to law more than 
they do on error as to fact. All the mentioned articles state that error as to law has the 
same conditions as error as to fact. In this article,228 error as to fact was the first time to 
be indicated through all the Palestinian Draft articles. The requirements for error as to 
fact are included in the articles that discuss error as to law. Based on that, the 
understanding of the error as to fact can be studied by implication, as nothing has been 
mentioned directly in the code’s articles, except in Article 121 which is explores error as 
to law.
Two main conditions are required for operating error as to law. Firstly, the error should be 
substantial, secondly, the error should be shared between the contracting parties.229 
According to the Palestinian Draft, as well as the Egyptian civil law, the contract would be 
voidable, as this sort of error is considered to be a defect of consent. The effect under the 
Jordanian civil law is different, where the contract would be void. It is clear that the case of 
error as to law and ignorance under the Palestinian Draft is different from the English rule 
of ignoratia legis neminem excusat.23° Generally, in order to operate error as to law it 
should be connected to the substantiality of error.231
10.3. Misrepresentation (Taghreer)
The Palestinian Draft used the word ta g h ree r32 to mean misrepresentation, following the 
Jordanian civil code.233 The Egyptian civil code234 uses tadlees as a parallel word for
226 Jordanian Civil Code, Article 154.
227 Egyptian Civil Code, Article 122.
228 Article 121. The Palestinian Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
229 Ibid, The memorandum of the Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law. P83.
230 F a r u q i . op. cit., P346.
231 Egyptian Cassation Court. No 129756. 29/11/1990. Para 2.
232 Article 124. Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
233 Article 143. Jordanian Civil Law.
234 Article 125. Egyptian Civil Law.
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taghreer. The Palestinian Draft shares the same articulation in one part235 of Article 124, 
with the Egyptian civil code.236 The Jordanian code starts with the definition of taghreer, 
however, the Palestinian and Egyptian codes started directly with the effects of 
taghreer/tadlees without a definition being provided in any of the articles. According to the 
Jordanian code,237 taghreer occurs when one of the contracting parties defrauds the other 
using fraudulence by means of statements or actions to induce him to enter into the 
contract, which would not have been entered into if these means had not been utilised. 
Egyptian jurisprudence defines tadlees (misrepresentation), when one of the contracting 
parties use any means or tools to convince the other contracting party against a fact and 
induces him into an error to enter the contract.238
The Palestinian Draft239 and the Egyptian240 code state that the contract would be voidable 
due to taghreer/tadlees, if one of the contracting parties or his agent uses fraud that 
induced the other to enter the contract, which would not be entered if fraud had not been 
used. Under the Palestinian and Egyptian provisions, fraud would not reflect 
misrepresentation as a concept; however, it would indicate that fraud is just a tool to 
establish misrepresentation. Fraud is one of the tools to establish misrepresentation as well 
as a lie or concealment.241 Furthermore, Sanhuri suggested that anything that can be used to 
misrepresent the other is a misrepresentation (tadlees), anyone that has been induced by 
any of them, as a consequence anyone making an error would have the right to void the 
contract, and to claim for damages or compensation.242
233 Article 124 (1). Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
236 Article 125 (1). Egyptian Civil Law.
237 Article 143. Jordanian Civil Law.238 M a h m o u d  A d d e e p . The Frauds in the Civil Law. Islamic Jurisprudence, and the Manlaw . Dar Al-Jamieh Al-Jadeedah 
for Publication. Alexandria. 2004. P54.
239 Used ta g h r e e r .
240 Used ta d le e s .241 A l-S a n h u ri. A lw a s ie t  f i  S h a rh e  Iqa n ou n  A l-M a d a n i. op. cit.. P I09.
242 Ibid. P I95.
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The memorandum of the Palestinian Draft243 argues that fraud is a result of taghreer, by 
stating that “taghreer would be operative if it generates a fraud for one of the parties and 
induces him to accept the contracting which he would not accept without using taghreer”. 
Ghish (cheating) is also considered to be a tool of misrepresentation. As a general rule, 
misrepresentation, or any of its tools, should induce the contracting party to enter the 
contract.244 Nondisclosure is also considered to be a misrepresentation. It has been decided 
that the seller of a restaurant is involved in a misrepresentation when he does not disclose 
the fact that he cannot transfer the title to the buyer when they entered the contract.245 The 
Jordanian code246 and the Egyptian code247 count intentional silence over an actual fact or 
situation as a misrepresentation if it can be proved, that the induced party would not have 
entered the contract had he known of this fact or situation. The Palestinian Draft248 
mentions a crucial point with regards to damages or compensation as a consequence of 
misrepresentation249, when it has been decided that the misrepresntee {mugharrar bihi or 
maghroor) has the right to claim damages if they are demanded. In general, the statement 
of “if it is demanded” has not been followed with a clarification of when the damages can 
or could be demanded.
For deception to be considered operative, it is submitted that it should intend to induce the 
other party and to benefit from this inducement, leading to a misrepresentation.250 It is 
noticed that there is no indication of negligent misrepresentation under any of the cases or 
articles within the Palestinian, Jordanian or Egyptian provisions. Generally speaking, any 
of the three civil laws, whether the Draft or the codes, do not point out any categories of 
misrepresentation, neither do the academic commentaries. It is also worth mentioning that
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law. P85.
Addnasouri, Al-Shawcirbi, op. cit., P31.
Jordanian Cassation Court, Civil Cassation, 371/88. Bar Association Journal. Year 38. Issues 8 &9 1990. PI 566. 
Article 144. Jordanian Civil Law.
Article 125 (2). Egyptian Civil Law.
Article 124 (3). The Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
Ibid.
Egyptian Cassation Court, 0329/39. 8/2/1972.
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a mere statement of opinion is not considered to be a misrepresentation.251 The Palestinian 
Draft252 states that if misrepresentation (taghreer) was established by a third party, the 
misrepresentee (maghroor) has the right to declare the contract void if he proves that the 
other contracting party knew or was supposed to know of this misrepresentation at the time 
of the contract.
Section 11: Conclusion to this Chapter
This thesis will attempt to apply the critical analysis throughout its chapters. The 
comparative focus will also be applied throughout this entire thesis, but the main 
comparative application will be within the chapter o f the concept o f error under Islamic 
contract law. This is attributed to this thesis’ attempt to explore the concept of error under 
Islamic contract law in light of the comparative approach with English and Scottish 
contract law. The comparative view will be used as a main reference to establish a clear 
vision with regard to the concept of error and misrepresentation in the Islamic contract law. 
This is due to Islamic jurisprudence does not discuss the concept of error within the 
contract law. Based on that, a decision has been made to have the intensive comparison 
within the chapter of the Islamic concept of error to create a clear ground to examine the 
concept of error and misrepresentation under the Islamic contract law.
Having discussed the concept of error under Palestinian Draft of civil law, it will be 
illustrated as a very specific conclusion of the experience, that Palestinian Draft is 
completely built on the Jordanian and Egyptian legal systems. These legal systems, 
including the Palestinian Draft need clarification with regards to the categories of error. In 
spite of discussing error, the discussion tended to be general without concentrating on 
specific titles, such as mutual, unilateral, as seen under English and Scottish contract law.
251 Addnasouri, Al-Shawarbi. op. cit., P31.
2:0 Article 125 (1). The Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
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The main ground to establish the comparative view will rely basically on English and 
Scottish contract law, as the concepts of error and misrepresentation are well established 
under both of them.
This thesis attempts to establish a new interactive approach between the discussed legal 
systems. This approach endeavours to create a familiarity between these legal systems, 
relying on the fact that these legal systems can be benefited from each other. This thesis 
attempts to create basic rules and routes to the legal researchers, writers, and practitioners 
to enhance their understanding in this particular area of research. The discussion of error 
and misrepresentation concepts under these legal systems begins by discussing mistake and 
misrepresentation concepts in English contract law.
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Chapter Two
The Critical Analysis of the Concept of Mistake and Misrepresentation in
English Contract Law
Section 1: Introduction
English law recognises the doctrine of mistake as one of the most important doctrines 
under contract law. Historically, English common law rules, in relation to mistake 
categories or types, descend from the Roman law traditions. On that basis, it is noticeable 
that English mistake doctrine depends mainly on the individual categories of essential 
mistake.1 It would be said that mistake arises as one o f the controversial subjects under the 
common contract law. This does not mean that mistake occupies a wide space under the 
English contract law. The discussion in relation to mistake provides an impression that 
mistake’s doctrine is recognised as a narrow area of application. Despite this, mistake 
under the English law does play a large role under the contract law. Different types of 
which are known and classified under mistake doctrine.
Usually, types o f mistake are classified under different categories. When the party makes a 
mistake in regard of the contract’s terms, it can be mistreated with the fact that, the non- 
mistaken party realistically would understand that the mistaken party agreed on the terms.2 
It is a simple and general rule, with a simple and general conclusion without further 
suggestions and explanations. Consequently, this kind of mistake is a unilateral mistake 
(one party is mistaken), although the mentioning comes exclusively without indicating any
1 Zweigert, op. cit., P I3.
2 John Cartwright. Protecting Legitimate Expectations and Estoppels in English Law. Report to the XVIIth International 
Congress of Comparative Law. July 2006. Netherlands Vereniging Voor Rechtsvergelijking. Netherlands Comparative 
Law Association. Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 10.3 (December 2006), P I5. http://www.ejcl.org.
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of other factors to aid the understanding of how exactly one could deal with this kind of 
mistake. This is an example of how it can be concluded that English law doctrine of 
mistake is constricted; however, it is complemented by a liberal doctrine of 
misrepresentation,3 this will be discussed in detailed later within this chapter.
Likewise, the mistake doctrine is established to facilitate the mistaken parties, agreeing that 
incompetent contracts are to be avoided. Additionally, it also supports the parties, 
encouraging them to share the information that facilitates them to avoid misinterpretation. 
It is also avoids inefficient investments, which can be effected by them through 
misrepresentation.4 One of the main targets of the contract law is to provide the guidelines 
to understand the acceptable terms for the contracting parties. It is also to provide the 
parties with suitable grounds to enter the contract with full of knowledge about their 
commitments. Furthermore, it implements that in the borders of the legal rules. 
Additionally, it is not acceptable by the law to have terms, conditions or any way that 
involved the formulation of contract that could break the rules of contract law. With this 
point, it is useful to notice that mistake, as to the terms of contract, is usually not effective 
on the enforceability of the agreement.5
It is a matter of fact that, all modem legal systems around the world would be interested in 
protecting the contracting parties’ interests. This can be undertaken through the rules of 
contract law. This revolves around safeguarding the rights of the contracting parties and 
preserving their interests without confusion or breach. It is concluded simply, that talking 
about mistake implies caring about treating any dispute that could occur at any point within 
contracting process. Consequently, the law of contract would be expected to discuss 
mistake and its effects, as it observes many details for maintaining all the contracting
3 Hugh Beale. Contract Law. Hart Publishing. 2002. P333. ISBN 1841132373.
4 Benjamin E. Hermalin. Avery W. Katz, and Richard Craswell. Chapter on the Law & Economics of Contracts. 
Forthcoming in The Handbook of Law & Economics (final draft: June 5. 2006). P62.
^Tetley, op. cit. P I6.
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processes more secure and less risky for the contractual parties. As a logical result of 
caring about mistake, investment would be encouraged and increasingly productive in 
regard of the legal cure. It is important to mention here, as a matter of accuracy, the 
English contract law with its various rules, is the main adapter of the contracting 
operations, which involves many regulations for guaranteeing the parties’ targets to be 
achieved.
It could be found that mistake is a fundamentally important issue that the law of contract is 
concerning about. This is attributed to the vital role of mistake with regard to commercial 
and economical operations and all the contracts types. It is also concerns the contractual 
legal effects that could be affected in case of mistake. By having mistake in any of 
commercial and/or financial relations, the descriptive form of contracting relation would be 
totally different than it would be without mistake. It is believed that many contractual 
relations can be expected to become collapsed or terminated when there is any 
involvement of mistake. This chapter will concentrate analytically and critically where 
needed on the concepts of mistake and misrepresentation under the English contract law. 
The comparative approach between mistake and the other related concepts would be taken 
into consideration to instantiate between mistake and the abovementioned.
To commence understanding of the concept of mistake itself, it is notable that the legal 
analysis of mistake varies from the meaning that people attach to it on a daily basis. One 
may admit “I made mistake when I read the newspaper” or “I entered the room by 
mistake”, and so on. Mistake is a regular expression when it comes to the relations 
between family members or friends. However, it is completely different in contract 
terminology; here the word “mistake” is viewed from a multitude of different aspects and 
points of view. Due to these circumstances, it is necessary to present the meaning of the 
word “mistake” in relation to the contract law.
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Section 2: Mistake in General
Mistake in broad terms is something that strongly affects the contract negatively, so its 
implementation is rendered impossible. There are numerous occasions where mistake can 
be expected to arise. Mistake could be made in regard to the identity of the contracting 
parties.6 Obviously, this could happen when the parties enter the contract with the wrong 
person which they did not intend. Mistake could also occur regarding the existence of 
contract itself, where a misapprehension of the subject-matter of the contract at the time of 
contracting. Under this situation, mistake could be connected to the quality of the contract 
subject-matter. It could occur in any other circumstances that may make substantial 
changes in the subject-matter of the contract, which would be fundamentally different from 
the subject-matter that the contracting parties contracted on or existing.7
To clarify, English law relies on an objective standard to deal with any matters connected 
to the offer or other contractual issues and any of the basic elements that related contracts. 
Mistake would not be relevant if the unmistaken party has no logical reason to know about 
the other party’s mistake. This is due to the mistaken party must be committed to what 
he/she has said or written.8 This reassures that “English law does not give a large role to 
mistake”.9
Traditionally, one or both parties could make a mistake. Therefore, depending on the 
category of mistake, the legal results or remedies would be expected to be different from 
one category to another. It is notable that there may be a mistake in the broad sense, even if 
the case would not be dealt with by the relevant legal system under the particular
6 Philips v. Brooks [1919] 2 KB 243
7 See Associated Japanese Bank (International Ltd) v. Credit du Nord SA [1988] 3 All ER 902 at 912-913, [1989] 1 
WLR 255 at 268 per Steyn J.
8 Beale, op. cit., P363.
9 Cartwright, op. cit., P I5.
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rubric. ^ Occasionally, mistakes arise from wrongly expressed sentences and intentions at 
the time of contracting.10 1 It occurs when the parties of the agreement fail to express the 
exact meaning of their wills or thoughts (usually in writing), or when they miss-expressed 
the proposed provisions of the agreement. In such cases, most of the mistakes will be 
considered as mistaken assumptions, whereby the mistaken party has an imperfect 
awareness of exterior reality.
Rowley explained that the USA perspective makes a distinction of a mistaken assumption 
from a misunderstanding, this occurs from a party’s faulty awareness o f the other party 
understandings or intention.12 According to this notion, a misunderstanding is not a 
mistake, which could be possible and logical to base for dealing with mistake. This is a 
remarkable distinction, which can lead one to consider that, misunderstanding could be 
used as an expression to describe the case when the party does not understand something 
marginal and, that it is not effective during the contracting process. It might be not worth 
applying this phrase, due to misperceiving the other’s sense does not avert the contract 
formation.13 Under the Scottish contract law commentaries, misunderstanding bears a 
similarity error,14 which will be explored in more depth in the Scottish Contract law 
chapter of this thesis.
It is noticeable that, under English law, mistake has mixed boundaries; sometimes it is 
difficult to draw the lines between these different concepts and classifications of mistake. 
At least, it is not in the same easiness as it could be regarding some other English law 
branches. Many cases in the mistake area can be considered as breaches o f a contractual 
context. One prominent case could be related to the quality o f the subject matter, or the
10 Beale, op. cit.. P343.
11 It known as an error as to expression under the Scottish Contract Law. More details will be explained within the 
concept of error under the Scottish contract law.
12 Keith A. Rowley. To Err is Human. Alleviating Mistakes: Reversal and Forgiveness for Flawed Perceptions. By E. 
Allan Farnsworth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2004. Michigan Law Review Vol. 104:1407 May 2006. 1411.
13 Ibid.
14 Huntley. Blackie, and Cathcart, op. cit.. 193.
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cases in relation to frustration.15 Despite the intensive discussions and the serious argument 
in respect to mistake and its categories, some legal academics have argued that English law 
has no law of mistake.16 In the alternative context, the major mistake is the one that renders 
“the thing [contracted for to be] essentially different from the thing [that] it was believed to 
be.”17 In spite of the role of mistake within the law of contract, there are some kinds of 
mistake that do not render the contract void or voidable. This will become apparent further 
in the chapter.
Another point which is somehow a disconnected matter is that mistake in one point 
connects directly to the core of the contract which could be summarised in what contract is 
all about, that is consensual planning. This proposes that, if one of the contracting parties 
would certainly not approved had he known the reality, then there was no shared idea of 
what was happening, no consensus ad idem. Subjective test needs to be applied to assure 
that the agreement was established between the parties, which are basically not the role of 
the courts,18 rather than focusing on the party’s mistake as a cause of his absconding from 
the contract.19 In general, English law does not consider mistake as part of a combined 
theory of imperfections o f consent.20
It is necessary to have some focus on the vitiating reasons theory and its fundamental 
doctrines or types under the English law of contract, such as mistake, misrepresentation, 
duress and undue influence. It could be found that, the courts do not typically examine 
these headings collectively. In general, they are treated independently, in accordance with 
their own division of regulations. It is clear that English contract law does not show a
? J C Smith, op. cit.
16 Ibid.
17 See Bell v. Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161 at 218. [1931] All ER Rep 1 at 28 per Lord Atkin, as adopted and confirmed 
by this court in Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1407, [2002] 2 All 
ER (Comm) 999. [2003] QB 679.
18 Paterson and Hocker. Contract Commentary and Materials. 8th Ed. LBC Information Services. 1998. pi.
19 Cartwright, op. cit.. P I5.
20 Green, op. cit.. P66.
62
willingness to permit subjective mistake in order to make the contract void. Therefore, it is 
correct that it should not be permitted for the party who caused the mistake to ask for the 
implementation of the contract.21 Clearly, English law of mistake has considered the offer 
as a prominent factor to be taken into consideration with regards to mistake rules. Based on 
that, mistake under English contract law in the area of offer, or any other related 
contractual documents, does not apply to situations where the unmistaken party has no 
cause to recognise the mistake.22
2.1. Common Mistake
In common, parties enter the agreement according to the same incorrect awareness of a fact 
in their minds.23 To clarify, each party bears comparative thoughts about the facts that are 
connected to the contract; although both of them are wrong. A simple example is when 
both parties believe that a painting is by Van Gogh, where in fact it is not.24 It could be also 
understood that both contracting sides believe that they have the right or correct idea about 
the contract, namely that they entered the contract having an assumption that a specific fact 
exists, although it appears not to be so.25 An expected result of this kind of mistake would 
be that the contract would be void, however, turning a contract void is not automatic. Still, 
it needs to be clear that under English law the doctrine of mistake as to substance plays a 
limited role. It applies only to cases in which both parties make the same mistake, the so 
called common mistake.26 A common mistake transpires when parties have the same 
mistaken awareness. This type of mistake would be considered when the contracting 
parties have the same mistaken beliefs with regards to the same subject matter. In common 
mistake, the parties enter the agreement according to the same wrong awareness of a fact in
21 Cartwright, op. cit., P I5.
22 Beale, op. cit.. P363.
23 Haigh, op. cit.. P156.
24 Bryan A. Gamer. A Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage. 2nd Edition, revised. Oxford University Press US. 2001. P579. 
ISBN 0195142365, 9780195142365
25 Richards, op. cit., P214.
26Beale, op. cit., P366.
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their minds. This kind of mistake does not break the consensus. In this case, the parties 
have an absolute agreement, while their consensus is built upon a false assumption. 
Mistake might relate to the idea of a common underlying assumption, based on which 
parties construct their contract.27
According to this approach, the parties are able to initiate a common motive into the 
conditions or the terms of the contract. It could be applied simply where the parties 
misunderstand the offers or the proposals of each other, or the contents of them, which is 
often referred to as senseless.28 At common law, mistakes by contracting parties, in many 
cases, offer rise to a no cause of action, this is attributed to the respected rule of caveat 
emptor. This denotes that each party is ordinarily supposed to care about his own business 
during the contracting operation, while each is permitted to depend on the obvious 
agreement of the other.29 Here, the point to be raised is about the meeting of the parties’ 
mind. If it is agreed logically that the contract is to be made, or the contractual relation is to 
be entered into, this needs two free wills to create complete consent. There is an opinion 
states that ‘there is undoubted agreement between the parties’ under the common mistake.30 
Some focusing on this point can tell that, when the parties have a wrong belief with regards 
to being connected to the contract, so there is no agreement between them at all. The 
reasons behind this argument is that, since every party has had different thoughts in 
relation to the facts of the contract; implying that every party will want to create a 
commitment in a different directions and for a different contract. As it is mentioned above, 
common mistake occurs where the parties want to build the contract on a certain existing 
fact, but this fact does not exist, which demonstrates there is nothing to be contracting for.
27 Harms. Mpati. Brand. JJA and AJA. op. cit., P10.
28 Beale, op. cit.. P345.
29 Tetley, op. cit. P I7.
30 Richards, op. cit.. P214.
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Here, it can be claimed that the parties have a shared intention to create a contract; 
however, there are vital elements missing.
Supporting the previous point of view, it can be seen clearly that Lord Atkin has dealt 
similarly with common mistakes as with mutual mistakes. He justified that both of them 
(common mistake and mutual mistake) have an alternative approach to deal with their 
effects.31 The argument around common mistake and its understanding could motivate 
more controversial points in respect of the common mistake definition. This kind of 
argument usually arises between the legal writers and the academic commentaries, as is 
mentioned above and as is indicated earlier in regard of Lord Atkin’s perspective that there 
are related to the similarities between common and mutual mistake.
The attitude of English contract law leads to more ambiguity and complexity in 
understanding how to deal with the cases that come within this area. The English law of 
contract should be examined to clarify this subject, creating clear lines between common 
and mutual mistake. This is attributed to some having indicated that mutual mistake is used 
confusingly to indicate common mistake, or shared mistake.32 Otherwise the law of 
contract needs to demonstrate an obvious attitude to combine the two categories. It is not 
clear if there is wisdom behind splitting this kind of mistake into the different 
classifications of common and mutual mistake. The following sections of this chapter will 
clarify how common and mutual mistake are close linked to each other, through their use 
in case law and through legal academic commentary.
It has been mentioned during the chapter that common mistake could render the contract 
void. In fact, this is a general rule, as in order to consider rendering a common mistake 
void, some requirements or demands should be taken into consideration, as this does not
31 Bell v. Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161 (HL).
32 Wishar. op. cit.. P249. Footnote 6.
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happen automatically. Many requirements or factors should be counted carefully to find 
out about common mistake and its remedies. The first issue is to identify a common 
assumption as to the existence of a state of affairs. The second is to ensure that there is no 
warranty by any party that state affairs of subsists. Thirdly, it is necessary to ensure that the 
non-existence of the state of affairs must not be as a consequence of a fault of any party. 
Fourthly, it should be made clear that the non-existence of the state of affairs should make 
the execution of the contract impossible.33
2.2. Mistake as to Subject Matter
According to English law, the Sale of Goods Act34 dealt with this subject by stating that 
“where there is a contract of specific goods, and the goods without the knowledge of the 
seller have perished at the time when the contract was made, the contract is void”. It is 
thought that mistake as to subject matter is part of common mistake, is mostly about the 
perished existence of the subject matter itself. Based on the Sale of Goods context, it could 
be explained that, common mistake occurs when the goods existed already, although they 
have perished. It is clear that this section of the Sale of Goods Act could be applied to 
common mistake according to this thesis’ point of view. Additionally, the existence of the 
subject matter of the contract should be interpreted as the existence or nonexistence after 
the agreement or contract has been reached. Furthermore, according to the Sale of Goods 
Act, all rely on the parties’ missing knowledge after entering the contract. It is said that the 
common mistake case arises when the parties have not realised that the contracted subject 
matter is destroyed or damaged.35
The Canadian approach to this issue is different. The Canadian approach is to treat the 
existence of the subject matter under four different issues. The first, is when the subject
33 Green, op. cit., P82.
34 Section 6 of the Sale of Goods Act. 1979.
35 Furmston. Et Al, op. cit., P284.
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matter never existed, second is when the subject matter has existed, although it has been 
ceased before entering the contract, third is when the parties think that they can contract on 
a specific thing but for some reasons (legal or otherwise) this thing cannot be the subject of 
contract; fourthly, when the parties expected the nonexistence o f the subject matter but 
they did not agree as to how to deal contractually with this fact, should it arise.36 This 
approach deals with the existence, or otherwise, of the subject matter at issue would be 
very helpful if adopted by the English contract law in the context o f the common mistake 
doctrine. Additionally, it is better to deal with this issue in this broad manifestation as it 
provides more flexibility to adapt the legal effects and remedy which would be expected to 
arise in cases of common mistake.
An arguable point has arisen in the English case of Couturier v Hastie37 where the plaintiff 
agreed to sell an Indian corn to the defendant. Meanwhile, the corn started to perish; 
however, without the knowledge of the two parties. To avoid more harm or losses the 
ship’s captain decided to sell the rest of the com. As a result, the buyer argued that the corn 
(the subject matter) stopped existing before the contract was entered into. The buyer 
argued that the contract was therefore void, implying there was no responsibility on him to 
pay the com price. The seller argued that the purchaser was responsible to pay the price as 
he bought the venture, so he took the risk on himself. When the case was presented before 
the House of Lords, it was held that the buyer was not liable to pay the price. It was held 
that the contract was expected to be about existing goods; however, in this case, the goods 
no longer existed. Furthermore, the seller was not required to deliver the goods. As it is 
well noticed, the judges did not indicate that voidability was a remedy, so the judgement 
was not clear enough on the point of whether there were any other alternative remedies, 
such as damages. In the decision, there was no mention of any type o f mistake, whether
36 Olivo, Et Al, op. cit., P75.
37 (1856) HL Cas 673.
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common or mutual. In the entire situation, it could also be noticed that this case does not fit 
the application of mistake as to the existence of the subject matter.38 The case does clearly 
reflect the approach subsequently adopted by s6 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 in regard to 
perished subject matter, although it is not fully matched in its approach with regard to the 
subject matter’s existence.
It is actually interesting to know that the defendant, relying on the English law rule, argued 
that when the property (the subject matter) does not exist at the time of agreement, that 
there ‘could be no contract of sale’.39 It is mentioned for this as signal of how common 
mistake attracted and raised different or even controversial arguments, which could be still 
open for more discussion. It is also useful to notice that some writers did not mention 
common mistake as a recognised category under the English law of contract when they 
presented the fundamental types o f mistake.40
The same case can be seen in Barrow, Lane & Ballard Ltd v Phillip Phillips & Co Ltd.41 
Here the seller contracted to sell 700 bags yet most o f them had been lost in one a way or 
another. Only 151 bags were to be delivered. Relying on section 6 of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979 the contract was held to be entirely void. Here, the issue once again was about 
perished goods, not about the existence of the subject matter as whole. The subject matter 
already existed, yet for some reason, it ceased to exist either partly or in its entirety. The 
two cases could be a reflection of failure of consideration or even failure of delivery; 
however, in this writer’s opinion it is not about the common mistake. It seems to be clearly
38 Richards, op. cit., P215-222.
39 David J. Ibbetson. A historical introduction to the law of obligations. Oxford University Press. 1999. P228. ISBN 
019876412X, 9780198764120
40 Haigh. op. cit.. P I56.
41 [1929] 1 K.B. 574.
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that the courts could not reach the point that could establish the general rules of common 
mistake.42
It is difficult to maintain a consistent line, when discussing common misstate as the law 
dictionary’s definition provide various contextual impressions as to the interpretation to be 
followed. The dictionary definition is where “both parties make the same error to a 
fundamental fact”.43 This however, is a broad definition but is logical and fits with the 
practicality that gives more definitive and clearer understanding to the understanding of the 
term “common mistake”. A similar definition is when “both parties to an agreement are 
under misunderstanding (single mistake shared by both)”.44
It would be better to define the common mistake in accordance with the previous view. 
Namely, it needs to be clear whether the misunderstanding happened between the parties 
before the contract, or after the contract. Practically this can strongly influence the view 
that the common mistake is with regard to the entire contract, including the existence of the 
subject matter. It would be suggested that if common mistake occurs after the contract was 
being entered, this should be treated as a non-performance, or a total failure of 
consideration, or a failure of delivery. Of course the case would be different when common 
mistake occurs before the point of entering the contract is reached, this would be treated as 
mutual mistake which is connected mostly to offer and acceptance. Since mistake was 
established before the contract was entered into and before the goods existed, then there 
would be no need to discuss the contractual relationship from the very beginning, as no 
contract existed; similarly, nothing needs to be discussed or disputed about. Common 
mistake as to the existence of the subject matter is also an arguable issue as was discussed 
earlier. When the use of the phrase “common misstate” is used to discuss the contract’s
42Smith, Keenan, op. cit., P299.
43 L.B. Curzon. Dictionary of Law. 6lh Edition. Pearson Education. 2002. P279. ISBN 058243898
44 Elizabeth A. Martin, Jonathan Law. A Dictionary of Law. 6th Edition, Oxford University Press.P344.
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existence due to the existence or non-existence of the subject matter, then it can be said 
that the case would be about an agreement to have a contract. This would be resolved by 
establishing the existence of a “promise to contract” which would then have different 
approach, and different remedies.
The serious and clear discussion between the commentators is summarised in the case of 
McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission.45 Here the CDC promoted a tanker of oil 
which was expected to be on the reef to M. When M agreed and prepared to transport the 
oil, he did not find the tanker and he did not find the reef, simply due to both of them did 
not exist and had never existed. M claimed damages and succeeded for a breach of the 
contract. On the other side, CDC argued that the contract was void as the parties were 
involved in a ‘common mistake as to the existence of the subject matter’. The high court of 
Australia held that this alleged mistake was irrelevant.46 They concluded that there was no 
contract, what was established is only a promise that there was a tank. There was no further 
discussion on such issues as non-performance or non-delivery. There is a legal logic in 
considering promise as being more appropriate than contract under such case.47 This 
Australian case brings us back to the discussion on section 6 of the UK Sale of Goods Act 
(1979), to differentiate between perished goods after they had been existed and goods that 
had never existed. An interesting point that can arise here is the possibility of 
misrepresentation or fraud by the seller which has not been suggested. It would be helpful 
to bring misrepresentation to the table of the argument. There would be very high 
possibility in considering the case as being one of unilateral mistake from the buyer (M) 
and misrepresentation (of any sort) from the seller’s side (CDC).
45 (1951) 84 CLR377.
46 Wishart, op. cit., P247.
47 Laurence Koffman, Elizabeth Macdonald. The Law of Contract. 6lh Edition. Oxford University Press. 2007. P319. 
ISBN 0199207151. 9780199207152.
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There is no shared concept with regard to common mistake as to the existence of the 
subject matter. This is attributed to many discrepancies that can be derived by the 
discussion of the academic writers and the commentators. For example, Richard Stone has 
stated that “the clearest type of mistake which renders a contract fundamentally different 
from what the parties thought they were agreeing to, of which will be regarded as 
rendering the contract void, is where the parties have made a contract about something 
which has ceased to exist at the time the contract is made”.48 Stone surprisingly added an 
explanation for his argument, by stating that “where the subject matter ceases to exist after 
the contract is made, the doctrine of ‘frustration’ ...., applies, rather than mistake”.49 Stone 
was explaining common mistake and the non-existence of the subject matter ‘res extincta’. 
This is an example of a practical reflection of the controversies between the understandings 
of common mistake especially a mistake as to subject matter. However, Stone was very 
keen to consider common mistake within the context of section 6 of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 in the context of the subject matter ceasing to exist. Ultimately, he considered 
applying frustration rules to this situation and not the mistake rules. Stone did leave the 
door open for further debate on the matter as he was not clear whether he supports 
frustration in such a situation, when the subject matter has ceased to exist, or whether to 
follow his definition of common mistake. The existence o f the subject matter is also an 
issue under the doctrine of frustration50 which would, in this writers’ opinion, be a better fit 
to the circumstances of the case than the doctrine of common mistake.
The context of section 6 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 is also relevant. Focusing on the 
direct meaning of the text which states “where there is a contract for the sale o f the specific
48 Richard Stone. The modem law of contract. 5lh Edition. Routledge. 2002. P284. ISBN 1859416675. 9781859416679.
49 Ibid, footnote 21.
M) Furmston, op. cit.. P85-95.
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goods and the goods, without the knowledge of the seller have perished at the time when 
the contract is made, the contract is void”. When it comes to understand the sentence that 
illustrates ‘without the knowledge of the seller’, it does not imply that lack of knowledge is 
a mistake. It could be easily imaginable that the two parties are not mistaken, as section 6 
applies without the knowledge of the seller, it would be automatically and logically 
understood that the buyer did have the knowledge as well. So both parties have reached the 
contract according to a correct understanding, although that an unexpected event has 
occurred and destroyed or perished the goods, of which they did not know. This does not 
appear to have anything to do with a mistake. No one has made any mistake or 
misunderstanding of any of the facts of the contract. Both however, are under the lack of 
information with regard to what has happened to the goods after they have been contracted 
for.
A deeper observation into the existence of the subject matter, and its wider conceptual 
container ‘‘common mistake”, could be examined by another hypothesis. This other 
hypothesis should start with the concept of the shared mistake of intent of the parties, the 
parties intended to create a contractual relationship yet the contract was unable to be 
established due to the non-existence of the subject matter. It is easy to expect that both 
parties might did not have knowledge that the subject matter has ceased to exist, or has 
never existed. In the first case section 6 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 can be applied 
easily and consider the contract void. In the latter case, the easiest way to deal with it is to 
consider the contract void as both parties shared the same mistake in believing that the 
subject matter was existed although this was not true. In general, it would be better for the 
remedies to be decided according to the contract stipulations, whether the parties agreed to 
pay for the received goods (CIF) or for the goods “on board” a method of transport (FOB).
72
CIF and FOB terms are normally used in international sale of goods contracts. FOB means 
free on board where the seller would be asked to load the goods on the ship’s board for the 
interest of the buyer.51 The seller would be responsible also to achieve the lading bill in the 
name of the buyer. These are two main basic rules govern the FOB sale, yet it may be 
followed by other demands according to the agreement between the parties such as, the 
seller might be asked to issue the lading bill in his name and then he might be expected to 
book a space on the ship’s board in advance. In general, under FOB sale, the buyer is 
usually responsible to name the ship for seller and, to pay for the carriage cost with bearing 
the risk o f the goods after being on the board.52 The other type is CIF53 contract which 
means ‘a cost, insurance and fright contract’. Under the CIF contract the seller would be 
responsible on the goods’ carriage arrangements and ‘their insurance in transit’ all the 
arrangements would be part of the contract costs. The bill of landing, insurance document 
or policy, and the prices invoice would be forwarded from the seller to the buyer. The 
buyer would be required to pay on receipt of the documents.54
In addition, common mistake arrive under the general umbrella o f misunderstanding or 
misapprehension, which certainly would be generated by a kind of wrong belief. It would 
be supposed that an incorrect belief does not play a vital role in non-performance, failure 
of delivery, or the failure of consideration. A wrong or mistaken belief would be expected 
to take a certain form in order to apply; which should then be followed with a correct 
evaluation of the suggested facts of the present or the future contract between the parties 
for example, when the parties agree to contract on a property, the seller intends to sell his 
inherited flat on the fifth floor and the seller understands that he is buying the same flat. It 
is then discovered by both parties that the title of this flat is not transferred to the seller, as *324
51 http://www.i-b-t.net/incoterms.html. Accessed at 16/10/2009.
32 Furmston. op. cit.. P249. For further discussion see Wimble, Sons & Co. v. Rosenberg & Sons [1913] 1KB 279
53 http://www.i-b-t.net/incoterms.html. Accessed at 16/10/2009.
34Ibid.
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the “seller” had in fact, no right to inherit it. The “seller” was unaware of this fact, so the 
subject matter (the flat) of the proposed and intended contract had not existed from the 
start. Here it is clear that, the parties understood each other very well, yet the seller had a 
mistaken belief that he owned the flat, which then turned out not to be the case. The buyer 
was not mistaken and clearly he did understand the other party. Here there are two parties, 
yet one party is mistaken and the other falls into the same mistake, which could be an 
innocent misrepresentation.
When the contracting parties believe that the subject matter exists at the time of the 
contract, although the contract never existed the contract will be void.55 Also relevant, are 
the application by the English courts of the equity principles56 in order to declare a contract 
as being voidable. This may apply when both parties have made a mistake is about a 
crucial point in the contract, such as the quality or the value of the subject matter.57 
Nevertheless, most mistakes in practice make a contract void ab initio, which from the 
Latin, means “from the beginning”. The contract ever existed. Some hesitation may be 
touched by the law to consider the contracts void ab initio that built on a mistake as it does 
not want to support fraudulent claims of mistake.58 This is clearly understandable, as it is 
difficult to prove the fraud.
English equity59 is more flexible than English common law in permitting the avoidance of a 
contract in the case of mutual mistake. Based on logical analysis, a mistake must be 
essential or substantial before the intervention of the court. In Bell v Lever Brothers60 it was 
held that where there is an agreement between A and B to purchase a specific article, yet in
55 Olivo. Et AL, op. cit.. P75.
56 The equity as a legal context is to deal with the contracts that involve with unconscionable conducts such as 
misrepresentation, mistake, and fraud.
51 Samantha J. Hepburn. Principles of equity and trusts.2nd Edition. Routledge. 2001. P122. ISBN 1876905077. 
9781876905071
58 Carron-Ann Russell. Opinion writing and drafting in contract law. Routledge. 1996. P75. ISBN 1859410308, 
9781859410301
59 More about equity in P79 of this chapter.
60 [1932] AC 161 at 218.
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fact, the article had perished before the date of sale. In this case the parties agreed upon the 
subject-matter, yet consent to transfer or take delivery o f something not existent is deemed 
useless, so the consent is nullified and the contract is void.61 The approach is covered by the 
Sale of Goods Act.62 634The contract is would be void if the vendor was unaware of the 
destruction or the non-existence of the subject matter.
The Court o f Appeal in Kyle Bay Limited t/a Astons Nightclub v Underwriters 
Subscribing63 tackled the obvious contradiction in the case law on common law mistake 
which arose between the judgment in The Great Peace64 and in the case of Associated 
Japanese Bank v Credit du Nord SA65 In Associated Japanese Bank,66 67Steyn J. held that a 
contract could be vitiated for common mistake if, inter alia, resulted from the mistake “the 
subject matter of the contract [was] essentially and radically different from the subject 
matter which the parties believed to exist”. The judgment o f Stein J. was quoted with 
support by the Master of the Rolls, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, in The Great 
Peace.61 However, Lord Phillips then went on to present that a fundamental factor required 
to vitiate a contract for common mistake was “impossibility of performance”. The Court of 
Appeal in Kyle Bay considered that the two views considered the same thing, although, in 
the immediate case; the examination of whether the mistake made the subject matter of the 
contract essentially and radically different should be taken into consideration. Lord 
Thankerton came to a similar conclusion when he stated that a common mistake “can only
61 Principle derived from Couturier v. Hastie (1856) 5 H of L Cas. 673. That case involved the sale of a cargo of corn 
which, unknown to the parties, no longer existed at the time that the contract was concluded. Other decisions where 
agreements were held not to be binding were Strickland v. Turner (1852) 7 Exch. 208 - the sale of an annuity upon the 
life of a person who, unknown to the parties, had died, and Pritchard v Merchants' and Tradesman’s Mutual Life 
Assurance Society (1858) 3 CBNS 622 - an insurance policy renewed in ignorance of the fact that the assured had died.
62 Section 6 of The Sale of Goods Act 1893 was a statute which set out to codify the common law: “When there is a 
contract for the sale of specific goods, and the goods without the knowledge of the seller have perished at the time when 
the contract is made, the contract is void.”
63 [2007] EWCA Civ 57.
64 [2002] EWCA Civ 1407, [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 999, [2003] QB 679.
65 [1988] 3 All ER 902.
66 Policy No. 019057/08/01 (February 2007).
67 [2002] EWCA Civ 1407, [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 999, [2003] QB 679.
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properly relate to something which both must necessarily have accepted in their minds as 
an essential and integral part of the subject matter.”68
Interestingly, in Associated Japanese Bank v Credit du Nord SA69 the court discussed the 
interaction of common mistake with equity in English law. It has been noticed that Steyn J. 
commented that “where common law mistake has been pleaded, the court must first 
consider this plea. If the contract is held to be void, no question of mistake in equity arises. 
However, if the contract is held to be valid, a plea of mistake in equity may still have to be 
considered”. In fact, this gives quite solid ground and strong credibility for equity to be 
applied where a remedy is not found under common law. Of course this rule would be 
applied where the mistake is essential or unconscionable.70 Despite this fact, it was 
mentioned that this role of equity does not go very far into the detail of the contract and its 
contents, nor is it connected to its roots. It is restricted to the effects and remedies of the 
contract.71
2.3. Mutual Mistake
A mistake becomes mutual when the parties exchange the misunderstanding of their intents 
when they are at cross-purposes and they mean two different things.72 This situation can be 
addressed by demonstrating that the parties misunderstand each other, or they have failed 
to communicate to each other. There is an interesting note here, that the English law 
traditions consider such a contract unenforceable under the doctrine of mutual mistake. 
Nevertheless, where the hazard of the mistake is allocated appropriately to one party the 
contract would be enforceable.73 There is a notable opinion related to understanding mutual
68 (1932) AC 161, P235; (1931) All ER 1,P(36).258.
69 [1988] 3 All ER 902. [1989] 1 WLR 255.
70 Peter Gillies. Concise contract law. Federation Press, 1988. P121. ISBN 1862870012. 9781862870017.
71 Hepburn, op. cit., P123.
72 Haigh, op. cit., P I56.
73 Parchomovsky, Siegelman and Thel. op. cit., P95.
76
mistake which suggests that mutual mistake can be treated as two unilateral mistakes,74 
which is a point of view worth developing either in case law or by way of academic 
commentary. However, great care is required when dealing with this opinion as the remedy 
for unilateral mistake is different from that for mutual mistake. In general, unilateral 
mistake does not provide the authority to the mistaken party to rescind the contract, unless 
the other party was aware of the other party’s mistake. This would then render the contract 
voidable.75 Mutual mistake would generally render the contract void.76 Logically and 
analytically, mutual mistake is the mistake that is made by two parties; everyone is 
mistaken with regard to the other party’s thoughts. So it is possible to state separately that 
the first party is mistaken and the counter party is mistaken as well, as a result this has 
created two unilateral mistakes. Here something could be added to enrich this suggestion 
with more details to be built on, but with one provision, that this proposal could be 
available for further discussion if there is no misrepresentation or fraud by one or other of 
the contracting parties.
When the contracting parties exchange a misapprehension and fall into a mutual mistake 
with regard to a contract, it means that the shared consent does not exist. This leads to 
conclusion that there is no contract. If the issue in question is a clerical mistake, which is 
known as a scrivener’s mistake, the court would then be in a position to correct this 
mistake. The contract would not therefore be considered invalid.77 The same rule is 
established under the Scottish contract law, where the court has a wide space to use 
(Scottish) equity in order to correct a clerical error in order to reflect the real intention of 
the contracting parties.78 It is clear that a mutual mistake arises if the parties are mistaken, 
albeit with different mistakes. When this type o f mistake appears the subsistence of a
74 Wishar. op. cit.. P278, Footnote 6.
75Emerson, op. cit.. P99.
76 Ibid.
77 Contracts. Encyclopedia of Business and Finance. Ed. Allison McClintic Marion. Gale Group. Inc.. 2001. eNotes.com. 
2006. 17 Feb/2008. P2. http://www.enotes.com/business-finance-encyclopedia/contracts.
78 Glasgow Feuing and Building Co. v. Watson's Trs., 1887. 14 R. 610. Lord Young. P618.
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contract relies on many factors, such as a meeting of minds, or a genuine offer and 
acceptance. The point to be investigated under mutual mistake is to find out whether the 
contract was established between the parties or not. Based on that, the contract would not 
be binding where there is an occurrence o f mutual mistake.79 This is due to the contract 
does not established between the parties. It is better to answer the question whether the 
contract was created at all. A simple way to explain this is to argue that, originally there 
was no contract, this is due to the mutual consent of the parties was not created. Everyone 
directed his consent to a different subject and their minds did not meet to create the 
contract. The reasonableness standard would be applied to find out if a contract has existed 
or not. This would be applied by testing if a normal person would have considered whether 
or not the contract existed, and to discover whether the intentions of the parties have been 
so directed.80 81
In fact, many cases would reflect a mutual mistake where the contract would not have been 
considered to have existed. As a leading case Raffles v Wichelhausu provides a clear 
example where both parties intended to contract on the same subject matter, yet, on the 
basis of different facts, that that could be considered as a mutual mistake. In this case 
where the buyer agreed to buy cotton and understood that the ship called (Peerless) would 
arrive from Bombay to Liverpool. In fact, the buyer and the seller did not realise that there 
was another ship which had the same name and it would also be arriving from Bombay. 
The buyer intended the ship arriving on October, but the seller intended the one which was 
due to arrive in December. The court backed the defendant, holding that he did not have to 
accept the cotton.
79 Emerson, op. cit., P98.
80 Stone, op. cit.. P296.
81 (1864) 2 Hurl & C  906.
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As with many cases of mistake, the above case attracted debate. The judgement was 
criticised by writers arguing that the mistake did not go to the substance of the contract; 
therefore, it should not have been avoided.82 This is a strange conclusion, as it would be 
very clear that the date of arrival is crucial for the buyer. The issue to be investigated is 
whether the parties considered the time of arrival as an essential factor of the contract or 
not. Clearly, the date in this case was crucial for the buyer. It would be understandable that 
time has crucial role within the commercial deals. An interesting comment was delivered 
by the US commentator83 Oliver Wendell Holmes who did not agree with the English 
court’s decision, arguing that the decision was ‘misleading’ as the law does not have 
anything to deal with the parties’ minds. Wendell Holmes suggests that the judgement 
should be established on the basis of the external behaviours of the parties. He argued that 
the court decision was not established as the two parties intended different things to each 
other, although the two parties expressed or said ‘a different thing’. Wendell Holmes 
pointed out, that when the plaintiff used the name of the Peerless intending the ship 
arriving in December and the defendant intended the ship arriving in October, that this was 
due to the seller used just the name of the ship without mentioning the date.84 It is true that 
the judgement should be established on the behaviour o f the parties not on what they bear 
in their minds or intents. In contrast, it is also important to realise that the behaviour is a 
reflection of the intent or mind. Of course, it would be considered different, as Wendell 
Holmes argued, when there is a fraud by the parties, where the parties can conduct or say 
something different from what they bear in their minds. It would be better if Wendell 
Holmes insisted that the judgement should follow the reasonableness which can make the 
balance between the internal intent and the external conduct.
82 Kevin M. Teeven. A history of the Anglo-American common law of contract. PI 84. Greenwood Publishing Group. 
1990. ISBN 0313261512. 9780313261510
83 He was a former judge of the US Supreme Court, and he is one of the most important common-law judges in the USA.
84 Oliver Wendell Holmes. The Common Law. Adamant Media Corporation, 2001. PP309. 310. ISBN 1402166257. 
9781402166259.
79
Interestingly, the discussion in Kyle v Kavanagh85 which was heard in court in the USA 
after the ruling in Raffles v Wichelhausf6 this was despite the fact that the facts in Kyle v 
Kavanagh were exactly the same as in Raffles v Wichelhaus; albeit in different a time and 
different jurisdiction. In Kyle v Kavanagh the seller offered to sell land that he owned in 
the Prospect Street in specific town and the buyer accepted the offer. Neither party knew 
that there were two streets with the same name in the same town. The court dealt with this 
case in very simple way. Since the parties represented two different objects, it was held 
that no contract existed. In the U.S. case of ITT Corporation v. LTX Corporation 87 saw the 
earlier case of Kyle v. Kavanagh as evidence of the non meeting of minds when the parties 
addressed the different meaning materially to the contract. So logically where there is no 
meeting of minds in US law there is no place for considering the contract’s existence. It is 
very clear that every case could have different decision even if it held the same or similar 
facts. The discretion of the judges is very important in understanding every specific case, 
and who to deliver it.
The English case of Scriven Bros v Hindley88 which is a case about the confusion (mistake) 
between hemp and tow, both o f them being offered at auction; where the defendant offered 
very high price for the tow believing it to be hemp. It was held that the contract was void. 
This case is presented as an example of mutual mistake. Building on this decision, it seems 
to be that the court considered that the two parties have fallen into the mistake mutually, so 
both were not agreeing on the same point or purpose. In this case they are not ad idem. It 
would be logical to think that the auctioneer should reasonably have known that the 
defendant was mistaken as he offered a much higher price than the market price. In one 
hand, the case could be considered as an induced unilateral mistake as the auctioneer 8567
85 103 Mass. 356(1869).
86 (1864) 2 Hurl & C 906.
87 926 F.2d 1258 (1991).
88 [1913] 3 KB 564.
should reasonably have known that the buyer was in mistake. While in contrast, the case 
could be dissuade a unilateral mistake as the auction might be considered to be a special 
situation. It is possible that some items or goods in the auction could be sold more or less 
than they would normally be available on the market.
Despite all the listed facts and discussions, still the categories of common and mutual 
mistake are not resolved in a clear manner. It has been mentioned earlier at different points 
that the mutual and common mistake categories were classified by some as being in the 
same category. This usually occurs when some cases could be a mix between the two 
categories, or by considering that both categories have some of the same elements. A US 
perspective is that o f Miceli, which examines law from the perspective of economics, 
pointing out that the case is totally different as he considered the mutual mistake as a 
common mistake. Miceli did not refer to the category of common mistake at all, 
alternatively, he categorised the elements of the mutual mistake as exactly those 
considered by many of commentators as being the elements o f common mistake.89 The 
same opinion was indicated within an English commentary in Economic principles of law, 
which indicate common mistake as a mutual mistake by using both interchangeably to 
indicate the same meaning.90 Generally, this brings the mixing between the two categories 
to the zero point, where it can create an open and unexpected argument which can be 
encouraging to build the clear boundaries between the two categories or to combine both 
categories within the same doctrine. It is clear that in the US some writers defined common 
and mutual mistake collectively, considering the two terminologies to reflect the same 
concept. That said, in the case of common or mutual mistake that ‘both parties are 
labouring under the same misconception’.91 This writer can understand why this approach
89 Thomas J. Miceli. Economics of the law. Oxford University Press US, 1997. P95. ISBN 0195103904, 9780195103908
90 C. G. Veljanovski, Institute of Economic Affairs (Great Britain) Economic principles of law. Cambridge University 
Press, 2007. P197. ISBN 0521873746, 9780521873741.
91 Damien Abbott. The shorter encyclopedia of real estate terms. Published by Damien Abbott, 2004. P502. ISBN 
0966894618.9780966894615.
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is adopted by some commentators. There is a certain level of instability in creating one 
uniform definition of common or mutual mistake as either a shared or two different 
concepts.
2.4. Unilateral Mistake
In the case of unilateral mistake one party makes a mistake where the counterparty (other 
party to the contract) does not share the mistaken notion or belief with the first one, yet the 
second party understands, or should have realised about the first party’s mistaken belief. In 
fact, two situations would be expected to occur where the unilateral mistake is established. 
Firstly, the other contracting party understands or would be expected to be aware of the 
mistake, which would lead to the contract being void ab initio 92 as was the situation in 
Hartog v Colin & Shields.93 In such case there would be no need to prove that the mistaken 
party suffered from a misrepresentation or deceived by the other party, whether the 
unmistaken party knew or is expected to have known of this mistake.94 Secondly, the non- 
mistaken party did not know, nor would he have been expected to know of the mistake. In 
such as situation the contract could not be avoided on the basis of the caveat emptor rules, 
which requires that every party has to take care of his own interests.95 In such a situation an 
objective test should be applied to know whether a reasonable person would know or have 
to know about the other party’s mistake.96 Usually under English law, in case of unilateral 
mistake regarding the terms of contract, if the mistake is known to the other party, this may
92 Treitel. An Outline of the Law of Contract, op. cit.. PI 37.
93 [1939] 3 All ER 566.
94 Hannah v. Blumenthal [1983] 1 AC 854
^  Treitel, The Law of Contract, op. cit., P 361.
96 Cf The Unique Mariner [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 438.
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render the contract void.97 It should be mentioned, however, that unilateral mistake may not 
render the contract void if the mistake was just connected to the subject matter.98
In Hartog v Colin and Shields99 where the offer of selling Argentine hare skins was 
accepted. The seller had intended to sell the goods per piece, and not per pound, since 
selling per pound would be much cheaper than selling per piece. In addition it was 
confirmed that the trading custom in these circumstances was to trade priced per piece. On 
the basis of the facts the buyer should have known of the seller’s mistake during the 
negotiation process when they formulate the offer. The question that would be logically 
raised is about the attitude of the buyer in keeping silent about the seller’s mistake. It is 
true that the buyer did not make any direct misrepresentation or fraudulent statement, yet 
simultaneously, he had contributed in inducing the seller to fall into a mistake. It would 
even be said that caveat venditor would not be applicable in this case as the buyer knew of 
this mistake during the negotiation process. It might be acceptable to apply caveat venditor 
if there were no negotiations between the parties before entering into a contract.
It is obvious that a unilateral mistake only results in the contract being void under English 
common law if the mistake was known to the other contracting party. Additionally, 
mistake leads the mistaken party to express his offer or acceptance incorrectly. This could 
happen where the offer is expressed in terms of a price by weight, whereas the offeror 
intended the price quoted to be per unit and the offeree knew this to be the case.100 The 
situation is not always considered in this way. For example, in Smith v. Hughes,101 the 
defendant bought oats from the plaintiff believing that the oats were old. In fact the oats 
were new, and the plaintiff was aware that the defendant had made a mistake with regard
97 Chitty on Contracts, supra n. 24, para. 5-022. p. 308. P35. Emil Y M. Weitzenboeck. Electronic Agents and the 
Formation of Contracts International Journal of Law and Information Technology. Vol. 9 No. 3. pp. 204-23. 
http://www3.oup.co.uk/inttec/. Oxford University Press 2001.
98 Atiyah, op. cit., P 253.
99 [1939] 3 ALL ER 566.
100 Zweigert. op. cit.. P 20.
101 (1871) LR 6 QB 597.
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to the real age of the oats yet he did not correct the defendant. Since the contract had no 
warranty with regard to the oats’ age, it was held that the contract is valid, as there was no 
place to consider unilateral mistake as a ground of rescission and the defendant should bear 
the responsibility of his own mistake. This brings us back to the principle of caveat emptor 
where the buyer is required to take care of his own interests. Caveat emptor was not kept in 
the same position, according to John Kleinig, caveat emptor doctrine has been eroded in 
favour of caveat venditor,102 which is supported clearly by Atiyah.103 When the principle of 
caveat emptor was originated in English law of Middle Ages the goods were mostly 
available in the open markets to be tested by the buyers, so they could rely on their own 
judgments. The situation became different when the trade and the commercial dealings 
started to rely more on the distant sellers.104 This became very clear after the amendments 
that have been made to the Sale of Goods Act in 1994,105 after enacting the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contract Regulations 1994;106 caveat emptor doctrine seems to become 
weakened gradually. With regard to these developments, it is noticed that caveat emptor 
would not be able to give the lessor or seller the protection if there is a claim against their 
negligence in regard of defect in the sold or rented property.107 108
In the above case Smith v. Hughes,108 Cockbum CJ stated that, since there was no express 
guarantee in the contract that connected to the specific offered commodities, the buyer has 
the complete opportunity to test or check these commodities; he decided to rely on his own 
judgement, so the principle of the caveat emptor applies.109 In commenting on the same 
case, Blackburn J110 backed the previous opinion strongly. It is strange to find this attitude
102 John Kleinig. Paternalism. Manchester Universtiy Press. 1983. P177. ISBN 0 7190 1703 3.
103 P S Atiyah & J N Adams. The Sale of Goods. 9th Edition. London Pitman. 1995. P i l l .
104John Tillotson. Contract law in perspective. Cavendish Publishing Limited. 3rd Edition, 1995. P106. ISBN 1 85941 002 2.
105 Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994, the Amendment of the Sale of Goods Act 1994.
106 Statutory Instrument 1994/3159.
107 Smith. Keenan, op. cit., P555.
108 (1871) LR 6 QB 597.
109 Ibid 604.
110 At 606-8.
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especially when it found that the plaintiff was totally aware of the defendant’s mistake. It is 
strange for not considering unilateral mistake as a ground of rescission in the previous 
case. This would be against a legal principle that prevents the unmistaken party to take 
advantages from the other party’s mistake.111 In fact the unmistaken party in the previous 
case112 was benefited from the mistake of the other party. In addition, it can also be noted, 
that the unmistaken party acted in bad faith and caused such a loss, which can be 
considered within the boundaries of misrepresentation. It could be argued that this contract 
would be void under the rules of equity. Gillies, writing from an Australian perspective 
states that unilateral mistake under equity would render the contract void where the 
mistake is fundamental and there would be no reasonability to keep the contract valid. This 
case would be applied whether the unmistaken party knew or he did not know about the 
other party’s mistake.113
The above line of argument, it is supported by the recent of Spice Girls Ltd (SGL) v. 
Aprilia World Service (AW S)114 Here Spice Girls Ltd entered into a contract with Aprilia 
World Service to fund a trip for Spice Girls. In return, Spice Girls agreed to perform some 
promotional activities for the defendant. The defendant believed that the pop band 
comprised five members, when, by this time, there were only four “Spice girls”, with Ms 
Halliwell (Ginger Spice) having just left the pop band before the conclusion of the contract 
between the band and Aprilia World Service. The court had considered that when the band 
did not disclose the fact that the fifth member confirmed her leaving as a ‘partial non­
disclosure’ or ‘half truth’.115 It is in general a very rich case, in that includes many different 
perspectives; it includes the effect of change of circumstances making a statement
111 Michael H. Whincup. Contract law and practice. 5th Edition. Kluwer Law International, 2006. P292.
ISBN 9041125213, 9789041125217.
112 (1871) LR 6 QB 597.
113 Gillies, op. cit., P241.
m  [2002] EMLR 27, CA.
11:> Damian Taylor. Contract law. Oxford University Press, 2007. P169. ISBN 0199299994, 9780199299997.
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untrue,116 non-disclosure, misrepresentation, half truth, fraud, damages and silent 
misrepresentation as results of unilateral mistake.
The case of Spice G irls L td  (SGL) v A prilia  World Service (AWS) can attract a lot of 
academic commentary as it covers many legal relevant points. It has been treated under the 
misrepresentation rules due to the silence of SGL, despite the fact that under English 
contract law, silence has not been considered to be a misrepresentation. In general Spice 
Girls L td  provided a clear example that the courts could give unpredictable and different 
decisions in regard of similar cases. It is strongly believed that there is no clear 
measurement to rely on when it comes to categorising or classifying mistakes. As has been 
mentioned above, Hartog  v. Colin &  Shields117 held that there was no contract between the 
parties as the buyer kept silent about the seller’s mistake when he offered the hare skins by 
the pound weight, rather than per piece and the buyer accepted on those terms, without 
correcting the mistake. In both cases silence played a vital role, the unmistaken party 
should have been aware of the mistake due to the particular circumstances of the case, even 
if he had not know originally of it. Academic writers, Treitel,118 Stone,119 and Richard,120 
tend to consider that unilateral mistake renders the contract to be void ab in itio , when the 
unmistaken party is aware of the mistake of the mistaken party.
Here, there have been some suggestions not to consider all unilateral mistakes which are 
known by the unmistaken parties as void ab initio. This is based on considering unilateral 
mistake within two categories; the first one being a mistake with regard to the subject
116 Smith. Keenan, op. cit., P736.
117 [1939] 3 All ER 566.
118 Treitel. An Outline of the Law of Contract, op. cit.. PI 37.
119 Stone, op. cit., 7th Edition. P388.
120 P. Richard. Law of Contract. 7th Edition. Pearson Longman, London, 2006. P225.
86
matter and other one is a mistake with regard to the promise. It is suggested that unilateral 
mistake with regard to the promise would render the relevant contract void.121
Based on the study of the mistake cases and their commentaries, different sorts of mistake 
generate different legal effects regarding the contracting parties and the contract itself. It is 
difficult to predict in advance what is the precise effect and remedy of each category 
before the judgement being released by the court. It is obvious that a mistake from one 
party regarding the contract’s terms can be overridden with the fact that, the unmistaken 
party understood that the mistaken party agreed to his terms.122 As a result, mistakes with 
regard to the terms of a contract regularly have no outcome on the enforceability of the 
agreement. Nevertheless, if one party agrees on the conditions of the contract, that he never 
anticipated agreeing whilst the other party knew or have to be known about the mistake 
before the contract, this contract might be held void. In this case the enforceability of this 
contract would be irrational. The partial and unspoken recognition of good faith as a 
control mechanism for contractual relationships is evident in rulings of this sort.123
It is concluded that, in English law, the doctrine of mistake is very constricted; yet, it is 
complemented by a liberal doctrine of misrepresentation,124 which will be discussed in 
detail later on in this chapter. In a contract between A and B, where the mistake is 
unilateral, B’s insistence on performance according to the strict terms of the contract is 
generally not affected by the mistaken belief of A. Whether A has any right to rescind or 
rectify the contract shall depend on various criteria which are well established in common 
law cases.125 In English law, a unilateral mistake, which is well known by the other party
121 J. Beatson, Anson’s Law of Contract. 28th Edition.Oxford University Press, 2002. P323.
‘"Cartwright, op. cit., P15.
123 Tetley, op. cit. P I7.
124 Beale, op. cit., P333.
125 Principles regarding the rectification for unilateral mistake, are set out in A gip SpA v. N avigazione A lta  Italia  SpA 
[1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 353 at 360-362 (Slade LJ), Commission for New Towns v Cooper (Great Britain) Ltd [1995] Ch 
259 at 277D to G and 280D (Stuart-Smith LJ) and, more recently, in George Wimpey UK Ltd v VIC Construction Ltd 
[2005] EWCA Civ 77.
87
are grounds for relief only when the mistake relates to what the terms of contract are. If the 
mistake is one as to motive, mistake is not relevant (though there may be relief for the 
misrepresentation)126 which will be discussed according to the law in regard with the 
unilateral mistake.
In relation to unilateral mistake, Chitty on Contracts127 states that “Unilateral mistake is not 
by itself a ground for rescinding or rectifying a contract unless the other party had 
knowledge about the mistake. It appears that the knowledge must be actual knowledge. It 
is not enough that the party against whom rectification is sought may have suspected that a 
mistake had been made; yet if a party wilfully shuts its eyes to the obvious, wilfully or 
recklessly fails to make inquiries as an honest and reasonable man would make, that will 
count as actual knowledge”. The previous statement simply confirms that maintaining 
silence in regard of mistake by the unmistaken party could count as a misrepresentation 
and contribution in inducing the mistaken party to fall in mistake. This stand point is fully 
supported by this thesis point view, which believes as some others do,128 that the 
contracting parties should act in good faith when they decide to enter into a contractual 
relationship.
Section 3: Operative Mistake
3.1. Mistake as to Law
A mistake of law arises when the parties do not realise their legal responsibility or 
obligation under the contract and they carry out their obligations mistakenly. This 
demonstrates that the party cannot pretend that he/she does not realise his/her duties under
126 Beale, op. cit., P364.
127 29th Ed. in para 5-100 headed “Unilateral mistake" at page 424
128 Tetley, op. cit. P I7.
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the contract and regard it as voidable. Simply, the parties are committed and bound by their 
contractual legal obligations.129
During 1802, Sir William Evans published an essay on the Action for Money Had and 
Received.130 In his essay, Sir William strongly supported the opinion that money paid by 
mistake is recoverable, whether the mistake is one of fact or law.131 In a later publication in 
1806, Sir William, stated that the rule is clear enough and clarifying itself by its terms, 
which eluded that no person can give himself an excuse to be freed from implementing his 
obligation by pretending that he is an ignorant of law ‘or acquire an advantage, or avoid a 
detriment, when he has omitted using the means ordained by law for those purposes. 
Applied to the immediate subject matter, it has no reference to the point, of money paid 
under a mistaken idea of a preceding obligation.’ This maxim is properly directed to cases 
in which a person was charged with wrongdoing.132 In general, there is a fact connected to 
the payment made under a mistake of law, in which is adopted by English law where it 
states that the payment would not be a ground of recovery for itself. In the contrary 
example, if the prim a fecie is involved in the payment made under a mistake of fact it 
would be recoverable.133 With regard to the same issue Lord Goff concluded that the 
English law had no principle decided that money paid upon to void contract was 
irrecoverable, this is based on the mistake of law, if the contract had been completely 
performed within the terms which have been agreed upon.134
129 Preparation and Review Guide for Auctioneer and Apprentice Auctioneer Licensing Examinations. Developed by the 
Alabama State Board of Auctioneers. 2002. P I2.
130 This has since published in [1998] RLR 1, the text having been prepared for publication by Professor Peter Birks and 
Dr Lionel Smith of Oxford University.
131 And criticised the contrary view of Pothier denying recovery where the mistake is one of law.
132 See Professor Keener's Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Contracts .1893. P85. and Professor Woodward's the Law of 
Quasi-Contracts .1913. P54.
133 The law commission report, law commission No 227, restitution: mistakes of law and ultra vires Public Authority 
Receipts and Payments, 30th September 1994.
134 Law Reform Commitee. Singapore Academy of Law. Paper on Reforms to The Law of Restitution on Mistakes of 
Law( The paper considers the law as it stands relating to claims for recovery of payments made under a mistake of law 
and the impact of the House of Lords’ decision in Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council & 3 other appeals 
[1999] 2 AC 349, and the implications for reform in the relevant aspects of the law of restitution. PI 2.
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If the payments were implemented obviously under a mistake of law and the payer had 
realised that requirement had no need to be fulfilled with, since it was away from, the 
command of the related authority to make such a requirement, subsequently the payer 
would not need to make the payment. In this case the recovery is permitted.135 For a long 
time, the rule rejecting recovery of monies paid under mistake of law had become a general 
one, forming a high and actually strong construction of authority for plaintiffs to defeat.136 137
In Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council137 the House of Lords had decided that the 
money paid under the mistake of law should be recoverable by the claimant. As it is 
mentioned within the chapter, this case actually was a remarkable one as it has turned the 
rule of the common law, which previously considered the payment under the mistake of 
law as unrecoverable. It has been mentioned even that the decision that has been taken 
considered the unrecoverable payment under the mistake of law had no longer part of 
English law.138 139In the same case’s commentary, Lord Goff mentioned that this case came to 
existence after two hundred years of applying the opposite rule (payment under mistake of 
law is unrecoverable) as a rule of public interest.
In general the argument with regard to the recovery under the mistake of law did not stop
after Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council',139 it has rather continued with some recent
cases. In Anderton v Clwyd CC140 14where the Court of Appeal raised the question of whether
the mistake of law is established within the case. Afterward, in Brennan v Bolt Burdon &
Orsul which accepted the mistake of law to be operative and consider the contract to be
void under such mistake. Notably, during this research, most of the cases that established
the mistake of law were about the money paid under this mistake. It is good to mention that
135Andrew S. Burrows. Et Al. Cases and materials on the law of restitution. 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press, 2005.
P I77. ISBN 0-19-929651-0 987-0-19-929651-4.
136 Keith Spencer. Restitution of Monies Paid Pursuant to a Mistake of Law. Vol. 12. 2004. P155.
137 [1998] 4 All ER 513.
138 Richards, op. cit., P397.
139 [1998] 4 All ER 513.
140 [2002] EWCA Civ 933; [2002] 3 All E.R. 813.
141 [2004] EWCA Civ 1017.
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the earliest case was established at common law which, suggested that a mistake of law is 
not a ground of recovery has appeared as an obiter dictum  in Buller J in Lowry v. 
Bourdieu,142
3.2. Mistake as to Fact
A mistake of fact occurs when the contracting parties believe that they are contracting on a 
factual subject, yet in reality it is not true or incorrect and the agreement is based on this 
mistake. For two hundred years, the English law has had a regulation which considers a 
payment that paid under a mistake of fact may generally be recovered by the payer that has 
been mistaken.143 This argument appears more obviously within the case of the Australia  
and New Zealand (A N Z ) Banking Broup Ltd  v Westpac Banking Corporation , 144 when the 
High Court opened the range for two questions, the first is to ask whether the mistake of 
fact must be classified as an essential mistake, the second is whether there is an adequate 
reason of payment. These questions have been reflected by the Australian High Court in 
David Securities Pty L td  v Commonwealth Bank o f Australia145 when the High Court gave a 
negative answer regarding the first question, and responded positively regarding the latter. 
Besides that, it seemed that the court invested this chance to get rid of the old rule that 
rejected recovery of money paid under a mistake of law. This attitude tends to the English 
law attitude in this regard as it is mentioned a bit earlier.
In initial records of English law, there was no separation between the two different 
classifications of a mistake of fact and a mistake in law.146 According to Lord Goff of 
Chieveley in Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council, 147 the first proposition to segregate
142 [1780] 2 Doug KB 468 at 471, 99 ER 299 at 300.
143 Furmston, op. cit., P2.
144 (1987) 164 CLR 662.
145 (1990) 93 ALR 271
146 RM Jackson. The history of Quasi-contract in English Law. WM W Gaunt &Sons Inc. 1968. P 58-61.
147 [1998] 4 All ER 513.
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between mistake of fact and mistake of law derived from the obitur dictum  of Buller J  in 
Lowrie v Bourdieum where his Lordship established the statute of non-recovery on the 
maxim ignorantia ju r is  non excusat.U9 The differentiation between the assertions of fact 
and of law seems to have been enthusiastically agreed upon during the 19th century, yet it 
has positively been considered as an uncooperative perception within the last 50 years.148 950 
Most considerably, latest recent decision that has been realised by the House of Lords in 
Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council,151 this established that mistakes of fact, as 
opposed to mistakes of law, allowed recovery benefit that the defendant had received at the 
claimant’s expenditure.152 The same situation occurred in Cooper v Phibbs,153 154where the 
nephew used to pay the rent of the fishery for his uncles’ daughters, despite the fact that 
the fishery was his own, yet he did not realise that. It was held that the contract is voidable.
Nevertheless, usually when the contract is involved in mistake of fact, this makes the 
contract void ab in itio. This implies that the contract would be considered to have never 
existed. In summarise, where the mistake of fact (fundamental) is found in the contract, 
under this situation the mistake would prevent the contract from being formed from the 
beginning.134 It is important to mention that there is no general rule under English law of 
contract that enforces the unmistaken party to inform the other contracting party in that he 
is acting under a mistake of fact.155
148 (1780) 2 Doug 468 (99 ER 299).
149 Bridging the Great Divide between Mistakes of Law and Fact in Restitution: is the bridge safe to cross? Singapore 
Academy of Law Journal. 1 IS. Ac. L. J. 1999. P322.
150 Furmston, op. cit., P2.
151 [1998] 4 All ER 513.
152 K lein w ort Benson LTD  v. Lincoln C ity Council [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL).
153 (1867) LR 2 HL 149.
154 Cartwright, op. cit., P497.
135 Reiner Schulze. New features in contract law. Sellier. European law publ. 2007. P 359. ISBN 3866530366. 
9783866530362
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3.3. Mistake as to Identity
Mistake as to identity can be one example of a unilateral mistake, where a person may 
make a mistake about the identity of the other contracting person, or when he enters a 
contract and makes a mistake in regard of the personality that he is entering the contract 
with. A person may believe that he is dealing with a particular person, although in reality 
that person is someone else.156 In general in this case if the innocent party can prove that 
the identity of the other party was vital to the business, the contract is void.157 It would also 
be possible to think about the probability of the mistake occurring as to identity under the 
mutual mistake, where the two parties are mistaken with regard of the identities of each 
other. It seems to be that under English law, if one party went into a contract under a 
mistake, as to the identity or of the other, the contract would be considered void especially 
if mistake was induced by misrepresentation. In English law, the only case of mistake as to 
the person would be operative is the mistake as to identity. It precludes the contract from 
being formed, this is due to English law does not recognise fraud unless when the party has 
effectively deceived the other contracting party.158
Interestingly, fraud was considered as a reason to render the contract void under mistake as 
to identity of the other contracting party, even when this fraud establishes mistake as to 
identity where the contract is done face to face. The clear example occurred in Ingram  v 
L ittle ,159 where the seller advertised the sale of a car, a person who responded to this 
advertisement presented himself as another person who lives in Caterham. The seller made 
the offer for the real name. It was held that when the seller contracted with a person who 
attended physically, he was not the real person to whom the offer intended to be made; 
additionally, he believed he was the person who physically attended. All the case events
156 Smith, Keenan, op. cit., P312.
1V7 Haigh, op. cit., P156.
158 Beale, op. cit., P366.
159 [1961] 1 Q B 31.C .A .
are about the subject of fact. Based on that, Court of Appeal decided that the seller had the 
right in the sold car. The mistake as to identity is expected to be induced by fraud or 
misrepresentation, yet simultaneously, it would be expected to be established without fraud 
or misrepresentation. In the two situations, there would not be a contract as there is no 
meeting of the minds between the parties.160
As other mistake cases, mistake as to identity attracted some arguments from some legal 
writers who suggested that mistake as to identity would not render the contract void.161 It 
was argued in Phillips  v Brooks L td , 162 that when there is an alleged contract or something 
similar, with one of the parties making a mistake with regard to the other party’s identity, 
this could mean that the contract is voidable but not void ab initio. Waddams, Et al. built 
their discretion about Phillips v Brooks Ltd  on the justification of Horridge J who 
suggested that the parties Phillips  v Brooks Ltd  made a bargain and the contract was 
established. This is apparently true; although, when it goes deeper into the case, it would 
be said that the seller’s mistake as to identity was established by the buyer’s fraud, while in 
reality the seller would not enter into the contract if the alleged name of the buyer was not 
registered in the phone directory. In this case the minds of the seller and the alleged name 
did not meet to form the contract. Under this situation two points would occur, the first is 
to elude that the contract is void ab in itio  as never existed. The second is to demonstrate 
that the contract is existed but it would be voidable.
More interestingly Ewan MacIntyre does not envisage the mistake as to identity renders 
the contract to be void, if the parties meet each other face to face.163 Ewan discretion is
160 John J. P. Krol. Construction contract law. John Wiley and Sons. 1993. P198. ISBN 0471574147. 9780471574149
161 S. M. Waddams, Et al. Cases and Materials on Contracts. 3rd Edition. Emond Montgomery Publication, 2005. P446. 
ISBN 1552391663,9781552391662
162 [1919] 2 KB 243.
163 MacIntyre, op. cit., P46.
94
against Ingram v L ittle ,164 which is mentioned a bit earlier where the seller and the buyer 
contract face to face, the seller made a mistake about the buyer’s identity, as a result the 
contract considered void. It is visible that the points of the controversies between the 
academic writers on one hand with the controversies between the judges from case to 
another on the other hand. It demonstrates that every case could be treated totally different 
from the previous or the later one, it does show that sometimes, there is no fixed standard 
to decide about the case occurred from time to time. This is attributed to us witnessing an 
opinion stating that mistake as to identity renders the contract void,165 which in turn came 
as opposite to Phillips  v Brooks L td , 166 1678in which that this type of mistake would render the 
contract voidable not void. This controversy was repeated with regard to mistake as to 
identity when the parties deal with each other face to face, as it mentioned at the beginning 
of this paragraph.
The same level of controversy was clear in Cundy v. Lindsay,161 where the rogue pretended 
to be the firm of Blenkiron & Co., by setting up in the same street and signing his name 
(which happened to be Blenkarn) in such a way that it could be read as Blenkiron. The 
court was satisfied that Lindsay had only intended to contract with Blenkiron. They had 
sent an offer to Blenkiron & Co. only if Blenkarn knew of the truth, Lindsay would not 
have accepted it. It was held that the contract is void. Another example which could be 
helpful to explain this subject happened in King's Norton M etal v. Edridge, M errett &  
Co.m the scoundrel set up a back street company and provided it overstated note titling to 
asserting to be a rich trader. It was pointed that the misled company determined to enter 
into contract with the scoundrel’s company depending on the mistake of its attraction and 
not of its identity, no remedy was awarded. It is not clear why no remedy has been
lM_ [1961] 1 QB 31. 
lfo Haigh. op. cit., P I56.
166 [1919] 2 KB 243.
167 [1878] 3 App Cas 459.
168 [1897] 14TLR 98.
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awarded, since all the cases of this contract are built on the mistake of identity, whilst one 
of the contracted parties has been deceived or induced to enter the contract. It would be 
implied that there was no logical basis not to award the misled party under any kind of 
remedies such as the rectification or any others sort of compensation.
A similar attitude can be observed in Lewis v Averym where Lewis advertised his car for 
sale. A man, whilst pretending to be Richard Green convinced Lewis to believe that he is a 
well-known film actor. The person paid the price by a cheque. Lewis asked him to see his 
identity proof, he showed him a studio pass which bore the name Richard Green and a 
photograph of the person. The person took the car however the cheque was dishonoured. 
The person sold the car to a third party who bought the car in good faith. When Lewis 
brought an action to the court it was held that the contract is voidable but not void. This is 
because Lewis dealt with the person face to face and he failed to show that he considered 
the identity of the rogue as a vital matter when contracted with him. It is said that the seller 
is responsible about his transaction when he decides to accept dealing with the buyer 
according to his presented identity. Lewis was just mistaken in regard of the other party’s 
attribute not about his identity. The contract was considered voidable not void as Lewis did 
not void the contract before the involvement of the bona fide  third party.
Based on the previous discussion, two attitudes would be concluded in regards of mistake 
as to identity to be mentioned. The first argued that the mistake as to identity of the person 
is different than the mistake as to an attribute of the person. Obviously this attitude 
suggests that a mistake as to identity, avoids the contract, yet it is not the same case when it 
comes to a mistake as to attributes. It does not appear that there is any difference according 
to this distinction as logically and legally, the name of the person is part of his/her attribute *
[1971] 3 All ER 907.
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or character.170 In other words, the name is the key of the identity, no one could be known 
without name, if someone provides wrong or false name, it would be logically held that it 
is the matter of a mistake as to identity. There is no reason to ask if the false name that 
given is a mistake as to the attribute or as to identity.
To clarify, it is difficult to agree with the cases above, as it would be as an encouragement 
for rogues to continue their fraud way and misrepresent more people, which is against the 
basic purposes of the law. So, from what the case law established, the claiming to mistake 
of identity should take two conditions into consideration, the claimant should present the 
evidence that he intended to enter the contract with definite party, while it was not any 
kind of negligence from the claiming party. Multiple complexities and difficulties derive 
from the law of mistake which extend for so many little points and branches which have 
completely different analysis, in many times and from one to another, especially in the 
courts decisions.
3.4. Mistake as to the Title
To transfer the ownership of the personal property, three essential legal demands need to 
be available to complete the legal procedures, the payee identity, the necessary character or 
description of the transferred property and the number of property. To make the agreement 
as an effective one, the parties should have real intent related to all three. If any mistakes 
occur with regards to one of the three demands, then this would be considered fundamental 
mistake.171 This subject is also connected to the existence of the subject-matter which is 
connected to mistake as to the title where it is not known to the parties that the purchaser 
was already the owner of the property that the vendor intended to sell him. In this case if
170 C itibank NA v. Brown S h ip ly [  1991] 2 All ER 702.
171 David Fox. Property in Intangible Money. Property and Trusts. SLS Society of Legal Scholars. Session 4 Friday 9th. 
University of Cambridge. Strathclyde Conference 2005.P10.
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the parties anticipated to make an effective transfer of the ownership: this kind of transfer 
would not be possible according to the rule of naturali ratione inutilis ,172
Section 4: Misrepresentation
4.1. Legal Background of Misrepresentation
The Misrepresentation Act 1967 is implemented in England. This provides legal grounds 
to deal with misrepresentation. It is established or built on some fundamental pillars. For 
misrepresentation to be actionable there should be a false statement present.173 174Jorden v. 
Money114 mentioned that the falsity would be treated differently between fraudulent and 
non-fraudulent misrepresentation. Under non-fraudulent misrepresentation the law treats 
the statement of fact differently from the statement of opinion or intention. Non-fraudulent 
misrepresentation would not be considered to be actionable unless it is related to an 
existing fact, the false statement of opinion or intention would not be considered as 
actionable unless it was made fraudulently. This generates a logical result that considers 
the statement of fact and the statement of opinion as actionable if they are established 
fraudulently.175 In addition, Nottinghamshire Patent Brick and Tile Co v. Butler176 
explained that misrepresentation can be considered as actionable sometimes if it is 
established by the half truth. Generally, the fact would be represented falsely by a positive 
(visible) act by the representor could be by wording or conduct.177 To reiterate, 
misrepresentation in most cases would be connected to fact as it is established in section 
2(1) of Misrepresentation Act 1967. Considerably in Avon Insurance p ic  v. Swire Fraser
172 B ell v L ever Brothers L td  [1932]. Lord Atkin at P 218.
173 Haigh, op. cit., P156.
174 (1854) 5 HL 185.
175 Cartwright, op. cit.. PI 10.
176 (1866) 16Q BD 778.
177 John Cooke. Law of Tort. 7th Edition, revised. Pearson Education, 2005. P420. ISBN 140581229X, 9781405812290
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Ltd  178 it has been stated by Rix J that the parties’ intention in relation to the underwriting 
for the next year can be considered as a misrepresentation under section 2(1) of 
Misrepresentation Act 1967.
Therefore, English law prevents the parties from misinforming each other, even if 
unknowingly- this would be applied according to the reasonable person standard. In this 
case, it is better for the person who does not say anything to be protected. However, 
contracting parties should not portray the wrong impression to each other regarding to the 
contract subject matter, innocently or fraudulently, they should be committed maintaining 
their exchanged interests.179
Normally, the law expects all the parties to enter the contract with good faith, with 
reasonable efforts to perform the contract to achieve the interest of the contracting parties. 
The effect of the statement in the pre-contractual stage is a central point of 
misrepresentation.180 This would be connected strictly to the other contracting party who 
claimed against misrepresentation. In order to count the misrepresentation the 
misrerpesentee, they should have been affected by misrepresentation for entering the 
contract. Clearly, if the misrepresentation was established though the party was not 
influenced by it, and he entered the contract relying on his own checks, so no 
misrepresentation.181 In Attwood v Small182 where was held that there was no 
misrepresentation as the purchaser decided to enter the contract relying on his own 
experience, not on the basis of the exaggeration (misrepresentation) of the other party. It is 
obvious that to consider the misrepresentation to be actionable, the misrepresentee should 
build his decision for contracting upon to the misrepresented fact. The promise would not
178 [2001] 1 All ER. 573.
179 Weitzenbock, op. cit.. P5.
180 Furmston. Et Al, op. cit.. P303.
181 Peter Birks. An introduction to the law of restitution. 2nd Edition, revised. Oxford University Press. 1989. P169. ISBN 
0198256450, 9780198256458
182 (1838) 6 C 1 & F . 232.
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be considered as a misrepresentation, as it is not counted as a statement of fact, unless the 
promise is mounted as a term of a contract.183
While the parties are not obliged to unveil essential materials on the subject of the 
transaction to each other, nor spend sensible attempts to achieve an agreement, contract 
law compels an obligation on the parties of contract not to create fake statements for 
misrepresenting and induce the other party to enter into the contract.184 Generally, it is 
agreed that to consider misrepresentation as an existing action, the way of the facts 
expression has to be false, does not express the reality as it should be, this could transpire 
when there is an inconsistency between the facts as represented by one of the parties and 
the real facts which would be believed by a reasonable person.185 In this case the 
misrepresentation should be operative.
To consider the false representation an operative, it should be connected to fact. It should 
be noted that the fact would be connected to the past or present. In relation to this case, the 
unclear or inflated statements will not be enough to seek the relief;186 it is the same 
situation about the expression of the parties’ opinion, unless the statement or the 
expression was provided by an experienced or a knowledgeable person in connection with 
the contract subject as an essential factor to consider the liability.187 The opinion would be 
considered also as a misrepresentation if the party intended to release his opinion wrongly 
as it has been explained.188 One academic writer has stated that if the seller exaggerates 
describing his items by puffing the presented items, it would not be considered as a 
misrepresentation.189 It would be said that for misrepresentation to be established, the 
exaggeration could be included within its elements. Exaggeration would be understood
183 Furmston. op. cit., P79.
184 Wishart M., op. cit.. P195.
18:1 Lord Mackay of Clashfem, Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th edn., Vol. 31 (Bath, Bath Press, 2003) para 743.
186 Smith v. C hadw ick  (1884) 9 AC 187.
187 M utual Life and C itizen 's Ins Co L td  v. Evatt. [1971] AC 393.
188 Larry May, Jeff Brown. Philosophy of Law. Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. P503. ISBN 140518387X, 9781405183871.
189 Cartwright, op. cit., P I9.
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sometimes, especially in the commercial transactions as representing the fact of the 
product against its features. As a result it could be misleading to the other party, 
establishing a misrepresentation. In other words, exaggeration can easily induce a person to 
enter a contract, which he would not enter without the involvement of the exaggeration. 
This case would be imaginable, when the seller exaggerates in describing a car by saying 
that its loading capacity is 300 KG, yet in real the maximum is 200KG. In this case and 
any similar, if the other party built his/her decision to buy on this exaggeration, so the 
misrepresentation is established.
It is believed eventually that most areas of mistake and misrepresentation are mixed and 
touch the borders of each other where they occur. Due to this, where an operative 
misrepresentation takes place, automatically there is a mistake on behalf of the party to 
which the representation was made. Of course, this is just when this party does not realise 
that there is false representation which makes him/her able to consider that as basis of a 
legal remedy.190
In this chapter, a very simple definition of a misrepresentation is adopted, which exposes 
that a misrepresentation is a false statement of fact that one party (the representor or the 
party making the representation), makes to bring the other party (the representee or the 
party to whom the representation been made) to the contract. It has been concluded from 
the provisions of the Misrepresentation Act 1967, and in accordance to the commentaries, 
that a false statement, misleading, misinforming, must be connected to the fact not to the 
law. It is worth mentioning the difficulties in distinguishing between an opinion and a fact 
in practice as sometimes an opinion can be an expression or a reflection of the fact.191 
Nevertheless, it is possible that statements of opinion contain an implicit statement of fact.
190 Bennion. op. cit., P426.
191 Samuel, op. cit.. P325.
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This mainly arises when a person in control who has an exceptional knowledge or 
expertise makes the statement.192 Even though this examination could not be acceptable 
easily due to the difficulty, which prevents the measure of the people’s status of mind, this 
difficulty is not restricted at some point.
In English law, a misrepresentation is regard as a representation, which maintains to be, a 
declaration of fact, it is not about the intention or opinion or law, which is in fact false or 
incorrect. To consider the misrepresentation as an operative, it must have the structure of 
inducing the misrepresentee to enter into the contract with the misrepresentor.193 
Nevertheless, a solution in tort for negligent misrepresentation might exist for the innocent 
party, who built his opinion or decision on a negligent misinformation that the other party 
has given him.194 However, there are legal effects to distinguish between the opinion and 
the fact. A vital distinction with regard to statements of opinion and belief generally refers 
to the fact that they “have no legal effect as it is not a positive assertion that the fact stated 
is true.”195 Misrepresentation in English law encompasses the tort of deceit,196 legislative 
responsibility for negligent and innocent misrepresentation under the Misrepresentation 
Act 1967,197 and the common law tort of negligent misrepresentation as in Hedley Byrne v 
Heller.198 This all leads to the conclusion that the subject is not easier or less complicated 
than the mistake, as it has many branches and many controversial areas. In addition there 
are many varying decisions for similar cases, and so on.
The Misrepresentation Act 1967 expands the legal remedies to include the consumers, 
when they enter into a contract that is affected by a misrepresentation, which was initiated 
by the seller. It noticed that the Act deals with the circumstances when a consumer finds
192 Esso P etroleum  Co L td  v. M ardon  [1976] Q.B. 801.
193 Bradgate, Brownsword and Flesner, op. cit.. P33. Footnote 19.
194 Weitzenbock. op. cit., P8.
195Treitel. The Law of Contract, op. cit., P6.
196 D erry  v. P eek  (1889) 14 App Cas 337.
197 The claim under s 2 (1) is linked to the making of a contract, but still tortious in nature.
198 H edley B yrne & C o L td  v. H eller & P artners L td  [ 1964] AC 465.
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that he/she can cancel the contract in a case of innocent or negligent misrepresentation, 
with the right of claiming damages as a legal remedy or solution. It was notable that the 
Act provides the consumer the legal right to be compensated for the loss, which happens 
from any misleading signal (misstatement) that induced the other party to enter a contract. 
The exceptional case here when the issuer of the statement will be able to submit evidence 
proving reasonable grounds for believing that the facts negotiated were true at the time of 
the contract. The consumer directly, through civil proceedings, may enforce the remedies 
presented by the Act.199
It would be understood that, in order to establish an actionable misrepresentation under the 
common law as well as under s.2 (1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967, the wronged party 
(the party who was under misrepresentation) must demonstrate that the representation was 
an explicit and included a false statement of fact. The fact should be material and create the 
inducement of the contract. If misrepresentation is created by silence and connected to an 
unambiguous false statement of fact, in this case Spencer Bower & Turner200 stated that ‘A 
misrepresentation may be made by silence, when either the representee, or a third person in 
his presence, or to his knowledge, states something false, which indicates to the representor 
that the representee either is being, or will be, misled, unless the necessary correction be 
made. Silence, under such circumstances, is either a tacit adoption by the party of another’s 
misrepresentation as his own, or a tacit confirmation of another’s error as truth.’ Silence as 
a case of misrepresentation was held in Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society 
v. Borders.201
It has been mentioned before that it would be expected to face many complications and the 
difficulties that could occur during the dealing with the legal effects of the
199 Office of Fair Trading. Enforcement of consumer protection legislation. Guidance on Part 8 of the Enterprise Act. 
Enter price Act 2002. June 2003. P52.
200 The Law of Actionable Misrepresentation. 3rd Edition. Butterworths, London. 1974. P101.
201 [1941] 2 A11ER 205.
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misrepresentation. It could be noticed that the contradiction touches the area of the silence 
and its connection with the misrepresentation. It has been found that some mentioning 
indicated that the silence may cause the misrepresentation, as the case that mentioned 
above. Simultaneously, it has been revealed that another mentioning proposed something 
different, that is, usually the silence cannot make up or cause the misrepresentation.202 This 
creates some difficulties towards developing a clear understanding for the whole subject. 
In general, it has been mentioned that silence could be turned and considered as a 
misrepresentation in some cases. If the facts have been changed during the contracting 
process and the party did not state these changes as it has been seen in Spice G irls L td  
(SGL) v. A prilia  World Service (AWS).203 2045It would be considered as a misrepresentation. In 
Peek v Gurney20* the nondisclosure of the information that could be counted as deforming 
the represented fact would be similar to the case of silence. It could also occur when it 
makes the declared true statement to become misleading as it happened in Nottingham  
Patent Brick and Tile Co. v. Butler.105 A similar scenario is evident in T ra ill v Baring206 
where the representor kept acting according to the previous representation, despite the fact 
that this representation became false according to his knowledge. It might occur also when 
it is connected to material facts in insurance contracts, or where the contracting parties 
have a special relationship between them (relatives, fiduciary).207
For the functions of English law, a statement of fact is the first prerequisite of a 
representation, typically, that is to say, a positive affirmation competent for being 
confirmed as correct or false.208 Despite the general rule in English law, which does not 
require parties to disclose information, there are a few exceptions. These exceptions relate
-02 K eates  v C adogan  (1851) 10 CB 591.
21,3 [2002] EMLR 27. CA.
204 (1873) L .R 6H L 377.
205 (1886). 16 Q.B.D. 778.
206 (1864) 33 L.J. Ch. 521.
207 MacIntyre, op. cit., P157.
208 Whincup. op. cit.. 4th Edition. P278.
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to the fact that if certain information was not disclosed it could lead to a danger of 
misrepresenting. For example, if a person makes a statement which is initially true he has a 
duty to correct it if, later, as a result of a change in circumstances, it becomes false. 
Likewise, if a person creates a partial statement which is correct in itself; yet it is creating 
misleading impression, due to the slip of some information, he is at fault of 
misrepresentation.209
In the doctrine of misrepresentation, academic writers almost have the same opinion to 
assert also damages or rescission for misrepresentation, the claimant ought to demonstrate 
justifiable dependence on the defendant’s representation. As it has been concluded from 
the Act of misrepresentation 1967earlier, the false statement must be connected to the fact 
not to the law or the mere opinion.210 Even though this examination would not be easy to 
apply, as a result, it would be difficult to establish a measure to evaluate the status of the 
people’s mind.
While the parties are not required to unveil essential materials connected to the transaction, 
nor spend sensible attempts to achieve the agreement, contract law compels an obligation 
on the parties of contract not to create fake statements for misrepresenting and inducing the 
other party to enter into the contract.211 Thus, a misrepresentation renders the contract 
voidable at the option of the representee. Statements of law are not treated as statements of 
fact, but the distinction is often hard to draw. A representation in respect of a legal 
document may be related to its contents or to its meaning. If the former, it is a statement of 
fact, if the latter it may be a statement of law, yet even here, a statement of fact could be 
implied. Statements as to future intentions are not usually statements of facts as long as the
209 Bradgate, Browns word and Flesner. op. cit.. P95.
210 Samuel, op. cit., P325.
211 Wishart M, op. cit., P195.
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intention is honestly held.212 According to English/Common law, the misrepresentation 
includes three categories as following:
4.2. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
In this sort of misrepresentation, the representor implies a false statement, either knowingly 
or carelessly. The concept of the carelessness here is about the person, who creates the 
statement (representor), being not sure whether this statement was true, and he did not 
make enough efforts to check if it is true or not. In this case the representee has right to 
rescind the contract and claim damage. One of the remarkable points that could be 
mentioned here is that the cases of misrepresentation which affect the contract previously 
was considered as voidable rather than void. This opens the options for the party who was 
adversely prejudiced by the misrepresentation to decide whether or not to go ahead of the 
contract in spite of the misrepresentation.213 Fraudulent misrepresentation would be the 
most important of the misrepresentation categories. This is due to the fact that usually, this 
type of misrepresentation generates damages as a legal remedy, so it needs particularly 
strict procedures for it to be proved. It is understood that the court would be very accurate 
and carful to decide about the involvement of such sort of misrepresentation. The failure of 
approving it might generate a defamation action against the plaintiff.214 It would be 
expected to find more arguments between the legal and academic writers on the matter of 
the fraudulent misrepresentation as it is very integrated with the unilateral mistake which 
are also attracting a lot of discussion and argument.
The remedies under the Misrepresentation Act 1967 denote that, if the party entered the 
contract by the inducement as a conclusion of misrepresentation which alleged by the other 
party; and the misrepresentation never turned out to be included as a contractual phrase,
212 Strachan & H enshaw  L td  v. Stein Indusrie ( UK) L td  (1998) 87 B.L.R. 52.
213 Haigh. op. cit., P157.
214 Richards, op. cit., P200.
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the representee was permitted to withdraw the contract whether the misrepresentation was 
fraudulent, negligent or completely innocent. Beale215 seems to have adopted a different 
opinion when he states that at common law, the right to withdraw from the contract would 
be available if the misrepresentation was fraudulent or if there was a total breakdown of 
consideration. Beale considered that there is a right to withdraw as the innocent 
misrepresentation is under the equity and not under common law. Since the Act was 
permitted the right of withdrawal, it is eligible, unless in the case of fraud, by the authority 
of the court to reject rescission and give damages in lieu.216 It is said truly, that in the case 
of misrepresentation, there is no need to prove that misrepresentation was the only motive 
for entering the contract. It is enough for the misrepresented party to show that 
misrepresentation was one of vital reasons or motives for becoming involved with the 
contract.217
It can be concluded that when fraudulent misrepresentation occurs, it would be treated 
totally differently from the other kinds of non-fraudulent misrepresentation. It would also 
be expected that the fraudulent misrepresentation circle is wider than the other kinds, 
because it might include cases of fraudulent non-disclosure, concealment, sometimes 
silence, and in some cases the half truth. Consequently, the fraudulent misrepresentation is 
a type of opportunistic behaviour in a pre-contractual context. In both civilian and common 
law jurisdictions the contracting party is entitled to claim damages if he/she suffers a loss 
from acting on the misrepresentation made intentionally by another contracting party.218 
Briefly, the fraudulent misrepresentation is a false representation which has been made 
with full knowledge that it is not true or even as carelessly as to whether it is true or false. 
All these elements are made dishonestly in order to induce the party to enter the contract.
215 H. G. Beale, Et Al. Contract: Cases and Materials.5th Edition. Oxford University Press, 2007. P308. ISBN 
0199287368, 9780199287369.
216 Weitzenbock, op. cit.. P6.
217 Furmston, op. cit., P79.
218 Zhou. op. cit., P84.
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As a result, such misrepresentation would make the representor liable under the tort of 
deception. As mentioned previously, the representee would be entitled to claim for all the 
losses that he has suffered due to the fraudulent misrepresentation. The losses would be 
measured as a direct and the indirect losses.
As a result of this part, for seeking the claims on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentation, 
two main elements should be present. The fraudulent misrepresentation must be material 
and the representor intended to induce the representee to enter to the contract. In addition, 
the materiality in this context signifies that the representation seriously affected the 
decision of the representee which could be different in the absence of the 
misrepresentation.219 Briefly, the basic elements of the fraudulent misrepresentation are, the 
intention should be directed to create the inducement, to consider this, the misrepresentor 
should be realised that the representation is not true and has no belief that the 
representation is the truth.
4.3. Innocent Misrepresentation
Section 2 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 of England excluded the responsibility of the 
non-fraudulent misrepresentation (innocent misrepresentation) within the contracts.220 So 
there is a meaning of the innocent misrepresentation. Principally, the innocent 
misrepresentation is unqualified to provide a rise to claims for damages at common law, 
except when the representation was released as a guarantee of contract.221 Some others 
argue that innocent misrepresentation could comprise the remedies of damages and 
rescission. In general, this situation would be subject to the discretionary role of the court, 
whether to entitle the misrepresntee damages in lieu of rescission.222 This clarifies that the
219 D. Sanders and T. Rattray. Interpretation of Construction Contracts. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP. November 15. 2001. 
P17.
220 Bowen, op. cit., P7.
221 Samuel, op. cit., P325.
222 Peel, op. cit.. P383.389.
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interested writers or the authors possess different point of views towards the proper 
remedies that should be applied when the parties face innocent misrepresentation. The 
same applies for the other sorts of misrepresentations (negligent and fraudulent). It is 
noticed that this area gives rise to much academic commentary and argument due to its 
connectivity with many other areas of remedial options, such as, equity, rescission, 
damages, termination and some others. All of this could even make the mission of the 
judges and the courts more difficult when it comes to the decision of similar cases that 
have similar situations and conditions. There is some connection should be mentioned 
here, when the innocent misrepresentation occurs, it means that there is a shared mistake 
with the other party.223
4.4. A Negligent Misrepresentation
A negligent misrepresentation is the one, which came into existence or was made 
recklessly, or without convincible justifications for considering it to be factual.224 *From 
what the research has driven, conceptually, the developments of negligent 
misrepresentation started with Hedley Bryne & Co Ltd  v. Heller &  Partners.215 
Nevertheless, a solution in tort for negligent misrepresentation might exist for the innocent 
party, who built his opinion or decision on a negligent misinformation that the other party 
has provided. In addition, consider that a contract would be created, yet the innocent party 
beard the loss based on this case.226 The Misrepresentation Act 1967 expands the legal 
remedies to include the consumers and allowed to them, when they come into a contract 
that is affected by a misrepresentation, which has been made by the seller.
223 Bennion, op. cit., P426.
224 Weitzenbock, op. cit., P5.
22> H edley B yrne & Co L td  v. H eller & P artners L td  [1964] AC 465.
226 Weitzenbock, op. cit., P8.
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The Act deals with the circumstances when a consumer finds that he/she can cancel the
contract under the case of an innocent or negligent misrepresentation with the right to 
claim damages as a legal remedy or solution. It was notable that the act gave the consumer 
the legal right to be compensated for the loss, which happens from any misleading signal 
(misstatement) that caused the inducing to enter a contract. The exceptional case here when 
the issuer of the statement will be able to submit evidence proving the reasonable grounds 
of the believing that the facts corresponded to were true at the time of the contract. The 
consumer, directly through civil proceedings may enforce the remedies presented by the 
Act.227 The Act extends to England and Wales. As is mentioned during this chapter, the 
English courts have indicated that liability for negligent misstatement can be established 
only where there is sufficient proximity between the parties, where it is just and reasonable 
to impose a duty of care.228 A beneficial point in this discussion is to push the sellers or the 
services offerors or the producers to make sure about the validity of the products they 
offer. Here, even the courts could use their own evaluations to decide what the suitable 
decision against the misrepresentor, based on the type of the misrepresentation that has 
been made, with keeping the right of misrepresentees to claim for the damages in all cases, 
unless they involved directly in making the misrepresentation. Of course the sellers, (could 
be any service offeror) should be committed to the obligations of the Misrepresentations 
Act 1967. This Act entitles the people, who entered a contract under fraudulent 
misrepresentation and they suffered losses as a result, to claim damages. If 
misrepresentation is not fraudulent, the plaintiff (buyer) must submit evidence showing 
that he reasonably relied on the misrepresentation to enter the contract.229 This issue is very 
controversial as it leads to many debates and arguments regarding the distinction between 
the fraudulent and non fraudulent misrepresentation for the claimants which suffered from 
the loss.
227 Office of Fair Trading, op. cit.. P52.
228 Financial Markets Law Committee, op. cit.. Para 3.2.
229 Williams, op. cit.. P7.
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The most appropriate method to deal with this case is to consider that all the 
misrepresentation cases should be counted as a sellers’ responsibility to prove what the 
grounds of the misrepresentation are, whether they are fraudulent or not, since it is more 
difficult for the ordinary people to prove that especially with complicated transactions. To 
solve this practical difficulty, the Law Reform Committee in its tenth Report made 
proposals which finally resulted in Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. This 
provides that, if a party entered a contract under the misrepresentation of the other and he 
suffered loss as a result of this misrepresentation, then the misrepresentor would be liable 
to damages if he made the misrepresentation fraudulently, he would also be liable even if 
he did not make the misrepresentation fraudulently; however, he would not be reliable if 
he proves that he had reasonable ground to believe and did believe up at the contracting 
time that the represented facts were true.230 Though, it is not enough to imply that the 
declaration or the statement was false; beside that, the false statement should cause the 
inducement to bring the consumer for entering the contract.
Consequently, the reliance on the false statement is required to establish misrepresentation, 
even though still there is some mystification as to whether real dependence has to be made 
known231 or the dependence should be reasonable.232 As a conclusion out of this point, the 
lack of dependence on the provider’s statement, it could not be considered that there is 
actionable misrepresentation. It means that, where the actionable misrepresentation is 
available the contract will be voidable and the misrepresentee will be permitted to 
withdraw or rescind the contract or even to claim for damages, yet the rescission of 
contract as a standard remedy of the misrepresentation is optional.233
230 Zhou. op. cit., P85.
231 M useprim e P roperties L td  v. A dhill P roperties L td  [1990] 2 E.G.L.R. 196.
232 Pan A tlan tic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. P ine Top Insurance Co. Ltd. [1995] 2 AC 501.
233 Bradgate, Brownsword and Flesner. op. cit.. P69.
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It would be helpful to mention that a lot of shops around the country allow their customers 
to return items if they found anything wrong in these items. This is could be a kind of 
responsibility regarding the innocent or negligent misrepresentations. There is no reason to 
ask the purchaser to confirm the misrepresentation or to define if it is fraudulent or not. 
According to this rule, once the representee proves that he/she suffered a loss by acting on 
the pre-contractual misrepresentation made by the representor, it is the representor’s duty 
to show his honesty rather than the representee’s duty to prove the representor’s fraud. 
Although the representee can, in theory, choose to take legal action against the representor 
for damages either with the234 action of deceit or under Section 2(1), it is obviously 
advantageous for him to choose the latter option.235 An insurance contract could be 
excluded from the previous rule as long as the insurer can demonstrate that the material 
breach of the duty has taken place, the remedy of avoidance can be deployed even if the 
assured has acted honestly and reasonably.
The insurer can, therefore, rescind the entire contract and with it all liability under the 
contract no matter how minor or innocent the non-disclosure or misrepresentation.236 Royal 
Court of Justice mentioned to similar principle in the Equitable Life Assurance Society v 
Ernst and Young237 where it was revealed that the duty of care is requested under the 
contract and all who offer professional services for reward, are implicitly under an 
equitable duty of care and the way of performing the services they offer. It demonstrates 
that in the action of deceit, a person (the representor) is liable for his/her misrepresentation 
if he/she knowingly or recklessly (i.e. not caring whether his statement is true or false) 
makes a false statement to another person (the representee) with intent that it shall be acted 
upon by the representee, who does act upon it and thereby suffers damage.238
234 Zhou. op. cit., P85.
235 Zhou, op. cit.. P86.
236 Soyer, op. cit., P9.
237 [2003] EWCACiv 1114.
238 D erry  v. P eek  (1889) 14 App. Ca. 337. At Zhou, op. cit., p85.
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One useful point could be added here, which is with regard to the liability that is connected 
to the misrepresentation. In general, it is apparent that misrepresentation would not be 
considered as grounds for relief unless the contract has been induced by the 
misrepresentation, where the misrepresentee relied on this misrepresentation to enter the 
contract.239 It could be concluded that English law, with regards to misrepresentation, 
allows the parties who are contracted under the effect of a false statement to take various 
kinds of remedies such as, to rescind the contract and/or claim damages, to terminate the 
contract based on the breach if the false statement has been considered as a term of the 
contract. It is really up to the misrepresentee to choose which kind of remedial options can 
be applied or claimed.240
Clearly, the three types of misrepresentation (fraudulent, negligent, and innocent) would 
have the possibility to be treated under the rescission rules; however, utilising the right of 
rescission would be available upon to the representee’s claim, not upon to the court’s 
decision.241 24Conversely, the misrepresentee has the right to ask or claim for the rescission 
and damages in the same time, as it is shown in Archer v. Brown.1*1 Both fraudulent and 
negligent misrepresentation would give arise to the tort liability, which is not be available 
in the case of innocent misrepresentation.243 Nevertheless, it has been noticed that the 
English courts are very restrictive with regard to fraudulent misrepresentation, so it would 
be difficult for the courts to consider the misrepresentor as a fraudulent.244 It might be 
useful to mention some facts in relation to misrepresentation. One of those facts is that 
some of the legal writers dealing with common law do not distinguish between fraud and 
misrepresentation. It is understood that “fraud is an intended misrepresentation of a
239 Skipskreditforeningen  v. E m peror N avigation  [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 67 at 73.
240 Bradgate. Brownsword and Flesner, op. cit., P95.
241 TSB Bank p ic  v. C am field  [1995] 1 WLR 430, CA. 438.
242 [1985] Q .B.401.
243 Cane, op. cit., P I95.
244 Furmston. op. cit., PI 12.
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material fact, made knowingly, with intent to defraud.”245 According to this definition, 
misrepresentation is an instrument of fraud, and making misrepresentation would bear the 
same meaning of defraud.
Fraud is when one party uses a deception or misrepresentation to gain an advantage on the 
account of the other contractual party.246 To clarify, the party defrauding the other party is 
the same as the party being misrepresented by the other party. Furthermore, it is noticed 
that the key word with regard to misrepresentation could be ‘intentional or unintentional’ 
to put the misrepresentation in the exact category of fraud and deceit. Instead of using 
fraudulent misrepresentation, some common law commentators used intentional 
misrepresentation as being parallel to deceit, so, according to this perspective the party 
who involved in a contract due to the intentional misrepresentation or deceit, here 
intentional used interchangeably with deceit, would not be committed to any legal 
obligation, as there was no agreement since the minds did not meet.247
Section 5: Conclusion
The doctrine of mistake under English contract law can be considered as one of the most 
important doctrines under the law of contract. This area of law has been investigated 
seriously and widely by the legal scholars and academic writers. Despite this serious 
investigation, the types of mistake still attract serious and interesting argument by the 
academic levels and the courts discretions. The main quandaries that can be concluded 
with regard to English doctrine of mistake is that there are no stable remedies which can be 
confirmed as a standard to a particular type of mistake. This is attributed to some of the 
mistake types are not stable with regard to the definitions. The clearest example is the type 
of common and mutual mistake, where there is still a strong argument connected to their
245 Emerson, op. cit., P97.
246 Miceli, op. cit.. P93.
247 Emerson, op. cit., P100.
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definitions. It is apparent that many of law cases related to mistake and its types did not 
take clear form within the courts and the judges’ arguments. It is noticed that many of the 
cases have very similar facts and based on very similar details but they ended with totally 
different courts’ decisions. This could impose two things; firstly, English doctrine of 
mistake is very rich of legal argument which can be improved and developed according to 
the legal facts and circumstances. Secondly, the English doctrine of mistake is not stable; it 
requires more legal discussion for it to be considered as stabilised and formalised. Overall, 
mistake under English contract law has clear categories containing clear general and 
specific types of mistake which allow the doctrine to be adaptable with the legal 
developments that occur from time to time.
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C h a p te r  T h re e
T h e  C o n c e p t o f  E r r o r  in  S co ttish  C o n t r a c t  L a w
Section 1: Introduction
Error is simply defined as misapprehension or1 misconception; a wrong or incorrect belief 
that is related to fact or law. It is alternatively called an uninduced error.2 Generally 
speaking, error does not render a contract void unless it is a substantial error3 (induced or 
not induced)4 which excludes the contractual consent.5 It is suggested that if an error is 
caused by a third party, the party in question is unable to reduce the contract. According to 
Hector L MacQueen and Joe Thomson, error in general attracts a lot of controversies 
amongst academic writers.6 Scottish academic writers rely on conventional civilian views 
when they discuss the issues surrounding error.7 In this chapter, the concept of error and 
its categories are discussed with some comparative perspectives, especially in the case of 
English law.
1.1 Error in Law
Error under this category means that the party entering into the contract does not 
understand what the legal results of the contract are and, equally, when the party does not 
understand his or her rights. Usually, this kind of error comes under the legal maxim that 
says Hgnorantia ju r is  neminem excusat, ’ which means that no one is excused when
1 Walker, op. cit., P14.1.
2 Rahmatian. op. cit., P3.
? Hec, op. cit.. P60.
4 J M Thomson. The Effect of Error in the Scots Law of Contract. Acta Juridica. 1978. PI 35.
5 Hec. op. cit., P60.
6 MacQueen, Thomson, op. cit., P I59.
7 J M Thomson, op. cit., P135.
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claiming an ignorance of law.8 Based on this rule, error of law does not generate any 
negative effects in regards to the contract legality.9 This situation occurred in Cloup v. 
Alexander,10 when a French comedy company agreed with ‘A.’ to lease them the 
Caledonian theatre of Edinburgh to perform their events for five weeks. The French 
comedians entered another agreement with Murray to perform at the Theatre Royal within 
the five week term and they refused to perform at the Caledonian Theatre. ‘A.’ then raised 
an action against them; they defended themselves alleging that they did not realise that the 
law would not allow them to perform outside the Theatre Royal because it ‘was the only 
theatre’ where their style of performance was acceptable. It was held that their ignorance 
of the law would not justify their withdrawal from the agreement with A., and resultantly, 
the contract did not involve illegality.
Another example occurred during Laing v. The Provincial Homes Investment Co. L tdn 
regarding the interpretation of a document which came a under error of the law. In this 
case ‘Mrs L.’ established an action against a building company with whom she entered into 
a written agreement. According to this agreement she paid certain sums. Later on Mrs L. 
sought to recover the money she paid by alleging that the agreement terms were not clear. 
Consequently she sought to reduce the agreement. It was held that Mrs L. had no right to 
withdraw from the agreement based on her allegation, due to the lack of clarity, which is 
not a reason to reduce the contract. This error is mentioned by Lord Kinnearl2; that the 
parties cannot escape from their obligations which are documented in the written terms of 
the contract. They are bound according to these terms, and the contracting parties are not
8 B a ir d ’s Trustees v. B aird. (1877) 4 R 1005. See also: B ritish H ydro-C arbon C hem icals L td  v. British Transport 
C om m ission. 1961 SLT 280.
9 B aird 's  Trustees v B aird. (1877) 4 R 1005. See also: B ritish H ydro-C arbon C hem icals L td  v. British T ransport 
Com m ission. 1961 SLT 280.
10 (1831) 9 S. 448.
11 1909 S.C 812.
12 At P.822.
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able to escape from the contract by alleging that they failed to understand the result or the 
meanings of the terms which they initially endorsed.
If a contract is reduced and there is no contract, the sums are paid to the other party in good 
faith on the strength o f the contract and can then be recovered under the doctrine of 
condictio indebiti,'3 the law of unjust enrichment under the Scottish law. A similar case has 
been referenced with regards to the concept of error under Islamic contract law which 
offers a clear comparative perspective, showing that both laws have very comparable 
attitudes towards the error of law.13 4 It is worth mentioning that error does not coincide with 
‘operative.’ But, error compares to fact, as it would be considered as an operative if it is 
fundamental. Error would be fundamental if it was connected to the transaction subject 
matter. In this case, this kind of error could be considered as a ground of reducing the 
contract.15
Section 2: Uninduced Error
2.1. Error in Expression
This sort of error would be established if the final form of the contract did not reflect the 
precise intent that had been taken by the contracting parties.16 In other words, error in 
expression occurs when the party fails to declare his or her intention orally or in writing, or 
for example when the party transmits the price incorrectly.17Another example of error in 
expression is when the parties have agreed about the contract verbally, but they do not 
write it in an accurate way. Simply put, if the oral agreement is different from the written
13 B a ir d ’s  T ru s te e s  v. B a ird . (1877) 4 R 1005. See also: B ritish  H y d r o -C a r b o n  C h e m ic a ls  L td  v. B r itis h  T ra n s p o r t  
C o m m iss io n . 1961 SLT 280.
14 H a y d e r .  op. cit., P50.
l5 Rahmatian, op. cit., P38.
16 Green, op. cit.. P I20.
17Rahmatian, op. cit., P38.
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one.18 This case has occurred with regard to an oral contract between an employer and his 
or her employee; where the employer has agreed orally to pay a specific percentage of the 
annual net profit, but it has been discovered that the written contract gave the employee a 
much lower percentage from what was stated in the verbal agreement. As a result, the court 
supports the employer’s allegation because he or she relied on the written agreement in 
supporting his defence.19 It means that the written agreement overrides the oral one. 
Practically, this decision shows that every case can have different outcomes relying on the 
situations of the case and that they can vary considering the court specific evaluation. At 
the same time, this decision may be inappropriate because opposes to the concept of error 
in expression, when the court should investigate the intent of the contracting parties, and 
compare between their oral and written expression. In a similar case,20 two parties agreed 
orally on selling a part of land, but it ended mistakenly that the seller’s solicitor transferred 
all of the land, and it was held that the contract was void even though it was written.
Actually, with regard to the wrong calculation of price, it would not be grounds for 
reduction when the error generates a profit for one of the contracting parties. It does not 
matter if the other party knows that the expression is right but the price calculation is 
wrong. Under this case, when one party is aware that the other has accepted a specific 
price during the negotiation stage, and then quoted a lower price erroneously in the 
contracting time, the price would be considered as part of the essential factors of the 
contract. The mistaken party can seek the reduction of the contract; not on the ground of 
the price being incorrect, but based on the prohibition of taking advantage of the other 
party’s error.21
18 Hector L. MacQueen, Reinhard Zimmermann. European contract law: Scots and South African perspectives. 
Edinburgh Studies in Law Vol. 2. Edinburgh University Press. 2006. P I79-180.
19 K r u p p  v. Jo h n  M e n z ie s  L td . 1907 SC 903.
20 A n d e rso n  v. L a m b ie  1954 S.C. (H.L.) 43.
21 G la s g o w  F eu in g  a n d  B u ild in g  Co. v. W a tso n 's  T rs ., 1887, 14 R. 610, Lord Young, P. 618. Rahmatian. op. cit., P39.
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This situation can be found in another case,22 regarding the reduction of a disposition, 
when a land owner agreed with a buyer to sell him part of his land on a farm. The land 
owner’s solicitor, erroneously, transferred all the lands to the buyer instead of the farm 
only. When the case was disputed in the court, Lord Reid said,23 since it is clearly proved 
that the two parties agreed to contract on one thing, but mistakenly contracted on 
something different, then even if the contract is a written document it cannot be considered 
as a valid contract. He added that if the error appeared within the document or the deed, 
and if the case of error can be proved beyond the deed, the error can be corrected by 
explaining or interpreting all of the deed. But when there is no way to prove that the error 
was established on the deed, as in this case, the mistaken party can seek reduction if he can 
prove the error beyond reasonable doubts with regard to the surrounding facts and 
situations. While Anderson v. Lambie24 was decided at common law the matter is now 
governed by LR (MP) (S) Act 1985 s8 rectification of deeds and the case decided there 
under.
If error arises with regard to clerical fault, this may render the contract void as in Verdin 
Brothers v. Robertson25 where Robertson sent a message by telegram to a salt trader asking 
him to provide a quantity of salt. The trader sent the salt to a different address because of 
clerical error in the posted telegram that had been sent by the salt trader. Later on, the 
trader delivered the salt for Robertson and asked for the price o f the salt, Robertson 
rejected the delivery because it was too late for him. When this case was disputed in the 
court, it was held that there was no contract and that there was no duty to pay, so 
consequentially the contract was void. Generally, when clerical errors occurring in the 
document have been formed and implemented in a wrong way, there is a wide margin for
22 A n d e r s o n  v. L a m b ie  1954 S.C. (H.L.) 43.
23 At P 57.
241954 S.C. (H.L.) 43.
25 (1871). 10 M. 35.
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the court to play an equitable role to correct the agreement according to the real intention 
that guided the parties into entering the contract. As it mentioned above, it is not allowed 
or acceptable for anyone to gain an advantage from the other party by the clerical error.26 
The similar case is established under English contract law, which is known as a Scrivener’s 
mistake, and the court will be in a position to correct this. Therefore the contract is not 
considered as invalid.27 It is not a problem when the parties confess or declare their error. 
The problem could start to be disputed when it comes to the parties who do not admit error, 
but despite this, the fact is that it would be a possibility to rectify error if it is clear or 
plain.28 To prove the existence of clerical error there is no specific or definitive procedure 
to follow. Therefore, no limitation to use of evidence, and any relevant evidence can be 
used to lead to assertion of clerical error, whether written, oral or of any other substance.29 
Eventually, wherever the court finds that the deed or the document failed to represent or to 
express the will of the two parties, and to give the legal effects of the agreement, the court 
has the power to rectify it to fit the intended purposes of the parties.30
A clear example has been mentioned by the case of the Steel's Tr v Bradley Homes.31 This 
case summarised the case of error in expression when the written offer made from ‘A ’ to 
‘B ’ intended to establish an action for a specific amount of money, and fixed 10 per cent 
interest to take effect from 16 March 1971. When B expressed his written acceptance, he 
repeated the same figure of interest and the same date of action. Later B realised that he 
had made an error. He held in his mind all the time that the interest will start to be 
accounted from 16 March 1969. Upon his error, he wanted to withdraw from the contract 
and terminate it, because his intention was to write 1969 instead of 1971. After discussion 
before the court, which checked the evidence during the negotiations stage, it was held that
26 G la s g o w  F eu in g  a n d  B u ild in g  C o . v. W a ts o n ’s T rs ., 1887. 14 R. 610, Lord Young, P. 618.
27 Encyclopedia of Business and Finance, op. cit., P2.
28 McBRYDE, op. cit., P435. P ara l4 -ll.
29 M ’L a ren  v. L id d e l l 's  T rs .. 1862, 24 D. 577.
30 s8  and s9 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985.
31 1972 SC 48; 1974S.L.T. 133.
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B honestly intended to consider 16 March 1969 as the date from which interest would run. 
According to ‘the reasonable situation test,’ this would not be known by A (offerer). Based 
on that the court held that B did not have the right for reducing the contract, because his 
true intent was unknown to A.32 Here, for comparative purposes, it can be said that this 
case would never happen under Islamic contract law, since any contract or transaction 
involving any kind of interest would be void at the very beginning because the interest is 
prohibited under the Islamic legal system as it has mentioned earlier in this thesis. Apart 
from the interest issue, the Islamic attitude is not clear, whether the party in error would be 
allowed to terminate the contract because the Islamic jurisprudence does not deal with 
error, as has also been mentioned in this thesis.
Under Scots law, it is permitted to rectify the contract that did not express or 
misrepresented the parties’ intention.33 The same Act gives the court authority to apply 
rectification with retrospective effect, taking into consideration the effects of the 
rectification on the third innocent party.34 But this is not the case under the English 
common law, because not many choices are available to the courts. It is noticed that the 
court has to release one decision, whether reducing the written contract or support it. In 
other words, any adjustment of the contract is not allowed.
Another situation can be expected to occur where there is no remedy to be found. It is 
when the error in expression occurs during the offer and acceptance stage, this could 
happen if the offerer states the conditions of the offer wrongly but unintentionally, and this 
offer has been accepted. Under this case, if the offeree has accepted the contract in good 
faith and does not realise the misstatement has been made, therefore there is no clear legal
32 Scottish Law Commission. (Scot Law Com No 144). Report on Formation of Contract: Scottish Law and the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. 14 June 1993. P10.
33 The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985. Section 8 .
34 Ibid, Section 9.
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remedy. For example,35 a person who offered to implement the work for a specific amount 
of money as a lump sum according to his own calculation discovered that he made a 
mistake by giving another price which was less than he intended. The problem started 
when he realised his miscalculation and refused to implement the work contract after the 
offer has been accepted. The court decided that the offerer was committed to do the work 
because the contract was valid since there was no notification to the offeree to be made 
aware of the error. But under another case36 the decision was wholly different - where a 
person paid his invoice as a result of a mistaken calculation that could be clearly noticed by 
the other party. Based on that, it was held that the erroneous person had the right to ask for 
payment which was originally agreed.
Generally, the court enjoys wide authority to correct the contract equitably and bring the 
parties’ intention back to the right track. Generally, if the parties did not admit the error 
and the error is clear in the document, so the document or the contract would be rectified.37 
Actually, when the error is not admitted, it could be proved by any kind of evidence, 
including parole.38 It has been mentioned that a word “not” was clearly added by error 
which gave the court the power to correct the document (policy).39 4012The concentration or the 
deep discussion in regard of the uninduced unilateral error in Stewart v Kennedy40 leads to 
an interesting conclusion, that is to say, the party involved in the uninduced error may not 
have found a remedy to set the contract aside. It means that such sort of error could result 
in no legal remedy for the mistaken party. This situation has been demonstrated in Young v 
McKellar,41 Royal Bank of Scotland Pic v Purvis42 where none o f these cases were 
considered as unilateral error by itself as a ground of reducing the contract. Under the
35 S ea to n  B r ic k  a n d  T ile  C o  v. M itc h e ll. (1900) 2 F 550.
36 W ilk ie  v. H a m ilto n  L o d g in g  H o u se  C o . (1902) 4  F 951.
37 Gloag. op. cit.. P435.
38 W a d d e ll  v. W a d d e ll  1863. 1 M. 365.
3yG le n 's  Trs. v. L a n c a sh ire , e tc ., In su ra n ce  C o ., 1906. 8  F. 915.
40 1890 17R (HL) 25.
41 1909 SC 1340.
42 1990 SLT262.
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English law tradition the result is different, because if the party entered the contract under a 
reasonable error created by him, he would be committed to the contract and the other party 
may be eligible for damages.43
Under Scots contract law, in order to prove the error case, it would not be adequate for the 
contracting parties to claim that their consent was affected by the error. For proving that 
the error has been established between the contracting parties, it is expected to trace two 
categories as following.
Section 3: Error in Intention
This type of error occurs when it is claimed that the parties which agreed on the contract 
(one or both) released their consent under error, the result of such kind of consent is not 
binding, because there was no intention to bind them, and the result will be no consensus 
ad idem. As a consequence, the contract will be void ab initio.44 In fact this kind of error is 
also about parties’ mistake with regard to the nature of the contract.45 In general, if error in 
intention occurs it prevents the contracting parties from concluding their consent. Under 
error in intention there is a classification o f error in motive, which occurs when the party 
misunderstands or interprets the situations around the contract differently than he or she 
intended. Simply, error in motive connected to the circumstances surrounding the real 
elements of the deal,46 but not the deal itself. For easier understanding of this point, it could 
be said that the parties’ intention was built on error and they thought that they have 
expressed it in correct way.47
4344454647
Hec. op. cit., P61.
Green, op. cit.. P I20.
Walker, op. cit.. P232. P14.47.
Rahmatian. op. cit.. P37.
Ibid.
124
The legal solution to error in motive will not be available unless the erroneous party was 
induced by the other one. Under both categories of error, the formation of the contract 
cannot be prevented unless the error is connected to a fundamental element.48 The focus on 
the substantial or fundamental error under the Scottish contract is concerns the gross affect 
this kind of error has on the legal capability of the contracting parties (one or both) which 
affect the consent.49 As is mentioned above, simple error is not sufficient to produce a legal 
effect. It has been held that this kind of error, which is uninduced error, could reduce the 
contract only if it was substantial which is difficult to be defined exactly, in other words, 
the error in this case goes to the contract foundations.50 It would be noted that the 
classification of error in transaction should be considered as part of the error in intention. 
Error in transaction occurs when the party misunderstands what the other party committed 
him or herself to, or if the contract has been interpreted differently to what the other party 
understood his or her duty or responsibility to be.51 To simplify the issue and make it 
clearer, the question to be answered in this regard is to know ‘what is the exact contract 
that the parties intended to form?’ This can be answered by investigating their correct 
intention which was expressed erroneously or wrongly.52 Generally the error in intention is 
divided into two categories, Unilateral and Bilateral error.
3.1. Unilateral Error
Regarding unilateral error under the Scottish law of contract53 as well as under English 
contract law,54the general rule to be followed is the caveat emptor ‘buyer beware’, which is 
usually connected to goods or quality of services. If the error is established by one party 
only, there is no negative effect in respect to the contract validity. That is to say, the
48 Green, op. cit., PI 19.
49 Scottish Law Commission. Defective Consent and Consequential Matters. Memorandum 42. June 1978. Vol.I.
50 Rahmatian, op. cit.. P36.
M Green, op. cit.. P I20.
Rahmatian, op. cit., P37.
53 Huntley, op. cit.. P I89.
54 Treitel, op. cit., P 361.
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reduction remedy will not be applied just because one party is mistaken about a material 
fact connected to the contract, unless there is an inducement by misrepresentation or fraud 
from the other party. The case55 of the true leasing period raised this kind of error, when 
one party understood that a sold property was to be rented for 99 years and the real period 
was 90 years. The decision was that the contract is valid since the error was not induced by 
misrepresentation of the other party. But under the Scottish contract law, the case would 
have a different perspective if the other party knew about the party’s error. That is to say, 
the contract would not be enforced because the other party wanted to generate an 
advantage from error despite the fact of the non-availability of the misrepresentation.56 It is 
clear that the contract would be void according to Scottish case57 but under the English 
contract law the case seems to be totally different, as this kind of error could just go to the 
performance of the contract that was not implemented and the damages may be claimed for 
the non-performance.58 But as usual, this is not final speak, since many different discretions 
could give different opinions whether for this topic or for the others.59
In other words, unilateral error would be created when one party has erred, whether by him 
or herself or through inducing by the misrepresentation,60 and this happens when the other 
party knows about the other party’s error and tries to gain profits Here the case will be 
irrelevant, unless the error is fundamental and connected to the transaction like when there 
is an error to the other party’s identity, where the personal identity of the contracting party 
is the core of the contract, or the personality is the focus of the transaction.61 In the Scottish 
insurance rules, if the insured person has made an error (reasonable and innocent),
55 S p o o k  E re c tio n  (N o r th e r n ) L td  v. K a y e . 1990 SLT 676.
56 S e c u r ity  P a c if ic  F in a n c e  L td  \ . T  &  I  F i ls h ie ’s  T r  1994 SCLR 1100.
57 S te u a r t's  T ru s te e s  v. H a rt. (1875) 3 R 192.
58 W e b s te r  v. C e c il  1861. 30 Beav. 62.
59 R. W. Craig. Procurement Law for Construction and Engineering Works and Services. Blackwell Publishing. 1999. 
P120.ISBN 0632049278, 9780632049271.
60 MacQueen. Thomson, op. cit.. P I64.
61 Rahmatian, op. cit., P38.
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discovered the error and intentionally left it uncorrected, the insurer has the right to avoid 
the insurance contract (policy) based on the intentional misrepresentation.62
In general, the contracting parties would be expected not to act against the good faith 
principle between each other. It is said that the contract usually comes into ‘existence’ 
relying on good faith.63 Under the Scottish law, some considered good faith as ‘a best 
underlying principle of Scots contract law’ that gives an ability to identify and solve the 
problems which are not solved by the current rules.64 According to Hector L MacQueen, 
Joe Thomson,65 the good faith principle was not welcomed very much under the Scottish 
law. Analytically, since Scottish law recognises the concepts of misrepresentation and 
fraud, and defines them clearly, it would be expected that good faith principle is adopted 
under the categories of misrepresentation and fraud. If the existence of the intentional 
misrepresentation or fraud breaks the contractual obligations between the contracting 
parties, it means good faith is highly demanded between the contracting parties. There is 
no point in adopting misrepresentation and fraud concepts, then to have an argument if the 
good faith would be welcome or not. Good faith would be expected to be as pre- 
contractual demand by the contracting parties as it is the case under the insurance contract. 
Similar analysis can be found clearly in Lord Macfadyen’s opinion in Kishwer Ahmed (Ap) 
v Clydesdale Bank Pic,66 where his Lordship connected the obligation of good faith in the 
credit agreement with the ‘fairness of representation’. In this situation, good faith demands 
the creditor to correct the erroneous belief that could be established by any event before 
entering into the loan agreement; failing do that means that the creditor deals in bad faith.
62 The Law Commission, Consultation Paper No 182 and the Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper No 134. 
Insurance Contract Law: Misrepresentation, Non-Disclosure and Breach of Warranty by the Insured, a Joint Consultation 
Paper. 21 June 2007. P I69.
63 Forte, op. cit., P14,15.
64 MacQueen, Zimmermann, op. cit., P60.
65 MacQueen, Thomson, op. cit., P158.
66 [2000] Scot CS 232.
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In fact, if the uninduced and unilateral error occurs within the gratuitous contracts, this 
could affect the validity of the contract as it could be seen from the comment of Lord 
Reid.67 He suggested that it is not permitted to keep profit of the gratuitous contract that 
has been generated under fundamental error on behalf of the party conferring the profit. 
But in general this is not always the situation for all gratuitous contracts in regard of the 
essential error that induced by the misrepresentation, which means that the error may not 
be a ground of reduction.68 It has been mentioned earlier that the unilateral error will not 
impair the contract validity, but there is an exceptional case could come out of this rule. 
That is to say, the unilateral error will affect the validity of the contract if this error was 
very serious or fundamental because the parties did not meet the requirements of the 
consensus in idem that make the contract non-existent from the beginning. That leads to 
rendering the contract void.69 What could be added to this point is to say that when the 
error is known by the other party for the purpose of making profits, the reduction of 
contract could arise. One of the clear examples about this situation,70 where the party who 
sold the land had an idea that the land has a commitment to pay a large feuduty, and in 
reality the feuduty duty are much smaller which was known by the buyer who wanted to 
take an advantage out of the seller’s error. It has been decided that the contract should be 
reduced because the error fundamentally affects the price of the land. At some point the 
court wanted to follow a different line with regard to the case of Steuart’s Trustees within 
the court’s explanation of another case71 by suggesting that the Steuart’s Trustees is an 
error of expression not of intention.
61 H u n te r  v. B r a d fo r d  P r o p e r ty  T ru st. 1970 SLT 173.
68 M c C a ig  v. G la s g o w  U n iv e r s ity  C o u r t  (1904) 6 F. 918.
69 PI 59.
70 S te u a r t ’s  T ru s te e s  v. H a r t. (1875) 3 R 192.
71 A n g u s  v. B ry d e n  1992 SLT 884.
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Based on Angus v Bryden72 facts, it could be seen clearly that if the contract involved an 
essential error of expression, the contract can be rendered void or set aside. The reflection 
of this case can be seen in the English case,73 where the seller intended to make his offer in 
pounds and he did it mistakenly in a different currency. It is concluded that the unilateral 
error when it is not induced by the other party’s misrepresentation, should be a substantial 
error which could be about the price, as it has been mentioned earlier or about the identity 
of the contracting parties, or affecting the quality of the subject-matter.74
3.2. Bilateral Error
3.2.1. Common Error
This type of error occurs when the parties share the same error. It means that the same 
error affects the thoughts of the contracting parties in relation to some fact of the contract.75 
As a consequence, the parties’ consent would be affected by the erroneous beliefs.76 It 
means that the parties are involved in the same error related to the facts of the contract; 
based on that, when the error of the fact is essential or material the contract will be 
rendered void. It has been stated that if the parties agreed to sell/buy a specific commodity, 
then it has later been discovered that the commodity is damaged but the seller is not aware, 
the contract will be considered as void.77 In a practical case,78 the grain has been sold but 
the parties’ did not know that some of the grain was rotten, that means that both parties 
made error with regard to the same fact which made the contract void.
72 Ibid.
73 H a r to g  v. C o lin  & S h ie ld s  [1939] 3 All ER 566.
7 4 Atiyah, Adams, MacQueen, op. cit.. P45.
15 Walker, op. cit., P14.27.
7 6 Rahmatian. op. cit., P41.
77 The Sale of Goods Act 1979. Section 6 .
78 C o u tu r ie r  v. H a s t ie  (1856) 5 HL Cas 673.
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3.2.2. Mutual Error
This type of error occurs when the parties fail to understand each other and have formed 
different thoughts or beliefs in regards to the contract, such as the subject matter, or the 
price.79 It would be useful to mention that, under the case of the mutual error there is no 
consent, in other words it could be said that the mutual error disallows the existence of a 
consensus in idem 80 which means that the offer and the acceptance do not come together to 
form the contract as a result of the parties’ wills, because the minds of the parties did not 
meet to conclude the contract.81
Under the Scottish law of contract, mutual error is one of the most difficult issues to deal 
with,82 which links with the aforementioned English law concept of mistake. It is clear that 
under mutual error the parties keep different images in their minds about what they have 
agreed as a consequence of misunderstanding each other.83 84According to this case, one 
party proved that he thought that he was buying an estate according to the title, and the 
other one decided to buy according to the plan. Here the contract would not be formed 
because there is no consensus in idem.u To decide whether both the parties or just one of 
them entered the contract under error, the case should be tested objectively, because it is 
not enough for any party just to pretend that he or she contracted under the error.85
Mutual error could raise an incidental or essential error, the case of the first sort does not 
affect the contract formation unless the error is induced by the misrepresentation which 
renders the contract to be voidable. Based on that, in case of Cloup v Alexander,86 when the 
parties agreed about a specific performance in a particular hall and then they knew that the
79 MacQueen, Thomson, op. cit., P I64.
80 M a th ie so n  G e e  (A y r s h ir e ) L td  v. Q u ig le y  1952 SC (HL) 38.
81R Black in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Vol 15 (1996), para 692.
82 Rahmatian, op. cit., P42.
83 J M Thomson, op. cit., P I36.
84 H o u ld s w o r th  v. G o rd o n  C u m m in g  1910 SC (HL) 49.
83 B r o o k e r -S im b so n  L td  v. D u n c a n  L o g a n  (B u ild e r s ) L td  1969 SLT 304.
86 (1831) 9 S 448.
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team was allowed legally to perform in this hall. The court decided that the contract should 
be binding because there was no mentioning for the particular performance as a part o f the 
contract as the contract was about the hall hire. Based on that, there was no 
misrepresentation and the error is incidental. Generally, mutual error/mistake under the 
Scottish and English contract law seem to have the same elements and the same view 
which eventually render the contract void ab initio}1 The previous reference which is 
related to the comparative approaches between the Scottish and English perspectives on the 
concept of mutual error could be part o f the detailed discussion. That is to say, it is worth 
noticing that M. P. Furmston indicated many different cases to explain the shared ground 
of the understanding of the mutual error under the two laws. He mentioned some cases, 
such as: Jones v Clifford87 8 which was approached by the gray group as a common and 
mutual mistake case.89 It is a similar situation in Couturtier v. Hastie.90 David M. Walker91 
William Gloag92 and William W. McBRYDE.93 seem to have the same perspective. In 
general, as it has been mentioned with regard to the mutual and common mistake under 
English law of contract. The Scottish law of contract has fallen into the same issue that 
English law of contract has fallen into, because both of them do not have clear distinct 
between mutual and common error, and there are sometimes no clear borders between the 
two types. The case would be clearer if the Scottish law combined the two types into one 
type o f error, or kept them as they are now but with clearer boundaries to enable the courts 
or the practitioners to differentiate between them. If mutual and common error have clear 
borders this would cause less difficulties in understanding the cases that involve such kind 
of error, and as a consequence this would result in more stability in the legal treatment.
87 Hec, op. cit., P61.
881876, 3 CH. D 779.
89 Furmston et al Cheshire, op. cit., PP297.298.
90 1856, H. L. C. 673.
91 Walker, op. cit., P 14.36-38.
92 Gloag, op. cit., P441.
93 McBRYDE, op. cit., P I76. Para9-08.
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Section 4: Essential Error (error in substantialibus)
Generally, essential error is connected to the core of the contract, which means that if this 
kind of error is available the consensus would not originally exist. That means the contract 
would be void.94 According to Lord Skerrington the general rule of essential error under 
Scottish law is to say that it is not enough for essential error to void the contract by itself. 
Essential error can occur in a number of ways, such as; proving that the error is induced by 
the misrepresentation or that the error is common between the two parties, or it was 
mutual, or that it was created by fraudulent concealment.95 This situation had occurred in 
Gibson v. The National Cash Register Co. Ltd.96 Where ‘G’ intended to buy new cash 
register machines, the N.C.R Co. Ltd. sold him second hand machines but the company 
reconditioned them and the machines appeared as brand new. G. claimed damages against 
the company because they concealed that the machines that he bought from the company 
were second hand. The court decided in favour of G. despite the fact that the decision was 
held mentioned that the case is a prima facie of fraud, but it could be considered that the 
case was an induced error by fraudulent concealment.
In general essential error is divided between five categories: Error as to subject matter, 
error as to identity of parties, error as to price, error as to quality of item, and error as to 
nature of contract.97 In Menzies v. Menzies98 mentioned below, Lord Watson considered 
that under Scottish contract law essential error occurs when the contracting situation shows 
that. In other words, it may add that when the contracting operation involves error, it could 
affect the contract and its surrounding conditions or the contract process in serious way 
which has been claimed by one of the parties and built on all the previous factors the error 
would occur. As has been noticed earlier in this research, under the English law of
94 Walker, op. cit., P 14.11-14.20.
95 S te in  v. S te in  1914. S.C. 903. 908.
96 1925 S.C. 500.
97 MacQueen, Thomson, op. cit.. P I64.
98 M e n z ie s  v. M e n z ie s  (1893) 20 R (HL) 108 at 142.
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contract, the mistake to be operative does not have to be essential regardless of the 
enormity of the mistake for vitiating the contract."
4.1. Error as to Subject M atter
This kind of error could occur when the two parties thought that they agreed about specific 
goods, services or products and in fact both of them have borne different products in their 
minds. In an English case9 100 the contract was not binding for the party because when he 
bought the items at auction, he put in his mind that the container has different items which 
would have given it more value. Another case was about cotton ships called Peerless, 
which were expected to travel from India to England but on two different dates (one in 
October and the other in December). When the parties agreed about the bargains, one of 
them intended the ship to arrive in October and the other party thought it would arrive in 
December. It has been decided that the contract did not exist because there was no 
consensus.101 It is worth noticing that the same case is used in the same area in English law 
of mistake. In Anderson v. Lambie102 it was held that the contract (disposition) would be 
reduced because the parties involved laboured under essential error in regard of the 
subject-matter of the contract, as the owner thought he is selling the farm only and the 
buyer thought that he is buying the farm including the minerals, so there was no consensus 
ad idem since both of them intended something different to bargain on which made the 
subject-matter of the contract to be fundamentally different from what the two parties 
intended to be sold or bought.
99 Hec. op. cit., P60.
100 S c r iv en  v. H in d le y  [1913] 3 KB 564.
101 R a ffle s  v. W ich e lh a u s  (1864) 2 H & C 906. (it is an English case)
102 1954 S.C. (H.L.) 43.
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4.2. Error as to Quality o f Item
When this kind of error is created the contract will be rendered as void, but the quality 
should be the substantial issue. In other words, to operate this error it should be proved that 
the contract is built or relied on the quality, and any error of the quality will affect the 
contract purpose.103 Generally, error of quality is connected to misrepresentation because it 
is important to prove that the other party’s error has been created by misrepresentation.104 
An example 105 of the connection between the error as to quality and the inducement of the 
misrepresentation is when a party bought jewellery which was meant to be an antique item, 
then it was discovered that the item was fake. It was held that the contract was void 
because the buyer had been mistakenly led to believe something by the seller. It would be 
imaginable that the contract might be treated as void even if the error was not induced by 
the seller’s misrepresentation. It is suggested that the error as to the quality will not be 
considered as an operative error unless the contracting parties decided expressly or implied 
that the quality of the subject-matter of the item is an essential term of the contract, 
because in this case the error will go to the roots of the contract.106 Practically, the error in 
quality could occur in different forms, it may occur as induced or uninduced unilateral, or 
bilateral, or mutual/common error. Also it may be stated that this sort of error could be 
involved in many bargains or deals like when the parties agree to deliver 24 carat gold and 
the seller delivered gold 18 or 9 carat which would involve an error in quality and price, 
since the quality of the gold would affect the prices seriously. It is difficult to prove this 
kind of error if it is connected to unilateral error because it will interest one party, but it 
would be easier in relation to mutual or common error as it would concern the two parties. 
According to the discussion during this research, it could be concluded that error in quality
11)3 Reinhard Zimmermann, Simon Whittaker. Good Faith in European Contract Law. Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
P591. ISBN 0521771900, 9780521771900.
104 M e n z ie s  v. M e n z ie s  (1893) 20 R (HL) 108.
105 P a tte r s o n  v. L cin dsberg  &  S on  (1905) 7 F 675.
106 J M Thomson, op. cit., P143.
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which is caused by misrepresentation by the other party does not need to be substantial and 
is not demanded to be connected to the root o f the contract.107
4.3. Error as to Price
Error as to price occurs when the parties have a dispute with regard to the price of the 
articles they contracting on in a contract. According to the Sale of Goods Act,108 when the 
parties do not mention the price or the means of settlement, the solution will be derived 
from the implied conditions of deals between the parties. But if there is no way to do that, 
the court is authorised to enforce a specific price based on the reasonability which can be 
established on the principle o f the unjust enrichment. This principle prevents a party to 
enrich at the expenses of the other, and if this happens, the enriched party might be 
required to pay quantum meruit. This principle was implemented in Sword v Sinclair109 
when the agent of the company offered the tea at a much lower price than it should be, and 
the offeree had accepted this. It was held that the offeree acted in bad faith because the 
reasonable price of tea in the market was higher, and based on that the offeror was not 
liable for delivering the tea to the offeree. In another case110 when the parties mistakenly 
bear different ideas about the price of the cattle, the seller intended the price to be decided 
upon to the quality which was higher than what the buyer thought. Here, the buyer 
envisaged a price different to the seller; under this case there was no contract which 
demanded the restitution to the situation before the contract. As consequence the buyer was 
asked to pay the level of the market price based on the unjust enrichment rules. In a similar 
case111 of the measurement units and the prices (per foot) were argued, that is both parties 
put different prices in their minds according to their understanding of (per foot). One of
107 Atiyah. Adams. MacQueen, op. cit., P45.
108 The Sale of Goods Act 1979. Section 8 (1 ).
109 (1771 ) Mor 14241.
110 W ilso n  v. M a rq u is  o f  B r e a d a lb a n e  (1859) 21 D 957.
111 S tu a r t  v. K e n n e d y  (1885) 13 R 221.
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them thought that lineal foot112 is the reference and the other thought that the square foot113 14
is the reference which resulted in serious differences between the evaluated prices by the 
two parties. Here the contract was void because there was no consensus, but the buyer was 
asked to pay according to the market prices.
It is clear that the case here is connected to the contract formation, because when the 
parties bear different ideas about the price or how to evaluate it, it means that there is no 
consensus in idem. Despite this case, and the decision of considering the contract as void, 
in Seaton Brick and Tile Co v Mitchell,114 the error in price was the point of the dispute 
between the parties but it was held that the contract will not be reduced, this is despite the 
contractor having proved that his son mistakenly provided the price which was less than it 
was intended by the contractor. In Margaret McLaughlin v The New Housing 
Association115 16the case o f Seaton Brick and Tile Co v Mitchell^6 was discussed as a 
unilateral error relying on the courts discretion, and considered it as a mutual error in 
substantials relying on Walker's book The Law of Contracts and Related Obligations in 
Scotland at paragraph 14.45 by another.
It is important to notice that the party who the makes mistake in selling or purchasing 
goods for too little or too much are not be eligible for protection from loss.117 18In Morrison v 
Boswellns the sale includes the seller who sold his items in cheaper price than they were in 
the market because of his own mistake with regard to the marketing knowledge. The same 
stand point could be derived from Welsh v Cousin119 where the court rejected the claim of 
damages because the tender decreased the price from 50 to 20 GBP without being affected
112 A measure of one foot, in a straight line, along the ground.
113 The area of a square with sides of 1 foot (0.333... yards, 12 inches, or 0.3048 metres) in length.
114 (1900) 2 F 550.
115 (2008 ) A 770/06.
116 (1900 ) 2 F 550.
117 Walker, op. cit., P I4.45.
118 (1801) Hume 679.
119 (1899) 2 F 277.
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by any inducement from the other party. The same was followed in Seaton Brick & Tile Co 
v Mitchell120 where the court decided that the contractor was liable for breaking the contract 
because he refused to implement it and he claimed that the price was much lower. It was 
held that he was not entitled because the mistake was established by him.
4.4. Error as to Identity of Parties
Error as to identity could be understood as being directly connected to the personal role of 
the contracting parties in implementing the contract. It means that the contract is built on a 
special qualification or characteristic of the contracting parties as a crucial point to 
conclude the contract. The leading Scottish case Morrisson v Robertson121 shows how the 
identity of the parties is important in regard to formation of the contract, because 
Morrisson would not sell the cows to Telford if he did not pretend (fraudulently) that he 
was a son of Wilson and he was acting on his behalf. This made Telford seem like an agent 
of Wilson who dealt with Morrisson on different occasions. W ilson’s character is the core 
of the case, since he is known and trusted by Morrisson which accepted to sell the cows on 
credit, but if Telford expressed his real identity Morrisson might not have sold the cows. 
Here, the point is that Wilson was qualified to buy the cows on credit which were not 
available for another person (Telford). Based on that, it was held that the contract between 
Telford and Morrisson is void, because Morrisson entered the contract relying on essential 
error as to identity of the other contracting party. Built on that, Morrisson had been entitled 
to reclaim his cows even after selling them to the innocent third party (Robertson) by 
Telford. In light of this case, it can be concluded that some contracts would not be created 
if  specific persons are not the essence o f the contract, such as the loans or credits contracts.
120 (1900) 2 F 550.
121 1908 SC 332.
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Concurrently, in Macleod v. Kerr,m which is mentioned below, despite the essential error 
connected to the identity, it was not held that the contract was void but voidable. This is 
because the error as to the identity was not the crucial point in the contract. The 
advertisement by Kerr was available to the public and not strictly for any specific 
character. As a clear conclusion, when the essential error as to identity occurs, this would 
prevent the contract to be formed. In this regard, J M Thomson argued that the cases of 
error as to identity (personal attributes) would rarely go to the root of the commercial 
contracts.12 23 It is actually an arguable opinion since the identity of the person could be the 
main motive to enter many contracts which makes the error as to identity goes to the 
foundations of the contract. Many contracts could be built (especially recently) on the very 
special qualifications or skills attributable to person who is the object of the contract such 
as a footballer or an accountant or any other professional. It is not easy to ignore the fact 
that essential error based on the identity could occur regularly in many commercial 
contracts or bargains even without fraud or misrepresentation from the other party. This 
also may happen if the two parties enter the contract under the wrong impression that they 
are dealing with specific persons, companies, or their representatives and in reality, they 
are dealing with the wrong persons based on wrong thoughts in relation to the identity. If 
the court is convinced that the party in error considered the identity of the other contracting 
party material, this type of error would be operative.124 It could be suggested that the error 
as to identity would not be restricted in induced error by the misrepresentation, but that it 
could be extended to include the uninduced error without involving the fraud or 
misrepresentation.
122 1965 SC 253.
123 J M Thomson, op. cit., P140.
124 Gloag. op. cit., P443.444.
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4.5. Error as to the Nature of the Contract
When it comes to this type of error, the discussion will go to the purpose of the contract. 
For instance, when the party thinks that he or she signs a tenancy contract and in fact it is a 
sales contract, or like the case when a party has signed a document which was thought to 
have been a will but in fact it was a document to transfer the title of his property instantly. 
This rendered the transfer of the title void.125 Here, what can be noticed is that the law does 
not clarify the main lines to be routed when such cases occur. It means that the law should 
be supported by some clear rules to govern the case when the party claims that he or she 
signed a document that was not understood by the signers. According to Lord Watson, it is 
not enough for the party to rescind the contract if he pretends that he has misguided ideas 
about the nature of his obligation, unless the claimant can prove that his mistake was 
caused by misrepresentation, and here no matter what kind of misrepresentation whether 
fraudulent or not.126 The discretion here could be partly right in some cases but it would not 
be correct in regard to all cases or situations. It is simply because the erred party should 
have the complete right to prove his error or to submit evidence to show that he made a 
mistake in regard of his or her understanding to the nature o f the signed contract or deed. It 
can be imaginable that many people would sign documents by mistake without any 
inducing by misrepresentation of the other party. Moreover, the misrepresentation should 
not be the main point to be proved, because it is expected from the parties to 
misunderstand each other in regard of the contract purposes. For instance, one party 
intends to sell the property title and the other thinks that the offer was to rent it, or when 
one party thinks that he is signing a tenancy contract and the other party thinks he is 
signing sale contract by instalments. This indicates that there was no consensus in idem 
because the parties misunderstood each other.
125 M cL a u rin  v. S ta ffo rd  (1875) 3 R 265.
126 S tu a r t  v. K e n n e d y  (1890) 17 R 25.
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In Wardlaw v Mackenzie127 it is noticed that one of the essential rules under Scottish law
that the bona fide third party was allowed to rely on ex facie valid deed and it would not be 
allowed for the signer to justify that there was no contract because there was no consensus 
between the parties. In Ellis v Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co,m there is a different attitude in 
this regard, stating that the third party who is bona fide is not allowed to rely on the cheque 
that is signed by error. The discussion with regard to Wardlaw v Mackenzie129 and Ellis v 
Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co,127 8930 is not about the contract law improvement related to vital 
changes of the legal thoughts within the Scots law, but about the circumstantial situations 
and details that are connected to every case separately which should be tested objectively 
by the court. This opinion does not mean that all the controversial decisions of the courts 
are due to differences that occur from one case to another. It could be connected to the 
various understandings from one judge to another. In contrast, the English contract law 
allows the party to rely on non est factum - to be discharged from the legal liability of ex 
facie valid document/deed where there are a third party’s rights involved in the contract. 
This can happen if the signer proves that the deed he intended to sign was fundamentally 
different from what he already signed mistakenly and the mistake he made was not created 
by his fault only.131
Now, owing to the understanding of error as to the nature of contract, it is understood that 
if the party signed a deed or a document that differed-from what he or she intended to sign, 
and where the signatory discovers the error, there is a right for reducing the contract even 
if this mistake is not induced by the other party. The point that could be raised here is 
about the principle that says; to reduce the contract it needs to prove that error is induced 
by the other party, which is different than the previous attitude that raised discussions with
127 (1859) 21 D 940.
128 1909 SC 1228 at 1282.
129 (1859) 21 D 940.
130 1909 SC 1228 at 1282.
131J M Thomson, op. cit., P143.
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regard to the discrepancies between the courts’ decisions and the legal structures of the 
different cases. In the same time it could be said that there is no problem to reduce the 
contract or deed if there is uninduced essential error when the implementation causes 
serious loss for the erroneous party even without being induced by the other party since the 
error was proved.
Section 5: Unilateral Error Induced by Misrepresentation o f the Other Party
When error whether in motive or in transaction is established on the inducement of 
misrepresentation by the other party, the party who is induced has the right for reduction.132 
Actually, these cases and their rules are developed and influenced basically by the 
misrepresentation rules under the English law;133 furthermore, the Scots contract law uses 
many English precedents and references to interpret the legal effects of the cases that occur 
with regard to unilateral error,134 as well as the other categories of error. It is noticed that 
not all the cases of the induced unilateral error are void. The judgment could be that this 
kind of error is voidable. In Macleod v. Kerr135 ‘A ’ wanted to buy the car from ‘B;’ A 
introduced himself to B as C. After that he bought the car from B and took the registration 
book from B and paid him money by stolen cheques. A sold the car to D by claiming that 
he was B (the original owner). When all this was discovered the police repossessed the car 
from D but it was held that the car should stay with D because the contract between A and 
B was voidable not void. It has been seen that if the error is not substantial, the consent 
will not be broken or destroyed unless the error involves fraud,136 this could be noticed 
above in regard of the error as to the subject matter, price, identity, quality of the subject 
matter, and the nature of the contract.
132 Rahmatian, op. cit., P40.41.
13’ Rahmatian, op. cit., P40.
134Elspeth Christie Reid, D. L. Carey Miller. A mixed legal system in transition: T.B. Smith and the progress of Scots 
law. Edinburgh University Press. 2005. P I52. ISBN 0 7486 2335 3.
135 1965 S.C. 253.
136 Hec. op. cit., P60.
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Section 6: Misrepresentation
Misrepresentation or misstatement is the twin of error and it is connected with it in many 
ways. Many cases of error rely on misrepresentation when it comes to the categories of 
error. Misrepresentation occupies significant space in the doctrine -  if there is any -  under 
Scottish law of contract. Misrepresentation is quite comparable to what has been seen 
under the English contract law, but with less independent cases and academic argument 
which affects the depth of the discussion. That is to say, misrepresentation under Scottish 
law of contract followed the track of the English law of misrepresentation in many cases 
and opinions. Sometimes it can be found that this area is better investigated and clearer 
than under English law, and vice versa. There is a very thin line with regard to fraud and its 
relation with misrepresentation. It is worth noticing that there is a tendency from the 
Scottish scholars or writers to approach fraud more towards misrepresentation to be closer 
than what is considered by English law scholars or writers.
According to Prof Joe Thomson137 the operative misrepresentation needs to be based on 
inaccurate statement of fact, and this statement would be made or released during the 
negotiations, inducing the other party entering the contract, and the statement being 
material, which means that the misrepresentee would not have entered the contract without 
this statement. In other words, this statement should be enough to convince any other 
reasonable person under reasonable situation to enter the contract. At first sight, this 
definition seems very similar to the English practical definition of operative 
misrepresentation, but in fact it is not. The reason behind this brief conclusion is connected 
to what Prof Joe Thomson has mentioned with regard to the inaccurate statement of fact as 
one of the factors of the operative misrepresentation. It can be noticed that in English 
definition, it uses false statement of fact,138 not inaccurate statement, as it uses in the
137 Joe Thomson. Misrepresentation. S.L.T. (N). 2001. P279.
138 J. Cartwright. Misrepresentation (London. Sweet and Maxwell, 2002) PI.
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Scottish definition. The core issue is to say that there is a difference between an inaccurate 
statement and false statement, the first one means imprecise, inexact. The second one 
means misleading or deceitful.139 In other words, the operative misrepresentation is when 
the misrepresentor or his or her representatives release a statement that is untrue and 
connected to current or past fact presented before the contract is concluded, and this was a 
base to induce the other party (a misrepresentee) to enter the contract with the 
misrepresentor. It is worth mentioning that the misrepresentation that has been made by the 
misrepresentor should be the only reason behind the conclusion of the contract, but it 
should have enough influence to do so.140 It has been noticed that in Attwood v Small,141 
despite the exaggerated (untrue) statement that has been released in regard of the mine 
profits for the buyer, it was held that there is no misrepresentation because the buyer did 
not rely on the exaggerated statement to enter the contract, but he entered the contract 
relying on his expert’s opinion who evaluated the situation erroneously.
It is noticed that the Insurance law does not distinct between the kinds or the levels of 
misrepresentation. In other words, all sorts of the misrepresentation would be treated on 
the same judgement, no matter if the misrepresentation was fraudulent, negligent, or 
innocent.142 Under this case the insurer has the right to cancel or rescind the contract, no 
matter whether the misrepresentation was significant or insignificant (small or big).143 For 
the misrepresentation to be operative, or actionable to be considered for the vitiating 
elements a misstatement is required, whether innocent, negligent or fraudulent.144 It would 
be concluded that the Scottish definition of the misrepresentation is not settled, especially 
in regard of the sorts of the misrepresentation.
139 English Dictionary. Webster’s Reference Library. Geddes & Grosset. Concise Edition, New Edition. 2008. PI 17.
140 Rahmatian, op. cit., P41.
141 (1838) 6  Cl & Fin 232.
142 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer. Insurance and reinsurance news. July 2007. P2.
143 Soyer, op. cit.. P9.
144 MacQueen. op. cit., P14.
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|LUntil the end of 19 century, in Scotland, the courts did not used to deal with 
misrepresentation inducing the contract as a ground of claiming damages unless the 
misrepresentation had been made fraudulently. This treatment continued in the same track 
despite the law in England which included the negligent misrepresentation to constitute a 
ground of claiming damages except when the inducer or the misrepresentor submitted an 
acceptable reason that he or she had a reasonable view for believing that the statement or 
the fact which have been presented was right. Nevertheless, this rule has been changed to 
follow the English path in Scotland by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
(Scotland) Act 1985 (c. 73)s.l0  (1), which provides that the misrepresentation whether 
based on fraud or negligence will establish a damages claim. Fraud is connected to the 
dishonest representation, or it could be said it is part of the misrepresentation especially if 
it is made intentionally.145
6.1. Lies and M isrepresentation
Telling lies is considered as a misrepresentation, and deception is considered as a fraud146 
which has been described as a lie.147
6.2. M isrepresentation and Silence
In general, it could be said that silence is not counted as a misrepresentation. In other 
words, misrepresentation would not be established by silence. Despite this general fact 
there are different situations that could form a ground to consider silence as a 
misrepresentation. If the seller failed to explain the real situation of the sold items that 
appear as an antique, but in reality they are not.148 It was held that this is a 
misrepresentation. Some even went further to consider the half truth as a
145 http://fds.oup.com/ www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-. P6826867-X.pdf. Accessed at 11/8/2008.
146 MacQueen, op. cit., in Forte, op. cit., 5-37. P3.
147 McBRYDE, op. cit., P325. P aral4-11.
148 P a tte r s o n  v. L a n d s b e r g  (1905 ) 7 F 657.
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misrepresentation, like when the party keeps silent in regard of the incomplete statement 
despite of its misleading indication. This situation has been reflected when the party 
ignored to read a substantial part of the document, which led the other party to sign it.149 
There is another case where silence could lead to a misrepresentation. That is when some 
changes have been created before the conclusion of contract; in this situation the party who 
stated the “original statement” would be asked to inform the other party about the new 
changes that could give false impression.150 This case had been reflected in Shankland v 
Robinson151 when the seller did not inform the buyer about the new changes with regard to 
the machine legal status, where the seller stated that the government will not take over the 
machine, but he kept silent in regard of the new change that is the government had “plans 
to requisition the machine”. It was held that the contract is void because the parties should 
disclose any changes happened before the contract conclusion, to keep the truth of the 
original representation. Under English law, a similar case was established in Spice Girls 
Ltd (SGL) v. Aprilia World Service (AW S)152 where Spice Girls Ltd entered a contract with 
Aprilia World Service to fund a trip for Spice Girls Ltd which was expected to make 
promotional activities for the defendant in return. The defendant did a mistake in regard of 
the Spice Girls number at the time of contracting, where the defendant thought that the 
members of the team are five, but in fact they were just four of them. It happened that 
before the contract Ms Halliwell (Ginger Spice) informed her colleagues in the Spice Girls 
group that she would be leaving the team before the contract’s conclusion. The Spice Girls 
group (plaintiff) had known about this fact which became a mistake of the defendant but 
they did not mention for the defendant about this. The court held that the Spice Girls group 
was liable for damages because of the misrepresentation according to section 2(1) of 
Misrepresentation Act 1967, which does not apply in Scotland.
149 C o u sto n  v. M ille r  (1862) 24 D 607.
1M) MacMillan. Lambie. op. cit., P89.
1S11920 SC (HL) 103.152 [2002] EMLR 27. CA.
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On the other hand, it was considered as a unilateral mistake of the defendant. The court
decided that the conduct of the Spice Girls was a misrepresentation that induced the 
defendants to enter the contract. It was obvious that despite the previous knowledge of the 
Spice Girls that Ms Halliwell decided not to join the group in this tour, but they kept silent 
which made the defendant believe that there were still five members. The court had 
considered that when the four members of the group did not disclose the fact that the fifth 
member confirmed her leaving as a ‘partial non-disclosure’ or ‘half truth’.153 It can be 
noted that silence here is playing a crucial role in establishing misrepresentation, which 
means that silence itself can be considered as misrepresentation or can be counted as a 
factor of making misrepresentation. The Spice Girls band did not act and they did conduct 
in material way, but just they kept silent which induced the other party to enter a contract 
with them. So here, silence can establish misrepresentation as it was held in this case. It is 
in general a very rich case that includes many different perspectives; it includes the effect 
of change of circumstances making a statement untrue, 154non-disclosure, misrepresentation, 
half truth, fraud, damages, and silent misrepresentation as results of unilateral mistake.
Under this category there is another similar situation connected to the non-disclosure of the 
material facts. This situation was reflected in Gillespie v Russel155 where the future tenant 
did inform the owner of the coal mine that he discovered that the mine contained a special 
valuable kind of coal. The owner brought an action against the tenant trying to finish the 
tenancy agreement when he discovered this fact. It was held that the tenancy agreement 
was valid, because the tenant concealment of the information was not considered as a
153 S p ic e  G ir ls  L td  (S G L ) v. A p r il ia  W o r ld  S e n d e e  (AWS). [2002] EMLR 27, CA. 238-239.1>4 Smith, Keenan, op. cit., P736.155 (1856) 18 D 677.
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fraud. Similarly, the English law of contract does not recognise the duty o f disclosure as a 
general rule.156
Two situations would be excluded from the previous disclosure rule. The two cases are 
well established under the English law of contract,157 as well as under the Scottish law of 
contract, where the disclosure would be demanded in the insurance contracts. The insured 
party should disclose all the material facts for insurer party. The same duty would be 
required with regard to the contract where there is a fiduciary relationship between the 
contracting parties. This is required under Scottish law of contract158 as well as under the 
English law of contract.159 The case under the Islamic law of contract is totally different. 
Under Islamic law the seller has to disclose the defect in the sold item, if he did not 
disclose the defect, this would be considered as a misrepresentation (taghreer). Taghreer 
or misrepresentation is very strictly impermissible or prohibited {haram), and if the 
contracting parties did not disclose the defect on the contracting time, the contract would 
be void.160
6.3. Distinction between M isrepresentation and Statement o f Opinion
As in English contract law, the concept of misrepresentation in Scots contract law is 
distinct from the statement o f opinion.161 It is held that when ‘F’ bought the car from ‘S ’ 
who said that the car was in good running, but F came back after 7 days because the car 
was broken. Under this case the statement of S was considered as an opinion not a 
misrepresentation that could entitle F to reduce the contract.162 The same situation occurred
156 W a rd  v. H o b b s  (1878) A.C. 13.137 Soyer, op. cit., P9.158 MacQueen. op. cit., in Forte, op. cit., 5-37. P14.159 MacIntyre, op. cit., P157.
m  H a y d e n  op. cit., P191.161 MacQueen, op. cit., in Forte, op. cit.. 5-37. P I9.162 F lyn n  v. S c o tt  1949 S.C. 442 (O.H.).
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in Hamilton v Duke of Montrose163 where the statement was released in regard of the land 
capacity of a specific number of livestock. It was held that the statement would not be 
considered as misrepresentation, because it was released as mere opinion. In general, as a 
mere opinion, even if it is proved as a misleading or incorrect statement it will not be 
considered as a misrepresentation.164
6.4. M isrepresentation, Different Remedies
It has been stated by the majority of the consultees that the innocent partner cannot rescind 
the contract without a court order.165 This could be logical opinion especially when it is 
known that misrepresentation and fraud are not easily proved, and in addition to the 
complexities, that the interests of third parties should be protected. This means, there is no 
automatic termination of the partnership contract due to discovering misrepresentation and 
fraud case.166
6.5. Negligent Misrepresentation, Non-fraudulent misrepresentation
The House of Lords167 states that negligent misrepresentation could be attributed to 
claiming damages if it causes financial loss. This is regardless of the existence of the 
contract between the adviser and his advisee, that is to say, the adviser is expected to have 
special experience that motivates the advisee to trust his abilities. In this case the adviser is 
committed to take care about the interest of the advisee since he knows that his opinion 
will affect the decision of the advisee, no matter if there is a fiduciary relationship between 
the two parties. Furthermore, in another case168 it was held that since the misrepresentor 
released a statement that was vital to the contract, and pretended to be a knowledgeable.
163 (1906) 8 F 1026.164 B r o w n lie  v. M ille r  (1880) 7 R. (H.L.) 66165 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission. (LAW COM No 283), (SCOT LAW COM No 192). 
Partnership Law. Report on a Reference under Section 3 (l ) (e )  of the Law. Commissions Act 1965. November 2003.
P135. 8.118166 Ibid, P 137.8.127.167 H e d le x  B v m e  v. H e lle r . [1964] AC 465.168 P e tr o le u m  C o  v. M a rd o n  [1976] QB 801; 2 All ER 5
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His special experience makes him responsible to take reasonable measures to make sure 
that his representation is accurate. As a conclusion of his representation, the other party 
was induced to enter into the contract. Based on that, it was held that he was responsible 
for damages as he was involved in a negligent misrepresentation. When the 
misrepresentation arises negligently, this may establish an action of damages.169 The court 
held that the party who suffered capital losses had the right to recover the losses, because 
they entered the contract under the negligent misrepresentation.170
An interesting opinion/discretion has arisen in regard to dealing with the fraudulent 
misrepresentation in same level as with the negligent misrepresentation; that is to say, both 
categories should not be treated in the same remedy or in the same level. One of the raised 
reasons is that the measure of damages is different under the two sorts of 
misrepresentation, because under the fraudulent one, the misrepresentee would be enabled 
to recover all the loss that he suffered from the transaction including the unforeseeable 
losses. But it is not the case when the misrepresentation is negligent, because the 
misrepresentee can be allowed to recover the foreseeable losses that could be evaluated 
reasonably and were triggered by the misstatement.171
6.6. Innocent misrepresentation
If the misrepresentation is made innocently,172 it actually means that the party makes the 
misrepresentation honestly or in good faith without knowledge that he or she is making a 
misrepresentation. In other words, the parties release the statement or conduct they believe 
is the truth. Based on that, the innocent misrepresentor should have reasonable ground to
169 Lord Justice Clerk. Lord Hamilton, Lord Mamoch. Second Division, Inner House, Court of Session. H a m ilto n  a n d  
o th e r s  v. A llie d  D o m e c q  P ic  [2005CSIH74] A283/01. Para [50], http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/2005csih74.html170 Ibid.171 Joe Thomson. Misrepresentation. S.L.T. (N). 2001. P281.172 L e e s  v. T o d d  (1882) 9 R 807.
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justify his or her belief.173 The induced party (misrepresentee) has the right to seek the 
reduction of the contract.174 1756This situation had been reflected in Ferguson v. Wilson115 where 
Wilson published an advertisement asking for a person to enter with him in a business 
partnership. Ferguson answered W ilson’s advertisement and started negotiations with him; 
they reached an agreement which was implemented by both to establish a business 
partnership. After six months, Ferguson brought an action against Wilson to reduce the 
agreement claiming that he entered into this agreement by an essential error. Ferguson 
claimed that the error was induced by Wilson’s false statement in regard of the profits and 
his financial and business situation. It was held that the agreement would be reduced 
despite the fact that it was no evidence had been presented to approve that the 
misstatement had been fraudulent. In general the misrepresentee also has a right to seek 
restitution with regard to the price, but this can be applied when there is a possibility of 
restitutio in integrum.116 Restitutio in integrum comprises the restoration of the subject- 
matter as it was before the contract creation.177 But if restitutio in integrum is impossible, 
there is no room for claiming damages,178 but there may be overlapping claims in delict.179 
As a general rule, the innocent misrepresentation does not create the right for the 
misrepresentee to ask for damage.180
6.7. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
It is worth noting Lord Herschell,181 who started his definition of fraudulent 
misrepresentation by defining fraud, which according to him must have some factors that 
the party would be expected to be involved in. Built on that, to decide that the fraud is
173 Thomson, op. cit., P 297.
174 L e e s  v. T o d d  (1882) 9 R 807.
175 (1904 ) 6  F. 779.
176 W este rn  B a n k  v. A d d le  (1867) 5 M (HL) 808.
177 B o y d  &  F o r r e s t  v. T he G la s g o w  a n d  S o u th -W este rn  R a ilw a y  C o . 1915 S.C. (H.L.) 20.
178 Ibid.
179 H e n d e rso n  v. M e r r it t  S y n d ic a te s  Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145, 193 (HL).
180 M a n n e r s  v. W h ite h e a d  (1898) 1 F 171: 36 Sc LR 94; 6  SLT 190.
181 D erry' v. P e e k  (1889) 14 App Cas 337.
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created, the party must know that the representation is false (does not believe it is true), 
and the carelessness involved in the contract if it is released falsely or truly. The same rule 
would be applicable for the statement of half truth. In other words, when the party intended 
to say part of the material fact to make another statement misleading for inducing the other 
party would be considered as a misrepresentation.182 Furthermore, for the fraudulent 
misrepresentation to be established two factors must be available, that is to say, it should 
be shown that the statement is wrong and fraudulent.183 It means that not all the lies or not 
every lie made by the parties could be considered as a fraudulent misrepresentation, 
because of that, some of the lies would not have a legal influence on the conclusion of the 
contract. For instance, when the owner of the flat in Edinburgh decided to sell his flat and 
presented an incorrect statement for the buyer about the number of residents in the city, 
and about the neighbour’s behaviours -  especially when these representations are an 
expression of opinion and not stating clearly the facts.184 It is the same case when it comes 
to the wrong statement which was made truthfully, that is this kind of statement that would 
not be considered as a fraudulent. 185
It is noticed that the fraudulent misrepresentation could seek the damages without 
rescission. When Sim186expressed his will to sell his business, Smith, relying on the Sim’s 
lawyer statement that he stated falsely that the business generates two times more than the 
reality. Despite of the fraud in this case, Smith sought damages without rescission, and his 
claim was supported by the court. In some cases187 the reduction or rescission would be 
accompanied with restitutio in integrum, which is the case under the Scottish and the 
English laws of contract. It is worth noting that William W. Mcbryde, under a subtitle of
182 MacQueen. Thomson, op. cit., P172.
183 McBRYDE, op. cit., P326. Paral4-12
184 B r o w n lie  v. M ille r  (1864) 2 M. 848.
185 B r o w n lie  v. M ille r  (1880) 7 R. (H.L) 6 6 .
m  S m ith  v .S im  1954 S.C. 357 (O.H.).
187 Lord Wright (at p. 76) of S p e n c e  v. C r a w fo r d  1939 S.C. (H.L.) 52.
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fraudulent representation, suggested that some of the fraud examples occur if representors 
produce a false statement to maximise the profits and decrease the legal duties. This can 
also happen if the parties lie about foreign exchange rates, or if they misrepresent the 
situations around the agreement of the inheritance distribution, or if they misrepresent the 
nature of sub-lease.188 An interesting idea that can be concluded from the abovementioned 
discussion, is to consider the fraud as misrepresentation. Because of that it is noticed that 
when he wrote the title he said fraudulent representation, but when he wanted to describe 
and define the fraud by the examples he kept stating “misrepresenting”. It comes to the 
mind that misrepresentation is used instead of fraud. It means that according to William W. 
Mcbryde, misrepresentation is one of the reflections of the practical fraud, and if there is 
no fraud there is no misrepresentation. This is because the author relied on fraudulent 
representation as a fraud and considered that misrepresention of a statement is in fact a 
fraud.
However, when it comes to the damages as a remedy of the fraudulent misrepresentation, it 
is clear that there is an obvious and crucial difference between the treatment under the 
English and the Scottish contract law. Under English contract law, the damages could be 
applied even if the contract has not been concluded yet.189 The justification stands behind 
this opinion simply because there would not be any loss as a result of contract, because the 
contract is not existent.190 The case under the Scottish contract law is different because the 
damages remedy needs to be applied when the contract was concluded or 
created.191 Actually this applies to the fraudulent misrepresentation as well as to the
188 McBRYDE, op. cit., 3nd Edition. P325. P aral4-11.
189Elspeth Reid. Protecting Legitimate Expectations and Estoppel in Scots Law. Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 
vol. 10.3 (December 2006). Report to the XVIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, July 2006. P10. 
http://www.ejcl.org
190 MacQueen, op. cit., in Forte, op. cit., P14.
191 C le l la n d  v. M o rto n , F r a s e r  a n d  M ill ig a n  1VS 1997 SLT (Sh Ct) 57.
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negligent form.192 Furthermore, the damages could be claimed by the misrepresntee when 
the misrepresentation is fraudulent or negligent.193
In fact, the discussion about the misrepresentation concept under the Scots contract law 
could lead to gray areas. The most important area connected to misrepresentation and error 
together is the fraud concept which took deeper discussion in many places of the Scottish 
literatures in regard of contract law. Furthermore, sometimes it is found that the fraud 
definition is very well communicated and linked with the misrepresentation definition 
because in addition to the fraud definition as ‘a machination or contrivance to deceive by 
words or acts’. It has been described as a false representation of fact that has been made 
knowingly or carelessly without believing in its truth. In addition to the intention to 
convince the other party to rely upon the representation and eventually act upon it. As 
mentioned earlier, if there is an intentional dishonesty in the representation and it has been 
proved, the party who was affected by the fraud could reduce the contract. Furthermore, if 
any loss happened this may give the right for claiming damages. The same elements have 
been indicated in regard of the fraud definition in Derry v Peek.194 Further conclusion 
could be derived from the Scottish law writers’ attitude in respect of dealing with the fraud 
as an alternative concept of fraudulent misrepresentation or as a parallel terminology. It has 
been argued that the unsubstantial error will not affect the consent unless it involves 
fraud,195 instead of using the fraudulent misrepresentation as it is usually used. It is noticed 
that English law commission adopted similar attitude in regard of the fraud definition. It is 
suggested that ‘fraud includes any dishonest conduct which causes, or exposes another to 
the risk of, financial loss,’ it can be added that the lies could be included within this 
definition.196
192 S 10 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985.
193 Joe Thomson. Misrepresentation. S.L.T. 2001. P279.
194 (1889 ) 14 App Cas 337. HL.
195 Hec. op. cit., P61.
196 The Law Commission (LAW COM No 276). Fraud. Report on a reference under section 3(1 )(e ) of the Law.
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When it looks to the definition of misrepresentation, it is a false statement or conduct that 
induces a party to enter the contract and this inducement causes financial or economic loss. 
Here, false is parallel to dishonest and actually they are the key words of the 
misrepresentation and fraud, in addition to causing a financial or economic loss. This 
research tends to find that the fraud and misrepresentation are similar and could be mixed 
conceptually but the main difference that can be derived is that the fraud is an action of 
deceit by itself and the misrepresentation is a tool of the fraud. The point is whether the 
fraud could be innocent or not. It can be said that there is a possibility to consider the fraud 
as an innocent as well as misrepresentation. When the innocent misrepresentation is 
unintentional misrepresentation, theoretically this could happen with the fraud when the 
person does not realise that he or she is practicing fraud during the contracting process.
It is obvious that the crucial point in this relation is about the intention to deceive in both 
cases which leads to intentional fraud or intentional misrepresentation. But when it says 
representation alone it refers to demonstration or illustration but when it comes to 
misrepresentation, the meaning will be different. The approach would be about misleading 
and this means intentional deceit which will be “the essence of fraudulent 
misrepresentation”.197 That could be modified to become fraudulent representation or 
misrepresentation. Here it can be followed by saying the intentional misrepresentation 
could give meaning of fraud but intentional representation does not mean anything in terms 
of misrepresentation or surrounding concepts. As an analytical conclusion, it could be said 
that when the party commits untrue representation intentionally to induce the other party to 
enter the contract, it will be a misrepresentation which will be an instrument of the action 
of fraud.
Commissions Act 1965. July 2002. Para 7.6. P58.
197 PACE (Property Advice to the Civil Estate). Central Advice Unit. GACC (Guide to the Appointment of Consultants 
&Contractors). Edition 2 REV 2: JAN 2000. LE 1.6.2(S).
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This viewpoint is certainly enlightened by the Scots legal background that has been 
explored during this research. It could be considered as a support of this researches 
discussion about the misrepresentation/misstatement. This means that the 
misrepresentation is a channel of doing fraud, or the misrepresentation is an acting tool of 
the fraud action. This takes the discussion back to the Islamic viewpoint in regards to the 
fraud; misrepresentation concepts which in many places do not differentiate between them.
Section 7: Conclusion
It can be said that the discussion of error or misrepresentation under Scots law of contract 
does not give an idea whether the concept of error has its own independent attitude or its 
clear borders from the English concept. It can be said also that the development of the 
concept of error under Scots law gives no clear idea that this concept will be able to 
develop independently far from the concept of mistake under English law of contract. 
Nothing can be said towards the clarifications of the error concept especially in respect of 
the case law. As it has been mentioned above in many places, it is found that in some 
occasions that one case law of error was used to explain different cases. Many cases have 
been borrowed from the English case law, which makes it difficult to examine whether the 
error concept is independent and can be treated independently when it comes to the 
implementation point. It happened that the same case was presented as a ground for 
different decisions. It is clear that the Scottish legal writers did not contribute markedly to 
stabilise a uniform understanding of the concept of error, as well as misrepresentation, 
fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation in particular. It is understood that the concentration 
of the Scots law of contract in regard of error is on the main categories of the substantial 
error but that these categories are not stable towards characterising the cases. It means that 
the error which could be considered an error as to quality may be considered as an error as
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to subject matter in another case, or mutual error in some cases to be considered as a 
common error. In contrast, these various dictums could be evidence of the flexibility of the 
Scots doctrines of error or evidence of the discrepancy between some legal schools inside 
the Scots legal structure. This leads to more confused discussion in relation to the notions 
of discretions and their legal effects under the Scottish contract law. It could be noticed 
that the doctrines of error under Scots law are not distinguished clearly from one another, it 
can even be added that many error cases are mixed into each other. It has been shown that 
the remedies which could be missed or unreached within the normal legal solutions might 
be resolved by the equity instrument. Of course this doctrine is approached from the 
English law principle in this area as it has been mentioned earlier in the English mistake 
chapter.
When it comes to the comparative point of view, the error concept under the Scottish 
contract law is very similar to the mistake and misrepresentation under the English contract 
law.198 But it does not mean that they are the same, or the bear the same mechanism to be 
understood or implemented. It has been seen that many different cases which are used in 
England are also considered by the Scottish courts when releasing decisions, which means 
that there are many shared areas that are well communicated and tied between the English 
concept of mistake/misrepresentation and the other cases of essential error under the 
Scottish contract law.199 It is also worth mentioning that error under Scottish law of 
contract is still remarkably influenced by the Roman rules and divisions in the same area.
198 Hec. op. cit.. PP59. 74.
199 William R. Anson et al. Anson's Law of Contract. Oxford University Press, 1998. P145.
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C h a p te r  F o u r
I n tr o d u c t io n  to  I s la m ic  C o n tr a c t  L a w
Section 1: Introduction
This chapter deals with the concept of contract under Islamic law. The discussion 
concentrates on the Islamic legal system (Sharia’h) derived from the Qur'an1 and Sunnah,2 
including the Islamic schools and doctrines where needed. In addition to the Ottoman 
Journal of Equity, this derived its principles including rules of contract from two Islamic 
resources (Qur’an and Sunnah). The Qur'an is the book revealed from God (Allah) 
showing Muslims how to organise their life, to include ethics, morals, behaviours, 
worships, in addition to commercial dealings. The general principles o f the Islamic 
contract law contained in the Qur'an and indicated in many verses: “O you who believe 
fulfil all obligations”3 “You who believe, be faithful to your contracts,” 4 and “Fulfil the 
covenant o f God when you have entered into it, and break not your oaths after you have 
confirmed them.”5 As referred to above, the contractual relationships considered to be the 
most important subject in relation to commercial dealings.6 Theoretically, Islamic contracts 
implemented throughout most of the Arab and Islamic world, including Jordan, Palestine 
and Egypt, in the manner approved by the main Islamic doctrines. These doctrines divided
1 The Holy Book of Islam That revealed from A lla h  (God) to his Prophet Mohammad (PBUH).
2 According to the traditional Islamic understanding, S u n n ah  is the traditions of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). Such as 
Speech, Acting, Behaviours, and Endorsement.
3 Q u r'a n  5:1.
4 Ibid, 4: 33.
5 Ibid, 16: 91.
6 H u sse in  H a ssa n . Contracts in Islamic Law: The Principles of commutative/Justice and Liberality. Journal of Islamic 
Studies 13:3 (2002). Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies. P251.
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into four main schools,7 8Hanafi, Shafe ’ai, Maliki and Hanbali. Palestine, Jordan, and Egypt 
follow Hanafi School. Scholars (Fuqaha ’a f  consider both, binding divine sources of law 
(Shari’ah) and human interpretation of these verses (fiqh) when discuss the structure of the 
Islamic contacts.9 The written divine source considered as permanent framework giving 
basic background to the general legal aspects (legal principles); rules of justice, equity, 
what is permissible, etc., in addition to the interpretation of practical procedures which 
should be applied to individual implementation as new cases and situations arise.
Term of contracts or obligations in Arabic- Islamic context is (Uqud, sing, Aqd) which is 
derived from Arabic verb (.Aqada), and means to tie or bind. Islamic contract has two basic 
elements to be entered or established; the first one is offer (ijab), the second one is an 
acceptance (qubul). These elements are also required in Scottish and English contract. The 
Islamic contract has also two main forms, oral, and written. Consideration under the 
Islamic contract law could be money, goods, or services.10 It is important to add that the 
contract become null or void when one of the parties dies before implementing the contract 
or before achieving its aims or purposes.11 In addition, under Islamic law, the obligations 
have a divine power arises from its spiritual nature and which related to God (Allah). This 
means that if somebody undertakes mutual obligations in both forms, explicitly or 
implicitly, entering into commercial or social contract, these must correspond to the 
framework of Islam. They must be fulfilled faithfully,12 thereby encouraging the people to 
implement their commitments toward others within their contractual relations. It should be
7 L u 'a yy  M in w e r  A l-R im a w i. Company Lawyer. Relevance of S h a r ia  in Arab securities regulation with particular 
emphasis on Jordan as an Arab regulatory model. Publishers: Sweet &  Maxwell Ltd ISSN 0144-1027. 2006.P1.
8 They are the Muslims religious specialists, they are known as U la m a ’a  also in Arabic language or Fuqaha’a. They are 
qualified people to interpret the Q u r ’an  and S u n n a . so they should have very high level of religious qualifications to be 
able for deriving the correct analogy from the both sources ( Q u r ’an  and S u n n a).
9 H a b ib  A h m e d . Islamic Law, Adaptability and Financial Development. Islamic Economic Studies. Vol. 13, No. 2, 
February 2006. p i8-19.
10 Angelo M. Venardos. Islamic Banking & Finance in South-East Asia: Its Development and Future. Asia-Pacific 
Business Series Vol.3.2nd Ed. 2006. World Scientific. P50. ISBN 9812568883.
11 Timur Kuran. Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional 
Stagnation. Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol 18. Number 3. Summer 2004. P78.
12 H a s s a n  S a lih  K h a lilie h . Islamic Maritime Law: An Introductio. Brill Acadamic. 1998. P59.ISBN 9004109552.
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noted that the Qur'an states that promise must be fulfilled exactly in the same way as 
contract.
The term Aqd covers meaning of obligations under every field: religious obligations to 
God (Allah), marriage obligations, political relationships articulated and established in 
treaties, and commercial relationships between parties in a form of contracts.13 14In fact, it is 
worth mentioning that marriage contract not indicated in the Qur'an under meaning of 
commercial contract. The Qur'an uses term Uqdahu to indicate the marriage, not term 
used for the commercial contract, Aqd. This provides basis to distinguish between social 
relationships, and commercial transactions determining how to deal with each one of them. 
Various issues need to be clarified before starting discussion and explanation about the 
Islamic contract law. There are many specific terms used in the Islamic contract law, which 
derived from the Arabic language.
Section 2: Explanatory Terminologies
Discussion the Islamic contract law should be supported with explanatory terms related to 
meaning of most contracts in use to make them clearer. Most of these terms derived from 
the main nominate contracts which usually used and referred to by Muslim scholars under 
the Islamic commercial or trade traditions. These terms along with brief explanations will 
be presented below. Majority of the Muslim scholars, both early and contemporary, 
considered prohibition of riba and gharar as the main condition to consider the contract 
valid under Sharia 'h law.
13 N. Mohammed. Principles of Islamic Contract Law’, Journal of Law and Religion. 6  (1988). P 16-115.
14 Q u r ’a n  1:235.
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2.1. Riba
The Qur'an considers charging “riba” (usury or interest) as most vital practice to be 
avoided and prohibited under the Islamic commercial and financial contracts. Riba literally 
means increasing or growth. For a wider understanding - for the purpose of this chapter - 
the context of riba means all sorts of predetermined interest payable on any kind of loan.15 
This would also be applicable to any other transactions that would generate any interest. 
According to banking terminology, interest means the premium that borrower must pay to 
the lender over the principal amount or an extension in its maturity.16 17Any amount over the 
principal, big or small, in a contract is riba.11 To enhance a better understanding of the 
reasons for considering riba as being forbidden (haram) under Islamic law, it is worth 
mentioning that all the evidence has originated, and been derived from the Qur’an, which 
is the main Islamic legislative source. The Qur’an stands at the heart of the Islamic way of 
living, to include the way the Islamic economy operates. Therefore, as part of this 
evidence, there are Qur’anic verses that mention riba directly, for example: “Those who 
take riba (usury or interest) will not stand but as stands the one whom the demon has 
driven crazy by his touch. That is because they have said: ‘Trading (sale) is but like riba’. 
And Allah has permitted trading, and prohibited riba’. Therefore, whoever receives an 
advice from his Lord and stops, he allowed what has passed, and his matter is up to Allah. 
In addition, the ones who revert, those are the people of Fire. There they remain forever.”18 
“And if the debtor is in a difficulty, grant him time till it is easy for him to repay. But if 
you remit it by way of charity, that is best for you if only you knew.”19 “O believers! Do 
not live on usury (compound interest) which compounded repeatedly. Have fear of Allah
^  Jahongirbek Burhonov. Islamic Banking Operations of Commercial Banks Under Islamic Banking Scheme( IBS) of 
Malaysia: The performance Analysis. A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master 
of Economics. Thammasat University, Faculty of Economics, 31 October 2006 P I3.
16 Glossary of Islamic Banking Terminology.
https://www.ubl.com.pk/ameen/pdf/Glossary_Islamic_Banking.pdf/Accessed at 10/6/2007. pi.
17 Aurangzeb Mehmood. Islamalisation of economy in Pakistan: past, present and future. Islamic Studies, 41:4 (2002). 
P6 8 8 .
18 Q u r'a n  2: 275.
19 Ibid. 2:280.
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so that you may prosper.”20 “That which you lay out for increase through the property of 
[other] people will have no increase with God; but that which you lay out for charity, 
seeking the countenance of God, will increase; it is these who get a recompense 
multiplied.”21
The above verses indicate that Qur'an prohibits riba through describing the people who 
deal with riba. This is to encourage people not to deal with riba. Riba is considered to be 
an unjust instrument to be used as part of the financial system by the people, since under 
riba the creditor asks for a fixed rate over the principal amount, even in case of losses.22 Of 
course, this could cause many problems with regard to the economic circle, such as making 
rich people richer and the poor people poorer. What could be understood from the spirit of 
the Islamic philosophy is that dealing with riba (interest) and its rate is one of the main 
reasons that could cause an imbalance within the financial system and with wealth 
distribution, which benefits rich people at the expense of poor people.23 It could be said that 
any payment of riba, or any taking of it, as is the case in the conventional banking system, 
is clearly prohibited under Islamic law.24 This is because trade usury is deemed to be unfair 
charges or gains. These are usually made by people (mostly traders or financial 
institutions) when exchanging the same sort of commodities but taking different quantities 
in return. This way applies to loans between banks and borrowers, as the loan contracts are 
about lending and borrowing money (the same type of commodities) but with higher 
money to paid in return by the borrowers (different quantities). Because of this it is clear 
that the Qur’an encourages trade but prohibits riba. From an economic standpoint, this 
means that trade involving a buyer and seller is viewed as just. The reason for this is the
20 Ibid. 3:130.
2 ‘ibid, 30:39.
22 M o h a m e d  A b d e lh a m id . Islamic Banking. Department of Economics, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario. September 
9, 2005.P35.
23 Ibid.
24 Burhonov, op. Cit., P I3.
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parity of the arising return and the effort and time that the buyer used up in securing the 
goods for the seller.25 This approach is clearly about using financial resources to activate 
economic sectors, and for there to be a sharing of the losses and profits together. This 
would enhance economic activities by encouraging people to implement real investments 
within the community. This should give a chance for more people to be involved in the 
economic activities and achieve benefits from them.
It can be concluded that the contract is not valid if it contains riba (interest, usury);26 in the 
other words, the Islamic contract or the transactions must be interest free. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that in Palestine, Jordan and Egypt the contract that contains riba is not 
deemed null, void, or even unenforceable, but rather it is considered, under legal practice, 
to be a valid legal contract. This is despite the fact that the civil laws implemented in these 
countries are based on Sharia’h law. The Jordanian Civil Code states that “If a profit in 
excess of securing the lender's right is stipulated in a loan contract, such stipulation shall 
be void without invalidating the whole contract.”27 Moreover, the same code, at Article 636 
forbids interest in a loan contract. Nevertheless, Jordanian Commercial law does allow 
interest in loans.28 The Central Bank of Jordan determines contractual rates of interest, 
regardless of the limit, which are valid in Jordan.29 The Egyptians engage in a similar legal 
practice. Palestine is very similar to Jordan and Egypt, where Majallat Al-Ahkam (Ottoman 
Journal of Equity)30 the Palestinian civil law considers riba as haram (impermissible or 
forbidden).31 Actually the Journal is still valid law, and is being implemented, without any
2:1 Spremann. op. cit., 2004.
26 T a rek  S. Z a h e r  a n d  M . K a b ir  H a ssa n . A comparative Literature Survey of Islamic Finance and Banking. Financial 
Markets. Institutions and Instruments. V.10, No 4. November 2001 New York. University Salmon Centre. Published by 
Blackwell Publishers. P I58.
27Article 640. Jordanian Civil Code.
28 Jordanian Commercial Law. Act Number 12. 1966.
29 A l-R im a w i, op. cit., P10.
30 “The M a ja lla h  is assortment of legal system based on the H a n a fi  School connected chiefly to business dealings. The 
courts used the M a ja lla h  as a direct for their judgements and were not obliged firmly to track it in their rulings.." H a b ib  
A h m e d , op. cit., p7.
31 M a ja l la t  A l-A h k a m  A l-A d liy y a h  (Ottoman Journal of Equity). Article 34.
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modifications by other legislative acts, within the Palestinian territories. Nevertheless the 
practice of interest persists. This leads to a conclusion that there is a contradiction between 
theory and application.
2.2. Gharar
According to the most traditional understandings, gharar means dishonesty, hazard, 
danger, risk, ambiguity, and uncertainty.32 It means any factor of complete or extreme 
uncertainty in any dealing or contract about the subject of contract or its price, or mere 
speculative risk. It leads to an unjustified loss by one party and an unwarranted enrichment 
of another.33 Gharar is also considered as one of the most strictly prohibited elements in the 
Islamic financial and commercial system in Sharia’h. Some have justified the prohibition 
of gharar under Islamic law as gharar stands against moral security.34 Actually, the idea of 
gharar relates to the problems of information irregularity and ethical hazard in 
conventional contract theory dealing with principal-agent affairs.35 In other words, it means 
cheating through the lack of awareness of knowledge by one or more parties in the 
contract. The cheating is based on concealing the information or the improbability of 
delivery with the view of causing damage. The existence of such (gharar) action means 
that one party does not know who is going to lose or profit from the deal as the profit or 
loss is a result of the uncertainty.36 More precisely, it also means that exposure to 
unnecessary risks and hazards in the course of dealing with a transaction is as a result of 
uncertainty about the price, quality, quantity of the counter-value, date o f delivery, ability 
of the buyer or the seller to accomplish the obligation, or vagueness of the stipulations of
32 Islamic Financial Services Industry Development, Ten-Year Framework. A joint initiative of the Islamic Research & 
Training Institute/ Islamic Development Bank , Islamic Financial Services Board and Islamic Research & Training 
Institute. Pxii. http://www.sbp.org.pk/ibd/2006/Ten Year Master plan.pdf. Accessed at 16/6/2007.
33 Glossary of Islamic Banking Terminology. Op. cit., P2.
u T a r iq , op. cit., PI 1.
3:> Burghardt, FuB, op. cit.. PI 1.
36 N. Comair-Obeid, The Law of Business Contracts in the Arab Middle East. London. 1996. P55.
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the transaction; so, exposing each of the two parties to needless risks.37 38Any type of 
contract which is unbalanced in favour of one party, at the expense and undue loss to the 
other, is classified as g h a r a r It could be concluded that the idea of the balance of profits 
which is required by Islamic ethics, is the basic principle behind the prohibition of gharar 
in Islamic law.
Despite all that has been said previously about gharar, its understanding by scholars and 
its definitions, there are some other facts and findings that will be explained later in the 
chapter on the Islamic concept of error. In this later chapter it will show that there is 
another understanding that is a materially different, giving a wider concept of gharar, that 
has not been discussed above. Gharar is very close to the concepts o f fraud or 
misrepresentation under English and Scottish contract law. It might even be considered to 
be a parallel concept for misrepresentation, as will be critically discussed later in this 
thesis. Following the traditional understanding among scholars that consider gharar the 
second important elements that affects the contract as uncertainty, speculation, and 
excessive risk, and in the view of the author of this thesis, also includes misrepresentation 
and fraud. This means that there is no valid contract if it contains gharar.39
However, according to the conventional standpoint, three conditions should be available 
for gharar to nullify the contract:
1. Gharar must be major and must affect the essence of contract,
2. The contract that is affected must be a commutative financial contract (aqd muaawada), 
and ,
37 Islamic Financial Services Industry Development, op. cit.
38 Burhonov. op. Cit.. P23.
39 Z a h er, H a s s a n , op. cit.. P158.
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3. Gharar must affect the subject matter of the contract.40
There are three main types of gharar:
1. The contract is of non-existing commodities,
2. The contract is for undeliverable goods, and
3. The contract is for unknown commodities in the sense of substance that is recognized, 
but stays unidentified as to specific type or quantity.41
Many different nominated contracts can be found under Islamic commercial and financial 
law, but due to the limited scope of this thesis, this section concentrates on the most 
popular contracts under Islamic law, which will be discussed below.
Section 3: Nominated Contracts 
3.1. Ijarah
As a general concept ijarah means leasing42 and hire; but in particular, ijarah is the sale of 
the usufruct.43 This means that the owner of the property has the complete right to receive 
or to ask for a benefit in the form of financial return ‘manfa’ah’, which originates from his 
ownership, by allowing others to use his assets or equipment.44 This means giving a right to 
use an item in exchange for rent. However, the implicit practical meaning of ijarah in an 
Arabic context is the right of usage and enjoying the advantages and the right to generate 
the profits out of leasing the assets and properties that are owned by financial institutions 
or banks that operate according to the Islamic financial contract system. Of course, the 
same concept would be applicable with regard to individuals. Ijarah contracts are
40 Ina Burghardt& Carolin FuB. Islamic Banking Credit Products in Germany and in the United Kingdom International 
University SchloB Reichartshausen. European Business School, Department of Finance, Working Paper Series, No. 12- 
2004.0ctober 2004. PI 1.
41 Spremann, op. cit., P5.
42 Sabahi, op. cit., P of Abstract.
43 Sherman Jackson Plenary: Basics of Islamic Law, the Sources of Islamic Law University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. P26.
44 Serlah, a Special Report for Client Sofraslan. Loon Gandree Grecht Sanwalte. Vol 2/2002, May- June 2002. P I3.
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comparable to the English term leasing.45 Under Islamic contract law the contract of ijarah 
also refers to a finance lease46 and an operating lease, but under Islamic finance the 
essential concept of this contract refers to the operating lease of land, equipment, buildings 
or other facilities to customers in exchange for a previously agreed rent.47 It is an 
agreement of leasing where the financial institution (usually a bank) provides the customer 
a specific equipment or assets for production, and then the customer leases it back for a 
specific period. Under this type of contract, the customer avoid spending the initial capital. 
Under some situations, the customers will be able to possess the equipment at the end of 
the contract period.48 It is called ijarah wa iqtina’a under the Islamic term that is parallel to 
the English term of to lease to own, but of course without any involvement of riba. The 
basic structure to this contract is built on leasing an asset by a special agreement between 
the clients and the financial institution. This asset must be leased for a certain time in order 
to open the way for the customers to have the possibility or the right to ask for ownership 
to be transferred at the end of the ijarah agreement.49
Furthermore, to add more factors for enhancing the permissibility of ijarah, the rented 
properties must enjoy all the productive features for a long period of time. The parties 
would be required to agree in advance the amount of the lease payments or instalments. 
This would protect their agreement from speculative operations.50 The contract o f ijarah, 
under Islamic financial terms, keeps all the rights and obligations of ownership in the 
hands of the financial institution (the lessor).51 It is used traditionally by financial 
institutions in many Islamic and Arabic countries around the world to provide funding for
45 A b d e ll ia m id , op. cit., P55.
46 North Carolina Banking Institute, op. cit.. P36.
47 Glossary of Islamic Banking Terminology, op. cit..
48 M . K a b ir  H a ssa n . Issouf Soumare. Financial Guarantee as innovation tool in Islamic project finance. November 
2005.P4-5.
49 Chiara Segrado. Islamic microfinance and socially responsible investments. Case study. Meda Project. Microfinance at 
the University. University of Torino. August 2005.P10.
50 Ibid.
51 Islamic Financial Services Industry Development, op. cit.
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the customer’s major purchases.52 This contract works when the financial institutions 
purchase an asset and then lease it to the customer in return for a rent payment.53 It is 
important to note that this contract follows a very popular Islamic financial pattern, which 
is widely adopted by banks which deal with Islamic system of funding long term assets.54
3.2. Murabahah
Murabahah is cost-plus sales;55 This is a contract between the customer and the financial 
institution that entitles the institution to purchase goods, and sell them again to the 
customer on deferred instalments, without the need for an interest bearing loan.56 *Here, 
when the banks undertake the transactions of murabahah, they actually play the role of 
traders.37 The process of this contract starts when the customers request a tangible asset 
from a supplier, which is then sold to the financial institution. Subsequently the customer 
pays the money to the institution on a deferred sale basis with a mark up representing the 
institution’s profit, which is called a cost-profit.58 This contract is a sale transaction with a 
specified profit margin, where the institution funds the purchasing operation for the benefit 
of the customer by an indirect way. Customer should pay money back in an agreed time in 
instalments, or in a lump sum. It should also be noted that the financial institution bears all 
the risks related to the ownership of the goods until they are delivered to the customer.59
^N orth Carolina Banking Institute, op. cit., P36.
53 Ibid. P3.
54 M o h a m m e d  O b a id u lla h . Islamic Risk Management: Towards Greater Ethics and Efficiency. International Journal of 
Islamic Financial Services. Volume 3. Number 4. P I2.
http://www.isu.ac.ir/Farsi/Academics/economics/edu/obaidvol3no4.pdf. Accessed at 10/1/2007.
55 Jackson, op. cit., P26.
^ H a s s a n , Soumare, op. cit., P4-5.
51 K a m ra n  A k h ta r , ACA. Islamic Economic System, Issues in Islamic Banking. The Pakistan Accountant Vol. 38, Issue4. 
July-August 2005. P26.
58 Segrado. op. cit., P10.
^  Islamic Financial Services Industry Development, op. cit.
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The above method of financing used to be one of the most important tools used extensively 
by Islamic banks for funding commodity trade by acquisition of long-term assets.60 In 
other words, the financial institution (the bank) gives the client a loan secured on 
commodities.61 There are some conditions for a correct Murabahah contract:
A- The bank (the seller) keeps the ownership rights o f the commodity during the time of 
negotiation until the end of the contract.
B- The bank should give the client the exact cost of the commodity, and define the amount
of profit in advance. That must add to the aggregate costs.62
C- The contract with all its transactions must be free from usury {riba).
D- The bank (the seller) must disclose or discover any defect in the sold goods and inform 
the buyer.63 As explained above impliedly, murabaha is one of the most famous Islamic 
financing forms, it is also applicable to financing commercial transactions which require 
short-term liquidity instruments, and it can also be used for long-term investments.64 As 
stated by Tariq, “It is estimated that 70 to 80 percent o f total Islamic financing is afforded 
by this arrangement {murabaha).”65
3.3. Istisna’a
According to the Istisna ’a type of contract, a manufacturer enters into an agreement with a 
customer to produce a manufactured commodity, at a definite price, on a set date in the 
future. The commodity has to be exactly specified in advance. Under this contract it is not 
necessary for the price to be paid in advance. It may be agreed between the parties to pay
60 O b a id u lla h , Islamic Risk Management, op. cit., P l l .
61 A h m e d  G a b e r . Risk Management: Islamic Financial Policies. Case study of Farmers’ Commercial Bank. Paving the 
Way Forward for Rural Finance, An International Conference on Best Practices.P6 . 
http://www.basis.wisc.edu/live/rfc/cs_06a.pdf. Accessed at 2/6/2007.
62 A b d e lh a m id , op. cit.. P37.
63 G a b e r .  op. cit.. P6 .
64 Islamic finance. Shariah, Sukuk and securitisation.
http://www.yasaar.org/pubs/20177%20Islamic%20finance%20client%20notel.pdf. P7. Accessed at 17/6/2007.
65 T a riq . op. cit., P17.
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the money by instalments, or partly up front, with the balance to be paid later.66 This 
contract is used primarily to finance long term and large transactions.67 However, it should 
be noticed that the asset transacted by the parties is, on many occasions, not yet existing. 
That means that the contractor or the manufacturer is ordered by the customer to produce 
or build a specific asset for the purchaser before receiving the value.68 It could be said that 
istisna'a is a type of manufacturing contract within the categories of contracts of sale. This 
contract has gained its legitimacy from the fact that it was extensively practiced in the 
Islamic commercial tradition as long as many of the other Islamic contracts referred to in 
this chapter. The istisna 'a contract requires the following conditions to be met in order to 
come into existence. Firstly, the price must be fixed or specified in advance with the 
parties’ consent. Secondly, the commodity should be well described, also in advance. In 
addition, when the manufacturer or contractor starts the work, it is then no longer possible 
for any party to revoke or terminate the contract69 without the consent o f the other parties.
3.4. Mudarabah
Mudarabah is an Islamic partnership.70 It could be said that mudarabah, is a profit and loss 
sharing Islamic contract71 under participating or trust finance. Under this contract, the first 
party, usually a bank, provides the money or capital, and the other party is concerned with 
the physical efforts under the contract, such as the labour, or management and experience.72 
This contract is also one of the most popular Islamic contracts as it provides the proper 
framework to conduct financial mediation.73 It is clear that this contract involves a 
combination of capital and labour, with the Islamic expression for the capital
66 Islamic Financial Services Industry Development, op. cit.
67 North Carolina Banking Institute. Islamic Finance: A Growing Industry in the United States. Vol.10. 2006. 
Kimtacy.doc.2/21/2006. P60.
68 A b d e lh a m id . op. cit., P44.
69 Ibid.
70 Sabahi, op. cit., P of Abstract.
71 H a ssa n , S o u m a re , op. cit., P4-5.
72 Sabahi, op. cit., P of Abstract.
73 D a h lia  E l- H a w a ry , W a fik  G ra is , Z a m ir  Iq b a l. Regulating Islamic Financial Institutions: The Nature of the Regulated. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3227, March 2004.pl0.
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representative (the financier) being (rabbulmal), with the other party (the entrepreneur or 
manager) being referred to as (mudarib).74 Nevertheless, one of the most important rules 
governing this contract is that any “financial loss is borne only by the financier.”75 In this 
situation no profit will be paid to the party who provides the labour for his labour or 
experience.76 The main aim of this contract is the investment of funds according to 
Sharia’h, which is based on the concept of sharing both the profit and loss.77 It could be 
added that a mudarabah is a financing instrument “where not all the parties need to invest 
capital, but the business is free to solely contribute labour”.78 At the end, it is worth 
mentioning that there are two types of mudarabah. The first type is a restricted 
mudarabah, where the party who contributes labour, the borrower, should be committed in 
specific activity o f work which is determined in advance. The second type of contract is 
referred to as an unrestricted mudarabah, which allows the party who contributes the 
labour to be free to practice any type of activity which they are going to be investing in.79
The Sharika or musharakah contract is a kind of partnership or company under its modern 
definition, but it could also refer to ownership in general.80 In addition it could be described 
as a type of financial participation through a joint venture between two parties, when they 
combine either the capital or the physical labour through sharing the profits and losses, but 
on the basis of pre-agreed ratios.81 This means that the partners are liable only up to the 
amount that they contributed in the project or the investment.82 Hence, “musharakah
74 Faith and Finance: A Place for Faith-Based Economics, (A preliminary statement from Muslims and Christians in 
Manchester). Manchester Center for Public Theology, MCPT.
http://www.wtf.org.uk/documents/FAITHSANDFINANCE-Nov06_000.pdf. P I7. Accessed at 13/7/2007.
75 Ibid.
76 G a b e r .  op. cit., P7.
77 A b d e l-F a tta h  A .A . K h a li l . Colin Rickwood and Victor Murinde. “Evidence on agency-contractual problems in 
mudarabah financing operations by Islamic Banks,” Islamic banking and finance: new perspectives on profit sharing and 
risk. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 2002).P37.
78 Burghardt, FuB, op. cit., P20.
79 G a b e r . op. cit., P7.
80 Jackson, op. cit., P26.
81 Spremann. op. cit., P6 .
%2T a riq . op. cit., P7.
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examples include equity participation in partnerships, limited companies and co­
operatives.”83 It could be said that a musharakah contract is similar to the usual concept of 
a partnership agreement, where the parties pay capital according to their specific capability 
and all the partners have an equal right to manage their shared investment in proportion to 
their contributions.84 It should be noted that under a musharakah, the profit, which derives 
from the shared investment, should be distributed upon a pre-agreed profit sharing ratio. 
However, the situation is different regarding a loss which should be shared on the basis of 
equity participation.85
3.5. Salam
Salam is a forward purchase86 or an advance purchase.87 In this contract there is a cash 
loan, which should be delivered immediately to the borrower after meeting the conditions 
of this contract, with the repayment being in commodity form.88 Majllat Al-Ahkam Al- 
adliyyah considers this contract to be similar to the sale contract in terms of its basic 
elements, ijab (offer) and qubul (acceptance),89 with its ability to defer the delivery of the 
goods to a future time. This future time, as specified by Majallat Al-Ahkam is to be one 
month, unless the parties agree otherwise.90 Majallat Al-Ahkam, at Article 387, says that to 
consider salam as being a valid contract, the consideration (money) should be paid at the 
time of the agreement between the parties fi majlis ala’qd (at the same meeting). 
Otherwise, the salam would not be considered to be a valid contract. This contract was 
created to meet Muslims’ public needs within the Islamic community,91 as it is more supple 
than other possible options. Farmers prefer the salam contract as it enables them to have
83 Spremann, op. cit., P6 .
u T a r iq , op. cit.. P8 .
85 Serlah. op. cit.. P3.
86 H assc in , op. Cit.. P286.
87 Serlah. op. cit.. P I3.
88 G a b e r , op. cit.. P8 .
89 M a ja l la t  A l-A h k a m , op. cit.. Article 380.
90 Ibid.
91 Vogel. Hayes, op. cit., pl48.
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cash in hand. The repayment of the borrowings usually takes place after harvest time, the 
harvest having been financed by the funds.92 The main aim of salam is to help small 
farmers to meet their needs to finance their crops and to manage their families’ affairs until 
the time of the harvest.93
Nevertheless, it is noticeable that modem books and references are often concerned much 
more with the sale contract94 when they need to draw analogies. The reason behind this is 
summarized by the Qur’anic verse (2: 275): ‘God has made sale lawful and usury 
unlawful’. This made the bay’a (sale) to be the original contract type and riba (usury) the 
arch antitype of Islamic contracts. Majallat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyyah specified 302 articles 
which deal with the sale contract.95 Al-majalah considers the sale contract to be the core of 
all other contracts. One might ask why this chapter does not describe this contract in detail. 
As all the contracts that are mentioned in detail with all their rules are governed by the sale 
contract. Therefore, all the conditions, elements, basis, factors, formations and so on that 
are contained by all the contracts in this chapter come from the sale contract. Anyone who 
would like to know about the sale contract can find its reflections in all the other contracts.
A contract in Isalmic law is an agreement between two or more parties. According to 
Majallat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyyah (the Ottoman Journal of Equity), the contract is the 
obligation and the undertaking o f the contractual parties to make specific action with a 
positive connection between the offer and acceptance.96 In fact, the main factors contained 
in the Islamic contract are similar to those in English and Scottish contract law.97 This will 
be critically analysed in more depth in the following sections. It should be noted that
92 G a b e r , op. cit.. P8 .
93 A b d e lh a m id , op. cit., P41.
94 N. J. Coulson. Commercial Law in the Gulf States: the Islamic Legal Tradition. London. 1984. P20.
95 M a ja l la t  A l-A h k a m , op. cit.. Articles 101-403.
96 M a ja l la t  A l-A h k a m . op. cit.. Article 103.
97 Asia-Pacific Business Series, op. cit.. P50.
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Islamic law usually considers and deals with sale as the typical contract under the Islamic 
legal system.98
Sharia 'h has most of the modem elements and concepts of contract law, such as freedom 
of contract. This is made clear by the various rules that govern the contracts.99 As an 
example, loans contracts are required to be written, and documented by special procedures 
according to the Qur'an.100 Many contracts that require written evidence for enforcement 
purposes or for approval by the witnesses in relation to the oral contracts.101 The Qur’anic 
instructions (verses) establish the record of Islamic contract by adult eyewitnesses and 
documentation by the official officer (katebuladl) who is responsible for documentation 
procedures. This seems to be like the documentation departments in modem courts. Again 
prices, parties, quantity, quality, payment, periods and so on, need to be explicitly 
written.102
It should be noted that the Qur'an respects the contract and puts it in a very high level 
(sanctity). This is clear since the Qur'an considers a contract as a metaphor for building a 
strong relationship with God. This is strong evidence that contractual relations under Islam 
have been given a high importance and respect.103 It is useful to add that “In Sharia’h law 
there is a recognized rule articulated in a maxim (the contract is the law of the contracting 
parties)”,104 which in Arabic is, Al-aqd Shari'at Al-muta'aqideen. This makes an
98 ADmad Ibn MuUammad al- Jai^aw i .The Function of Documents in Islamic Law: The Chapters on Sales from 
□  aD awl's Kitab Al-shuruH Al - □ a la w l. Edited with an Introduction and notes by Jeanette A.wakin.Suny 
Press. 1972.foot note 1, P38. ISBN 08 7395100X.
99 Paul R. Powers. Intent in Islamic Law: motive and meaning in medieval Sunni Fiqh.Brill Academic.2006. P100. ISBN 
9004145923.
m  Q u r'a n  2:282
101 Karla C. Shippey. A Short Course in International Contracts: Drafting the International Sales Contract.2nci Ed. World 
Trade Press. 2002. P I22.
102 Powers, op. cit., P I00.
103 Nicholas Capaldi. Business and Religion: A Clash of Civilizations. M &  M Scrivener Press. 2005. P204 ISBN 
0976404109.
104 F a th  e l  R a h m a n  A b d a l la  “e l ” Sh eikh . The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia. 
2nd Ed. Cambidge University Press. ISBN 0-521-81772-2.
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interrelation with other modes, whereby an obligation might generate,105 since sharia’h 
encourages Muslims to respect the contract through the divine order, which says “O you 
who believe fulfil all obligations.”106 Moreover, the Quar’an adds a very strong meaning 
for contract sanctity when it says; “Fulfil the covenant of God when you have entered into 
it, and break not your oaths after you have confirmed them.” 107
The concept of contract in the Islamic legal system relies on essential ideas of offer, 
acceptance, the capacity of the parties and consideration. All of these are also required in 
English and Scottish contracts, with the sole exception of consideration, which is not part 
of the Scottish legal system. The capacity of the contracting parties is one of the most 
important elements for the validity of an Islamic contract. This means that under an Islamic 
contract no person can conclude valid bargains without having both physical and 
intellectual maturity, which is translated as Bulugh or Rushd in Arabic. When the 
consideration of either or both sides of a bargain is indeterminable jahala (ignorance), the 
contract will not be enforceable, e.g. payment of a fixed price for a diver’s catch next 
day.108
“The consideration must also be legal. For example, one cannot pay for goods with 
wine.”109 While some of the possible considerations are not allowed under the Islamic legal 
system, e.g. wine, they are legal under the English or Scottish law. However, illegal drugs 
and brothel services are forbidden under the three legal systems considered and may serve 
as an example for the above rule. No items or activities forbidden in the Qur’an must form 
any element o f a contract. Therefore, a contract dealing with the following items or 
activities would be considered illegal: “They ask you concerning wine and gambling. Say,
105 H a b ib  A h m e d , op. cit., p2
106 Q u r ’an  5:1
107 Ibid, 16:91
108 S a b a h i, op. cit., P5.
109 Nicholas HD Foster. Islamic Commercial Law (II): An Overview, Some principles and rules. University of London. 
Barcelona. January 2007. P I3.
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in them is great sin, and some profit for men, but the sin is greater than the profit.”110 “O 
you who believe! Intoxicants and gambling, dedication of stones and divination by arrows 
are an abomination of Satan's handiwork. So eschew it all so that you may prosper. Satan's 
plan is to excite enmity and hatred among you, with intoxicants and gambling and hinder 
you from the remembrance of God and from prayer. Will you not, then, abstain?”111
The extent of the freedom of the parties in relation to contracts under their different 
classifications depend on the close interaction of all these factors.112 Islam gives a wide 
freedom to create contracts, assuming that the stipulations of the contract are not in 
contravention to the Sharia’h, and approves any agreement based on the permission of the 
parties involved.113 It does not mean that Sharia’h has to be explicitly associated with an 
unrestricted freedom of contract, since a breach of the Islamic prohibitions can never be 
valid.114 Islamic law does not recognise the Western approach of liberty of contract, but it 
provides an appreciable measure of freedom within certain fixed contract categories.115 The 
parties have the complete and wide freedom to create any type of contract without any 
special conditions, as long as the parties are committed to avoiding riba, gharar, and other 
forbidden items and activities. In other words, according to the Sharia’h the independence 
of the will of the parties is subject to the Islamic prohibition that connected to riba, gharar, 
or dealing in definite products specifically forbidden in Qur’an. As a result, the concept of 
freedom of Islamic contract operates to the extent that it does in common law except that 
independence of will needs to adapt to the requirement to comply with Islamic restrictions. 
Taking this into account, one is free to enter into any type of contracts.116 It can be 
concluded that the Qur’an does not restrict the freedom of any one to enter any kind of
11(1 Q u r'a n  2:219.
111 Ibid 5:90.
112 H a b ib  A h m e d , op. cit., P2.
ll?Burhonov. op. Cit., P17.
114 H a ssa n . op. Cit., P261.
115 Foster, op. cit., P4.
116Hisham. M Ramadan. Understanding Islamic Law from Classical to Contemporary). Rowman Altarmira. 2006. P.103. 
ISBN 0759109915.
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contract. However, the contract should be entered without causing any harm to the other. 
As in other legal systems around the world, the Islamic legal system puts in many 
conditions as to form in order to build the contract. To say that the contract is formed or 
valid, the consideration117 should be definite at the time when the parties agree to create the 
contract. This means that the contract without Iwad (consideration) is void. This is found in 
the English contract law.118 Nevertheless, this doctrine does not exist in Scottish contract 
law.119 To say that there is a property contract, the property should be existing, and the 
seller cannot sell property if he does not the legal right to do that. This means that for there 
to be a valid property contract; the seller should be the possessor. In this context, it should 
be mentioned that the sale operation is generally understood as an exchange of property, 
and not of promises or obligations. Conditional or option contracts are generally 
prohibited.120
One of schools of Islamic jurisprudence, the Hanafi,121 in justification of this position, 
quotes the Prophet Mohammad as having said, “no sale that has an additional stipulation 
attached to it is permissible (la bay‘bi-shart)”.122 At the same time, some of the Islamic 
scholars123 said that it is not true that the Prophet forbade these transactions. They argue 
that what the Prophet forbade was the contract containing two additional stipulations: he 
allowed the contract comprising one such stipulation.124 These views however do not rule
117 As in English common law. consideration may consist of money, goods or services. For further information, see 
Dennis J. Keenan, Kenneth Smith . English Law. 14th Ed. 2004.P268.
118 Keenan, op. cit., P268.
119 Hugh G. Beale. Et Al. Contract Law. Hart Publishing. 2002. P140.
120 Frank E. Vogel. Islamic Contract, Commercial, and Financial Law, Islamic contract law. Harvard Law School. 
Zysow. aron. Res. Assoc., Islamic Legal Studies Prog., Harvard. Palnning Commettee for Joint Aals, American Society 
of Comparative Law and Law And Society Association Workshop on Islamic Law. p25.
121 It is belong to one of the four main Islamic Qiyas or Ijtihad (Analogy or discretion) schools or doctrines. “It is school 
of jurisprudence based on the teachings of Abu Hanifa.” (Nazzer Ahmad, Ph.D. Islam in Global History from the Death 
of Prophet Mohammad to the First World War. Xlibris Corporation. Vol.2. 2000. P380. ISBN 0738859664. and “ he 
established this school upon the rules of the interpretation developed by him, and he became one of the most highly 
acclaims scholars of his day.” Ramadan, op. cit., P.26.
122 Al-Sarakhsi (Hanafi jurist, d. 490 A.H.), A l-M a b s u t , 30 vols. (Cairo: Sa‘ada Press, 1324 A.H.), vol. 13, p.13.
12?This is the modem Islamic name of religious scholars nowadays.
124 Shams al-Din ibn Qudama, A l-S h a rh  a l - K a b ir  ‘a la  a l - M u q n i\  published in the margin of Muwaffaq al-Din ibn 
Qudama, A l-M u g lm i, 12 vols. (Cairo, 1341 A.H.), vol. 4, pp. 49-51.
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out the possibility of a sale contract with a stipulated option for either party or both in the 
khiyar al shart (option of condition) framework of the Islamic law of contracting.125 For 
example,126 in a contract of sale, a condition which was not necessitated by either the nature 
of the contract or habitual custom within a society, but give profit to the seller or to the 
buyer would make the transaction null and void. An example of this would be if a party 
sells a house, and puts a condition in the contract that obliges the seller to leave this house 
a month before the purchaser moves in.127 128
Finally, it is clear that the legality of a sale contract containing only one irrelevant 
condition is accepted by a different variant of the first hadith (the speech of Prophet 
Mohammad). Appealing to this variant, the Hanbali jurisprudential school legists have 
created legal rulings which oppose those followed by the Hanafis,128 when they dealt with 
sale contracts as being lawfully valid even through additional stipulations are attached to 
them. Consequently, conditions which a unrelated to major contracts that give favour for 
one of the transaction parties are sometimes permissible.129 For example, if the buyer 
stipulated an added stipulation to his advantage like the shipping of the commodities or the 
styling of the cloth would be permissible.130 It should be mentioned that Majallat Al-Ahkam 
Al-Adliyyah (Ottoman Journal of Equity) adopted the Hanafi jurisprudence, which has 
been implemented in Palestine, and was also implemented in Jordan and Egypt. However, 
as has been discovered by this research there are many main contradictions regarding the 
stipulation (Al-shart). This is even the case with regard to what the Islamic schools 
scholars claim in respect of the Prophet Muhammad Hadith (Speech). It has been found 
that there is another Hadith for the Prophet saying Almuslimun inda shurutihim (Muslims
125 M o h a m m e d  O b a id u lla h . Financial Options in Islamic Contracts: Potential Tools for Risk Management J.KAU:
Islamic Econ., Vol. 11. pp. 3-26 (1419 A.H / 1999 A.D). p6 .
126 These examples come according to Hanafi doctrine.
127 Abu Bakr al-Kasani. K ita b  B a d a ’i ‘ a l - S a n a ’i ‘ f i  T a r tib  a l - S h a r a ’i ‘, 7 vols. (Cairo. 1327-1328 A.H.), vol. 5, p. 169.
128 Arab/. op. Cit., P55.
129 Ibn  Q u d a m a , op. cit.. PP49-51.
130 Ibid, P50.
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are bound by their stipulations). This means that the stipulations are allowed according to 
this Hadith (speech). Another notable point regarding this issue is that Majallat Al-Ahkam 
Al-Adliyya considered the stipulation as completely permissible in the contract.131 Here 
Majallat Al-ahkam has fallen into a clear contradiction because Majallat Al-Ahkam 
adopted the Hanafi doctrine, and this doctrine considered the stipulation as completely 
impermissible.
The Qur’an does not deal with the stipulation issue, despite many Qur’anic verses which 
discuss the issue of contracts. The argument of Muslim Fuqaha’a (scholars or jurists) is 
about the Prophet Hadith (Prophet Mohammad Speech) not related to the Qur’anic A ’ay at, 
simply because it is not found in Qur’anic context as it mentioned earlier. The majority of 
the dealings finish with the payment of variable prices is not allowed in Shariah. 
Moreover, futures are completely impermissible in spite of their subject matter so no rights 
and obligations can be derived there from and there is no distinction whether these 
contracts are created with the function of assumption or for the reason of hedging.132 In fact 
most of the jurists have legalized definite contracts; salam (forward sale) which is mostly 
used for agricultural crops. Salam would be formed for example when the buyer pays the 
farmer in advance to buy the next year’s orange crop.133 However, the consideration to 
settle this contract should be paid in advance.
Islamic scholars (Fuqaha’a) like Imam Abu Hanifa, Al-Shaji, Imam Ahmad and some 
Maliki have distinguished between a contract and a promise. They consider that a promise 
is neither mandatory nor enforceable. This rule will, however, be different if the subject 
was with regard to the financial murabahah contract. Here the promise is binding as it is
131 M a ja l la t  A l-A h k a m . op. cit.. Articles 186-189.
132 Response of Justice M u h a m m e d  T a q i U sm cini to the author’s query, published as an article “Futures, Options, Swaps 
and Equity Investments”, N e w  H o r iz o n , June 1996, p.10
133 S u b h i M a h m cissa n i, a l  M u jib a t  w a  a l  U q u d  f i  a l  F iqh  a l  I s la n d , D a r  a l  I lm  Ii a l  M a la y in . Beirut, 1983. p327.
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made conditional upon a performance of an obligation and in the case where the promisee 
has already incurred expenses on the basis of such a promise.134 There is no restriction in 
Sharia ’h on promises to make specific payments under a promissory note. However, there 
are customary judicial procedures that make it difficult for an investor to act against the 
holder of an asset if a promissory note does not exist.135 It is worth mentioning that Islamic 
law also recognises the Bill of Exchange under the term Saftaja as an act of depositing a 
definite sum of money with another one for payment, to the advantage of the depositor or 
his representative or agent in a different country. This is permissible whether for fees or 
not.136 In general, commercial papers such as cheques, promissory notes and Bills of 
Exchange are permissible and lawful types of authentication of a debt under Saria’h law.137
As noted above, that for a contract to be formed the property or item must exist, but a 
contract of Salam (Forward Deals) is exempt from this rule, because the commodity does 
not yet exist when the finance is provided.138 Many contracts are termed permissible (ja'iz) 
but essentially cannot be made prospectively binding. This is because counter values139 in 
these contracts are not subject to being known and defined.140 Generally, the contracting 
parties should make sure to ascertain that the subject and the prices of the sale are agreed, 
and are able to be delivered, in addition to specifying the categories and amounts of the 
counter values, the quantity, quality and date o f future delivery, if it needed.141
134 H a b ib  A h m e d , op. cit., p i3.
135 S u le im a n  A b d  D u a le h . Islamic Securitisation: Practical Aspects. Jersey ii-online.com, ltd. Geneva. Switzerland & St. 
Helier. Jersey. Channel Islands. World Conference on Islamic Banking. July 8  9. 1998. p 7.
136 Islamic Development Bank, Islamic Research and Training Institute Jeddah, Islamic F iq h  Academy Jeddah. 1st Ed, 
2000. Resoluations and Recommendations of the Council of Islamic Fiqh Academy 1985-2000. PI 84.
137 Ibid, P I35.
138 UNCTAD secretariat. Islamic Finance and Structured Finance Techniques: Where The Twain Can Meet. 29 May 
2006. P I2.
139 The counter value here means the equivalent consideration of the subject matter of the contract, such as the amount of 
money or gold or silver whatever the kind of currency, to be paid for specific service or specific sort of goods or 
commodities.
140 Jackson, op. cit., P25.
141 M d . A b d u l  A w w a l  S a rk er . Islamic Business Contracts, Agency Problem and The Theory of The Islamic Firm. 
International Journal of Islamic Financial Services Vol. 1 No.2. P2.
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It should be noticed that the contract provisions in the Islamic legal system concentrate on 
business contracts, in particular, sale contracts, more than on any other type of contract. 
This means that the Islamic legal system is concerned more about the contracts that derive 
from and organise trade and business relations. Islamic business contracts can be classified 
into three broad categories. Firstly business contracts based on Direct Financial 
Accommodation or Uqud (contracts) al-Ishtirak: Profit Sharing Principle, Profit Loss 
Sharing Principle, and Output Sharing Principle. Many of these contracts, such as 
Mudarabah, Ijara and Musharakah, have already been mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter. In addition, they also include the MusaqahU2 and Muzara’ah contracts,142 43 which 
were well known both before and during the Ottoman era. These latter two types of 
contracts were mentioned in Mjallat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyyah, 144 but it is rare to find these 
types of contracts operating nowadays. Secondly business contracts on the basis of Indirect 
Financial Accommodation or Uqud al-Muawadat: Mark-up based Principle, Lease based 
Principle, and Advance Purchase Principle. All these business contracts have a general 
framework which is based on the generated funds of credit extensions. In other words, 
these contracts are managed in a fund through a third party by selling the products and 
arranging the reselling operation to the customers, together with a mark-up.145 Thirdly, the 
other forms of permissible contracts such as: Direct Investment, Finance on Development 
Charge, Rent-sharing on the basis of construction/purchase of houses/flats, sheds etc. on a 
co-ownership basis.146
142 In this contract the bank, supply farmers orchards, grounds, or trees for harvesting on crop partaking. (S a rk e r , op. cit., 
P3).
143 This contracts between landlord of agricultural ground and a farmer for agriculture it in return of a proportion of its 
crop. (S a r k e r . Op. cit., P3).
144M a ja l la t  A l-A h k a m , op. cit., Articles 1431-1448.
145 Vogel, op. cit., P3.
146 S a r k e r , op. cit., P4.
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In addition it is necessary to note the following points:
1. Generally, it is not allowed to exchange debt for debt, except at par.147 This issue raises 
specific and important questions about cost and expenses. It could be said that the 
institutions that serve the debt can charge specific fees for any type of service in relation to 
the debt, which are commonly referred to as administrative expenses. The institute or the 
person who has spent effort, time and incurred expenses in the course o f processing the 
debt has the right to charge fees against his services.148
2. In general any legal deal requires instant virtual implementation.149
3. It is forbidden to discount debts, especially to third parties.150
The fundamental Islamic principles, to including those underpinning contractual relations, 
depend on obedience to (Allah) God, and entail respect for the principles of Islam. Islamic 
precepts and morality affect the rules in a detailed, substantive way which is quite different 
in nature from the general philosophy underpinning Western legal systems.151 It should be 
admitted that a comprehensive Islamic legal system with all its rules is not applied in a 
pure way in many Arabic and Islamic countries, to include Palestine, Jordan and Egypt. 
There is therefore a form of contradiction between theory and application in these 
countries.
The provisions of the Islamic legal system dealing with contracts mostly concentrates on 
business and commercial relations, with more of a focus being made on the financial deals. 
The main derivative framework dealing with financial contracts derives from sale 
contracts. The basic issue facing Islamic contracts is with regard to riba (Usury or 
Interest), which is completely prohibited. However there seems to be a lack of
147 Vogel, op. cit., P 25.
148 Islamic Development Bank, op. cit., P101.
149 Vogel, op. cit., P25.
151 Foster, op. cit., P6 .
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implementation of this point even in countries using the Shari’ah as their main legislative 
source, to include Palestine, Jordan, and Egypt. This issue would raise serious issues if 
these countries implemented the Islamic legal system fully in practice, to the extent that 
they have adopted it theoretically. However, since they are a part of the international 
economic system, they cannot ignore the fact that all the international trade and finance is 
controlled by a financial system which deals with riba normally and without any objection.
It might be asked, why riba is the most prohibited issue in the Islamic legal system, 
especially in the financial area. The answer to that would be that countries which 
completely adopt the Islamic finance model could ignore trading with the prohibited goods 
or commodities, such as, alcohol, pork, or whatever is prohibited by Islamic law as it is 
their choice to deal or not with these items. However, when the issue comes to the financial 
dealing, none of the Islamic countries would fully implement the Islamic principles for fear 
that this may impede inward trade or investment. However, countries which would like to 
adopt the Islamic finance model could deal with an interest free system if they were the 
funder in the financial contract. The problems arise if these countries need to be funded by 
one of the countries or financial institutions that deal with interest, which is legitimized 
and lawful in non-Islamic countries. It is very important to say that the Islamic legal 
system does not classify, or differentiate between, financial and commercial contracts, but 
deals with all of them under the same categories or classifications, which are the 
commercial categories. It is also clear that the Islamic law of contract is not articulated as a 
general theory of contract but as regulations for a variety of defined contracts.152
152 Vogel. Hayes, op. cit., P97.
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Section 4: Conclusion
To conclude, it could be stated that the principles are often drawn from the nominate 
contracts and that there is no general law of contract in the Sharia ’h. The reason for this is 
that the jurists did not have the same unified discourse about contract. There was no 
explicit overarching general theory.153 The jurists did not try to develop a clear meaning of 
a contract, nor clear formulation of a theory of contract. The centre o f attention of a 
contractual agreement was “the object of obligation, the subject matter of the particular 
agreement, the action to be performed, not the obligation itself.”154 Contract under Islamic 
law is very well organised, and has all the elements of the modern contract structure. Most 
of the contracts under Islamic law are derived from contract of sale. It can be concluded 
that the Islamic law of contract is very flexible and adaptable and it could work in any 
legal system as long as the contract does not involve riba, gambling, and gharar (fraud or 
misrepresentation). The subject matter of the contract must not include dealing with any 
harmful material or commodities.
Considering riaba and gharar as well as gambling, as the main factors to be avoided in 
Islamic contracts, means that any party can cancel the contract or the transaction if he 
discovered that the contract is involved in riba. This would be applicable whether the party 
was induced by the gharar o f the other party, or if both parties were mistaken in this 
regard. The same can be said with regard to the gambling (excessive risk or uncertainty), 
where the party would be allowed to avoid or rescind the contract if he was induced to 
enter into it by the gharar of the other party. It is very sensitive to have proper 
understanding towards Islamic contracts as mentioned above, because any wrong practice 
or implementation would affect the formation or the existence of the contract. In taking
153 Foster, op. cit., P6 .
154 H a s s a n . op.cit.. P261.
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murabahah as an example, if the seller charges any extra money as an arrear penalty would 
be considered as a breaking the rules of the Islamic contract law in avoiding riba, and the 
buyer would be permitted to cancel the contract when he discovered that he was 
misrepresented by the gharar of the seller, if the seller gave him misleading information 
with regard to the contract terms that considered the arrear penalty as allowed under 
Islamic law. This leads us to the next chapter of the concept of error and misrepresentation 
in Islamic contract law, where we will discuss the concepts of error and misrepresentation 
deeply.
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Chapter Five
A Comparative Critical Analysis of the Concept of Error and 
Misrepresentation in Islamic Contract Law
Section 1: Introductory to the Origins and the Roots
Some important questions need to be taken into consideration when study the concept of 
error under Islamic contract law. Answering these questions helps to understand the 
concept of error within the Islamic contract law. First question to be asked is whether 
Islamic contract law recognizes unified concept of error, and secondly, what are the main 
underlying issue of the concept of error under the Islamic jurisprudence. Thirdly, there is 
also a need to explore the influence of the Qur’anic in establishing the concept o f error. 
Fourthly, there is a need to clarify whether variation, in Islamic law, made between error 
and misrepresentation.
The concept of error under the Islamic contract law has not been defined clearly as in 
English and Scottish contract law. Muslim scholars and jurisprudential literature have also 
not established or developed definition of the concept o f error. This applies to the early and 
modern Islamic literature. This does not imply that the concept of error is not existed under 
Islamic contract law; but to confirm that there is no clear definition and obvious distinction 
between the concept of error and some other concepts, misrepresentation, fraud, and 
deception. Understanding the concept of error under the Islamic contract law requires an 
extensive searching to explore the Arabic language connotations in this area.
To indicate English and Scottish concept o f error, different Arabic words are used.
According to one of the well known English-Arabic dictionaries, mistake or error in Arabic
185
means khata ’a or ghalat.1 A detailed classification of mistake or error can also be found 
using terms khata’a and ghalat.1 2 However, this is not the case with the Qur'an. Qur’an 
does not use ghalat within its verses to indicate any meaning. However, one of the most 
prominent Muslim and Arab scholars in contract law, Al-Sanhuri, uses the term ghalat 
when he refers to mistake or error.3 Al-Sanhuri’s use gains importance, as he is one of the 
most influential Arab/Muslim scholars who have remarkable contribution in comparing the 
rules of Islamic contract law to their Western counterparts; this appeared in the civil laws 
of many Arab countries.4 This issue is raised to introduce the confusions between the 
authors and scholars who discuss the concept of error.
As mentioned above, ghalat used by Al-Sanhuri to express the meaning of mistake or error 
in English contract law, despite his long and deep experience in Islamic contract law. As 
mentioned earlier in this thesis, Al-Sanhuri’s experience expected to be derived from the 
Qur’an. As meaning of error or mistake, the Qur’an uses the term of khata’a which has its 
linguistic roots and branches in many verses.5 Al-Sanhuri would be expected to refer to the 
Qur’an when he indicated error, as he has distinguished contribution in explaining the 
Islamic law and its terms. The importance of the reference meant to be shown as an 
evidence of the differences between the terms used by the Qur’an and the terms used by 
Arab/Muslim law scholars to indicate the concept of error or mistake. The Qur’an meant to 
be the main resource of the Islamic law and the main background o f correct usage of the 
Arabic language.
1 B a  ’a lb a k i , op. cit.
2 F a ru q i, op. cit., PP254, 460.
3 A l-S a n h u ri. A lw a s ie t f i  S h a rh e  Iqa n ou n  A l-M a d a n i. op. cit., P396.
4 It is clear in his books, but more obvious in his book under the topic of (M a s a d e r  A lh a q f i l  f iq h  A l-I s la m i)  which means 
the resources of the right in the Islamic F iq h  (jurisprudence).
5 Q u r 'a n  2:286. 4:92, 33:5.
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Al-Sanhuri has established classifications of contract defects under Islamic law putting the 
duress, fraud, and finally error using (ghalat).6 Ghalat never been used by Muslim scholars 
before Al-Sanhuri. It is worth mentioning that ghalat as meaning of error is used in Arabic 
colloquial dialect. It is also worth mentioning that the laws of many Arab countries have 
used ghalat to mean error.7 The author of this thesis finds that all definitions of ghalat in 
most of Arab laws almost the same. This would be clarified when discuss the Jordanian, 
Egyptian civil laws, and the Draft of the Palestinian civil law.8
As the Qur'an is the primary resource of the Islamic law including rules of contract, this 
author finds that the Qur’an refers to error using term khata’a in three situations: In the 
first situation the Qur’an considers error as type of forgetting, which does not generate any 
punishment against the person who does it.9 In the second situation the Qur’an refers to 
error in context of mistaken or unintentional killing. In this case the Qur’an considers 
financial compensation as basic solution of the remedies as a result o f the mistaken 
action.10 This can be considered, in context of contractual relationships, similar to mistake 
as to fact in English contract law,11 which has been discussed in detail in chapter 2 of this 
thesis. The author sees that the approach of this error or mistake can be highly considerable 
with regard to contract, because understanding the Qur’ans should be taken 
comprehensively not separately. To do that, the understanding should be linked through the 
entire verses using method of qiyas (Analogy), this provides efficient, and clear 
understanding and interpretation.12 Finally, the third context of error in the Qur’an is about
6 A l-S a n h u ri, M a s a d e r  A lh a q  f i lf iq h  A l-I s la m i  (the resources of the right in the Islamic F iqh  (jurisprudence). The Islamic 
-Arabic Scientific Association. M u h a m m a d  A d d a y a h  Publications. 1955. PI 12.
7 Jordanian civil code, articles 151-156. See also Kuwaiti civil code, article 147-150. See also Egyptian civil code, 
articles 120-124.
8 It will be discussed further in chapter seven of this thesis.
9 Q u r'a n  3:285.
10 Ibid. 4:92.
11 Mike Molan. Cases & Materials on Criminal Law 3/e: Cases And Materials. 3rd Edition. Routledge Cavendish. 2005. 
PP77, 78. ISBN: 1859419356.
12 Charles Kurzman. Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A Sourcebook. Oxford University Press
US. 2002. P185. ISBN:0195154681. For more details see: R u q a ix x a h  W a r is  M a q s o o d . Islam. Heinemann. New 
Edition. 1995. P84. ISBN:0435303198
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differentiating between mistaken belief which can be forgiven and rectified, and the 
intentional behaviours which should be blamed.13 This approach is similar to intentional 
misrepresentation (fraud) under English common law.14 Furthermore, this case can be 
extended and cover many similar cases to include rectification, damages or compensation, 
under English and Scottish contract law as these terms traditionally linked to mistake or 
error.
To discuss the concept of error or mistake under the Islamic law thoroughly, this chapter 
will trace the approach of the Ottoman Journal of Equity15 discussing this subject. It is 
important to know that the Ottoman Journal is the first and the only formulated (codified) 
and organized civil law completely based on the Islamic doctrines or schools. For more 
accuracy, however, the Journal relies in most of its articles and materials on hanafi 
doctrine.16 This doctrine has been mentioned in chapter five of this thesis when discussed 
the Islamic contract.
The author would like to note that applying the objectivity in this research provide that the 
Ottoman Journal has not mentioned mistake or error under any of the used Arabic or terms, 
neither in colloquial (ghalat) nor in classical (khata ’a), an exception to that, the Journal has 
mentioned error in one position within its articles, which will be clarified below. The 
author of this thesis will follow the implicit meaning of mistake or error within the Journal 
articles exploring probable indications within the comprehensive context. It is worth
13 Q u r ’a n  33:5.
14 James Karp. Elliot I. Klayman, Frank F. Gibson. Real Estate Law. 5th Edition. Dearborn Real Estate Education. 2003. 
P203. ISBN:0793149568.
15 It calls M a ja l la t  A l-A h k a m  A l-A d liy a h  A l-O th m a n iy a h . which is the civil code of the Ottoman Empire, this code is still 
applied officially in Palestine and affected many of the Arabic civil codes of the Arabic countries such as Syria. Jordan. 
Iraq.
16 The introduction of the Ottoman Journal of Equity. PP8 , 9.
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mentioning that the Ottoman Journal of Equity was written in Turkish language and 
translated to Arabic.17
Understanding the concept of error under the Islamic contract law needs careful and an 
accurate discussion, saying that is because the concept of error under the Islamic contract 
law, including the Ottoman Journal, is not identified or classified clearly as the case under 
English and Scottish contract laws. Dealing with this existed fact, in this part o f this thesis, 
the attempt will focus on deriving meaning of error from the linguistic stand point, and 
then to explore the interpretations of the Ottoman Journal articles related to mistake or 
error, assuring that nothing has been found as directly indication by the Journal linked to 
subject of error.
The Journal uses different terms implying the concept of error or mistake and similar 
concepts and terms such as misrepresentation, fraud, deceive, and frustration. Seeking the 
accuracy and being precise, there is no consensus, among most of the Islamic resources 
and scholars including all the Islamic doctrines with regard to these concepts. Some 
Muslim scholars, both early and contemporary, use the same terms or expressions to 
indicate different meanings and connotations. For example, it is clear that particular 
scholar or author uses a word to mean misrepresentation, and the same word being used to 
mean error or fraud by others. In this part of this chapter the plan is to follow terms of the 
Ottoman Journal as the only codified code containing the framework of the Islamic 
contract law. This will be followed by applying comparative approach between the Journal 
and the other references where needed. In addition, this chapter also raise comparative 
stand points with English, Scottish, and International contract laws where needed. To 
establish clear background related to the concept of error in the Ottoman Journal in this
17 Ibid.
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research, it must be noted that the Journal has mentioned error directly in one article.18 It is 
worth noticing also that in this article, the Ottoman Journal uses Arabic term “khata'a”. 
This article states that “No validity is attached to an assumption concluded by error”. The 
Journal attached its own interpretation directly after this article by stating “if you paid 
money for someone thinking that you are committed to do so, and you discovered that you 
are not committed to pay this money, the money must be recovered”.19
According to Ali Hayder, if  guarantor covered the debt thinking that he is committed to 
pay, and he discovered that the guaranteed person (the original debtor) covered this debt, 
he has the right to recover his money. The same would apply if the debtor discovered that 
the guarantor covered his debt. This is because they covered the money relying on 
mistaken belief, which means that the mistaken payment does not generate any legal right 
for the party who received the payment.20 In fact, the previous case can be found in cases 
under English contract law, which suggested that the payment under mistake of law would 
be recoverable.21 The Journal of Equity approached the concept of error comparably to 
English and Scottish law approaches. Of course, the Journal did not classify error or 
mistake as shown seen under English and Scottish law.
This case is similar to what implemented under English and Scottish contract law, and 
notably the case is about borrower and lender but under the rules of the unjust 
enrichment.22 It is worth noting that some authors considered the mistaken payment as the 
core of the concept of unjust enrichment.23 Based on the Journal of Equity and it 
explanation by Ali Haydar, it can be concluded that the focus on the mistaken payment
18 The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article 72.
19 The attached example of the 72 article in the Ottoman Journal of Equity.
20 H a y d e r , op.cit., P50.
21 Scottish Law Commission. (Scot Law Com No 169). Report on Unjustified Enrichment. Error of Law and Public 
Authority Receipts and Disbursements. 23 December 1998. P5,6.
22 John Tarrant. Limitation Legislation and Loan Repayable on Demand. (2004) 1 UNELJ. PP255, 256.
23 Peter Jaffey. Classification and Unjust Enrichment. The definitive version of this article, a review of Peter Birks. 
U n ju s t E n ric h m e n t, (OUP, 2003), was published at (2004) 67 M o d ern  L a w  R e v ie w  1012, and an electronic version is 
available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.P15.
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implied a reference to unilateral mistake or error. The Ottoman Journal states some terms 
and concepts can be closely considered similar to error and misrepresentation which will 
be discussed under the following headings:
Section 2: Khiyar Alwassf
Khiyar Alwassf means “option of description”; this is the accurate and literal translation 
from Arabic to English. When comes to the legal context and its connotation, the case is 
different. This can be derived by concentrating on articles o f the Ottoman Journal 
discussed Khiyar Alwassf. Two main articles have discussed this option with great 
concentration and details. The first article24 considers option of description when seller sold 
goods or commodities with specified and desired description, if the buyer discovers that 
the goods have not contained this description, he has the right to rescind the contract, or to 
accept it the goods according to the agreed price. An example to this case, if seller sold 
cow describing her as in milk and the buyer discovers she is not. The same case occur 
when buyer purchases precious stone described as red ruby in the dark time (night), and it 
appeared to be yellow or any other colour. In the two cases or any other similar cases, the 
buyer has the right to cancel the contract. The second article is about cancelation of this 
option, which suggests that if buyer deals with the object bought/sold as an owner, option 
of description will be null.25
Similar situation rose with regard to description under the English case Smith v Hughes,26 
where the defendant agreed with the plaintiff (seller) to buy oats according shown sample. 
The defendant was interested only to buy an old oats. The defendant (buyer) declared that 
the seller provided him specified description stating that the oats is “good old oats”. The 
buyer (defendant) did not accept the oats delivery because oats appeared to be new.
24 The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article 312.
25 Ibid. Article 313.
26 (1871) LR 6  QB 597.
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Despite that the seller knew that the buyer was under mistake but he did not pay his 
attention about the mistake. The Court of Queen's Bench considered contract valid, 
justifying that the buyer should care about his interest according principle of caveat 
emptor. Of course, it is not always the case under English contract law, because there is 
some cases consider that if the other contracting party knows about the other party’s 
mistake, the contract would be void as will be shown below.
The examples mentioned in the Ottoman Journal and in English law case, both, are 
obviously about description as a key idea. In the first example the seller described cow as 
in milk but it discovered she was not. In the English case the seller described oats as “good 
old oats” but in fact it discovered that it was new; similar facts but different remedies. 
While in the former case the buyer was entitled to cancel the contract (void the contract), 
the latter was not. This provides that misdescription in the two laws can contain the 
principle of mistake. Both did not raise the principle o f misrepresentation or fraud despite 
the fact that in both cases, misrepresentation and fraud were implicitly established; because 
the sellers supplied items contrary to desired description in object of the contracts. This 
situation was mentioned within the concept of error under Roman law, which stated that 
the party who knows that the other party in mistake without informing him about this 
mistake would be considered fraud {dolus).11 It would be concluded that Roman law is 
more approachable to the position of the Islamic contract law regarding this point than 
English contract law. Furthermore, Roman law also discussed term of misdescription “in 
substantia” where contract would not be able to arise.27 8 Scottish contract law deals with 
this situation under error as to quality. If this type of error occurs, the contract would be 
rendered void -as the case under the Islamic and Roman laws-, but to consider that, the 
quality of the subject matter should be substantial issue in contract. In other words, under
27 W.W Buckland and Arnold Mcnair. Roman Law & Common Law A Comparison in Outline. 2nd Edition. Cambridge 
University Press, 1952. P201.
28 W.W Buckland. LL.D, F.B.A. A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian. 3rd Edition. Cambridge 
University Press. 1963. P419.
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Scottish contract law, to operate this error needs to prove that contract relied essentially on 
quality, and any error of quality will affect the purposes of contract.29 According to 
Scottish contract law, error as to quality is connected to misrepresentation; based on that it 
is important to prove that error of other party has been created by misrepresentation.30
The main context of option (khiyar), means right to rescind. In other words, when the 
Journal refers to option of description means that purchaser has right to cancel contract if 
he discovers that the description of commodity sold he received different from he intended 
to buy. Two main possibilities would be discussed in this respect, on one hand, it can be 
understood that this apply to the mistaken belief from the purchaser, which means that he 
fall in unilateral mistake, because he intended one thing and he received something 
different.
On the other hand, there is a possibility to establish misrepresentation (gharar) from the 
seller side if description different from what he sold. Of course, this is one of the 
possibilities which will be difficult to prove. Ali Haydar31 discussed this option relying on 
two divisions; first one considers option of description as part of the contract’s terms or 
conditions which should be free from gharar32 as meaning probability of nonexistence. 
Under this case, (misdescription if it is established as part of the contract’s terms) the buyer 
has right to cancel contract and leave item sold to seller since the intended description was 
not available, or to accept contract with its agreed price. In this case, buyer has no right to 
accept contract and reducing the agreed price because of missing description.33
29 Zimmermann. Whittaker, op. cit., P591.
30 M e n z ie s  v. M e n z ie s  (1893) 20 R (HL) 108.
31 He is the most important author or scholar who interpreted and explained the Ottoman Journal in his famous and wide 
sjpread book (D u r a r r  A lh u k k a m  f i  S h a rrh  M a ja l la t  A l-A hkcim ). Which has been mentioned above.
3~ A l-G lia r a r  or G h a r a r  considered by another authors and scholars as uncertainty or an excessive risk.
33 H a y d e r , op. cit.. PP126.127.
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English contract law deals with doctrine of unilateral mistake under two categories. The 
first category is when unmistaken party does not know about the other party’s mistake. 
English law does not provide legal solution in this situation. This means that contract is 
valid between the parties. The second category is when unmistaken party does know about 
the mistake; in this case contract may render void ab initio. As a result, both parties return 
goods and its prices to each other.34 Interestingly, one of the cases discussed unilateral 
mistake in English contract law presented similar cow example as used in the Ottoman 
Journal, as shown earlier to explain this doctrine.35 In this case it is suggested that if seller 
sold cow to buyer who do not know that the cow is barren (has mistaken belief), the law 
would consider such contract valid unless if the seller deceived the buyer.36 Despite 
mentioning deception in this case, but there was no mention to remedy which could be 
remedy to fraudulent misrepresentation under English law. Under Scottish contract law, 
when unilateral error occurs, usually, contract would be voidable if error caused by 
misrepresentation. If error occurred and is connected to one of fundamental elements of 
contract, such as identity of the contracting party, contract would be void.37 This opinion 
attracted an objection suggesting that, whatever the cause or reason of error, whether 
misrepresentation or fraud, contract still would be voidable not void.38
The author of this thesis notices that the remedies for misdescription involved gharar 
decided in the Ottoman Journal as Ali Haydar explained similar to the case under English 
law for unilateral mistake without deception; where the parties should return goods and 
their price to each other. In other words, the Islamic remedy gives the party affected by 
misdescription right to cancel contract and to leave the item sold to seller or take it without 
reduction of the price. This corresponds to the English principle in relation to unilateral
34
35
36
37
38
Zhou. op. cit., P3.
K e a te s  v. C a d o g a n  (1851) 10 CB 591.
Ibid.
Atiyah. Adams, MacQueen. op. cit.. P45.
T.B. Smith. Short Commentary on the Laws of Scotland. W Green, Edinburgh. 1962. PP 808-835.
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mistake abovementioned. The author noticed, however, that English rules do not clarify if 
the mistaken party can accept contract if he discovers mistake, as given in the Ottoman 
Journal.
Furthermore, under English common law, as an application of the doctrine of unilateral 
mistake, if somebody enters contract under mistaken belief regarding particular description 
in the contract object and the unmistaken party realises this mistake, contract can be void.39 
It can be noted that there is an implicit indication to a probable misrepresentation from the 
unmistaken party. The example is about mistake from one party (unilateral) and 
misrepresentation from the other, which is similar to the Islamic case mentioned above. 
Practically, unilateral mistake is hard to prove which could cause injustice between the 
parties to the contract.40 These rules can affect negatively the economic interests of the 
contracting party.41 Clearly this is what can be said with regard to unilateral mistake/error 
within Islamic contract law. This needs organisational or codified rules to compensate the 
absence of the relevant codification in this respect.
In addition, this case of misdescription relies on the claim of the buyer that he is not 
obliged to receive the sold item. There a case could occur if the dispute arises with respect 
to the condition o f the option (means the right to rescind the contract) itself whether the 
parties agreed that the option is existed or not. In other words, it could happen that the 
buyer claims that he agreed with the seller to give him the option of description as a 
condition in the contract, and the seller denied this claim. Under this situation, if the seller 
denied that the condition is exist; his claim will be trusted, unless the buyer presents his 
evidence to prove that the condition has been founded.42
39 http://www.singaporelaw.sg/freelaw/File/8 -ContractLaw.pdf. Para 8.9.11. Accessed at 2/10/2008.
40 Alastair Hudson. Assessing mistake of law in derivatives transactions. Kleinwort Benson v. Lincoln City Council and 
the local authority swaps cases. 1999. P5.
41 Zhou, op. cit., PI.
42 H a r d e r , op. cit., P I28.
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As second division of the option of description Ali Haydar stated that the option of 
description would be expected normally to be available with the sold item as a commercial 
custom in regard of specific description between the people without being stated as a 
precondition. Under this case, when the buyer discovers the misdescription he has the right 
to cancel the contract.43 The same idea is founded in international commercial principles 
that considered the misrepresentation occurs when the seller fraudulently does not provide 
the bank with the goods that have been expected by the parties with their exact 
description.44 The same duty (for goods to comply with their description) is demanded from 
the seller under the CIGS.45 To be discussed further chapter 4 o f this thesis. Generally, 
under Islamic law if the buyer dealt with the sold item as the owner -selling or transferring 
the title to another party-, he would not be able to use option of description.46
In discussing the gharar meanings and its understanding it would be clear that there are 
different definitions of gharar are provided by the Muslim scholars. Some of them defined 
the gharar as uncertainty that means the non existence of the contract’s subject matter47 48as 
was defined by Ali Haydar. Similar definition was provided by Al-Qarafi.A% This 
perspective is adopted by both the Hanafi and Shafi’i doctrines.49 Following the same track 
of checking the meaning of the gharar, it has been found that even in the same paper of 
Salman Syed Ali50 that has been mentioned above, within its glossary explained the gharar 
as “deception, danger, and risk” in addition to representing someone to enter the contract
43 Ibid. P I29.
44 Gao Xiang and Ross P. Buckley. A comparative Analysis of the Standard of Fraud required Under the Fraud Rule in 
Letter of Credit Law. Duke Journal of Comparative& International Law [Vol 13:293. 2003]. P295.
45 Article 35.
46 H a y d e r , op. cit., P I31.
47 S a lm a n  S y e d  A l i  & A u s a f  A h m a d . Islamic Banking and Finance: Fundamentals and Contemporary Issues. Islamic 
Development Bank, Islamic Research and Training Institute. First Published 1427H. 2007.P54.
48 S h e h a b u d d e in  A h m a d  B in  Id r is  B in  A b d u rra h m a n  A sse n h a ji, k n o w n  as (A l-Q a ra fi) . A n w a r  a l - B u n iq f i  A n w a ' a l-  
F u ru q . The translation of the topic (lights of the lightings in kinds of the differences).Investigated by Khaleel Almansour. 
1st Edition. 1998. D a r  A lk u tu b  A l-I lm iy a h . vol.l. Beirut-Lebanon. P275.
49 A b d u l-R a h im  A l-S a a ti. The Permissible G h a ra r  (Risk) in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence. J .K A U : I s la m ic  E c o n . y ol. 
16. No. 2, pp. 3-19 (1424 A.H / 2003 A.D).P6 .
M) A li.  A h m a d , op. cit., P54.
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under excessive risk or danger with regard to one of the contract elements such as the 
price, quantity, contract performance and so on.51 According to this interpretation of 
gharar as risk or uncertainty, it has been established that a minor gharar is allowed 
because it does not affect the contract seriously, and the contract would remain valid. It has 
been added that excessive gharar is prohibited because it could cause a conflict and 
problems between the parties. Upon this perception, it has been stated that gharar does not 
affect gratuitous or donation contracts.52 In general, this discretion does not fit or match the 
analytical stand point of this research which has been derived and approached in different 
understanding from the Qur’an as it will be seen within this chapter.
When it comes to the English and Scottish perspectives, dealing with the issue of 
misrepresentation, English and Scottish law give the misrepresented party the right to 
rescind the contract whether the misrepresentation is minor or not. This comes in 
contradiction with the perspective of the Financial Services Authority rules that deal with 
the misrepresentation remedies relying on the sort of misrepresentation (innocent, careless, 
reckless, or intentional or fraudulent).53
It can be seen clearly that different discretions have been expressed with regard to the 
effects of a minor misrepresentation based on the situation of the case, or based on the 
regulations and the acts that govern the contract. It should be noticed, however, that a 
minor misrepresentation subject and its effect under the English/Scottish law is different 
than the minor gharar under Islamic contract law. It has mentioned above that some of the 
Muslim scholars considered the contract as a valid if it involves minor gharar because 
their concept of gharar is restricted with regard to the level of risk or uncertainty. This 
means that they are allowing a minor risk or a minor uncertainty, expectedly; it will not be
51 Ibid. P303.
52 For more details in this regard see: A d d a r e e r , op. cit.
53 Soyer, op. cit.. P9.
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the same case for those whom consider gharar as a misrepresentation which is haram 
(prohibited).54 There is no differentiation between misrepresentation and fraud as such 
under Islamic contract law. It is true that gharar as a misrepresentation is not classified 
under different categories such as innocent, negligent, or reckless, but this gives another 
impression, that is to say, the Islamic rule in regard of gharar might be more restricted than 
the English and Scottish law provisions. It is believed that Islamic law does not deal with 
minor or excessive gharar as a fraud or misrepresentation because it is considered 
principally as a ‘serious moral wrong’.55
Saying that the subject matter of contract is not exist as a meaning of gharar, would be 
different from saying that the subject matter is exist with some uncertainty in respect of the 
other elements of contract. Also it is different to say you are not sure or uncertain with 
regard to something than to say you are deceived in this regard. Here if gharar involves 
deception, it will approach to the same level of the fraudulent misrepresentation under the 
English law that involves deceit56 as well as under Scottish law.57 The importance of 
understanding how to differentiate between a misdescription that involves gharar and a 
misdescription without gharar is to decide what is the proper remedy that can be used 
when this case occurs. Based on that, there are some implied indications for gharar as a 
misrepresentation as will be clarified in this chapter.
The same level of difference could be seen by more definitions and more confusion when 
one can find completely different implications by classifying gharar as an ambiguity58 and 
finding that ambiguity is interpreted by some others as jahalah.59 Jahalah has another
54 H a r d e r ,  op. cit., P191.
Rayner, op. cit., P206.
56 H IH  C a s u a lty  & G e n e r a l  In su ra n c e  L td  v. C h a se  M a n h a tta n  B a n k  [2003] U.K.H.L. 6 .
57 B o y d  & F o r r e s t  v. G la s g o w  & S o u th  W este rn  R a ilw a y  C o  1912 SC (HL) 93.
58 M o h a m m e d  S a leh  A l i  A y ya sh . K h iy a R  A l-M a jl is  And Its Application In lA q d  B a y  ‘ A l  S a la m . Islamic Economics and 
Finance Research Group. Working Paper in Islamic Economics and Finance No. 0306. Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. 
January 2003. P I3.
39 A b u  G h u d d a h . a l-K h iy a r  W a A th a ru h u  f i  a l-U q u d , 2nd edition. M a tb a  ’a t  M q h a w i, 1985. Kuwait.
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meaning, which is ignorance.60 Al-Sanhuri defined jahalah as a lack of knowledge, 
suggesting that there is a point of distinction between jahalah and gharar. Gharar is, when 
selling something with an unknown existence, but jahalah is selling something that already 
exists but with an unspecified quantity. In this regard, many of the scholars confuse and 
mix up both terms, attributing them the same meaning or using the words interchangeably61 
as is mentioned above. The issue of gharar concept and the differences between its 
definitions had attracted critical opinions with regard to the confused interpretations in the 
distinction between jahalah and gharar. It has mentioned that gharar goes to the nature of 
the contract, but jahalah goes to the defective description of the contract. Additionally, 
when the contract involves jahalah it will be voidable, but if the contract involves gharar, 
the contract will deemed to be void. In the case of gharar, the parties would be affected, 
but in the case of jahalah one party alone might be affected.62 According to this 
perspective, gharar and jahalah clearly are not the same, and do not have either the same 
rules or concepts. This supports the stand point that considers gharar as being different 
from jahalah. But a worthy opinion to be noticed with regard to ignorance suggests that 
gharar would be established when the contracting parties use deception to induce the other 
parties in ignorance,63 with the ignorance itself not being gharar.
The above is quite different from the English rule of ignoratia legis neminem excusat.64 
That means a person can’t defend a case claiming his ignorance of law is a valid excuse. 
“When mistake is pleaded as a defense, the mistake must be one of fact, not of law.”65 It is 
not the case from what could be concluded of the Islamic term that deals just with the
60 F a ru q i. op. cit., P346.
61 A l-S a n h u ri, M a s a d e r  A lh a q  f i lf iq h  A l- ls la m i,  op. cit.. P232.
62 N a b il  A . S a leh . Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law: R ib a , G h a r a r  and Islamic Banking. Cambridge
University Press, 118 pp., 1986. Reviewed by: S.M. H a sa n u zza m a n . JKAU: Islamic Econ., Vol. 3. pp. 115-124 (1411
A.H./1991 A.D.). P122.
63 S a rk er . Op. cit.. P2.
64 F a ru q i. op. cit., P346.
65 Curzon. op. cit.. P206.
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ignorance of fact, and not of law. Mohammed Obaidullah66 has another opinion or 
discretion related to the implication of jahalah. He has argued that the Islamic contract or 
transaction must be free from jahalah, which is considered by him to be a 
misrepresentation.67 Notably, some others who operate the objective probabilities distinct 
between the risk and uncertainty, and who operate the subjective approaches look at this 
distinction as being irrelevant.68 Mohammed Obaidullah has considered jahalah as a 
misrepresentation, using misrepresentation as meaning Khiyar Alwasf in the same paper 
but in different page.69 In fact, this part of opinion is acceptable but partially, if Khiyar 
Alwasf contains gharar which could be interpreted as a misrepresentation. In going further 
and deeper within a different paper of Obaidullah, he suggests that the Islamic contract 
should be free from misrepresentation which is connected to the information disclosure 
concept, not to jahalah (ignorance) as stated in the paper abovementioned.70 Furthermore, 
he changed his mind again when he considered that gharar is an excessive uncertainty like 
many of the other traditional interpretation of gharar, which is very big change in opinion 
for the same author or scholar. Anyway, if there is something to be said in this respect, that 
Obaidullah is one of the clear examples of the contradictions within the different 
understandings of gharar which urges a new reformulation to unify understanding under 
one concept and one terminology.71
In spite of the contradiction that had arisen within the two different points of view for the 
same author, the interpretation of Khiyar Alwasf as a misrepresentation could be 
supportable by this chapter as it will be shown during its details and its analytical 
explanations. Additionally, it would be more comprehensive to saying that if Khiyar
66 This author is not loyal to any exact Islamic school or doctrine.
67 O b a id u lla h , Islamic Risk Management, op. cit., P3.
68 S a m i A l-S u w a ile m . Towards an Objective Measure of G h a r a r  in Exchange. .I s la m ic  E c o n o m ic  S tu d ies .W o l. 7, Nos. 1 
& 2, Oct. ’99, Apr. 2000. P64.
69 O b a id u lla h . Islamic Risk Management, op. cit., P10.
70 M o h a m m e d  O b a id u lla h . Ethics and Efficiency in Islamic Stock Markets. International Journal of Islamic Financial 
Services, Volume 3, No.2. Para 3.2.3.
71 Ibid, Para 3.1.2.
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Alwasf involves gharar, then it will be parallel to the concept of fraudulent 
misrepresentation as used in both English and Scottish contract law. This is what can be 
understood by Ali Haydar when he distinguished between Khiyar Alwasf as its own, and 
Khiyar Alwasf that involves gharar.
A contemporary Muslim scholar suggests that gharar is a risk but entails delusion and 
deception.72 Actually, this approach could come to suit the context of the research process 
which leads to conclusion that Khiyar Alwasf is a non-fraudulent misrepresentation, but if 
Khiyar Alwasf included the gharar, it could be considered as a kind of fraudulent 
misrepresentation, that would be comparable to the fraudulent misrepresentation under the 
English law when the representor’s action is based on deceit, as per. section 2(1) of 
English Misrepresentation Act 1967.73 This analysis would be clarified and supported by 
the Arabic-English translation, which translated gharra into “to mislead, to deceive”.74 
Gharra is the past tense verb of gharar which is here the noun. As a result of that, gharar 
will be translated as a misleading or deception75 and one of them could be the direct 
meaning of the misrepresentation (misleading), the second one could be crucial element of 
the fraudulent misrepresentation (deception) or fraud. Building on that, Khiyar Alwasf 
(option for description) should be translated as a misdescription. After that, probably the 
misdescription concept could come to the meaning of the misrepresentation.
As a deep view, it could be said that the jurists defined gharar in many ways or even in 
contradictory concepts.76 Abdul-Rahim Al-Saati, in his interesting paper about gharar 
stated that the verbal noun of gharar is taghreer, stating that “it means deception or
72 A d d a r e e r , op. cit., P27.
73 Zhou. A Deterrence Perspective on Damages for Fraudulent Misrepresentation, op. cit., P85.
74 R o h i B a a lb a k i. A l-M a w r id  A I -Q u a r e e b . Arabic-English Dictionary. 16th Edition. D a r E l- l lm  L ilm a la y in . 2005. Beirut, 
Lebanon. P292.
75 M .S. E b ra h im , S. R a h m a n . On the pareto-optimality of futures contracts over Islamic forward contracts: implications 
for the emerging Muslim economiesJ. of Economic Behavior & Org. 56. 2005. P274.
76 M . E l-G a m a l. An Economic Explication of the Prohibition of G h a r a r  in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence. This paper is 
prepared for the 4th International Conference on Islamic Economics to be held in Leicester, UK, 13-15 August 2000. 
First version: May 2, 2001.P5.
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misrepresentation.”77 This, in fact, is what can be found in the Ottoman Journal in a literal 
formulation and remarkably, it follows that with a clear definition by saying “taghreer: 
describing the sold item for the buyer against its real description.”78 There is no doubt here 
that taghreer and misdescription carry the same meaning. It can be noticed also that there 
is almost a clear indication for the misleading statement or conduct from the seller towards 
the buyer. In describing the item against its real description would be considered as an 
intentional doing from one party, the seller, to another, the buyer. The describing action is 
at the core of the issue, so misdescription is a direct meaning of misrepresentation. There 
would be a tiny space or a very narrow margin to consider the option of description 
(Khiyar Alwasf) as an error except one case which, would be restricted in an induced 
unilateral error (misrepresentor and misrepresentee).
The Journal of Equity defined taghreer as a meaning of fraud (khida’a). Based on that, the 
fraud maker is called the misrepresentor (mugharrir) and the person who falls under the 
fraud is called the misrepresentee (maghroor)79 or (mogharrar bihi). But in the same time, 
when it comes to the detailed clarifications, Ali Haydar explained that the taghreer 
examples will be relevant when the seller tells the buyer that the properties worth this 
amount of money -and in fact it does not-. In contrary, it is the same when the buyer tells 
the seller that his belongings worth this amount of money and -in fact it worth more-.80 
Here the examples that Ali Haydar explained suit another case which is called ghabn, 
which is related and restricted in the misevaluation of goods. In general Ali Haydar was 
more successful when he clarified the definition of taghreer, but he totally failed when he 
tried to clarify the examples. The modem Muslim scholar’s definition of taghreer is “to 
deceive one party the other contractual party by fraudulent means, either by saying or
77
78
79
80
A l-S a a ti , op. cit., P6 .
Article 164.
H a x d er , op. cit.. P264.
Ibid.
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acting which induce the other party to enter the contract that he would not give his consent 
without these means.”81 This is very similar to what has been seen during the thesis with 
regard to misrepresentation under English law. Also, ghabn indicates a similar meaning; it 
is used as a fraud (khida’a or waks) in relation to the trade contracts (selling and buying).82 
It can be added that taghreer is obviously about the description of the item, which could 
affect the price, but not about the price itself.
It is reasonable to reach for this conclusion with regard of gharar especially with the 
different points of view that have been approached by the Muslims doctrines,83 as well as 
the differences or it could be seen as contradictions in connection to the error or mistake 
area as it will be explained and discussed in next parts of this chapter.
English law rules deal with the description from a technical stand point and have built on 
the legislative condition which demands that the goods should be suited or equivalent to 
the description that has been released expressly according to the contractual terms between 
the contracting parties. Generally, Islamic law is less technical than the English law; the 
Islamic law methodology gives the general rules that govern the implementation of law. 
This gives the scholars a wider margin to adapt the law when new cases occur from time to 
time. It can be noticed that the substantial difference in this regard is that the Muslim 
scholars derive their discretion relying on the Qur’an by using the analogical methodology 
which relies on the reasoning method by the analogy (qiyas). That comes under the 
concept of usul al-fiqh (jurisprudential methods).84 Furthermore, the main rule of the 
interpretation approach depends on the Prophet’s implementation of the Qur’an, which is 
available in some cases. But if the Prophet’s way of implementation is missing, the scholar
81 A ljo u fa n , op. cit.
82 Ib in  M a n th o u r , op. cit.. P 3211.
83 For more details see: E l-G a m a l , op. cit., P6 .
84 M . H . K a m a li . Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence. Islamic Texts Society. 2003. P12. ISBN 0946621810. 
9780946621811.
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or the judge would be committed by Qur’an to directly to find the proper approach that 
would fit the practical issues of case in question. If not, the decision must not be in 
contradiction with the Qur’anic teachings. This is what strengthens the pragmatism of 
Islamic law that has widened to include the agreed and acceptable traditions or customs of 
the people.85 This could develop from time to time, or from one place to another and should 
not be contradicted by the Qur’an rules.86 But English law has a similar pragmatic 
instrument which is addressed in the equity practice that feeds into the English legal 
system, implementing the law flexibly in a wide range o f cases. But here, the English court 
that releases its decisions based on equity can release different decisions for the same type 
of cases depending on the judge hearing the case, of the level of discretion left to the court. 
The main different that can be noticed here is that the Qur’an is a set of divine rules, and 
no decision can be issued contradicting its teaching. Simply put, this is not a standard 
demanded or conditioned in the English law of Equity.
Anyway, reading the English contract law leads one actually to say that the purchaser who 
finds any misdescription has the right to terminate the contract, especially in the case of a 
considerable loss of profit.87 A misdescription in this case comes to a similar approach to 
what has been explained in relation to the Islamic concept of Khiyar Alwasf (option of 
description). Furthermore, the similar evaluation with regard to the misdescription could be 
comparable to what was established under the International Sale of Goods rules in 
misdescription occurring during the contract’s implementation.88 Similar rules can be 
concluded from the CISG that require the goods to conform the description that was agreed 
in the contract.89
85 Q u r'a n  7:199.
86 M u a h a m m a d  R a jih  Y o u su f D w e e k a t.T h e  Percentage of the Commercial Profit from the Q u r 'a n  and the Life. 
20/10/2008. http://kuno-rabbaniyeen.org/?page=details&newsID=105&cat=3. Accessed at 22/10/2008.
87 Poikela, op. Cit.. P244. 245.
88 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (1980) Known as (CISG). Article 35.
89 Ibid.
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Nevertheless, misdescription could be one of the equivalent concepts of misrepresentation 
under the English, Scottish and international contract law under the CISG, but there is no 
direct reference made connecting misdescription and misrepresentation in the Islamic and 
international contract laws. It is important to notice that when the required description 
within the CISG law that mentioned above, could be concluded impliedly and it could be 
recommended to be included by the statutory frameworks as has been established under the 
English and Scottish laws. Interestingly, the law in both UK legal systems has been 
enacted in Trade Descriptions Act 1968 explaining the rules in the context of 
misdescription. This act came to the life to replace the Merchandise Marks Acts 1887 to 
1953 to forbid the misdescription that connected to the trade and business. It is designed to 
disallow the indications that are false or misleading in respect of the goods prices, which 
includes all the categories of goods. This law enhances the authority for requiring the 
information that related to the goods to be clear and advertised.90 In Scotland this law will 
be applied under the Food and Drugs Act 1955, the Food and Drugs (Scotland) Act 1956, 
otherwise the specific description should be mentioned as a provision in the contract.91
It is clear that the definition of a false trade description according to this Act, is a 
description that is materially false,92 even if it is not false in its own right, but misleading93 
but false in a sense of the material measure with regard to any indication that is connected 
to the capacity, size or measure, the way of manufacturing, or producing, renewing or 
repairing, the way of construction, the appropriate for usage purpose, effectiveness, acting, 
conduct or correctness.94
90 Trade Descriptions Act 1968. Chapter 29. PI.
91 Ibid. Section 2 (5). P3.
92 Ibid. Section 3 (1 ) .  P3.
93 Ibid. Section 3 (2). P3.
94 Ibid, Section 2 (1 ) .  P2.
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In addition, a false indication could be considered as a false trade description or anything 
similar to the indication and seems to be false by anyone who recognises or approves 
impliedly or specifically that the indication is a false trade description.95 From what has 
been explained and referred to above, the earlier conclusion that misdescription under the 
Islamic law of contract as a misrepresentation or very approachable to it conceptually and 
practically (technically), seems to have a very comparable direct notion under the law that 
is applied in the UK. As a remarkable signal, it has to be said; no doubt that Trade 
Description Act is dealing directly with the misrepresentation rules, since its purpose is to 
prohibit a false or misleading indication, and more than that to prohibit the concealment of 
information. Misrepresentation as it has been clarified earlier in this research (under 
English concept of mistake chapter) is a false statement as a general definition, and it has 
been considered at some point that non-disclosure could be a sort of misrepresentation. If 
we bring the factors o f Khiyar Alwasf and compare them with English and Scottish law, the 
logical conclusion will be that misdescription under Islamic, English and Scottish law of 
contract is the reflection of misrepresentation under English/Scottish contract law. This is 
because false indication has been considered as a false representation* 96 and a false 
misleading statement.97
Furthermore, if someone has made a false statement and he was aware that he had, then 
that will be deemed to be an offence,98 which impliedly means fraudulent 
misrepresentation. It has added that the reckless making of a false statement will be 
considered as an offence as well,99 which is the parallel of the reckless misrepresentation.
Ibid. Section 3 (4). P3.
96 Ibid, Section 13. P7.
97 Ibid, Section 14. P7.
98 Ibid. Section 1 4 ( l ) (a ) .P 7 .
99 Ibid. Section 14 (1 ) (b). P7.
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Generally, misdescription is not an error or mistake (khata’a) in Islamic contract law, 
whether in the Ottoman Journal of Equity as the only codified and classified Islamic code 
discussing the contract, or even in the other Islamic schools or doctrines. Despite o f this 
fact, it can be said that Islamic law in the area o f contract could be clearer if it takes more 
room to be discussed by the Muslim scholars and jurists. There is a strong background to 
believing that the subject of error can be explained and interpreted by more clarification 
and classifications. To enrich this subject in Islamic law, there is no problem at all to 
invent a new classifications methodology within the Islamic directions since the error as a 
concept originated in the Qur’an. The idea is to build on the origins and the concepts of the 
Qur’an but by modernised tools to be approached for the people nowadays.
Another option will be presented to be examined in regard of the concept of error has been 
mentioned by the Ottoman Journal of Equity. In fact this option could have more than one 
approachable understanding, whether to error or to misrepresentation. This option will be 
discussed in light of both approaches (language and practice), in other words, it will be 
taken from the theory and application perspectives which will be followed by checking this 
option (Khiyar Al-ayb) technically. It will be shown that if there is any conceptual or 
technical approach that could be found in the other legal systems that are targeted in this 
research. Generally speaking, Khiyar Al-ayb (option of defect) took a very wide room 
within the Islamic law (sharia ’h) doctrines, and actually it is covered by the heads of the 
main Islamic schools or doctrines. Generally speaking, Khiyar Al-ayb as a general concept 
could touch the borders of error at some areas, and could touch the misrepresentation in 
some other areas. Sometimes, Khiyar Al-ayb does not take place in both areas at all, in 
other words, Khiar Al-ayb is considered out of error and misrepresentation concepts. 
However, the final conclusion will be clearer at the end of this part of the chapter after the 
deep discussion of this option.
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Section 3: Khiyar Al-ayb
Regarding this option (right), the Ottoman Journal of Equity has discussed it in greater 
detail than it did with Khiyar Alwasf. This could be an indication as to the importance of 
this option and its strong relation with the contract. More detailed, the Ottoman Journal 
specified nineteen articles100 within its texts to discussing this option directly. But, the 
Journal also refers indirectly to this option in many different articles.101 The sixth chapter of 
the Ottoman Journal is specified to discuss this option.
According to the Ottoman Journal sold items should be free from defect when the sale is 
unconditional.102 This is when the sale transaction is implemented without any mentioning 
of any existing defect, which leads to dealing with this transaction as being free and empty 
from defects.103 It is clear that the seller should bear the legal responsibility by guaranteeing 
that the sold item must be delivered to the buyer without the defect.104 So, there would be 
an explanation if the sale transaction contained a defect. In this regard, it is explained that 
the unconditional sale means; the usual and normal sale which does not need any special 
condition to state that the sale should be empty and free from the defect. As a general and 
well known rule, sale contracts should be free from defects originally, as a desired 
description in the contracts, habitually and traditionally. Furthermore, it is argued that, if 
the seller did not disclose the defect in the sold item, this is considered as a 
misrepresentation (taghreer), which is impermissible or forbidden (haram).105 With regard 
to this point, the main assumption here could be that the seller has a duty to disclose the 
defect. Otherwise, it will be taken as a misrepresentation (taghreer). Taghreer here seems
100 The articles 336-355.
101 Article 85,360. 362 ,36 4 ,4 06 ,513-517 ,52 9 , 579, 671 .69 3 , 1026, 1037, 1153-1356, 1378,1461, 1486. 1489, 1548, 
1746, 1782.
102 Unconditional here means that, no conditions have been mentioned by the seller that would make him not reliable for 
hidden defects.
103 The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article 336.
104 R o slv , S a n u si and Y asin . op. cit., PI.
W5H a y d e r ,o p .  cit.,P191.
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to be comparable to fraudulent concealment, which is applicable when the party is
committed to a duty of disclosure under Scottish law.106
English law does not deal with this situation in the same way, because it has been 
established107 that, for example, the vendor of pigs is not responsible for fraud despite the 
fact that he knew that the pigs in question had a fault, namely a fever, and he did not 
disclose this fact to the buyer. This case is applicable in both the rules of law and equity.108 
The exception from this rule is when the parties rely on a confidence and trust. In other 
words, a party must disclose all the facts about the sold item if the other party is a son, dad, 
guard, and so on, otherwise the concealment would be considered as a fraud.109 This point 
does not sound logical because the word fraud should have one legal meaning, and there is 
no point allowing a fraud to be done against special kind of parties, and not to be done 
against different criteria of people. Other English case points out that at some point 
fraudulent concealment would be at the same level of fraudulent misrepresentation, where 
a duty of disclosure is demanded.110 In general Al-ayb (defect) is defined as a fault that 
causes a reduction in the value of the property.111 Even the same definition can be found in 
the contemporary Islamic jurisprudence ifiqh).112Actually, the definition of Al-ayb is 
different from that of error (khata’a), because error means that, if someone intended to do 
something and discovering that he or she did something different unintentionally.113 As a 
principle, the option of defect would result in an extremely different meaning or concept. It 
means that any contracting party is normally expected to disclose any defect or fault that
106 English and Scottish Law Commissions. Insurance Contract Law. Misrepresentation and Non Disclosure. Issues Paper 
1. September 2006. P102. Para A 25.
107 W a rd  v. H o b b s  (1878) A.C. 13.
108 James O'Donovan. Lender Liability. English Edition. Sweet &  Maxwell. 2005. P338 ISBN 0421885807. 
9780421885806.
109 Law of Contract Business Law Including Company Law. P37. 
http://www.newagepublishers.com/samplechapter/001048.pdf. Accessed at 7/10/2008.
110 C o n lo n  v. S im m s  [2006] EWCA Civ 1749.
111 The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article 338.
112 Kingdome of Saudi Arabia. A Ministry of Islamic Affairs, endowments, preaching, and guiding, http://feqh.al- 
islam.com/Display.asp?Mode=0&MaksamID=58&DocID=47&ParagraphID=442&Diacratic=0. Accessed at 1/7/2008
113 Ib in  M a n th o u r . op. cit., PI 193.
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could affect the intended purpose o f the goods negatively.114 According to this principle, it 
is clear that the defect itself is not the error or the mistake, but it is connected to error 
where the parties do not realise the existence of the defect. If the party knows about the 
defect and does not disclose it, this case would be considered for sure as a 
misrepresentation. Now the case seems to be stated that the parties’ knowledge with regard 
to the existence of the defect would be judged if there is an error or misrepresentation, but 
the defect would never be declared to be an error or misrepresentation. Obviously, there is 
a big difference between the two meanings that take the research to another direction to 
analyse the connotation of Khiyar Al-ayb.
It is understood from what Ali Haydar has suggested that the defect itself is not the 
misrepresentation (taghreer), but that the non-disclosure of defect is the misrepresentation. 
This is exactly what can be found in Lisan Al-Arab (the Arab tongue) under the meaning of 
tadlees, which is generally interpreted as a fraud, but it has been interpreted as a 
defrauding by hiding the item’s defect from the buyer as a particular meaning.115 
Remarkably, as understood by Alhajeri, an Arab legal academic, tadlees has been 
translated into English as a fraud, and the fraud has been interpreted as intending to induce 
another contracting party into error by way of cheating and fraud.116 This context is very 
close to misrepresentation in the English and Scottish contract laws. Furthermore, it 
mentioned that tadlees is haram (prohibited) because it includes the taghreer and ghish 
(cheating).117
For more clarification, it is worth noticing that, conceptually, misrepresentation is parallel 
to fraud and cheating in the Islamic legal term and its understanding. But it is worth noting
114 Rayner, op. cit., P205.
115 Ib in  M a n th o u r , op. cit.. P I408.
116 A lh a je r i . op. cit.. P2.
117 A s s a y y id  S a b iq . F iq h u ssu n n a h  (jurisprudence of Sunnah). 3rd Vol. 1st Edition. Dar Al-Kitab Al-Arabi. Beirut- 
Lebanon. November 1971. P l l 6 .
210
as well that the Islamic definition of misrepresentation is not fixed or stable, whether 
between the early or modem Muslim scholars. As it is mentioned above in the context of 
tadlees, which is very clear example about the different Muslims’ definitions and 
understandings of misrepresentation. Even writings emanating from the Islamic Research 
& Training Institute,118 show the difficulties of the contradictive signals given of Muslim 
scholars’ understanding of misrepresentation and similar legal terms.119 In one of the 
institute’s papers, it has been found that tadlees concept has three different meanings. 
Firstly, when it is mentioned for khiyar al-tadlees it is translated as a (fraud option),120 that 
fits Ibin Manthour’s interpretation121 referred to above. Secondly, on the same page of the 
same paper, tadlees interpreted as a misrepresentation, but with different interpretation of 
fraud which become (ghabn).122 Ghabn as a fraud comes to the same meaning used by Ibin 
Mant hour. 123Thirdly, when the paper came to the glossary, khiyar al-tadlees was explained 
as being an option of cheating, which allows the party to rescind the contract if he 
discovered that he has been cheated.124 Fourthly, continuing on the same line in 
controversially mixing the terminologies, when the paper tried to explain why al-ghabn is 
prohibited in the Islamic contracts or transactions. It is pointed out that “al-ghabn in 
transactions implies deception and misrepresentation or cheating.” 125 126
The same paper considered that gharar126 could mean deception, or could mean danger, or 
could be uncertainty.127 As can be seen, the three words give different meaning. Obviously, 
two points could be concluded from the above discussion: firstly, Islamic jurisprudence
118 This institution attracts and employs Muslim scholars from different Islamic and Arabic countries that come from 
various Islamic doctrines.
119 It is expected to be one of the best Islamic institute who is interested in improving and developing the Islamic banking 
and finance, in addition to issue a lot of researches and papers in this area depending on many of high qualified academic 
staff and practitioners.120 A l i , A h m a d , op. cit., P53.121 Ib in  M a n th o u r . op. cit.. P1408.122 A li. A h m a d , op. cit.. P53.123 Ib in  M a n th o u r , op. cit., P 3211.
124 A li, A h m a d , op. cit., P304.
125 Ibid. Note 2.P21.126 G h a r a r  will be discussed in details later on within this chapter.
127 Ibid, P303.
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does not differentiate between fraud, misrepresentation, cheating, and deception. In other 
words, tadlees, gharar, ghabn and ghish are all given the same meaning and the same 
connotation according to the Islamic jurisprudence schools, but they use different words 
for the same meaning which can be seen in the other languages. Secondly, there could be 
different understanding of the concept, depending on the school that the scholars come 
from or are loyal to. Admittedly, it is so difficult to follow all the Muslim schools in this 
regard as there has been no in depth academic analysis made of all these possible 
differences.
It is useful to mention that there are no problems between the jurists regarding the legal 
position of gharar, but problems do arise when it comes to its practical implementation, 
which relies on customary applications, which are different from a place to another which 
leads to many controversial points,128 as is shown during this chapter. The discussion or 
even the argument could go further and conclude that the Islamic concept of 
misrepresentation that derived from the Qur'an directly is restricted in gharar and its 
similar meanings. This will be broadly discussed later on below. One more point could be 
added to the previous discussion about the origins of tadlees ‘tadlis’ as a word. Tadlees as 
a word is not mentioned at any verse of the Qur'an, which is recognised as being the most 
important source of the Arabic language. Some writers proposed that past simple verb of 
tadlees which is pronounced as dallas derived from the Latin word dolus (fraud), and then 
modified by the Arab to become the word used by the early Arab-Muslim people or the 
Arabs nowadays.129
It could be said that the Ottoman Journal followed the logical and modern legal stand point 
in respect of this subject. Under English law, the case is different, because the buyer is
128 S a leh , op. cit., P I22.
129Rayner, op. cit.. P204.
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completely responsible to take care of his own interests according to the maxim caveat 
emptor.130 But this is not, however, the case under English or Scottish consumer law.
Under a contract for sale by sample one of the main implied term to be understood and 
included in the contract is that the goods is expected to be free from any defect that could 
make the goods unacceptable or does not achieve the satisfactory o f the parties. This 
means that the goods would correspond to the sample that has been shown by the seller.131 
This is applied in England and Scotland as a condition, which means that the goods should 
be free from any defect, and this would be understood impliedly even without a condition 
to be concluded as part of the contract or transaction.132 In the same Act, it has mentioned 
that in Scotland (just applied in Scotland), when the goods are sold according to the 
sample, the other goods which the sample intended to be as a reference or a standard to 
them should be fitted in quality.133 It does not give any significant differentiation between 
what has been mentioned in regard of the Scottish and English rules in this regard, it would 
not make notable difference if the rules have been combined to governing both. It could be 
simpler because the section that governs the English terms of quality considered that the 
goods to fit in quality should be free from minor defect.134 Automatically it should be 
understood that the goods must be free from the flagrant defect as well. By comparing 
these rules, it has been found that the Ottoman Journal of Equity deals with the defect 
particularly in this point in the exact way of the UK rules. This is what can be found 
clearly from the above mentioning in this respect. Something is worth to be mentioned that 
the Ottoman Journal does not distinguish between the consumer and the commercial law. It 
deals with both of them as one, which means the protection that is given to the individual 
consumer will be applied automatically to the traders. The methodology of the Journal is to
130 Giuditta Cordero Moss. Lectures on Comparative Law of Contracts. Reproduced here is a text published in the 
Publications Series of the Institute of Private Law. University of Oslo, No 166, 2004. PI 31.
131 Section 15 (2 ) (c). Sale of Goods Act 1979.
132 Ibid, Section 15 (3).
133 Ibid, Section 15B (c).
134 Ibid, Section 14 (2B) (c).
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put many examples that fit and applied for the two categories (consumers and traders). 
Generally, this is because of the Islamic principles that deal with all permissible and 
impermissible issues at the same level of rules with the individuals and the community. 
That is, what could be applied in regard of the community will be considered as an 
example for the individuals.
This leads to another point that is mentioned by the Journal that decided that “if the seller 
discloses the defect in the sold item at the contracting time. Up to that, if the buyer 
accepted the item, then he has no right to use the option for defect”.135 Obviously, this is 
what has been stated under the English and Scottish law, when considering that if the seller 
has drawn the buyer’s attention about the defect before entering the contract.136 Then it is 
clear that many different rules govern this point relying on the legal system itself, and even 
sometimes depending in many different cases and discretions within the legal systems 
rules.
From what has shortly mentioned above, it is similar to the concepts of the European 
contract law which put the person under a duty to inform about anything hidden.137 It is 
worth mentioning that the duty to inform is selected to be used here instead of the English 
term of duty of disclosure and misrepresentation.138 Something worth to be noticing here, 
the English legal writers consider that the English law of contract does not have a duty of 
disclosure.139 Accordingly, the non-disclosure of a defect in the Islamic contract is 
supposed to be similar to one of the misrepresentation classifications under the English 
contract law (fraudulent, negligent, or innocent) which will be decided separately 
according to the case in dispute. But probably the category of the innocent
135 The articles from 341.
136 Section 14 (a). Sale of Goods Act 1979
137 Green, op. cit., footnote 3. P2.
138 Ibid. PI.
139 Weitzenbock. op. cit.. P6 .
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misrepresentation will not be considered under Islamic law because similar cases would be 
dealt with as a mistake (khata’a). This will be mentioned in more detail within this chapter. 
Despite the fact that the disclosure is not highly demanding under the English law, but it is 
clear that many questions have been raised around this area, discussing if the exclusion of 
the information could be considered as fraud. This could be obvious from the court’s 
attitude when it expressed its opinion that saying the non-disclosure of a material fact 
could be considered as a misrepresentation.140 It seems to be that the case of a non- 
disclosed defect could attracts similar arguments and discussion because of the ambiguity 
of the non-disclosure of defect obligations, but the argument would not be expected about 
the existence of the defect itself as material fact.
Following on this opinion, it is clear that even some contemporary Islamic law authors 
suggest that, the option of defect under the Islamic contract is established to achieve 
fairness between the contracting parties. According to this suggestion, no justice or fairness 
could be achieved with fraud or cheating. It is because taking the people properties by 
cheating or fraud is forbidden by God (Allah).141 They have supported their perspective by 
referring to the Qur’anic verse142 “O you who have believed, do not consume one another’s 
wealth unjustly ‘unlawfully or under false pretence’143 but only [in lawful] business by 
mutual consent. And do not kill yourselves [or one another]. Indeed, Allah is to you ever 
merciful.” It could be understood the same when they added Prophet Muhammad's speech 
describing the Al-ayb’, “he who cheats us is not one of us.” 144 But from the context of this 
speech it is concluded that, the Prophet said this to a seller who concealed a defect in his 
exhibited goods. So two things could be derived from the Prophet’s speech, one is the
140 Kathari Pistor. Chenggang Xu. Incomplete Law - A Conceptual and Analytical Framework - And its Application to 
the Evolution of Financial Market Regulation. January 2002. P46.
141 R o s ly ,S a n u s i  and Y asin , op. cit., P6 .
142 Q u r ’an  4:29.
143 The Q u r ’an . English Meaning. A l-M u n ta d a  A l-I s la m i. 2004. P74. ISBN.9960-792-63-3.
144 R o s ly ,S a n u s i  and Y a sin . op. cit., P6 .
215
prohibition on non-disclosure, the other is the prohibition on cheating or fraud 
(misrepresentation).
According to the previous explanation, a hidden defect is fraud or cheating. But for 
neutrality sake, this result could be considered as a correct conclusion in the same 
percentage of cases as it would be considered to be an incorrect conclusion. It is noticed 
that the Qur’anic verse 145 which is used to support the idea of considering the defect as 
parallel to fraud or cheating, is used as an indicator for gharar.u6 In the case of 
discovering the old defect145 647 the Journal gives the buyer the right to return the defective 
item or to accept it as it is according to the nominated or agreed price. Under this case the 
buyer does not have the right to retain the sold item then ask the seller to recover the lost 
value that caused by the defect.148 Lost value means here the difference between the price 
of the sold item when it is defective and when it is not defective.149 The same rule can be 
found in Jordanian Civil Code.150 This means that Jordanian civil law adopted the rules of 
the Hanafi doctrine, which is completely reflected in the Ottoman Journal. The Shafiai 
doctrine adopted the same perspective, as did the Maliki docterine. However, Hanbali 
doctrine gives the buyer the right to detain the sold item and to ask for the lost value.151 For 
more explanation, the four main Islamic doctrines did not mention to the issue of 
error/mistake (khata ’a or ghalat) under any category. This is strange, because khata ’a as a 
concept has been established in the Qur’an with regard to a mistaken murder as it has been 
mentioned above, at the beginning of this chapter. According to Al-Sanhuri, error as one of 
the contract defects has occupied very little discussion among Muslim scholars.152
145 Q u r’an 4:29.
146 A l-Suwailem , op. Cit., P65. See also: A l-S aati. op. cit., P6 .
147 The defect that existed when the item was under the seller control.
148 The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article 337.
149 Am in D aw w as. Voluntarily Sources (The Contract and The Unilateral will), A Comparative Study. l sl Edition. 
Drrishurouq, Ramallah. 2004. PI 6 6 .
150 Articles 196.513.
151 Salahu Iddin Annahi. Sources of the Individual Rights, Sources of Commitment-Voluntarily Sources. A l-B ayt A l- 
A ra b i Printer. Amman. 1984. P185. 186.
152 Al-Sanhuri, M asader A lhaq filfiqh  A l-Islam i, PI 12.
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Generally this is what could interpret the logic behind the lack or even the non-existence of 
the Islamic doctrines scholars’ references when discussing the concept of error. It is also 
worth noticing that these doctrines discussed khata’a in the context of murder in many 
references, which are outside the scope of this research.
The right of detaining a sold item can be concluded impliedly within Scottish and English 
law, particularly in the context of consumer law. It is allowed for consumers to refuse any 
defective goods (to return the goods) within any sale contract. It is also allowed to ask for 
damages (compensation) in regard to any lost value that caused by the defect.153 It is 
noticed that similar rules have been established in the Ottoman Journal if the defect 
happened after the sold item came into the hands of the buyer, and the buyer discovered 
another old defect before the sold item became under his control.154 As was mentioned 
earlier, Islamic law does not differentiate between consumer and commercial contracts.
It is argued that for the option of defect (Khiyar Al-ayb) to be applicable, the defect should 
not be seen by the buyer at the time of the purchase and receipt of the goods. Even in the 
case of seeing the defect, he should not have realised that the traders deal with it as a 
defect. There should not be any evidence showing that he expressed his satisfaction despite 
the defect. There should not be any condition in the contract discharging the seller from his 
responsibility in regard of the defect. The defect should be old. The defect cannot be 
moved without hardship. The defect should be obvious. The defect has not been removed 
before rescinding the contract. It should be noticed that it does not matter whether the 
defect is extrinsic or intrinsic.155 In one way or another, these conditions are similar to those 
demanded by English and Scottish law. It is suggested that an extrinsic defect is when
153 Hans Schulte-Nolke, Christian Twigg-Flesner and Martin Ebers. EC Consumer Law Compendium -Comparative 
Analysis-. Prepared for the European Commission under Service Contract No. 17.020100/04/389299: “Annotated 
Compendium including a comparative analysis of the Community consumer acquis”. April 2007. P 662.
154 The articles from 345.
15:1 H a r d e r ,  op. cit., P I92.
217
someone assessed a property that is free from defect for a specific price, and assessed the 
same property at a lower price when it is defective, and if another one assessed the same 
defective item as the original price is; here the defect would be classified as an extrinsic. 
The intrinsic or flagrant defect is when the experienced assessors (experts) together 
evaluated the price of the property free from defect at a specific level and the same 
assessors evaluated the same property when it is defective at a much lower price.156 The 
buyer has the right to rescind the contract and return the sold item, either directly or by his 
agent. The sold item could also be returned to the seller or his agent, with the return of any 
money already paid.157 Under the English and Scottish Sale of Goods, the defect will be 
considered existent if it has made the goods un- merchantable, and would not be seen if the 
normal test has been implemented.158 The goods will not be merchantable if they do not 
suit the function that they were intended to be bought for.159
But there are some exceptional cases that come out of the previous situation. Under Islamic 
law if the agent, trustee or guardian bought in their official positions as a trustee or an 
agent a property at a price less than its value, they cannot return the sold item by using the 
option of defect. On the other hand, they have a right of rescission of the sale by using 
khiyar arruayah (the option of sight or inspection).160 But if a person sold a property for 
another and the item has already been delivered, and the seller decided to give this item as 
an award before receiving money, in this case the buyer has no right to return the sold item 
if he discovers any defect and take the money back. If the buyer bought a property from a 
person, then he resold it again to another buyer and delivered it to him. If the new buyer
156
157
158
159
160
Ibid.
Ibid.
Section 15 (2 ) (c). Sale of Goods Act 1979.
Ibid. Section 14 (6 ).
H a y d e r ,  op. cit.. P193.
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discovered an old defect when the sold item was under the responsibility of the first seller, 
then he has no right to return the item to anyone.161
Here it is not clear why the buyer has no right to return the defective item when he 
discovered it. It is even not clear why or how Ali Haydar concluded this. The Journal 
decided that in the case of discovering the old (long standing) defect, the Journal gives the 
buyer the right to return the defective item or to accept it at the nominated or agreed price. 
Under this case the buyer does not have the right to detain the sold item then asking the 
seller to recover the lost value that is caused by the defect.162 This is what has been 
discussed above. The English and Scottish law perspective according to a shared 
consultative paper163 suggested that the buyer’s complaint with regard to the 
merchantability context (not defective products) would be based on the terms of the 
contract he made with the producer according to the price that has been agreed. Similar to 
what Ali Haydar has argued, the paper suggested that if the item is already oversold, and 
the buyer bought it from another retailer, then he has no right of complaint against the 
producer.
There is no reason for preventing the buyer from returning the defective item. In saying so, 
this allows the seller to use fraudulent ways to conceal defects in the sold items. This could 
lead to harm to the buyer through carrying big losses. As it will be seen shortly below, this 
is not acceptable at all within Sharia h principles. Of course, there would appear not to be 
any other Islamic scholars’ opinions taking a line similar to that suggested by Ali Haydar. 
Even this is in contradiction with a basic Islamic principle, adopted by the Journal, which
161Ibid.
162 Article number 337.
163 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission. (Law Com. No.82) (SCOT. LAW COM. No.45). Liability 
for Defective Products. Report on A Reference Under Section 3(1) (e) of the Law Commission Act 1965. Presented to 
Parliament at June 1977. P I6 . Para 46.
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says that there must be neither harm nor harming (la dararah wa la dirar).m This derives 
from the same saying of the Prophet Muhammad, and more importantly from the Qur’an,164 65 
which forbade any kind of harm towards humans or between each other. So, according to a 
logical understanding of Islamic principles the interpretation of Ali Haydar is not 
acceptable on this point. The buyer has the complete and the obvious right to return the 
property if it is defective, especially if that defect causes any harm.
If the buyer removes the sold item from the place of the purchase, he will not have the 
right to return this item as a result of using the right of defect. But the buyer can use this 
right (returning the item) if the buyer returns the sold item back to the place of purchase.166 
It is still not understandable, however, why the buyer cannot return the sold item if he 
originally removed it, and why he does have the right to return it if he removed it back 
again to the place of purchasing. Here the logic will be lost, because this might cause harm 
or economic loss for the buyer, especially if the bulk occupies a big place that can cost the 
buyer a lot of money as a rent or making some problems for his business. A similar attitude 
has been taken with regard to this point by CISG; where it is argued that the buyer will be 
responsible for proving the defect’s existence in the goods if they were delivered.167 It is 
true that the situation is different regarding the remedies provided by Islamic law and 
CIGS law, but the similarity is about the moving or delivering of the goods, which in both 
laws transferred the burden of the responsibility to the buyer from the seller. As is noticed, 
according to what Ali Haydar has explained or understood from the Ottoman Journal, the 
buyer will lose his right to use the right for defect (.Khiyar Al-ayb) if he removes the goods 
from the place of purchase. This is comparable to what is understood by the rules of the
164 The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article 95.
165 Q u r'a n  2: 231.2:233.2:282.
166 H a y d e r , op. cit.. P193. 194.
167 Johan Erauw. CISG Articles 66-70: The Risk of Loss and Passing It. Journal of Law and Commerce [Vol. 25:203. 
2005-06], P204.
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CISG, that the buyer might not be entitled to the right for compensation for the damage 
automatically after the goods being delivered.168
If the buyer discovered the defect in the sold item and the defect has been removed before 
returning the item, then there is no right to claim an option of defect. If the buyer insisted 
on using this option he will be obliged to cover the expenses of the delivery and 
transportation.169 This situation is comparable to the English position that was established 
by the House of Lords in the case of Ritchie v Lloyd170 relying on the s.35 (6) (a) of the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979. The House of Lords decided that the buyer has no right to reject the 
goods that have been repaired by the seller before the receipt of them by the buyer.171 On 
the contrary, by explaining the CISG rules, it has been suggested that when the confidence 
or the expectation that is built on the trust have been destroyed in regard of the contract, 
there is no reason to believe, or it should not be anticipated, that the buyer would agree to 
have the goods repaired, if this destruction has been caused by the seller’s fraudulent 
conduct.172 Furthermore, if the seller refuses to repair the defect, or when there is no 
possibility to repair the defect using a reasonable level of effort and within a reasonable 
period of time,173that means that an essential violation of the contact has occurred.174 This 
opinion is not totally supported with regard to the expectation of the buyer’s reaction to the 
seller’s cure; this is built on an absolute hypothesis, which means that there will not be a 
standard expectation available to predict this kind of reaction. Nevertheless, if the seller
168 Ibid. P209. See also. Section. Effects of Avoidance. Commentary of Article 6 6 . http://www.cisg- 
online.ch/cisg/materials-commentary.html#Article%2066. Accessed at 9/10/2007.
m H civd er, op. cit., P194.
170 [2007] UKHL 9.
171 R itc h ie  v. L lo y d  [2007] UKHL 9. Elements of the law of contract recent developments 2008. P3. 
http://www.londonextemal.ac.uk/current_students/programme_resources/laws/llb_diplaw/recent_dev/elements_law.pdf. 
Accessed at 10/8/2008.
172 Switzerland. Handelsgericht des Kantons Aargau. 5 November 2002. CISG-online 715.
173 Germany. BGH, 3 April 1996, CISG online 135, BGHZ 132, 290 et seq.
174 Germany, LG Oldenburg, 6  July 1994, CISG online 274.
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provides a remedy or the repair of the goods or provides the buyer alternative goods within 
a reasonable period, there would not be breach of contract.175
It could be concluded that there is a possibility to consider the defect that is occurred as a 
result of a fraudulent conduct as a fraudulent misrepresentation under CISG rules. But the 
same analysis cannot be reached as obviously within the English and the Islamic rules on 
defects to goods. Generally, in reaching to this point, it is not easy to tell or to conclude 
that the option of defect under the Islamic contract law rules could be used as a parallel 
terminology to the error or mistake in the English or Scottish contract laws. The same 
could be said with regard to the rules on misrepresentation.
If the defect affects a desired description in the sold item and this description was stated as 
a condition in the contract after the selling but before the delivering, and the buyer chose to 
take the sold item with its defective description; the buyer has the right to reduce the price 
of the of this description from the total price of the item.176 Here it is clear that the Ottoman 
Journal has almost the same rules as those of the other legal systems being analysed in this 
thesis, in the context of discovering defects in the goods. It has been referred to before that 
the Journal dealt with this case in different ways depending on the facts of a particular 
case.177 Generally to claim against the defect is made in court. At the court hearing it must 
be proved that the defect continues to exist at the time of the trial. This means that the 
buyer must show the defect in the sold item. It does not matter whether the defect is old or 
not, but if the buyer cannot prove the existence of the defect he will not be able to go 
further in the trail. Under English and Scottish consumer law a similar procedure is
175 CISG Advisory Council. The buyer's right to avoid the contract in case of nonconforming goods or documents. CISG 
Advisory Council Opinion No. 5. Nordic Journal of Commercial Law. issue 2005 #2. P8 . Para cc 4.4.
176 H a y d e r , op. cit., P197.
177 Moss, op. cit., P P 162J63.
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demanded for who refuses the goods and claim the compensation on the basis of a 
defect.178
But how is the buyer going to prove the existence of the defect? This could be by the direct 
admission by the seller, or by the sight in the context of a visible defect, or the testing by 
experts in respect of an invisible or hidden defect. In this situation, under Islamic law, the 
sold item does not return to the seller and the seller will not be asked to cover the loss that 
were caused by the defect unless the defect is old.179 Here, it is understood impliedly that 
the Ottoman Journal gives the right to claim compensation instead for the loss that has 
been caused by the defect. This point leads to another contradiction. As it has been seen 
that the Journal has a clear attitude in relation to this situation which demands the buyer to 
accept the defective item according to the agreed price or to return it as it is.180 It is not 
allowed for the buyer to detain or to keep the defective item and then ask for compensation 
instead of the loss that has been made by the defect. The Sale of Goods Act, as is applied 
in Scotland, gives the buyer the right to retain the defective goods, and to ask the seller to 
maintain the breach giving the right of damage or compensation.181 This rule seems to be 
restricted to Scotland, because it has specified directly to Scotland without any reference to 
England. Finally, under Islamic law rights as a result of a defect can be claimed when the 
buyer claims that the defect exists and the seller has denied this fact. In this situation, the 
seller will be asked to make an oath assuring that he did not know about the defect that 
existed. If the seller refused to make this oath the case will be brought before the court in 
order to start the dispute process against the seller.182 Something worth noticing generally 
under Islamic contract law is that there is no distinction between a sale and an agreement to 
sell. The Ottoman Journal codified the rules of the contract sale as a basic background for
178 Reforming the Law on Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods. An Introduction to the Law Commissions’ Project.20 
February 2008. P2. Para 1.8.
179 H a r d e r ,  op. cit., P198.
180 Article number 337.
181 Section 11 (5). Sale of Goods Act 1979.
182 H a r d e r ,  op. cit.. P I99.
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the agreement to sell, consumer law, commercial or trading contracts, and any other 
derivative contracts such as salam, istisna’a, murabahah.m This means that an 
understanding of the sale contract rules is the key to dealing with other trading or 
commercial contracts. The sale contract is the main pillar of the other Islamic contracts 
when dealing with financial, commercial, and the trading issues.
Generally the option of defect will be transferred to the successor in title in the case of the 
death of the buyer, because the successor has the right to have the sold item free from any 
defect.183 84 In the case of discovering the defect with the attendance of the seller but before 
the paying, the buyer can cancel the contract in using the option of defect without the need 
for a court decision or the consent of the seller. The buyer needs just to say, “I cancel or 
rescind the contract”.185 It should be noticed here that, under Islamic law, there is no 
difference between written and oral contracts.186 This is can be seen clearly in the context 
of the hire or lease contracts that can be concluded orally or in writing,187 as well as in 
respect of confirmation and termination of contracts.188 This has been referred to earlier in 
the Introduction to Islamic contract law chapter, which explained the Qur’anic teachings 
and instructions on this point.
Section 4: Khiyar A r r u  ’ayah
Some Muslim scholars have considered khiyar arru ’ayah (option of sight or inspection) as 
one of the options that entitles a party, for example the buyer or hirer, to rescind a contract 
after inspecting the goods or object of the contract.189 This option seems to be very similar 
to option of description as the buyer or hirer would be expected to agree with the other
183 See more details about these terms in chapter five of this thesis.
184 H a v d e r , op. cit., P202.
185 Ibid. P203.
186 The Ottoman Journal of Equity.Article 173.
187 Ibid, Article 436.
188 Ibid, Article 302.
189 A b d u lla h  A lw i  H a j H a sa n . Sales and Contracts in Early Islamic Commercial Law. Islamic Research Institute. 
Islamabad. 1994. P56.
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party to have specific goods. If the other party inspected the goods and found them not to 
conform with his specifications he has the right to rescind the contract. It is simply very 
similar to the option of description rules, where description conformity would be the vital 
element of keeping or voiding the contract.
Section 5: G h a r a r and Misrepresentation
Obviously, considering gharar as forbidden conduct from Muslim believers came through 
the reference to the danger of fraud and deception, alerting people who behave in this way 
to stop doing so as it is against God {Allah). Allah describes those who defraud or deceive 
as people with diseased hearts, both ethically or behaviourally. After making this point, the 
Qur’an connected deceit and fraud with the habit of lying. All the previous conducts and 
behaviours brought together are described as corruption and the people those who practice 
them as corrupters. 190Furthermore, the Qur’an encourages people to avoid dealing with 
delusions,191 which means (khida’a, gharar, tadlees),192 according to the professional 
English-Arabic translation. The tracking of the meaning of delusion here as khida’a, or 
tadlees is indicated as being elements of gharar or taghreer in the Arabic-Arabic 
dictionary, in addition to considering taghreer as an action of gharar.193
It is noticed that the Qur’an maintained the same line of argument, teaching the people and 
Muslims how they must avoid gharar or anything could be related to it, due to its 
connection with Satan’s behaviours.194 In Islamic traditions anything connected to or 
referring to Satan is not acceptable either religiously or ethically. This is what can be seen 
in the same connotation in different verse.195 For more emphasis, the Qur’an warned
190 Q u r ’an  2:9,10.11.
191 Ibid. 45:35.
192 B a 'a lb a k i .  op. cit., P259.
193 Ib in  M a n th o u r. Liscin A l-A ra b  (the Arab tongue). Dar Al-Ma’aarif. Cairo. P3232-3234.
194 Q u r 'a n  4:120.
195 Ibid. 17:64.
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Prophet Muhammad not to be misrepresented by the non-believers.196 Qur’anic teaching 
continues with regard to gharar encouraging people not to rely on gharar in their life.197 
Just for more accuracy, all the verses referred to gharar by one of its meanings or 
derivative words and expressions as, gharrah, ghoroor, yaghorranakah, gharrakah, 
gharrakum. If the tracing of the terminology continued to follow the line of the translation 
from English to Arabic and vice versa especially within the commercial/financial 
dictionary, the direct meaning of misrepresentation includes all the words or expressions 
abovementioned.198 This suits the definition of the verbal noun of gharar when the 
Ottoman Journal stated that “taghreer: is describing the sold item for the buyer contrary to 
its real description.”199 This brings us back to Khiyar Alwasf which is defined as a 
misdescription.
In accordance with this research, gharar as a risk or uncertainty, which is the most famous 
and approachable definition, attracts a lot of argument and discussion among Muslim 
scholars and jurists. As it referred to earlier in this chapter, this concept of gharar is very 
clear from the Qur’anic teachings and their instructions. Gharar as a misrepresentation 
includes fraud, deception, beguiling, and delusion. As has been shown, all of these words 
or terminologies are founded in the Qur’an as being forbidden (Haram) in regard to all 
human behaviours or conducts. It finds that the Qur’an strongly emphasises and insists that 
gharar and all its trappings are not acceptable at all from human beings. This is very 
obvious from what can be concluded when the Qur’an connected gharar and the badness 
of the devil, and describes gharar as being a continuous and practiced job of Satan. Based 
on this analytical stand point, it could be said that no Muslims in general, and Muslims 
jurists or scholars in particular, would object to or be involved in any disagreement with
196 Ibid, 40:4.
197 Ibid, 57:14, 20.
198 F a ru q i. op. cit., P460.
199 The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article 164.
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regard to the impermissibility of gharar in Islamic contracts, which suits all the Qur’anic 
and Islamic law philosophies.
In light of that, it is therefore difficult to deal with or to accept the idea that a certain 
amount of gharar could be permissible, and then lead on to a discussion on how much 
gharar is permissible.200 201Unfortunately, this discussion had developed without any 
reference to what Qur’an has said in this regard, or what professional Arab linguists have 
said in this context. This has led to many contradictions and many controversial points, as 
it has mentioned above, and will be repeated again later on. The concentration on Qur’an 
teachings and meanings give the reader or the researcher a clear line of understanding of 
the Islamic way of life. The sturdy and consistent background of the Qur’an understanding 
starts from a good knowledge of the Arabic language as a first key for a deep 
understanding of the Qur’anic context. Based on that, it is strange to find most of the 
authors who wrote about Islamic contract law, and realised how important it is for the 
contract to be free from gharar, to find them defining gharar as a risk or uncertainty which 
could be found in any commercial transaction around the world.
It is worth mentioning here, that Islamic financial contracts in general, and the 
musharakah/ mudarabah contracts in particular, are built on risk-sharing between the 
partners to the contract, which is connected to profit/loss-sharing principles. In conclusion 
to this discussion, these contracts carry a level of uncertainty in regard to the expected 
results of the project,201 otherwise, the saying that there is no risk or uncertainty in 
Islamic contracts as a meaning of gharar, turn them into the interest (riba)202 concept.203
200 Dipl. Ing. Osama Abdelwahab. Developmental Perspectives on Financial Innovation in Forward and Futures 
Derivatives-A Critical Discussion with Special Consideration of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions, genehmigte 
Dissertation. Promotionsausschuss: Vorsitzender: Prof. Dr. Frank Heinemann. Berichter: Prof. Dr. Gemot WeiBhuhn. 
Berichter: Ass. Prof. Dr. Seif Tag el-Din. Tag der wissenschaftlichen Aussprache: 2.5.2007. Berlin 2007.D 83. P99.
201 It would be very useful to see this subject in detail at: Tariqullah Khan. Practices and Performance of M o d a r a b a  
Companies (A Case Study of Pakistan’s Experience). Research Paper No. 37. Islamic Development Bank, Islamic 
Research and Training Institute. 1st Edition 1416H, 1996.
202 See more about r ib a  in chapter five of this thesis.
227
Most of the authors who wrote about gharar described it as being an unacceptable risk, and 
usually they add that the avoidance of gharar as an essential principle within all Islamic 
contracts, or transactions that rely on Islamic financial/commercial rules. Also they 
considered the importance of preventing gharar, seeing it as a kind of gambling,203 04 which 
is mentioned directly in the Qura’an, using a completely different meaning from that of 
gharar.205 Under sup topic called “permissible gharar”, Al-Saati., a contemporary author, 
has quoted from Shatibi, a traditional Islamic scholar, that the Hadith (Prophet 
Muhammad’ s speech) that prohibited gharar, was not intended to prohibit all gharar 
categories or types. Based on this background, Muslims scholars have allowed some kinds 
of transactions like selling the products that are unseen, being still growing in the ground 
(onions, carrots, and radish), and they have also permitted sale of houses that do not have 
seen foundations. Al-Saati argues that the Hadith just intended to disallow gharar, that 
could lead to conflict between the contracting parties, and which cannot be tolerated in 
Islamic law.206
The controversial point in the above is the permissibility or the impermissibility of gharar, 
according to the Qur’an, with gharar being described as deceit, fraud or misrepresentation. 
Therefore there is no logic in saying that some gharar is permissible and other gharar is 
not. Forbidding (tahreem) gharar is very clear from all Qur’anic evidence which has been 
built on a very logical background preventing Muslims form dealing with any transaction 
which includes fraud, deceit, or cheating. More contradictions can be found when gharar is 
defined as speculation; the example of “speculation” that has been given is when 
contracting parties have formed their contract on lost goods. It is clear that the given
203 R o s ly ,S a n u s i  and Y asin . op. cit., P3.
204 Christopher F. Richardson. Islamic Finance Opportunities in the Oil and Gas Sector: An Introduction to an Emerging 
Field. Texas International Law Journal Vol. 42:119. 2006. P I27.
205 More and deep details will be discussed later on in this chapter to explain the gambling.
206 A l-S a a ti .  op. cit.. P10.
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example refers to lost commodities selling207 is not the proper one, because if someone sold 
goods that had already been lost, this is more likely to be gharar as a form of 
misrepresentation rather speculation.
It will be clear that gharar is much more like the misrepresentation concept in English 
contract law, rather than any similar concepts. It is understood that misrepresentation under 
the English common law is considered as a false statement or representation about a fact 
that have been made has induced the other party to enter the contract. This definition, as 
analysed in the English concept of mistake chapter has a parallel definition in the context 
of fraud which was defined as being a false representation of a fact, whether this 
misrepresentation has made intentionally (knowingly), without believing it to be true, or 
carelessly.208 This leads to the opening of another gate of debate, which is related to the 
similarities between gharar under Islamic contract law, and the concept of 
misrepresentation under English contract law. It seems that fraud or deceit reflects the 
meaning of gharar, as well as cheating. This chapter’s analytical approach matches the 
approach of the Arabic-Arabic dictionaries, with the verb gharra meaning to misrepresent 
or to defraud which puts misrepresentation and fraud in the same category or classification. 
As has mentioned in this chapter, English-Arabic dictionaries translate misrepresentation 
using the words khida’a, tadlees (fraud) and kathib (lying), and they stated that 
misrepresentation means releasing false statement by misrepresentor about a fact to induce 
the other to achieve his desires.209 This meaning has been translated to be used to mean 
“misleading” as well.210 In discussing fraud and misrepresentation under English law, some
207 A d il  M a n z o o r  B a kh sh i. Developing a financial model for Islamic credit card for the UK. Dissertation submitted in 
partial fulfilment for the degree of MSc in International Banking & Finance, University of Salford. March 2006. P14.
208 Curzon, op. cit., P I83.
209 F a r u q i, op. cit., P460.
210 Ibid, P459.
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authors considered that the material misrepresentation a type of fraud. This gives an 
entitlement to sue under the tort of deceit.211
The contradictions between Muslim scholars and their definitions of gharar are not based 
on the Qur’anic verses that talk about gharar. It has also raised more questions with regard 
to the applicability of Islamic contract in non-Muslims courts. These questions could be 
raised if the contracting parties expressed their clear will that the contracts are to be 
governed by Islamic law in non-Islamic courts. The problem starts if one of the parties 
claimed against gharar and asked the court to nullify the contract as a result of gharar by 
considering it to be a risk or uncertainty. It suggested that the court would face some 
difficulties in deciding this case due to the ambiguity of the elements of gharar. It is added 
that in a practice, the court concluded that one of the reasons for gharar as speculation 
being forbidden under Islamic law that only Allah can predict and know the future.212 
Accordingly human beings cannot go into risky transactions or trade as they cannot predict 
or evaluate the level of risk, with the prohibition of gharar being built in order to prevent 
people from dealing with any business involving risk. Of course, this is not imaginable 
meaning of the context behind prohibition of gharar as many types of necessary business, 
trade, or commerce involve risk, and applying such an interpretation or understanding of 
gharar would stop a huge number of necessary business transactions, and make them 
haram.
The most important point is to establish whether gharar means risk and/or uncertainty, or 
if misrepresentation means a percentage of risk and/or uncertainty. In emphasising this 
research discretion, there is no objection to saying that some categories of risk, uncertainty, 
and speculation are forbidden under the Islamic law of contract, but the Qur’an has
211 Xiang, Buckley, op. cit., P323.
212 Charles P. Trumbull. Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts. V a n d e r b il t  L a w  
R e v ie w  [Vol. 59:2:609. 2006], P 611, 636.
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mentioned and clarified that clearly, as have all the Islamic schools, to include their jurists 
or scholars, both early and contemporary. These categories are restricted within the 
meaning of gambling (maysir or qimar) which is directly prohibited by Allah (God), who 
asks that believers to avoid it as it causes animosity and hatred between people.213 This 
prohibition is linked with satanic behaviour. In a different verse gambling is described as a 
sinful and harmful activity.214 The translation of the word “gambling” from English to 
Arabic becomes excessive risk or speculation with high level of uncertainty and with no 
guaranteed result.215
The previous discussion with regard to the gambling concept and its prohibition gives a 
clear picture that gharar interpreted as a risk, speculation, and uncertainty is not giving a 
correct perspective to the meaning of gharar . It would be expected to see confusion by the 
courts in interpreting gharar as uncertainty or risk, which is difficult to be defined in an 
absolute sense. This confusion would not arise if the word gharar is used as it was used in 
the Qur'an to be a misrepresentation or fraud which is expected to be not acceptable under 
any legal system.
Gharar also, “has been translated as ‘trading in risk,’ or ‘risk-taking.’ These uses are in the 
context of ignorance of a material attribute of a transaction, such as the existence of the 
subject matter, deliverability, terms, and timing of payment”.216 217It can be noticed that 
almost every explanation has some contradictions one to another. Because some of the 
writers refer to the prohibition of gharar as coming from Prophet Muhammad,211 which is 
correct, as he understood the Qur'an in the most proper way, and very few of Muslim
213 Q u r ’an . 5:90,91.
214 Ibid. 1:219.
215 B a 'a lb a k i . op. cit.. P278.
216 Sapana Shah. Islamic Banking and Finance: Shari 'a-Compliance and the Reinterpretation of R iba . 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/sections/ils/writing-competition_2007_islamic-banking_shah.pdf. P10. Accessed at 
13/8/2008.
217 O u ssa m a  A r a b i. Early Muslim Legal Philosophy: Identity and Difference in Islamic Jurisprudence. UCLA 
International Institute.G E von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies. (University of California, Los Angeles). 
Paper 1 Year 1999. P29.
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scholars understand his point with regard to the prohibition of gharar. Very few of the 
Muslim scholars refer to this prohibition to the Qur’an which is completely wrong. Some 
of them do not mention to what Qur’an said about gharar, and some other claim that there 
is no Qur’anic verses prohibiting gharar.218 Of course, this gives an impression that most of 
the scholars did not focus their attention to what Qur’an has to say in relation to this 
concept, or they did not understand it properly.
It is worth mentioning that Sami Al-Suwailem has summarized part of the controversies 
between the authors in relation to gharar, which shows how some Muslim jurists are very 
much involved in causing confusion on this topic. He has argued that despite the well 
established legal characteristics of gharar under Islamic contract law, the authors who are 
interested in Islamic finance find problems or a “dilemma” in the way of defining gharar 
so as to give a specific meaning to this concept. Al-Suwailem, in order to prove this point, 
has stated that Zaki Badawi wrote that gharar as a specific meaning is uncertain, adding 
that gharar has not been given a definite meaning under the Islamic literature. This has 
driven Muslim scholars to deal with every case separately, thereby generating different 
meanings for the term gharar. The same impression has been built and expressed by Frank 
Vogel when he argued that Islamic jurisprudence cannot characterize the precise concept 
of gharar, which demands a deeper study and articulation for the purpose of its 
definition.218 19
Of course, it is possible to find some authors including an element of deception as a part of 
their definition of gharar.220 Also some others have traced a closer line to the Qur’an and 
the logical construction of gharar when they included uncertainty as an element of gharar
218 A l-S c ia ti, op. cit., P6 .
219 A l-S u w a ile m . op. Cit.. P61.
220 Islamic Capital Market Fact Finding Report. Report of the Islamic Capital Market Task Force of the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions. July 2004. P7.
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beside the deceit, but not just using gharar to mean uncertainty.221 For example, they would 
use deceit to evaluate or describe the level of uncertainty in a contract. This factually could 
lead to another result, that gharar is not uncertainty or risk or ambiguity, but rather, gharar 
by its action, taghreer, can push people to an unknown excessive risk or an excessive 
uncertainty, thus causing loss and damage for the contracting parties. As it will be seen in 
this chapter, risk itself is not impermissible. Risk is strongly accepted and expected under 
Islamic law within the financial and commercial transactions, but for the purposes of 
motivating the people to act productivity, thereby adding new value to economic activities 
in general, or to individuals in particular. As has been mentioned in different places in this 
research, the mudarabah contract is a very clear and desirable example that has a very 
acceptable risk level associated with it.222
Based on the above analysis, a similar approach can be noticed when some authors 
interpreted gharar as meaning a probable or certain deception.223 This approach enhances 
the discretion of this research partly by emphasising that the prohibition of gharar, not 
because it is a risk or uncertainty, but because it contains the meaning of deception, that 
leads to two further points needing to be made. Firstly, the interpretation of gharar as 
uncertainty could be understood as uncertainty about the existence of the deception in the 
contract. In other words, the prohibition of gharar as being a probable deception means 
that gharar is considered to be a misrepresentation because misrepresentation and 
deception have the same concepts under the Islamic-Arabic term. It can be added that 
contracting parties under Islamic contract law would be encouraged to avoid entering a 
contract if there were any doubts about the existence of a misrepresentation. For the sake 
of simplification, the entire approach of this research regarding the concept of risk, the
221 The 4 Major Forbidden Elements in Islamic Finance. Shirkah. Year I, Issue 1 - July/August 2006. P49.
222 A l-S u w a ile n u  op. Cit., P64.
223 A h m e d  F a z il  E b ra h im . A Technical Analysis of the M u rc ib ah ah  [or Cost Plus/Mark up]. Financing Technique as 
Applied by the Islamic Banks. Understanding Islamic Finance Conference. 19th and 20th September 2007. Geneva. 
Switzerland. P6 .
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understanding of the Islamic economic logic leads one to say that it is impossible to banish 
all types of risk, as no business or human activity is without risk, to include the issue of 
making a profit, and risk should be built into the consideration of whether or not to enter 
into a contract. This issue can be associated with the expectation of disappointing results 
from some parties to a contract, as the issues of gain and loss are key elements in 
commerce. The significant changes of the prices of some goods from one day to another is 
good example for this.224
There is something that need to be said, which is the most direct and clear definition of 
gharar as a translation from Arabic-English. This translation states that “gharar means 
deceptive misrepresentation and the use of misleading ways and means.”225 It would be 
useful to describe that one of the key elements in the misunderstanding of gharar, and 
many other Islamic terminologies or concepts is coming from the errors in translation from 
Arabic to English by the authors or the writers who write about Islamic law terms. This 
problem is even more serious when acknowledged Muslim scholars who do not speak or 
understand the Arabic fluently, which results in an altered meaning of concepts from their 
original and intended purposes.226
As a result of this chapter, the structural lack of knowledge of Arabic language and its 
context has caused a clear misconception which has led to some very serious 
misunderstandings of the impermissibility of gharar in the Qur’an. The Qur’an, dealt 
with, clearly and directly, the concept of gharar and its derivative terminologies and verbs 
to be as an obvious rule to clarify how this important issue is to be avoided. Built on this 
analysis, it will be much easier for anyone to understand and to appreciate why gharar is
224 Dipl. Ing. Osama Abdelwahab. Developmental Perspectives on Financial Innovation in Forward and Futures 
Derivatives-A Critical Discussion with Special Consideration of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions, genehmigte 
Dissertation. Promotionsausschuss: Vorsitzender: Prof. Dr. Frank Heinemann. Berichter: Prof. Dr. Gernot WeiGhuhn. 
Berichter: Ass. Prof. Dr. Seif Tag el-Din. Tag der wissenschaftlichen Aussprache: 2.5.2007. Berlin 2007.D 83. P97.
225 R a h m a n , op. cit., PI.
2 2 6E b ra h im . op. cit., P3.
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totally not allowed in Islamic contracts as one of the most, both moral and ethical demands 
of all the kinds of dealings between people.
Just for the purposes of remembering, the early trade between Muslims and other nations 
was almost continental trade. The situations and conditions of the trade were very risky 
and had uncertain results. In this regard, it would not be possible or imaginable that the 
Qur’an and the Prophet would prevent Muslims from practicing trade through the desert 
because it is was risky or uncertain. Otherwise, early Muslims would have had to stop 
working because they had built most of their economic system on trade. So gharar is 
connected directly to the subject-matter and the price, the quality, the description, the 
quantity, and so on. Considering gharar as a risk or uncertainty would contradict one of 
the most famous Islamic contract (mudarabah)227 which is mentioned in the Qur’an as a 
type of work contains risk and uncertainty.228
It would be imaginable the levels of risk early Muslim traders had to experience in that era, 
with all the lack of the modern facilities that are available nowadays. Some would be 
wonder if all the categories or types of risk, speculation, and uncertainty are forbidden 
under Islamic law, or whether some of them are allowed and permissible. The answer will 
be in accordance with what has been indicated earlier, issues such as excessive risk, 
speculation, and uncertainty will be dealt with under the concept of gambling (maysir), 
which is the way for some people to gain their money easily, without any effort, at no risk, 
and it is the way for the others to lose their money without working, and through excessive 
risk. In this way, the concept of productivity is missed, which is one of the most important 
factors to keep the economy working in a proper and healthy way. Here, the measurement 
of the acceptable risk, speculation, and uncertainty is imaginable or approachable since it is
227 See more details about this contract in chapter four of this thesis.
228 Q u r ’an . 73:20.
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far from the gambling, which is the extreme level of risk and uncertainty. Considering 
excessive risk and uncertainty prohibited under Islamic law as a sort of gambling leads us 
to say something about the very recent international financial crisis. The financial 
instruments that were devised prior to the crisis were secured on mortgage receivables that 
bore a very high risk of not being repaid. However, a very strong example of excessive risk 
taking in the current financial crisis is the mortgage policy of giving mortgage almost 
anyone interested regardless of his ability to repay the loan. In having this policy, the 
financial institutions (were betting that houses prices will be soaring and the average 
repayment of the portfolio of the mortgage loans will not deteriorate. As this policy was 
very focused on the short term gains and fuelled by an appetite for excessive risk, this 
business models proved disastrous when the customers who should not have got the loans 
in the first could not afford to pay it back.
In the seventh chapter, the Ottoman Journal organised the rules of ghabn and taghreer. As 
has been mentioned above, ghabn used in the context of fraud (khida’a or waks), which 
related to trade contracts (selling and buying).229 As has been explained before, taghreer is 
the action of gharar, which is misrepresentation. There is another perspective could 
support considering taghreer as misrepresentation and misrepresentation as fraud (tadlees). 
This possibility comes under the title of khiyar al-tadlis or khiyar al-taghreer, as a fraud 
option. It is said that ‘the disappointed party’ would be able to rescind the contract if he 
can prove that he entered into the contract on the basis of ‘deceit or willful 
misrepresentation of the other contracting party’.230 In general, this supports the idea that 
proposes that taghreer, tadlees, deceit, and misrepresentation bear the same meaning under 
the Islamic law of contract which has been mentioned within this chapter. However, the 
Journal has put the general rules of all these concepts together. Nevertheless the Journal
229 Ib in  M cin thour, op. cit., P3211.
230 H cij H a s a n , op. cit.. P59.
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has decided that in the case of the existence of a flagrant fraud (ghabn) in a sale, but 
without misrepresentation (gharar), the defrauded party has no right to void the sale unless 
the flagrant fraud alone was connected to an orphan, an endowment, or dealing with public 
interest property.231 In contrast with this view, the Journal has stated that if one of the 
parties has misrepresented the other party, and the misrepresentee proven that the sale 
involved a flagrant fraud, then misrepresentee has the right to void the sale.232 It added that 
if the misrepresentee dies then the case of misrepresentation and flagrant fraud does not 
transmit to the successor.233 If the misrepresentee has experienced a flagrant fraud, then he 
uses the property as a real owner does, he does not have the right to void the contract.234
Finally, the Journal has decided that if a sold item has been destroyed or consumed, and 
this sold item suffered from a flagrant fraud and misrepresentation, or any defect has been 
found, or the buyer has built a building on the land, then there is no right for the 
misrepresentee to void the sale.235 The journal here has distinguished between 
misrepresentation and the fraud, and has dealt with the misrepresentation as having a wider 
meaning than fraud. This approach would be in line with the general rules of the English 
law of contract when dealing with misrepresentation. As has been seen earlier, the Arabic- 
Arabic translation does not distinguish between misrepresentation and fraud, and similar 
words such as cheating, deceit, lying, etc. This has also been shown in the very notable UK 
court cases which have dealt with misrepresentation and fraud such as Banco Santander
S.A. v. Bay fern Ltd.236
In this context gharar cannot be considered to be a risk or uncertainty. It should be said 
that gharar will be applicable when one of the contracting parties has tried to change the
231 The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article 356.
232 Ibid, Article 357.
233 Ibid, Article 358.
234 Ibid. Article 359.
233 Ibid, Article 360.
236 [1999] EWHC 284.
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facts, or did not give the correct information with regard to the risk or uncertainty, by 
convincing the other party that there is no uncertainty or the level of risk is very low, when 
in reality it is a very high or excessive risk. Based on that, if a party induced other party to 
enter a contract by providing him misleading evaluation, this would be considered a gharar 
(misrepresentation). The legal effects of gharar would depend on the facts of the case, and 
these could make the contract null or voidable. This is because gharar is connected to 
fraud or at least involved fraud, which is one of the main reasons behind the prohibition. 
The reference to the fraud here is based on the understanding that a contract which 
involves fraud will involve an attempt at obtaining the property or money of another’s 
without having the legal right to do so.237 This issue requires further research from 
contemporary Muslim scholars in order to properly classify the categories of gharar, and 
their legal effects in regard of the contract.
Section 6: Conclusion
Generally Islamic contract rules have not organised the rules of error or mistake. It has 
concentrated rather on misrepresentation, fraud, deceit and similar terminologies. This, of 
course, has come from Islamic jurisprudence and scholars writings which dealt with 
gharar mostly far from the Qur’anic context. The same can be said with regard to error 
which can really generate a lot of legal standpoints and rules. This area needs to be 
investigated more deeply, and may be need to be reformulated in order to be presented in a 
more understandable way, which would be more acceptable and approachable to the 
modern legal terminologies, while being founded following the Islamic law perspective. In 
addition, there is a need to make the terminologies more compatible to Qur’anic thoughts 
and instructions. This is will not be difficult as the error/mistake concept has its origins in 
the Qur'an, as is the case with the misrepresentation concept. The mission of the jurists or
237 H a j  H a sa n , op. cit.. P41.
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scholars would be to derive and organise the rules of the error and misrepresentation, and 
unify them under the same terminologies. The same situation would be demanded with 
regard to the English-Arabic translation and visa versa. This is very much needed in order 
to bring an end to the confusion and contradictions with and between the non-Arabic 
speakers who are scholars in Islamic contract law. This is needed urgently due to the 
notable emergence internationally of Islamic financial contracts, which need a more 
modem understanding of the concepts underlying contracts, in order to meet contemporary 
commercial demands while still fitting with the Qur’anic teachings.
With regard to gharar (misrepresentation), this area of contract has attracted a lot of 
interesting and wide ranging discussions by Islamic financial and commercial contracts 
writers. It noticed, however, that most of these writers have not derived their opinions from 
the Qur'an. Very few of them when they did so, did not go directly to the verses which 
explained gharar and its derivative terminologies. It is also worth noticing that those who 
did write about on this subject connected the Arabic practical meaning of gharar following 
respected Arab linguistics and dictionaries that help to enhance and strengthen the 
knowledge and the understanding of the realistic Islamic approach to Qur’anic teachings. 
At the same time, Khiyar Al-ayb and Khiyar Alwasf could have some connections or 
shared areas with the error concept, but neither can be classified as error. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, gharar is very much comparable to the English and Scottish contract 
law concept of misrepresentation. The same conclusion can be made with regard the close 
connections between Khiayr Alwasf and the English and Scottish use of the word 
misdescription. As a final note to this chapter, the question can be asked; does Islamic 
contract law have its own concept of error? In short, this writer’s answer is yes, the concept 
is originated by the Qur'an but it never been followed or been properly developed by 
Islamic jurisprudence.
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There is a big need to revise the concepts of error and misrepresentation in the Islamic 
contract law. This need derives its importance from the fact that the Islamic contract law 
has established theses two concepts, but they have not been clarified and modernised a 
long side with the contemporary terms. The translation issue from Arabic to English is one 
of the most important issues to be taken into consideration when comes to establishing a 
proper understanding of error and misrepresentation under Islamic law.
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Chapter Six
A Comparative Critical Analysis of the Concept of Error and 
Misrepresentation in CISG
Sectionl: Introduction
There is serious lack of materials discussing the concept of mistake/error and 
misrepresentation under the CISG; few actual cases discussed the subject. Furthermore, 
there are no unified interpretations explaining these important topics. Adopting a unified 
interpretation of error and misrepresentation would be crucial in solving many disputes 
occur under the CISG.1 This view would include the litigation of cases of mistake and 
misrepresentation. The author has found no direct reference to mistake or error within the 
CISG articles. In light of that, the discussion will rely on the analytical comparative 
method attempting to derive the rules of mistake and misrepresentation and their 
categories, if any, from the materials available. It is clear that the CISG has not discussed 
any type of error and misrepresentation as in English and Scottish contract law. Stating that 
the concepts of mistake and misrepresentation and some relevant cases can be concluded 
by implication when discussing the CISG; however, no clear categories are developed, 
(e.g. error as to motive, error as to transaction, unilateral or bilateral mistakes).
Having clear concepts of mistake and misrepresentation under the CISG gains considerable 
importance, however, this subject lacks clarity and raises serious debates among the 
writers. It is suggested that this subject derives its importance from the “warranty as to the 
quality of the goods”. In this situation, a serious problem would occur, which is the conflict
1 Flechtner, op. cit., 259.
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between the CISG and the national remedies. Two issues to be noticed about “warranty as 
to the quality of the goods”; firstly, it includes the validity of the contract using avoidance 
as a remedy, which used under many national laws. Secondly, it includes the concept of the 
fundamental breach using avoidance as a remedy under the CISG. Both rules are usually 
related to mistake or innocent misrepresentation about “the quality of the goods or claims 
non-conformity of the goods”. There is an open question whether the CISG rules or 
equivalent domestic rules should be implemented; it is an issue to be discussed later in this 
chapter.2
Section 2: Concept of Error
2.1. Mistake as to Quality
As shown earlier, mistake renders the contract void in many national legal systems; but 
this is not the case under the CISG. For example, some argued that the CISG rules would 
not be applied if a mistake as to quality of the goods occurs.3 On the contrary, different 
argument raised by others suggesting that mistake as to quality of the goods under some 
national laws corresponds with the scope of Article 4(a) of CISG.4
Based on the rules govern defective goods, the author of this thesis concludes that Article 4 
of CISG can be considered as a remedy for the mistaken party if this mistake relates to the 
quality of goods.5 This author suggests establishing an approach considering mistake within 
the scope of the CISG rules; this approach allows the mistaken party as to the quality of 
goods to apply the norms of the defective goods as a legal solution.6 Mistake as such was 
part of some discussion meetings about the CISG rules. According to the Italian view,
2 Kazimierska, op. cit., PP 158.159.3 Rudolf Lessiak, op. cit.. P487.492.4Lessiak, op. cit., P99.101.5 Kroll. op. cit., P556 C lo u t  Case No. 47 [Landgericht Aachen (Regional Court), Germany. 14 May 1993], p u b li s h e d  in R e c h t D e r  
I n te m a tio n a le n  W ir tsc h e ft (R IW ) 760, 761 (1993).
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mistake approached as an equivalent to the lack of conformity;7 mistake under domestic 
laws and their counter parts of invalidity and non-conformity under the CISG were the 
extent of discussion one of the CISG’s meetings.8 This shows the differences between the 
member states whether considering mistake as part of the remedies of the CISG where 
occurs.9
This author noticed that when the CISG discusses description of goods in contracts 
governed by the CISG; there is no indication to mistake. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
to any remedy for mistake, such as rescission, avoidance, or any similar remedies, dealing 
with mistake as used in domestic legal systems.10 Some writers have even denied any link 
or relationship between error and misrepresentation concepts and the CISG rules. They 
argued that national rules and remedies should be the only reference to deal with cases 
related to error and misrepresentation. The writers have argued that there is no need to 
discuss these opinions; as they do not have any considerable implication in the context of 
the CISG.11 This view followed by the German courts, where one of the District courts12 has 
stated that the CISG rules do not govern the case of mistake in expression, and this case 
should be solved under the rules of domestic law.
This author sees no logic to reject the relationship between the CISG and mistake. Many of 
the member states of the CISG deal with mistake as an independent doctrine. Furthermore, 
many cases established assisting judges, courts, and arbitrators in reaching reasonable 
decisions disputes related to mistake and misrepresentation occur.
7 Legislative History, op. cit.8 Ibid.9 Ibid.10 Ferrari. Verona, op. cit.. P70.11 Kazimierska. op. cit., P I89.12 Germany, Landgericht [District Court] Hamburg. 19 June 1997. http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu.
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However, many cases “dealing with Article 35(1) CISG”, address directly the issues of 
quality, quantity and the description of goods of the subject matter of the contract. These 
issues can be contained in any contract and interest the contracting parties. There must be 
provisions, dealing with error of the contracting parties and the intentional violation of the 
fundamental stipulations of contract; which related to quality, quantity, and description of 
the goods. The provisions must provide solutions when the contracting parties, one or both, 
become under mistake and misrepresentation. This author finds that there is no evidence to 
indicate when the party can be considered mistake inducer (misrepresentor) or 
misrepresentee (under mistake). The author also sees no explanation to cases related to 
mistake, which expected to occur at any stage of the contracts. It is difficult to settle on 
which analytical method to be followed to derive the concepts of error and 
misrepresentation when applying the CISG.
Good faith is one of the examples of supplementary issues that related to mistake and 
misrepresentation cause confusion when using the CISG rules. Good faith has no clear 
concept or definition under the CISG; it is also not clear which stage of contracting can be 
applied. There is no indication how good faith affects the validity of the contract, its 
understanding, performance, negotiations.13 Studying the aforementioned issues shows that 
all of them are logical and acceptable in terms of the general context of good faith.14 Saying 
good faith presumed or expected under the CISG, does not indicate precise definition of 
this concept.15 It early to conclude that good faith is the incubator of misrepresentation or 
fraud; but there is a great possibility for good faith to include the concept of mistake and 
misrepresentation. Some authors support this approach as they mention an implicit the 
existence of mutual mistake under the CISG rules; but they do not explain how to deal with
13 Andrea L. Charters. Fitting the “Situation”: the CISG and the Regulated Market. Washington University Global Studies 
Law Review. Vol 4 No 1. 2005. PP6.7.14 Lookofsky. op. cit., P92.15 Akaddaf. op. cit.. P33s.
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it. Also they do explain its legal effects in relation to existence of the subject matter.16 In 
supporting this hypothesis, the English case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus,17 indicated as a 
certain example of mutual mistake, to be governed by Article 8 CISG.18 This article 
concerns the interpretation of the related issues to the intent of the parties, which will be 
explained below.
There is different opinions worth to examine in relation to good faith understanding. In 
spite of the mentioned ambiguity earlier with regard to good faith understanding under 
CISG; there is discretion giving a direct indication to the concept of good faith under 
CISG. According to this view, good faith applies to all the features of the convention, the 
interpretation and implementation of the contract. It can also apply to the dealings’ 
fairness;19 it suggested also that good faith contains duty to disclose the defect in 
accordance with Article 40 CISG related to non-conformity rules.20
Akaddaf, in her comparative approach, between the Islamic and CISG application in the 
Arab-Islamic Countries, she argues that good faith implies prohibition of fraud and 
fraudulent dealings; according to her opinion, good faith in this context complies with the 
concept of good faith under Article 7(1) CISG.21 This opinion follows the perspective of 
English law related to good faith that considered as a minimum requirement for contracts. 
The opposite expressed through the rules of fraud and misrepresentation. This does not 
mean that good faith restricted only to misrepresentation and fraud; but it means, however,
16 Lookofsky, op. cit.. P280.17 (1864) 2 Hurl & C  906.18 P. Latimer. A u str a lia n  B u sin e ss  L aw . 20th Edition. CCH. 2001. P327.19 Phanesh Koneru. The International Interpretation of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods. An Approach Based on General Principles, 6 Minn. J. Global Trade. 1997. P105. At 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu.VIII. Accessed on 7/01/2009.20 Akaddaf, op. cit., PP33,34.21 Ibid, PP31.32.
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that good faith is a wide concept and open to include different aspects, depending on the 
contract in dispute.22
The author sees another clear logical approach to be followed enhancing fraud as a basic 
element the concept of good faith under the CISG. Scottish contract law deals with fraud as 
an essential factor of good faith;23 good faith also considered a means to control un-induced 
mistake which is known by the other party.24
The author proposes that error, fraud, and misrepresentation contained within the concept 
of good faith and considered as vitiating means of contract in most of the legal systems 
cited in this thesis. Relying on this analysis, this approach assists to reach the key 
guidelines to error and misrepresentation under the CISG. This then bring the CISG closely 
to English law approach on misrepresentation as being an element of good faith or “utmost 
good faith”.25 Based on that, some authors considered the right given to the misrepresented 
party (misrepresentee) to rescind the contract as part of the concept of good faith under 
English commercial law.26 Some authors raised this issue from interpretive perspective; 
they suggested that the CISG rules create disputes under different legal systems because 
CISG requires the variety of remedies to be sought under national laws.27
It is believed that the CISG has rarely dealt with mistake or error.28 This belief, however, 
provides a ground to further exploration of the CISG rules. In studying Article 8(1) CISG,29 
some signs can be found indicating the concept of error concentrating on understanding the
22 Vanessa SIM. Good Faith in English Contract Law: Of Triggers and Concentric Circles. Ankara Law Review Vol.l 
No.2 (Winter 2004), PP229.230.
22 MacQueen, Good Faith in the Scots law of contract: op. cit., PP5-37.
24 Tetley, op. cit.
25 Shi Feng. Utmost Good Faith in Marine Insurance: A Comparative Study of English and Chinese Maritime Law. 
Plymouth Law Review (2008) 1. P I56.
26 R. Bradgate, Commercial Law, 3 Ed. (London: Butterworths, 2000) P31.
27 Novoa, op. cit., P608.
28 Charters, op. cit., P I7.
29 For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to 
his intent where the other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was.
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statements by the contracting parties. As Article 8(1) CISG refers to the contract 
interpretation, it would be expected that the drafters of the CISG considered the possibility 
of misinterpretation or misunderstanding by the contracting parties. This section stated that 
the interpretation should consider the intent of one of the contracting parties. Some points 
need to be examined, because there is no explanation how the intent of the party can be 
interpreted, and whether fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake is involved. Dealing with this 
point, raise additional issues to deal with, as it is difficult to be prove what the party has 
intended by his conduct. Another issue occurs regarding the awareness of the other party, 
and when he knew or must have known about the real intent of the other party.
This discussion leads one to say that the indication to the interpretation of the statement 
provides that there might be unseen meaning of error and/or misrepresentation, fraud 
which are not clear in Article 8(1) CISG.30 Serious problem occurs related to mistake 
definition, because it is not categorised as common, mutual, unilateral, or any other type. It 
is not clear whether section (1) of Article 8 CISG expects one or two parties in error. If the 
case of mistake solved, further investigation required to know whether misrepresentation 
established by one party and mistake by the other. If there is an answer to the previous 
questions, another question occurs, regarding the intended type of misrepresentation. There 
is no clear category or clear legal effects of misrepresentation, whether fraudulent or 
negligent.31 This subject is widely open for theories and controversies, as will be shown 
later.
In order to strengthen the analytical approach regarding Article 8.2 CISG, it can be noticed 
that this section attempts to resolve disputes to which section 1 is not applicable. Section 2 
suggests that, in the case of misunderstanding of statements and conducts, reasonableness
30 For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to 
his intent where the other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was.
31 Lookofsky. op. cit.. P280.
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should be followed as a solution of interpretation. This means that the standard is the 
understanding of the reasonable person under the same situation. In this way, section 2 
raises another issue related to the reasonability, which might have the different 
understanding and application in different countries, or among different commercial 
contexts. In this situation, any dispute occurs between the contracting parties would not be 
resolved easily due to the conflict of laws under different national courts. The CISG does 
not deal with mistake and misrepresentation as in English and Scottish law; this creates 
more complications to the contracting parties. This is because there is no clear international 
court or judicial body to deal with the cases and disputes.
The author believes that there is an implicit, but strong link, between Article 8 CISG and 
some Scottish contract law rules related to intent and its interpretation. This is derived 
from the simple definition of error under Scottish law, which concentrates on resolving 
disputes between the contracting parties when there is misunderstanding between 
intentions and expressions.32 According to this view, the intention of the contracting parties 
is the core of the error law. The author finds differences between the classical rules of 
English and Scottish law of error and Article 8 CISG with regard to the interpretation of 
intention. Both about the understanding intent of the contracting parties, whether it 
expressed correctly or incorrectly. This approach is indicated in the Islamic-Arabic 
definition of error discussed earlier in this thesis. The Islamic-Arabic definition 
concentrates on the intention of the person, the error being considered where someone 
intended to do something but unintentionally he did something different.33 Furthermore, it 
can be noted that under Scottish contract law, as shown earlier in this thesis, considered an 
independent category of error as to intention. This type of error occurs where the parties 
prove that their consent established on error, which makes the contract not binding as they
32 Rahmatian, op. cit., P36.
33Ibin Manthour. op. cit.. PI 193.
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did not intend to bind themselves. In this case, the contract would be considered as void ab 
initio (from beginning).34
It is clear that when the parties’ dispute about their intention, and the case ended before the 
court, in this situation, the litigation is about interpreting the parties’ intention. The author 
sees that Article 8 CISG close to Scottish law view of error as to intention. The English 
view is not different and the standard of reasonableness applies to interpret the real 
intention of the parties under the category of mutual mistake.35 Following this issue, the 
interpretation of the parties’ intention under English contract law discussed usually in case 
law. This point is clear in Investors Compensation Scheme Limited v. West Bromwich 
Building Society,36 where Lord Hoffmann presented five principles to be used when 
interpreting the contract. These principles concern the method of understanding the 
intention of the contracting parties. These principles rely on the understanding of 
reasonable person having knowledge in the same field of commerce. These principles 
would correspond to purposes of Article 8 CISG. Error as such, is not established under the 
Islamic contract law.
It is noticed that Article 28 CISG mentioned that the court is a national reference with 
respect to the disputes of a greed specific performance that is required by one party, but the 
court has the option whether to accept or to refuse to look at the dispute. Based on that, as 
an analogical conclusion, the interpretation of misunderstanding or misrepresentation, and 
their similarities, would rely on the domestic courts, which of course, will have many 
different perspectives on this point. Even when remedies are available under domestic and 
CISG rules, it is still a problem in deciding what the rule should be implemented.37 This 
leads one to mention another issue relying on the historical legislative drafting of CISG
34Green, op. cit., P I20.
35 Stone, op. cit., P296.
36 [1997] UKHL 28; [1998] 1 All ER 98. at 912.
37 For further discussion see: Lookofsky. op. cit.. P283-285.
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which, does not give an impression that the drafters intended to give the parties the right to 
rely on the national rules with regard to mistake in all situations.38
2.2. Mistake in Commentators’ Arguments
There are many different opinions between the commentators with regard of the discretion 
whether to consider mistake and its effects and remedies within CISG rules only, or, as 
some writers have said, to see the issue of validity as being restricted to national legal 
rules.39 Despite the mentioning this rule, it is said that the CISG drafters did not indicate 
clearly in Article 79 whether domestic rules on validity would be applied in a case of 
mistake or not.40 It is clear that there is no way to escape from the fact of conflict between 
domestic rules and CISG rules. Some authors suggest that mistake as to the quality of 
goods is not regarded as being connected to validity, and this has given them sufficient 
evidence to say that domestic law remedies are not applicable.41 There is something that 
should be mentioned when studying the CISG, which is the non-clarity of its interpretive 
rules. Based on that, the issue of validity is still moving inside the same circle because as it 
is not clear if there any possibility to conclude that the validity concept should be 
interpreted just upon to the understanding of the CISG, in order to ensure it uniformity 
application. Following the historical legislative route, the CISG gives no indication other 
than those which are mentioned in Article 7(1) CISG, which again leads to the conclusion 
that the issue of validity can be interpreted independently.42
Of course more authors can be found supporting this line of argument which put the issue 
of mistake as to quality of the goods within the scope of the CISG rules, but with another 
restriction which decided that the mistaken party has the remedy of defective goods
38 Ferrari, Verona, op. cit., P62.
39 Checklist on the CISG. op. cit.
40 Hartnell, op. cit.
41 Leyens, op. cit.
42 Ferrari, Verona, op. cit., P63.64.
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available in the case of mistake.43 In fact, it is normal to find all these arguments leading to 
an animated discussion between the academic authors as the rules encompassed within the 
articles of the CISG is not clear or specific enough to cover the gap between domestic laws 
and CISG rules, and because of normal reaction which would be expected is that the 
domestic courts would apply their national legal rules in the cases presented before them. 
However, it is found that there is a discretion built into the broad scope of the CISG which 
brings mistake into the CISG body. It is said that mistake could occur during the formation 
of the contract, or during the “sale of goods” process. The issues of the delivery of goods, 
and the conformity of the goods, and their remedies would be included.44 The buyer should 
be able to rely just on the conformity rules if he would like make a compliant on the basis 
of mistake.45
Some academic writers make a general conclusion that the CISG does not have any clear 
definition of the term “validity”, and of course this requires domestic legal systems to 
address this issue, and decide if its conditions are existing or not, and what the legal effects 
should be.46 As has been mentioned above, the differences between domestic legal rules 
will affect the legal consequences of whether the contract is valid or not. At the same time, 
another fact is worth to be mentioning, that of invalidity issue, here the mistake, and its 
causes which give rise to two different remedies under national rules and the CISG. The 
problem which still arises is the complete difference between some domestic legal rules 
which give avoidance as the remedy for mistake as to the quality of the goods. For 
example, the German authors deny the right of the avoidance under the CISG when the 
mistake is connected to the quality of the goods but the Austrian authors allow the right of
43 Kroll, op. cit., P55.
44 Zeller, op. cit., P77.
45 Felemegas, op. cit., P172.
46 John Honnold. Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention. Kluwer Law 
International, 1982. P96.
251
avoidance as a remedy when the same mistake occurs.47 The case under English law is a bit 
more complicated as it gives the right to consider the contract void when the non-mistaken 
party is not a misrepresentor but he knew about the mistake of the other party.48 However 
this does not mean that every mistake in this category would render the contract void.
The debate is not closed yet on the topic of remedies in the case of invalidity under the 
CISG and national laws. Some state that if the invalidity question is raised, the buyer’s 
ability should be restricted to the remedy given under the applicable domestic law for 
mistake. This approach has been strongly supported by Schlechtriem, who believes that 
“error about the quality of the goods” is totally governed by the CISG regulations, which 
therefore does not allow any space for domestic rules.49
Interestingly, there is an attempt to combine the CISG rules and their counter parts in 
classical examples of mistake. In this combination some examples have been presented to 
be considered under the same categories. For example, it is considered that the CISG’s 
rules on initial impossibility and its remedy can be applied in ‘a cross-reference’ for 
mistake as to the existence of the goods. The cross-reference of the mistake as to quality of 
the goods would be the breach of contract rules with regard to the conformity of the goods 
under the CISG. The mistake as to the character of the contracting party would be the 
cross-referenced to the ‘CISG’ rules’ which deal with the Tack creditworthiness of the 
other party’ .50 Despite this attempt, others, have found that national courts do not deal with 
the cases of mistake to be relevant to the CISG rules.51
47 Ulrich Drobnig. Substantive Validity. American Journal of Comparative law. vol. 401992. P 636.
48 ZHOU. Misrepresentation in English Contract Law from An Economic Perspective, op. cit., P271.
49 P. Schlechtriem is of the opposite opinion. P. Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law. The UN-Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods 96 (1986). P32-33.
50 Leyens, op. cit.
51 Hartnell, op. cit., PP74.75.
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Even the above suggestion brought further debates, with some suggesting that mistake is a 
matter for national law; with others suggesting that the CISG remedies should have been 
protected from conflicting with domestic law remedies.52 In the light of the previous 
discussion, the controversy still exists with regard to the position of mistake, conceptually 
and practically, within the CISG rules. It is said that the assessment of Article 4(a) CISG 
gives an impression that all points related to mistake “were intentionally excluded from the 
scope of the convention,” and as a consequence, mistake is governed by national law. 
Some say that the non-conformity remedies provided by the CISG were intended to 
displace the domestic law remedies for mistake.53 It is a strong signal to say that domestic 
law will not be applied in relation to mistake.
Continuing along the same lines, it is said that, according to domestic laws, when there is a 
mistake with regard to one party’s ability to perform his contractual obligations, the case 
would be treated as it is the case with regard to the characteristic of the goods. This matter 
is dealt with by Article 71 CISG, and this should not be deemed to be a validity term 
according to the Article 4(a) CISG. Instead, it should be treated using the beginning of 
Article 4 CISG that refers to “rights and obligations”. Following this line of reasoning, 
therefore, domestic remedies should not be applied.54
The above approach would logically this lead one to say that if a case has occurred related 
to the quality of goods the buyer would not have the right to claim for avoidance if the 
contracting parties had agreed that the CISG governs their contract. This might mean that 
the existing remedies for the nonconformity of goods under the CISG would replace the 
domestic remedy. It could clearly be noticed how much the scholars are in argument 
regarding the interpretation by the court and if it should follow the CISG rules to decide
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Peter Huber. Alastair Mullis. The CISG. sellier. european law publ., 2007. P24 ISBN 386653020X. 9783866530201
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mistake cases, or whether the court should be committed to domestic law rules. This lack
of clarity between the scholars is created by the drafters of the CISG, who were not clear 
enough on this point. The drafters did not establish the obvious and visible boundaries for 
the remedies of mistake, and they did not resolve the question of whether it should be dealt 
with by the CISG or by way of national norms and structures.55 It would not be expected 
that the ambiguous attitude by the drafters would be understood as a positive given all the 
arguments that have arisen and the different perspectives given of the commentators. It 
would be always expected to find that the CISG rules are in conflict with the national rules 
of mistake. This is what can be shown clearly by the remedy of avoidance in relation to 
fundamental breach, which is provided by Article 49 CISG. It seems to be very restricted 
in comparison to some domestic rules which give the party the right to claim avoidance for 
any mistake related “to the quality of goods”.56
It could be said, in addition to the above, that there is another, revolutionary, opinion 
which states that the CISG rules are capable of dealing with mistakes that are connected to 
the performance capacity of a party, and the conformity of the goods.57 This point has been 
supported, but from a different perspective, which believes that mistakes in the area of 
capacity to perform give the right of retain to the creditor under the Article 71(1) CISG.58 59It 
follows that mistake will be considered out of the scope of the CISG when it is induced by 
fraudulent misrepresentation.39 This explanation gives an opportunity to understand that 
other types of mistakes would be considered to be within the scope of the CISG 
boundaries, whether they are induced by negligent and innocent misrepresentation, or by 
way of common, mutual mistakes. In general, whether one agrees with this stand point or
55 Todd Weitzmann. Validity and Excuse in the U.N. Sales Convention. CISG Database. Pace Institute of International 
Commercial Law. Journal of Law and Commerce. Vol 16. (1997) 265-290.
36 Kroll, op. cit., P59.
^  Peter Schlechtriem, Petra Butler. UN Law on International Sales. Springer. 2008. P43 ISBN 3540253149, 
9783540253143.
58 Ibid. PI 84.
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not, this gives an impression of how deep the differences are between the academic writers 
with regard to mistake and misrepresentation, and their position under the CISG rules. 
Following the perspective of U.S. law, it seems to have quite restorative view to approach 
between the CISG and the domestic law. It has been mentioned that, for example, that if 
the “CISG seller” was guilty of misrepresentation, whether negligent or fraudulent, with 
regard “to the quality of the goods”, then there is a possibility of talking about the overlap 
between domestic laws with regard to rescission as a remedy for misrepresentation, and 
avoidance, as a remedy for fundamental breach under the CISG.60
Of course, the point here is about the direct and the indirect indication of the mistake 
within the CISG rules, which means that this opinion deals with the spirit of the CISG 
context in regard of the meaning of mistake. It is important to mention that this thesis 
would prefer to support this line of analysis, especially when it finds that it is difficult to 
ignore the crucial importance of the mistake and misrepresentation rules included within 
the CISG texts, at least impliedly. It is noticed that there is no stability between the 
commentators with regard to mistake and its connection with the CISG, as some consider 
mistake as being provided for by the CISG, and the others believe that mistake is not a 
matter covered by the CISG.61 There is also the matter of the differences between the legal 
systems of CISG member states, which of course affects the commentators who build their 
legal approaches in a way which probably supports their own domestic legal rules at the 
expenses of others.
Despite the fact that the CISG could give direction to the interpreters and academic writers, 
but still confusion is the dominant stream on the subject of mistake and misrepresentation. 
This is because the CISG rules do not provide clear directions to be followed with regard
60 Joseph M. Lookofsky. Understanding the CISG in the USA. 2nd Edition. Kluwer Law International, 2004. P26. ISBN 
904112277X, 9789041122773.
61 “Checklist on the CISG', op. cit.
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to the definitional and conceptual lines. On the one hand, some commentators interpret 
some articles of the CISG as parallel articles dealing with mistake and giving some legal 
remedies. On the other hand, other commentators take the totally opposite view adopting 
opinions that say that the CISG excluded the issues of mistake from its scope and left the 
matter to be resolved by domestic legal rules. Moreover, it can be claimed that the CISG 
attracted a lot of criticism due to its ambiguity in the articulation of the CISG articles. 
Sometimes there is no clear rout showing that the CISG drafters were realistically 
interested in establishing a connection between the CISG texts and the national legal 
systems in relation to mistake and misrepresentation.
It is thought that it would have been be more realistic for the CISG drafters deal with the 
issue of the mistake and misrepresentation clearly, rather relying on the national courts to 
solve anticipated problems. Ignoring this point has caused a lot of discrepancies, and even 
sometimes conflict between domestic rules within the same legal system. It would have 
been wise if the drafters had detailed the rules on mistake and misrepresentation. They 
must have realised how important these issues are in the process of the contracting and the 
consequent results. Moreover, what should be explored by studying the hypothesis of 
remedies for mistake being contained within the CISG is the unceasing complicated 
arguments between the supporters and the opponents of the subject matter of mistake being 
dealt with by the CISG.
It is noticed how many different views have been raised by the scholars with regard to the
applicability of the CISG within domestic legal systems, and which are the preferred rules
to be applied. Most of the commentators usually focus on conflicting rules, with few
focusing on the combined crossing points between the CISG rules and domestic rules. The
strangest thing is that the CISG drafters even did not try to clarify such an expected
conflict. This somehow weakened the idea international uniformity of CISG interpretation
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and application. This writer would be of the view that the drafters should have been more 
concerned about these issues, which has given rise to many serious differences.
Section 3: Misrepresentation in CISG
It is clear that the CISG does not deal directly with misrepresentation in the way that it is 
covered within English and Scottish contract law. Some writers do not even see 
misrepresentation, as it is understood in national law as being encompassed with CISG 
rules. Rather they suggest that misrepresentation be kept out of the CISG as, they 
conclude, the CISG itself has no answer for misrepresentation cases.62 This is the 
conclusion of the Canadian courts which have failed to find a connection between a 
claimed fraudulent misrepresentation and the CISG rules, either amongst academic 
commentators, or in CISG case law.63
The reading of Article 40 CISG, according to some authors, could give new approach to 
the issue of material non-conformity of goods. Article 40 presents non-conformity to be 
understood as misrepresentation. This is concluded as Article 40 gives negligent sellers 
less protection when compared to negligent buyers, this being justified through the seller’s 
failure of disclosure being counted as a fraudulent misrepresentation.64 In presenting this 
opinion, does not mean that there is total agreement with it. The point being made here is 
to show that non-conformity could be studied as an alternative or parallel to the 
misrepresentation concept, or could be used instead of the misrepresentation to ease 
dealing with the non-conformity, when it occurs. Notably, according to discretion, the 
court has decided that the interpretation of Article 40 CISG gives the fraudulent seller less 
protection than the negligent buyer. Based on this discretion, the court has considered that 
the seller will not be released from his liability according to Article 35(3) CISG, in a case
62 Poikela. op. Cit., PP62.63.
63 Antonin I. Pribetic. Arbitration and Fraudulent Misrepresentation: Another Canadian court overlooks the CISG. The 
Globetrotter. Volume 10. No. 3. January 2006. P6.
64 Garro. op. cit., P260.
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where the seller misrepresented the correct age and mileage of the car, despite the fact that 
the buyer could not have been unaware of the lack of conformity.65 What can be clearly 
noticed here is that the court has used the word “misrepresented” to indicate “fraudulent 
seller”, which establish a new link between fraud and misrepresentation under the CISG. In 
other words, it means that there is a possibility to deal with misrepresentation and fraud in 
the same level. This can be supported by the uncleamess of the CISG articles with regard 
to misrepresentation and fraud concepts, thus opening the doors for many controversial 
interpretations and many discrepancies arising from the differences between the legal 
systems, from country to another or even within a particular legal system.
Articles 37 and 48 CISG which give an opportunity to the seller to restore the negative 
effects of the non-conformity that is made by him,66 the two articles open a space for the 
party who defected the contract, with regard to the quality or the quantity of the goods, to 
correct the intentional or unintentional wrong doing or conduct as a possible remedy for 
breaching the contract. Here, the intentional wrong doing can be counted as a 
misrepresentation or fraud, and the unintentional wrong doing can be counted as a mistake. 
This can be taken as an implied expression of the misrepresentation or mistake. In general 
some authors find it difficult to understand what justification can be presented to allow for 
the seller to correct his wrong doing by delivering goods that conform the quality 
mentioned in the contract. The raised point is about how many times could be given to the 
seller to meet the buyer expectations.67 It is an indication if the type of arguments that 
usually arise with regard to the interpretation of CISG rules. Whether considered a 
misrepresentation or a mistake, some deal with the presence of non-conformity to lead to 
the logical demand to consider the contract void. Non-conformity for these writers, is
65 See CLOUT case No. 168 [Germany: Oberlcmdesgericht [Appellate Court] Koln 21 May 1996. available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960521gl.html]; Ferrari ‘Gap-filling'. P89.
66 Flechtner. op. cit., P346.
67 Silvia Ferreri. Remarks Concerning the Implementation of the CISG by the Courts (the Seller’s Performance and 
Article 35). Journal of Law and Commerce. Vol. 25:223 2005-06. P224.
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parallel to mistake and misrepresentation.68 An interesting comment, by one writer, is that 
the CISG did not take into consideration cases when the parties are aware or must to have 
aware of non-conformity in the goods.69
In general, the main stand point of conformity is about the buyer’s expectations from the 
seller, and when the seller does not meet these expectations the result is the seller is in 
breach of the contract. According to Article 49(1 )(a) CISG if the seller fails to perform his 
contractual obligations this would be counted as a breach of contract, which would give 
rise, generally speaking, to the possibility of avoidance of the contract. More specifically 
not breaches lead to avoidance, unless the breach is fundamental. Article 25 CISG 
considers that fundamental breach causes loss for the buyer which prevents him from 
enjoying his contractual expectations. The seller, of course, would not have been aware 
that this would be the result.70 After some comparative approaches, it could be concluded 
that avoidance is usually used as one of the remedies for mistake under English71 and 
Scottish72 contract law. Fundamental breach, which is somewhat similar to essential or 
substantial mistake, also required the application of avoidance or rescission as a remedy. 
Similarly, detriment caused by the seller’s non-conformity can be seen as a parallel to the 
demand for the losses that caused by misrepresentation under Scottish and English contract 
law.
68 Benjamin K. Leisinger. Fundamental Breach Considering Non-Conformity of the Goods. Sellier. European Law 
Publishers GmbH. Miinchen. 2007. P3.
69 (JUR) ULI Foerstl. The General Principle of Good Faith under the United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (SICG) - A Functional Approach to Theory and Practice. February. 2005. P50. Available at 
http://lawspace.law.uct.ac.za:8080/dspace/bitstream/2165/39/l/Uli_Foerstl_2005.pdf. Accessed on 13/01/2009.
70 Ingeborg Schwenzer. Avoidance of the Contract in Case of Non-Conforming Goods (Article 49(1) (a) CISG). Journal 
of Law and Commerce. [Vol. 25:437 2005-06]. P437.
71 Beale, op. cit., P366.
72Green, op. cit., P I20.
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The expected conflict between domestic laws and the CISG with regard to mistake as to 
subject could also be said about misrepresentation, for the same reasons.73 If there is a 
negligent misstatement, or misrepresentation, as “to the quality of the goods”, or the 
capacity of the other party to perform, this will seriously affect the interests of the parties. 
Some see that in spite of Article 4(a) CISG, the CISG remedies should only be 
implemented, thereby preventing the use of domestic rules on avoidance and rescission.74 
This stand point leads to a simple and accurate conclusion, that the CISG deals with the 
mistake and misrepresentation, both practically and impliedly. This view point somehow 
fills the gap between the two disputing groups of academic writers with regard to the 
implementation of the CISG rules or domestic laws. This approach creates a sort of 
compromise, helping to make the combination between the rules of mistake and 
misrepresentation under the national rules, and the other rules of the CISG. This would 
give implicit remedial treatment by the norms of the non-conformity or good faith, as has 
been mentioned many times earlier in this chapter. Furthermore, it is considered that 
negligent misrepresentation and mistake as to the character of the goods should be 
controlled and organised by the CISG rules. This, it is submitted, is a direct and obvious 
opinion for dealing with the CISG rules as a remedial reference for a negligent 
misrepresentation and mistake,75 which has been referred to impliedly by academic authors 
as referred to earlier.
Trying to understand misrepresentation as a controversial issue within the CISG debate, as 
referred to above, leads one to go further into the study some of the articles of the CISG 
which might be related impliedly to misrepresentation, specifically the gharar concept in
73 Joseph Lookofsky. CISG Case Commentary on Preemption in Geneva Pharmaceuticals and Stawski. Copyright © 
1997, current 2008 Ralph Amissah. PI.
74 Peter Schlechtriem. The Borderland of Tort and Contract — Opening a New Frontier? Cornell International Law 
Journal. Vol. 21 (1988) 467-476. http://www.cisg.law.pace.edU/cisg/biblio/sclechtriem.html#ps23.
75 Eduardo Grebler. Fundamental Breach of Contract under the CISG: A Controversial Rule 
available online at
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+UN-i-Sales-i-of+Goods+Convention:+perspectives+on+the+current...-aO 177100796. 
Accessed on 02/02/2009.
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Islamic contract law. This was explained in detail, under the concept of error, in this thesis. 
The CISG discussed the quality of goods under Article 35(1, 2). Article 35(1) provides that 
“The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and description required 
by the contract and which are contained or packaged in the manner required by the 
contract.” The Islamic law concept of khiyar alwasf (option of description), could deal 
with description in the same way as mentioned in Article 35(1) CISG, or under a similar 
remedial conceptual structure. Delivered goods that do not meet the agreed description in 
the contract is treated as a misdescription which could close to misrepresentation. The 
CISG rules in this respect, it might leade one to look at a wider range of provisions which 
could be similarly investigated. Generally, since the seller must deliver the goods, as 
described in the contract, there is an obligation to operate according to good faith, which 
expect goods to be free from misrepresentation or misdescription, and also free from 
mistake.
Article 35(2)(a) CISG could give wider range for misdescription (misrepresentation) as an 
applicable concept. It expects that when goods do not conform with the contract 
description, should at least suite the ordinary uses of the goods that have the same 
description. Of course, this is could be read as giving a wide meaning to the term 
misdescription, creating more restrictions for the contracting parties when they implement 
their contractual obligations. This is obviously enhanced by Article 35(2) (b) CISG, which 
provides that the goods should meet the requirements of an agreed specific function 
mentioned to the seller, either “expressly or impliedly”, unless a situation gives the 
impression that the buyer was not relying, “or that it was unreasonable for him to rely” on 
the assessment and the ability of the seller.
Another meaning can be derived from this point. Misdescription could be involved when
very accurate features of the goods energise the misdescription role to occupy bigger space
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in the contract with regard to the CISG as a parallel conceptual application of 
misrepresentation. It is quite possible to use similar approaches with regard to samples and 
models that are connected with the quality of the goods. Article 35(2) (c) CISG provides 
that the samples or models should “possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held 
out to the buyer as a sample or model.” This means that if the item or the sample that was 
agreed upon in the contract missed any of the agreed features, this might be referred to as a 
missample. This would a new, different approach to developing the analysis structure for 
misrepresentation or mistake under the CISG. A new line of understanding would raise 
many issues with regard to misrepresentation, for example misrepresentation under English 
and Scottish contract law of contract could termed a misstatement. In addition, it could 
been seen that misrepresentation could be retermed misdescription under Islamic contract 
law. The point to be mad here is that the idea and understanding should occupy the main 
stage with regard to the definition. This could very much fit with the CISG rules, which are 
read in many different languages around the world.
Section 4: Conclusion
To simplify the discussion with regard to mistake and misrepresentation under the CISG, it 
could be said that there was a serious burden on the CISG drafters to deal with many 
different perspectives and opinions that occur with regard to error and misrepresentation. It 
is noticed that the drafters were interested in uniformity of laws but unfortunately they did 
not design some articles to deal with anticipated disputes that occur regularly with regard 
to mistake or misrepresentation. This chapter would tends to take a similar approach that 
has been adopted with regard to the concept of error in Islamic contract law which appear 
to have established the same approaches, but these approaches have never been explained 
directly in order to govern disputes which arise during the contracting processes. The 
concept of error and misrepresentation is impliedly found in a different context in the
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CISG articles, but this has never been made clear, whether as direct reference or through 
remedial contexts. It is very clear that it would be much better if there was a direct 
reference to mistake, in specific articles in the CISG text, which would contribute to 
solving a lot of legal conflicts related to the theoretical understanding and practical 
applications. Since the CISG rules create a legal system, it would be easier if it had its own 
interpretation rules, keeping it away from the many contradictions or discrepancies appear 
in the absence of such rules and remedies.
This chapter tends one to believe that conceptually error, as well as misrepresentation is to 
be found within the CISG structures, but there is no direct evidence of that. This chapter 
also tends to accept and support the opinion that the contracting parties are entitled to rely 
on the parallel CISG rules as a remedy for error and misrepresentation, rather than 
domestic legal solutions. It is believed that this matter will not be resolved until the CISG 
rules have their own remedies in general, and remedies for error and misrepresentation in 
particular. It has been noticed also that the drafter of the CISG did not expressly define any 
kind of error or misrepresentation as an independent concept, as it has been seen with 
regard to the Islamic concept of error and misrepresentation. Generally, if there is any 
chance to follow any line of analysis to find a convincing definition of mistake or 
misrepresentation, this analysis should be focused on the parallel ideas and concept within 
the CISG articles. This is in order to create some kind of balance, between the absence of 
the direct indication of error and misrepresentation, and between the implied concepts that 
could be used as parallel concepts for mistake and misrepresentation, such as non­
conformity, defective goods, description, fundamental breach, and good faith.
To avoid all the confusion, conflict and discrepancies between different domestic legal
systems and between them and the CISG rules, it has to be said clearly that the concept of
error, as well as that of misrepresentation should have their own definition and their own
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classifications and categories. It is clear that an independent approach would enrich the 
commentators’ contribution towards the uniformity and the stabilisation of the CISG rules, 
and their application would cause less conflict and confusion. It would be much better to 
see that the CISG rules are the main point of reference to deal with problems caused by 
mistake or misrepresentation. It would give a new, settled, legal and economical approach 
to international trade transactions, particularly within the globalised economy that was not 
yet been fully established when the CISG came to life in 1980.
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Chapter Seven
A Comparative Critical Analysis of the Concept of Error and 
Misrepresentation under the Palestinian Draft of Civil Law
Section 1: Introduction
As it has been indicated in the introductory chapter, the Palestinian legal system 
contains elements of many different legal systems; mainly Ottoman, British, Egyptian, 
Jordanian, and Israeli. Contract law area is affected widely by the Ottoman, Jordanian, 
and Egyptian legal systems. Theoretically, Ottoman law1 is still the official source of 
Palestinian contract law. In practice, the Jordanian and Egyptian understandings -both 
case law and commentaries - are applied by Palestinians. This chapter will clarify how 
the Palestinian courts have been influenced by Jordanian and Egyptian law in the 
application of contract law.
A general introduction to Palestinian contract law has been given in the chapters on 
Islamic contract law. The discussion in this chapter will focus on the concept of error and 
misrepresentation contained in the Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law that defines the legal 
rules of contract including the error concept (ghalat). Given the lack of Palestinian 
commentaries on this area, reliance will be made on the Egyptian and Jordanian academic 
commentaries and case law. The Palestinian Court of Cassation2 has released a decision3 
regarding the contract law relying on the Jordanian Court of Cassation.4 The same
1 The Ottoman Journal of Equity, op. cit.
2 It is the highest court in the Palestinian judicial system that specialised in the civil and criminal cases. All the decisions 
of this court are binding for all other lower Palestinian courts.
3 Palestinian Cassation Court, Civil Cassation No 70/2004. Decision No 88. 4/6/2004.
4 Ibid. P4.
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Palestinian court in the same decision chose to rely upon article 104 of the Jordanian code 
of civil law5 to explain the concept of acceptance within the contract. It has been noticed 
that the Palestinian court of cassation referred three times both to Jordanian court of 
cassation precedents and also to the Jordanian civil code articles.6 In addition, the 
Palestinian court of cassation justified its decision by relying on Article 753 of the 
Egyptian civil code in order to explain the reasoning behind the discretion of the court in 
the same case.7
Moreover, it can be noticed that the Palestinian courts also follow the precedents of the 
Egyptian courts to explain their decisions. The Palestinian court of appeal in Ramallah, in 
order to justify its decision regarding a contract of sale case,8 has built its judgment on the 
Egyptian courts’ decisions, derived from the Egyptian appeal courts of Cairo9 and 
Alexandria.10 In addition, in the same judgment referred to the decision of the court of 
Banha city.11 This gives clear evidence that the Palestinian Draft of Civil Law would be 
expected to be interpreted in light of both Jordanian and Egyptian academic and judicial 
comments. Analysis shows that the Palestinian courts have equal preference for Egyptian 
and Jordanian precedents. It would be expected that the courts would prefer the precedent 
which best fits the case presented before the courts. The cases of error and 
misrepresentation would probably be interpreted in a similar way by Egyptian and 
Jordanian legislators, commentaries, and courts. Furthermore, academic Palestinian 
commentators -if any- and courts would rely on Egyptian and Jordanian commentaries and 
judicial precedents; indeed this is the current practice.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. P5.
8 Civil Appeal, No 19/2004. 21/9/2004.
9 Ibid, P5.
Ibid.
Ibid, Banha is an Egyptian city, and the court has been given the name of the city.
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Another issue arises with regard to the memorandum of the Draft of the Palestinian Civil 
Law which usually discusses the background and the reasons behind the articulation of the 
codes. The Palestinian memorandum shows how the Draft of the Palestinian Civil code has 
been influenced by the Egyptian/Jordanian civil codes. These influences included the 
contract rules in general and the error (ghalat), misrepresentation (taghreerlgharar) in 
particular. In this chapter it will be seen that the Palestinian Draftspersons derived the vast 
majority of its rules from the legal systems of Jordan and Egypt. Interestingly, it is useful 
to know that the Palestinian Draft copied some articles word for word as they are 
articulated in the Egyptian/Jordanian civil codes. This will be demonstrated later in this 
chapter. It would be expected that Palestinians would interpret these articles according to 
the Jordanian and Egyptian understandings. It is worth noting that usually Jordanian 
commentators refer both to decisions of Egyptian courts and to Egyptian commentators. 
This is not reciprocated by the Egyptian courts or commentators. It is difficult to decide 
whether Palestinians rely more on the Jordanian or the Egyptian point of view, but it is 
clear that Palestinians will refer to only one system either Jordanian or Egyptian when 
considering a case.
Error is dealt with directly in six articles of the Palestinian Draft,12 five articles of the 
Egyptian civil code,13 and six articles of the Jordanian civil code.14 There are only five 
Egyptian articles solely because the Egyptian code does not deal with error in gratuitous 
contracts, not because of any explanation additional to the Jordanian code and the 
Palestinian Draft. Now to highlight the similarities between the Palestinian Draft, and 
the Jordanian and Egyptian civil codes, it is noticed that Article 119 (1) of the 
Palestinian Draft is a copy of Article 120 of the Egyptian civil code. Article 118 of
12 Articles 118-123 of the Palestinian draft of Civil Law.
13 Articles 120-124 of the Egyptian Civil Law.
14 Articles 151-156 of the Jordanian Civil Law.
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Palestinian Draft is a copy of Article 152 of Jordanian civil code. Article 120 of 
Palestinian Draft is a copy of Article 121 of Egyptian code, and articles 151,152 of 
Jordanian code. Article 121 of Palestinian Draft has copied article 122 of Egyptian 
code, and article 154 of Jordanian code. Article 122 of Palestinian Draft has copied 
article 123 of Egyptian code, and Article 155 of Jordanian code. Article 123 has copied 
article 124 of Egyptian code, and Article 156 of Jordanian. The main point is not to 
demonstrate the similarity between the Draft of the Palestinian civil law with the 
Jordanian and the Egyptian civil laws, but to discuss how the Egyptian and Jordanian 
civil laws are formulated and implemented. This is to clarify how the future Palestinian 
civil law will be operated by the courts and practitioners. Furthermore, the fact that 
these laws are couched in exactly the same terms makes it easier to expose weaknesses 
in the Egyptian and Jordanian civil laws, and propose some modifications and 
suggestions to be added to the Palestinian Draft before it becomes an applied law.
Section 2: Brief Background of the concept of Error
It is clear that the Palestinian Draft divided error into two types. First type is the error as 
to fact, which is implied but not directly articulated. The second type is error as to law. 
In general, error has no specified definition within the Jordanian & Egyptian codes, and 
the Palestinian Draft.
2.1. Meaning of error
The understanding of error in Palestinian law is that of a psychological situation that 
leads a person to have a wrong belief in regard to fact.15 According to another 
definition, the error occurs when a person believes something to be a fact and in reality 
it is not, or vice versa.16 It is also defined as an incorrect belief in a fact that motivates
1:1 Dawwas, op. cit., P93.
16 The Memorandum of the Jordanian Civil code. P143.144.
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one party to enter the contract.17 It is said that when error is shared between the seller 
and purchaser, it means that the seller has good faith and intention; in this case the 
remedy would be to void the contract. If only the purchaser was in error, this generates 
two possibilities, the seller knows about the purchaser’s error and he has bad faith and 
this could be considered as tadlees/taghreer (misrepresentation). The remedy would be 
to void the contract and enforce damages or compensation. The second possibility is 
that the seller could know about error easily, and in this situation he would be 
considered as a negligent and the remedy would be to enforce compensation.18
The term shared error needs to be more clearly defined, by indicating the difference 
between common and mutual error. This author believes it is necessary to adopt at least 
one of these types. This would give the court clearer view how to deal with and to 
decide about the error’s legal effects. It would be expected that some misrepresentation 
(,tadlees/tagreer) would occur in cases of unilateral error, but there is no cogent reason 
to consider that the purchaser’s error would mean automatically that the seller had 
misrepresented to him. There is a high possibility that the buyer could be in error 
simply motivated by his own mistaken belief without any external intervention. The 
Palestinian Draft would be strengthened by defining negligent action and its impacts in 
the case of error, and have even greater force if it also discussed the relation between 
misrepresentation and negligence.
In general commentaries define error based on a theory of apparent will19 which 
distinguishes between two categories of error, visible and invisible error. It is 
considered that invisible error occurs when one party hides the error and his real will is
17 Abu-Albasal, op. cit., P139.
18 Addnasouri, Al-Shawarbi, op. cit., P28.
19 For more details about this subject under English contract law see. Prof. William Tetley, Q.C. Good Faith in Contract 
Particularly in the Contracts of Arbitration and Chartering. McGill University. 35 JMLC 561-616. 2004. PI 7. 
http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/comparative/goodfaith.pdf.
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unknown by the other party. Visible error occurs when the party shows or expresses his 
real will, or when this will is known through the circumstances related to the case, or 
according to custom.20 This is found in the Jordanian civil code.21 The same meaning is 
reflected in the Egyptian civil code,22 and in the Palestinian Draft.23 It is understood that 
error would occur when the contracting party declares his will clearly. Obviously, the 
deemed error would be established when the party declares his intent clearly.24 It is said 
that if the parties did not express their intent directly in the written contract, the intent 
would be out of consideration.25 This could happen if the party expresses his desire to 
buy an item having agreed the specific description with the seller. After that if the buyer 
discovered that the item does not meet the agreed specification and description, it 
means that his consent is affected by error and it should be considered as error case.26 It 
is explained that if the parties agreed to sell/buy an item according to written 
descriptions such as in the catalogue, and the item lacks an element of its description, 
the buyer is under error.27
Despite the fact that there is no express reference to the Ottoman Journal of Equity, the 
spirit of the Ottoman Journal is reflected here. It is because the consideration of error 
comes after discovering that the demanded description by the buyer is not available in the 
item. This point draws our attention to Khiyar Alwassf (option of description) in the 
Ottoman Journal rules.28 This can be seen in detail in this thesis within the concept of error
20 The Memorandum of the Jordanian civil code. P I43.
21 Jordanian Civil Code, article 151.
22 Article 121.
23 Article 120.
24 Al-Far, op. cit., P77.
25 Munthir Al-Fadl, Sahib Al-Fatlawi. Explanation of the Jordanian Civil Law. Nominated Contracts (Sale and Rent). 
Modified Edition. Dar Athaqfah for Publication. Amman-Jordan. 1996. P53.
26 Egyptian Cassation Court. No 0357/52. 31/12/1985. Annual Report of the Egyptian Cassation Court.
27 Salah Addein An-Nahi. Sources of the Personal Rights, Sources of Obligations-Voluntarily Sources. Al-Bayt Al-Arabi 
Printer. Amman-Jordan. 1984. P81.
28 The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article number 310.
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under the Islamic contract law chapter.29 This reference is restricted to self made error, 
when one party commits the error by him/her self. This means that the discussion could 
apply similarly to the Ottoman/Islamic concept of error with regard to Khiyar Alwassf and 
Khiyar Al-Ayb. As it has been explained earlier in this thesis, the option of description and 
the option of defect are partly connected to the unilateral error by one party. It is related 
more to misrepresentation by the other party, but it is not contained in the 
Jordanian/Egyptian civil codes, or in the Palestinian Draft.
Section 3: Categories of error
Three categories of error could be identified by studying the Palestinian Draft, along 
with the Jordanian/Egyptian civil codes. The three categories will be discussed as 
following.
3.1. Error that Prevents Consent
The first category is the error that prevents the consent of the parties,30 which would be 
parallel to the consensus in idem under the English/Scottish contract law. As a result of 
this kind of error the contract would be void or not existent.31 Three cases of this 
category of error could be identified by studying the Jordanian civil code,32 the Egyptian 
civil code,33 and the Palestinian Draft.34 Since all have the same articulation, they agree 
that this error has three types.
The first case is error as to the nature of the contract. This kind of error could happen 
when one party believes that he enters a tenancy contract, and the other party believes 
that he enters a sale contract. This could occur for example if a landlord leases his land
29 Chapter Five of this thesis.
30 Dawwas, op. cit.. P95.
31 MacQueen. Thomson, op. cit.. Para 4-38. P160.
32 Article 152. The Jordanian Civil Law.
33 Article 121. The Egyptian Civil Law.
34 Article 120. The Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
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for one thousand Jordanian Dinar (JD) per year, but the tenant thinks that he is buying 
the land for one thousand JD per year to be paid to the landlord until he dies.35 This also 
could occur if a person asks another for money, and he is given the money as a loan or 
debt to be recovered later, but thinks that the money is a gift.36
The second case of error is as a reason for the contracting between the parties. This 
could occur for example if a person shared an inheritance with other inheritors, and it is 
found that this person is not an inheritor. This also could occur if a person donated to 
another person because he thought that he donated to one of his relatives, but he has 
found that the other is not in fact a relative.37 It is noticed here that error is connected to 
the reason that motivates the parties to create the contract. It is also built on 
preexistence of a condition, so if the reason or condition does not exist, it means that 
there is no consent at all. This therefore means that the contract is not established from 
the beginning.38
The third case of error is error as to an object or subject-matter of the contract. This sort 
of error could occur with regard to the place of contract, as when a person intends to 
buy a flat on the first floor and the owner thinks he is selling a flat on the fourth floor. It 
could also occur with regard to the type of item, as when the seller sells rice and the 
buyer thinks he is buying wheat.39 More examples could represent this case of error 
when a person buys a ring thinking that he is buying golden ring but in fact the ring is 
just aluminum, silver, or Copper.40 It would be the same case when the buyer buys a 
piece of jewelry thinking it is a real diamond and in fact it is piece of glass. Abu Al- 
Basal argues that the reason for considering the contract void under this type of error is
35 The Memorandum of the Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. P80.
36 Abu-AlbasaL op. cit., P145.
37 The Memorandum of the Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. P81.
38 Dawwas. op. cit.. P96.
39 Ibid, P95.
40 Memorandum of the Jordanian Civil Code. P145.
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because the offer intended something and the acceptance has been released for 
something different. He argued also that because the described and articulated subject- 
matter of the contract became nonexistent, the nonexistent subject-matter is not capable 
of being contracted for.41
In principle, there is no problem in agreeing with Abu Al-Basal with regard to the 
difference between the offer and acceptance point, and in respect of the nonexistence of 
the subject-matter as well. The point of disagreement is about the described subject- 
matter of the contract and its relation with error. He stated that if the described subject- 
matter is not available it means that there is an error by the buyer and a misdescription 
on the part of the seller.
The error would be established after the articulation of the contract, which must include 
the described subject-matter. When this description is not available it means there is a 
misrepresentation (misdescription) as it has been discussed earlier in this thesis. It was 
noticed that the Jordanian, as well as the Egyptian commentaries ignored this aspect of 
the problem. This could bring the discussion back to the same argument of the concept 
of error under Islamic contract law in general, and under the Ottoman Journal of Equity 
in particular (as currently applied in Palestinian contract law). That is to say, when the 
Ottoman Journal dealt with this subject, it implied error and misrepresentation when it 
talked about description, but never mentioned directly either of them.
Some would argue that it is not necessary to talk about error as to an object or subject- 
matter of the contract under the classification of error that prevents the consent. It is 
because the three legal systems, Egyptian, Jordanian and the Palestinian Draft discussed 
error in the context of defects of consent. It is argued that these examples of error are
41 Abu-Albasal. op. cit., P147.
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not so much about the defects of consent, but rather about the offer and acceptance 
stage. It means that the discussion with regard to this type of error would aim to 
establish that a common understanding has been reached about the offer and acceptance 
to create the intended contract between the parties. As a conclusion with regard to this 
type of error, it can be argued that the above types of error should be excluded from this 
category, with a new category being formed. It is understood that the main reason 
behind rendering the contract void is because there is no meeting between the offer and 
the acceptance. It is worth considering this category of error as being related to an error 
in the offer and acceptance, rather than considering it as an error resulting in a defect in 
the consent. There is no need to discuss this error as a defect of consent and in fact the 
error occurs after the establishment of contract, which is considered as the after­
contracting stage.
3.2. Error which Defects Consent
The second category of error is the one that renders the parties’ consent defective, 
which means that this error affects the consent but does not prevent the contract from 
existing. The error arises after the contract has been established. Under this category the 
contract would be voidable, but not void.42 For this category of error to be considered it 
should be a substantial or essential error.43 The substantiality or the essentiality to be 
taken into consideration here needs to involve one of the subject-matter-descriptions 
that have been agreed in the contract. Moreover, it is important that the description 
should be the motive or reason behind the contracting.44 It is clear that the Palestinian 
Draft relied on the objective standard or circumstantial judgment in order to decide 
about substantial error, which is usually a matter for the court or judicial decision.
42 Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. Article 119.
43 Dawwas, op. cit., P95.
44 The Memorandum of the Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. P81.
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It has been noticed that Article 119 of the Palestinian Draft did clarify that this type of 
error could either be shared between the two contracting parties or be an error of just 
one of the parties. Despite this fact, the memorandum has complicated the situation 
because it stated clearly that the draft was not clear whether error should be shared 
between the two parties or just by one party.45 It should be mentioned that if the error is 
not shared between the two contractual parties, this would not render the contract void.46 
In the same time it is not clear whether the contract would be voidable. To consider the 
error as being operative it should be induced by the other party, or he should have 
known about it, or it should have been easy for him to know about it.47 It makes no 
sense to consider the essential error only when it is known by the other party or was 
easy for him to know. It could be caused by an uninduced unilateral error. As is 
mentioned earlier, this part of the article has the same articulation as that of the 
Egyptian Civil Code.48 Both of them consider the substantiality of error as being the 
main factor in deciding whether or not the error is operative. However this factor is 
missing under the Jordanian Civil Code.49 This omission did not prevent the Jordanian 
commentaries following the same track as that established by the Egyptian code and the 
Palestinian Draft. It is found that substantiality is considered as a main factor in 
determining whether error is operative. Accordingly, substantiality would be demanded 
with regard to the special description of the item, or to the character of the contracting 
party.50
Three cases can be included under this error category. The first case is connected to the 
substantial description of the subject-matter of the contract. This could occur if the
47 Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. Article 119(1).
48 Article 120. The Egyptian Civil Law.
49 Article 153. The Jordanian Civil Law.
50 Dawwas, op. cit., P95.
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party intended to buy a specific item with a specific description, but he found out that 
the item he was provided with by the seller is the same kind or sort but does not have 
the specific description that he had required.51 Here, of course, consent would be 
affected, because when the buyer entered the contract he intended to have an item with 
the specified description. If this description is missing it means that the buyer would no 
longer wish to enter the contract, the specific description having motivated him.52 In 
general, it could be noticed that all the principles of this error category closely follow 
the practice of the Ottoman Journal of Equity.53
The most notable point here is when the article and the commentaries mention error 
from one side, there is no mention of misrepresentation at all from the other side. There 
is no indication of any category of misrepresentation even at the minimum level, neither 
intentional nor unintentional. There is therefore a direct indication of the involvement of 
the other party by inducing the erred party in the error. This is clear from the Palestinian 
Draft which stipulates; ‘To consider the error as an operative error it should have been 
induced by the other party, or he should have known about the error, or it should have 
been easy for him to know about it’.54 The inducement action is considered, but without 
any clarification. It is not clear why there is no mention of any of the inducing 
instruments; such as fraud, misrepresentation, or the act of misleading someone. Based 
on that, it would be recommended for the Palestinian draftspersons to add some articles 
within the civil code dealing with the inducement act and its instruments. It would be 
better if the memorandum included clear explanation in this regard in order to establish 
the independent Palestinian concept about this important subject.
51 Abu-Albasal, op. cit., P149.
52 Al-Khafeef, op. cit.. P325.
53 The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article 310 and its explanation by Haydar. Op. cit.. P129.
54 Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. Article 119(1).
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The second case is error as to the identity of the parties. This kind of error could occur 
when the identity of the parties plays a crucial role in the contracting process. Clearly a 
contract with a doctor or lawyer in their professional capacity, who then turns out not to 
be so qualified, would be a typical example of this type of error. This kind of error 
could occur regularly in the gratuitous contracts when the person intended to donate to 
another specific person.55 In an instance of error related to gratuitous contracts there is 
no need for the other party to be aware of the error. To be considered as an error, it 
would be enough for it to be discovered by the donor.56 It is useful to note that the 
Jordanian and Egyptian civil codes do not specify any articles in the context of a 
gratuitous contract, unlike the Palestinian Draft, which does.57
The third case is error as to a substantial feature or characteristic of the other party: the 
motive for the contracting between the parties, this being the only reason behind the 
contract.58 It should be noted that both the Palestinian Draft,59 and the Egyptian code60 
concentrate more on the substantiality of error and its explanation. This obviously leads 
one to say that essential error is the most important category of error, and in 
comparison, essential error has great importance under the contract laws of Egypt, 
Palestine, and Scotland.61 To emphasize the importance of essential error, it should be 
noted that the Palestinian Draft followed the Egyptian route in articulating a special 
article62 to describe what essential or substantial error means. The key point is 
essentiality, which is connected to the intent of the party in entering the contract,
:o Al-Far. op. cit., P80.
56 The Memorandum of the Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. P82.
57 Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. Article 119 (2).
5X Addnasouri, Al-Shawarbi, op. cit., P30.
Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. Article 120.
60 Egyptian Civil Code, article 121.
61 For wider understanding of the comparative point of view it could refer to the concept of error under the 
English/Scottish chapters in this thesis.
62 Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. Article 120 (1).
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w ithout th is intent the party w ould  not be in v o lv e d  in  the co ntracting  p ro cess.63 In  th is 
situ atio n , a k e y  factor in  d eterm in ing  w hether or not an error is  essen tial is  the good 
fa ith  o f the p arty in  error. In  order to determ ine good fa ith  the circu m stan ces 
surrounding the contract w o uld  have to be exam ined, w h ich  w o uld  then re ly  on 
o b jective  standards. C le a r ly  the understanding o f th is case w o uld  then be a m ix  betw een 
the personal standard o f good fa ith  on the one hand, and its o b jective  e valu a tio n  on the 
other hand.64
R e ly in g  on the a n a lysis  above, a ll aspects co u ld  be c ru c ia l in  d e cid in g  on essen tial 
error, fo r exam ple the p rice , the d escrip tio n , and the id e n tity  o f the other party. Th e  
m ost im portant issu e  is  the intent o f the parties in  d ecid in g  w h ich  facto r has been 
established as the m otive fo r in vo lve m en t in  the contract. In  general, the operative error 
or m istake as it  is  know n under the E n g lish /S co ttish  contract law  is  not established  
under the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft or under the E g yp tian /Jo rd an ian  c iv il law . O ne catego ry o f 
error or m istake w h ich  can be found as a concept com m on to these the ju risd ic tio n s , 
a lb e it w ith  som e d ifferen ces, is  essen tial error, w h ich  can be seen c le a rly  w ith in  the fiv e  
leg al system s, E n g lis h , S co ttish , Jo rd an ian , E g y p tia n  and the P ale stin ia n . O ne m ore 
po int w orth m entio ning  it  that acco rd in g  to the E g y p tia n  C a ssatio n  C o u rt the e valu a tio n  
and the d e cisio n  on w hether the erro r is  essen tial or not w ould  a lw a ys be the 
re sp o n sib ility  o f the co u rt.65
Fro m  a com parative p ersp ective, it  co u ld  be sa id  that concept o f erro r under the 
P a le stin ia n  D ra ft has m an y s im ila rit ie s  w ith  the E n g lis h  and S co ttish  concept o f erro r or 
m istake. T h e  m ain  issue  to be ra ised  is  w ith  regard to the m ethodology fo r d e a lin g  w ith  
error categories. E n g lis h  and S co ttish  contract law  is  c la ss ifie d  c le a rly  in to  u n ila te ra l
63 The Memorandum of the Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. P82.
64 Ibid.
65 Egyptian Cassation Court. No 00039/38. 13/03/1973. Para 2.
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and b ila te ra l error, but th is c la ss ific a tio n  is  not found in  the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft, and the
sam e can be said  o f Jordanian and E g y p tia n  contract law . O f course it  does not m ean 
that the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft d id  not deal w ith  the u n ilatera l and b ila te ra l error. R ather, it 
does so b y  im p lic a tio n , fo llo w in g  the E g y p tia n  and Jo rd anian  c iv il law , and as a re su lt it 
w ould  not be expected that P a le stin ia n  com m entaries w o uld  create th e ir new  ow n 
m ethodology. T h is  is  because the P a le stin ia n  courts re lie d  on the E g y p tia n  and 
Jo rdanian  courts and com m entaries to e x p la in  th eir d e cisio n s in  c iv il law . A n  in terestin g  
exam ple is  in  the case o f a contract sa le ,66 w here the P a le stin ia n  appeal court d erived  
and established its judgem ent based on three E g yp tia n  ju d ic ia l precedents.67 In  ad d itio n , 
in  the sam e case, the P ale stin ian  court referred to an E g yp tia n  com m entary.68 It can also  
be noted that the P a le stin ia n  C a ssa tio n  C o u rt,69 b u ilt its ju d gm en t on Jo rd an ian  
precedent,70 and Jo rdanian  le g is la tio n .71 T h e  P ale stin ian  C a ssa tio n  C o u rt referred to 
m ore than one Jo rd anian  ju d ic ia l precedent,72 as w e ll as to Jo rd an ian  le g is la tio n .73 It is  
noticed that m any precedents and le g is la tio n  have been referred to b y  the P a le stin ia n  
court, d erived  from  the Jo rdanian  le g a l ru les. N o ta b ly, in  the sam e case the court 
referred to E g y p tia n  le g is la tio n 74 and an E g yp tia n  com m entary.75 It is  ve ry  c le a r that the 
P a le stin ia n  courts w ould  be expected to decide cases u sin g  both Jo rdanian  and E g y p tia n  
le g a l ru les w here they fit in  w ith the case before the court. A t the sam e tim e, it  w o uld  be 
d iffic u lt  to decide w hether the P a le stin ia n  courts, and as a resu lt the com m entaries,
66 Civil Appeal, No 19/2004. 21/9/2004.
67 Appeal Court of Cairo. 20 April 1930, No 438, Bar Journal. p868. The Domestic (al-ahliyah) Court of Alexandria.
28th February 1925, No 562. Bar Journal. p684. The Court of Banha city. 3rd June 1925, No 383, Bar Journal. P450.
68 Al-Sanhuri. The General Theory of the Obligation. Para 753. P829. This Citation is according the Civil Appeal, No 
19/2004. 21/9/2004. P3.
69 Civil Cassation No 70/2004. Decision No 88. 4/6/2004.
70 Jordanian Cassation. 625/83. P I389, Bar Journal. 19848. This citation is according to Palestinian Cassation Court.
Civil Cassation No 70/2004. Decision No 88. 4/6/2004.
71 Article 4. Code of the Jordanian Civil Law.
72 Jordanian Cassation. 915/88. Bar Journal. 1990. P I792. This citation is according to Palestinian Cassation Court. Civil 
Cassation No 70/2004. Decision No 88. 4/6/2004.
73 Article 204. Code of the Jordanian Civil Law.
74 Article 753. Code of the Egyptian Civil Law.
75 Al-Sanhuri. P1365. This citation is according to Palestinian Cassation Court. Civil Cassation No 70/2004. Decision No 
88. 4/6/2004.
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w ould  also  fo llo w  E g y p tia n  and Jo rd anian  law  or not, as there has, to date, been no 
P a le stin ia n  court d e cisio n  fo cu sin g  d ire c tly  on error. In  the case o f a d irect co n flic t 
betw een E g yp tia n  or Jo rdanian  law  on a p a rticu la r point d ealin g  w ith  erro r it  w o uld  be 
d iffic u lt to anticipate w hich  lin e  o f ju risp ru d e n ce  the P a le stin ia n  courts w ould  p refer to 
adopt. A t the m om ent in d iv id u a l ju d ic ia l experience or preference appears to fa vo u r the 
ch o ice  in  the P a le stin ia n  courts o f Jo rd an ian  law  o ver E g y p tia n  law .
B ila te ra l and u n ila te ra l error o r m istake under the E n g lis h  and S co ttish  contract la w 76 is  
ju s t an exam ple o f other categories o f error. U nder the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft there is  no 
d irect m ention o f erro r as to m o tive, error as to intentio n, com m on m istake, m utual 
m istake, or erro r in  exp ressio n. A s  in d icated  e a rlie r, the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft does 
recognise erro r as to id e n tity  as part o f essen tial error, w h ich  is  in  the sam e category as 
error in substantialibus under Sco ttish  contract la w .77 E rro r o r m istake as to id e n tity  is  
c la ss ifie d  under E n g lis h  contract law , w ith  both the courts and the com m entaries 
d ealin g  w ith  it u sin g  d ifferent c rite ria .78 E rro r in  exp ressio n, w h ich  is  established  and 
c la ss ifie d  under S co ttish  contract la w ,79 is  not found under an y c la ss ific a tio n  w ith in  the 
Jo rd anian  or E g y p tia n  c iv il law , nor in  the P ale stin ia n  D ra ft. E rro r as to the q u a lity  o f 
an item  has also  been categorized lite ra lly  under the S co ttish  law  o f contract80 and is  
a lso  m entioned d ire c tly  under m istake as to the subject m atter w ith in  the E n g lis h  law  o f 
contract.81 It can also  be c le a rly  noticed that the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft has in clu d e d  it  as one 
o f the m ost o b vio us errors, c la ss ify in g  it  as an erro r that prevents the consent o f the 
p arties, as m entioned e a rlie r in  th is chapter. It is  noticed that the category o f m istake as
76 Peel, op. cit.,P311-349.
77 More details can be found under sub-title of Error as to identity of parties. A Concept of error in the Scottish Contract 
Law.
78 More details can be found under sub-title of Mistake as to identity. A Critical Analysis of the Concept of Mistake in 
English Contract Law.
79 More details can be found under sub-title of Error in Expression. A Concept of error in the Scottish Contract Law.
80 More details can be found under sub-title of Error as to Quality of Item. A Concept of error in the Scottish Contract 
Law.
81 More details can be found under sub-title of Mistake as to Subject-Matter. A Critical Analysis of the Concept of 
Mistake in English Contract Law.
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to fact is  not m entioned d ire c tly , e ith er in  the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft, or in  the 
Jo rd an ia n /E g yp tian  c iv il codes. O f course it  co u ld  be d erived  b y  im p lic a tio n  from  the 
error cases and catego ries, but it  is  not an e x p lic it or independent c la ss ific a tio n  o f error.
3.3. Error that has no Effect on the Consent
T h e  th ird  category o f erro r under the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft is  erro r that does not affect the 
consent or the contract at a ll. A rt ic le  12 2  o f P a le stin ia n  D ra ft, A rt ic le  15 5  o f Jo rd anian  
c iv il code, and A rt ic le  12 3  o f E g y p tia n  c iv il code a ll deal w ith  th is category o f erro r 
under m istake as to ca lcu la tio n , and m istake as to w ritin g . N o  le g a l actio n co u ld  be taken 
under th is category; th is o m issio n  sho uld  be corrected. F o r exam ple, w here a lan d  ow ner 
contracted w ith  a b uyer to se ll h im  h is  lan d , the exact lo catio n  o f the lan d  so ld  w as 
sp e cified  in  the contract. T h e y  registered the contract acco rd in g  to the ru le s dem anded. 
A fte r som e tim e they re a lise d  that the lan ds departm ent had m ade an erro r in  respect o f 
the lo catio n . T h e y  asked the lands reg istratio n  departm ent to correct th is error, but th is 
w as refused. T h e  Jo rd an ian  C a ssatio n  C o u rt82 has held that the head o f the lan ds 
registratio n departm ent has com plete auth o rity to correct the erro r in  the reg istratio n  
statem ent or docum ent if  th is error is  founded on c le ric a l error or in co rrect m easurem ent.
T h e  P a le stin ia n  m em orandum  is  expected to co ntain  the m ain  exp lanatio ns and 
interpretations o f the a rtic le s o f the D ra ft code. It g ive s the reaso n in g  behind the 
articu latio n s and th e ir purposes. U s u a lly  it  g ive s som e exam ples fo r further c la rific a tio n  
fo r the b enefit o f the courts and the p ractitio n ers. It is  supposed to be the m ain  guidance 
fo r understanding the law  codes. In  general there is  not m uch to be found in  the 
P a le stin ia n  m em orandum  about th is category o f erro r that does not affect consent, 
except that it repeats w hat has been m entioned w ith in  the draft code itse lf. It takes the
82 Jordanian Cassation Court, civil Cassation. 284/81. Bar Association Journal. 1981. P525.
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sam e approach as that taken b y both the Jo rdanian  and E g y p tia n  c iv il law s. It w ould  
appear, therefore, that the com m entaries d id  not add anyth ing  o f s ig n ifica n c e  on th is 
subject. A  c le a r exam ple o f th is co u ld  o ccu r w hen the contractor takes the m easurem ent 
o f the lan d  or b u ild in g  in  square m eters, but fa ils  to record th is as square m eters in  the 
contract, o r w hen the accountant decreases or increases the num ber o f zero s, e.g 10  
instead o f 10 0  or vice versaP  In  general, an y erro r in  respect o f the p artie s’ s k ills  or 
q u a lifica tio n s does not affect the contract w hen th is ch aracteristic is  not essen tia l to the 
contract or does not p la y  a sub stantial ro le  in  the contracting process. T h is  m eans that 
personal features are not the m otive b ehind  entering into  the co ntract.83 4 E rro r w o uld  not 
be actionable or operative if  it  w as connected to in e ssen tia l d escrip tio n  o f the contract 
sub ject-m atter.85 N o  cases have been cited  b y  Jo rd anian  com m entators o r courts to 
e stab lish  how  errors o f th is type w ould  be treated. It co u ld  be understood, how ever, that 
w here th is type o f error o ccu rs, it w o uld  be treated as not h avin g  existed  because it  is  not 
connected to one o f the sub stantial elem ents o f the contract.
T h e  P ale stin ia n  D ra ft,86 the E g yp tia n  c iv il c o d e ,87 and the Jo rd anian  c iv il code,88 have a ll 
stated that the p arty in  erro r sho uld  not in s ist on the erro r o f the other p arty in  bad fa ith , 
and the contracting p arty sho uld  keep h im se lf com m itted to the contract he intended to 
enter if  the other p arty show ed h is  w illin g n e ss to im plem ent the contract. T h is  a rtic le  
ignores the theory o f fraud or m isrepresentation and th eir effects, such as dam ages or 
com pensation, as has happened w ith  the other categories o f errors m entioned above. T h e  
author o f th is thesis suggests that the p ro visio n s d ealin g  w ith th is sub ject w o uld  b enefit 
from  adding two further c rite ria  fo r d ifferen tiatin g  betw een in d uced  erro r w ith  bad fa ith
83 Al-Sanhuri. Ahvasietfi Sharhe Iqanoun Al-Madani, op. cit., P54.
84 Al-Far, op. cit.. P81.
85 Ahmad Al-Dmour. The Brief of Explanation of the Nominated Contracts in the Jordanian Civil Law. 2006.P18.
86 Article 123. The Palestinian Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
87 Article 124. The Egyptian Civil Law.
88 Article 155. .The Jordanian Civil Law.
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and the uninduced  erro r w ith  good fa ith . T h is  w o uld  m ake th is k in d  o f erro r m ore 
d efin ite  and clearer. It w o uld  not be fa ir  to deal w ith  a party w ho entered a contract in  
good fa ith  in  the sam e m anner as w ith  a p arty w ho entered a contract in  bad fa ith .
In  p rin c ip le  E n g lis h  and S co ttish  contract law s, p a rtic u la rly  the E n g lis h  one, have 
d iscu ssed  the subject o f erro r and its categories m ore w id e ly  than is  the case w ith  the 
P a le stin ia n  D ra ft. A s  has been m entioned e a rlie r, the P ale stin ia n  D ra ft d iscu ssed  three 
categories o f erro r w ith  a b rie f exp lanatio n  b eing  g iv e n  fo r each. T h e  E n g lis h  law  o f 
contract has considered m ore categories, w ith  m any d etails attracting m uch argum ent 
and d iscu ssio n  b y the com m entators and the courts. U n der the E n g lis h  law  o f contract it 
is  p o ssib le  to fin d  alm ost e very sin g le  category o f m istake fo llo w ed  b y sub -catego ries 
w ith  further d etails co ve rin g  the area o f that m istake type. It can be found that, for 
instance, a com m on m istake is  d iscu ssed  c le a rly  and defined w ith in  c le a r borders in  
d etail, e sp e c ia lly  w ith in  the case la w .89 T h is  is  u su a lly  fo llo w ed  b y  m ore c la ss ific a tio n s  
and d efined types o f m istake, such as m istake as to the existence o f the sub ject-m atter,90 
m istake as to q u a lity ,91 and m istake as to q uan tity.92 T h is  w ould also  ap p ly  to m utual and 
u n ila te ra l m istake catego ries, w h ich  have been covered e a rlie r in  th is thesis. T h is  
com m ent w ould  also  a p p ly  to the categories o f erro r in  the S co ttish  law  o f contract. It 
m ight be argued that the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft d id  not go further in  its c la ss ific a tio n s  because 
it w as to ta lly  in flu en ce d  b y the E g yp tia n  and Jo rd an ian  c iv il law s. It m igh t, how ever, be 
w orthw hile  fo r the P a le stin ia n  D raftspersons to develo p  a new and w id e r a n a ly s is  based 
on c le a r c la ss ific a tio n s  or categories o f erro r in  P a le stin ia n  law .
89 Associated Japanese Bank v. Credit du Nord.SA [1988] 3 All ER 902.
90 Griffith v. Brymer (1903) 19 TLR 434.
91 Kennedy v. Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co. LR 2 QB 580.
92 Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd. /1932] A.C. 161; [1931] All ER 1.
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3.4. Error as to law
D espite the fact that the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft d id  not d iscu ss the error as to fact e x p lic it ly , it 
is  c le a r that the D ra ft has established a sp e cia l p o sitio n 93 fo r error as to law . It is  not 
strange to fin d  th is because it  has fo llo w ed  the sam e lin e  o f a n a lys is  as both the 
Jo rd anian94 and E g yp tia n  c iv il codes.95 F o r the sake o f a com parative p ersp ective, it  is  
p o ssib le  to note that the three le g a l system s focused d ire c tly  on erro r as to law  rather 
than fo cu sin g  on erro r as to fact. R e m a rka b ly  a ll the a rtic le s m entioned say that erro r as 
to law  has the sam e co n d itio n s as fo r error as to fact. In  th is a rtic le ,96 the in d ica tio n  o f 
error as to fact is  proposed fo r the first tim e in  any a rtic le  d iscu ssin g  erro r and its effects. 
Th e  in d ica tio n  o f error as to fact is  in clu d e d  in  a rtic le s d iscu ssin g  o n ly  error as to law . 
Th erefo re, the understanding o f erro r as to fact w ould  be im p lie d  because nothing  has 
been m entioned d ire c tly  b y the co de’ s artic le s except in  A rt ic le  1 2 1  that is  b a s ic a lly  
about error as to law .
Th e m em orandum  o f the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft o f C iv il  la w 97 c la rif ie d  that the case o f erro r as 
to law  is  not about the p artie s’ igno rance o f the law . T w o  m ain  co n d itio n s w o uld  be 
dem anded fo r operating erro r as to law . F irs t ly , the erro r sho uld  be sub stan tia l, and 
seco n dly, the erro r sho uld  be shared betw een the co ntracting  p arties.98 H ere there is  a 
d iscrep an cy created b y  the P a le stin ia n  m em orandum , w h ich  states that if  erro r as to law  
is  not shared (w ith  both parties fa llin g  into  the sam e error), there is  no reason to operate 
th is k in d  o f error. It is  added that in  order to operate th is erro r the other p arty m ust have 
know n about the error, or he w as able to know  about it .99 It co u ld  be understood that the
93 Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. Article 121.
94 Jordanian Civil Code, Article 154.
95 Egyptian Civil Code, Article 122.
96 Article 121. The Palestinian Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
97 The memorandum of the Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law. P83.
98 Ibid.
99
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D raft dem ands the error to be shared betw een the contracting parties to operate the error 
as to law . T h e  draft g ive s no in d ica tio n  w hy the other p arty sho uld  have know n o r w as 
able to know  about the error to operate error as to law  as an operative error. It w o uld  be 
p o ssib le  that error as to law  co u ld  be m ade b y  one o f the co ntracting  p arties, as w e ll as 
b y both parties. It is  c le a r that the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft w o uld  not co n sid er u n ila te ra l erro r as 
an error o f law . T h is  author recom m ends that the P a le stin ia n  D raftspersons lo o k  ag ain  at 
error as to la w , in  order to ensure that it  is  operative in  both cases. It w o uld  be cle are r 
and easier to co n sid er error as to law  an operative one w here e ither one o r both the 
parties are acting  under m istake.
F o llo w in g  the above a n a lys is , there is  no p o ss ib ility  to operate a u n ila te ra l e rro r under 
the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft. It is  also  noticed that w hen the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft d iscu ssed  erro r as 
to law  it  does not d iscu ss the p o ss ib ility  o f e sta b lish in g  m isrepresentation o r fraud w ith in  
error as to law . M isrep resentatio n and fraud w ould be expected under th is k in d  o f error, 
re ly in g  on p rev io u s know ledge o f the other party in  respect o f error. T h e  h yp o th esis o f 
m isrepresentation is  to ta lly  ignored here, despite the c le a r in d ica tio n  that appears in  
A rtic le  1 2 1  o f the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft, w h ich  ta lks about in d uced  or u n in du ced  u n ila te ra l 
or m utual error. A s  is  w e ll know n, w here u n ila te ra l error o ccu rs, m isrepresentation and 
fraud co u ld  be one cause o f the error. A cco rd in g  to both the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft, and the 
E g yp tian  c iv il law , the contract w o uld  be vo id a b le , because th is sort o f erro r is  
considered a defect o f consent. T h e  effect under Jo rdanian  c iv il law  is  d ifferen t, w here 
the contract w o uld  be vo id . It is  c le a r that in  cases o f error as to law  and ig n o rance the 
P ale stin ian  D ra ft is  d ifferent from  the E n g lis h  ru le  o f ignoratia legis neminem excusat.100 
It is  not c le a r w h y Jo rdanian  c iv il law  considered a rem edy d ifferen t from  that o f the
Faruqi, op. cit.. P346.
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E g yp tia n  law . T h e  P a le stin ia n  m em orandum  does not e x p la in  its reason fo r fo llo w in g  
the E g yp tia n  rather than the Jo rd anian  approach.
E rro r as to law  is  not d iscu ssed  at a ll under the O ttom an Jo u rn al o f E q u ity , e ither b y  the 
code or in  its com m entaries. T h e  E g y p tia n 101 and S y r ia n 102 c iv il codes are deem ed to be 
the h isto rica l b ackgro und o f the Jo rd an ian  concept o f error as to la w .103 C o n seq u en tly, 
the h isto rica l background o f the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft in  th is area w o uld  be understood 
au to m atically  as b ein g  in flu en ce d  b y  the E g y p tia n  code, because it is  noticed that the 
P ale stin ian  D ra ft has adopted the exact articu latio n  and rem edy as in  the E g y p tia n  code. 
E rro r as to law  sho uld  g e n e rally  operate w hen connected to the su b stan tia lity  o f 
contract104 as has been m entioned e a rlie r w ith  regard to essen tial error cases.
Section 4: Misrepresentation (Taghreer)
T h e  P ale stin ian  D ra ft used the w ord taghreer105 to m ean m isrepresentation, fo llo w in g  the 
Jordanian c iv il co d e.106 T h e  E g yp tia n  c iv il co de107 uses tadlees as p a ra lle l in  m eaning  to 
the w ord taghreer. T h e  P ale stin ian  D ra ft shares the sam e articu la tio n  in  one p art108 o f 
A rtic le  12 4 , w ith  the E g y p tia n  c iv il co d e.109 T h e  Jo rdanian  c iv il code starts to d iscu ss 
taghreer in  a d ifferen t w ay from  that taken in  the other two ju risd ic tio n s . T h e  Jo rd an ian  
code starts w ith  the d e fin itio n  o f taghreer, but the P a le stin ia n  and E g yp tia n  codes started 
d ire ctly  w ith the effects o f taghreer/tadlees w ithout a d e fin itio n  b eing  p ro vided  in  an y o f 
the article s. A c c o rd in g  to the Jo rd anian  co de110 taghreer is  w hen one o f the co n tractin g
101 Article 122. The Egyptian Civil Law.
102 Article 123. The Syrian Civil Law.
103 Abu-Albasal. op. cit., P I52.
104 Egyptian Cassation Court. No 129756. 29/11/1990. Para 2.
llb Article 124. Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
106 Article 143. Jordanian Civil Law.
107 Article 125. Egyptian Civil Law.
108 Article 124 (1). Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
109 Article 125 (1). Egyptian Civil Law.
110 Article 143. Jordanian Civil Law.
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parties defrauds the other u sin g  fraudulent m eans b y  in d u cin g  h im  b y  w ord or deed to 
enter into the contract, into w h ich  he w ould  not otherw ise have entered. E g y p tia n  
ju risp ru d en ce  states that tadlees (m isrepresentation) occurs w hen one o f the contracting 
parties m islead s the other contracting p arty b y  any m eans, and in d u ces h im  b y erro r to 
enter the co n tract.111
T h e  P ale stin ia n  D ra ft112 and the E g y p tia n 113 code state that the contract w o uld  be 
vo id ab le  because o f taghreer/tadlees i f  one o f the contracting parties or h is  agent uses 
fraud that ind uces the other to enter the contract w h ich  w ould  not be entered if  fraud had 
not been used. It co u ld  be concluded that the P a le stin ia n  and E g y p tia n  law s considered 
fraud as an act o r a m eans o f taghreer/tadlees, but Jo rdanian  law  considered fraud as a 
m eaning o f taghreer. T h is  m eans that under Jordanian law  the d e fin itio n  o f taghreer 
(m isrepresentation) no d istin ctio n  is  m ade betw een m isrepresentation and fraud. I f  the 
w ord “fraud” is  used, it w ould in d icate  m isrepresentation and vice versa. U n der the 
P a le stin ia n  and E g y p tia n  p ro visio n s fraud w o uld  not re flect m isrepresentation as a 
concept, but it w o uld  in d icate  that fraud is  ju s t a m eans to e sta b lish  m isrepresentation. 
Fra u d  is  one w ay to e stab lish  m isrepresentation as w e ll as a lie  or co n cealm en t.114 
Furtherm ore Sanhuri suggested that an yth in g  that can be used to m isle ad  is  a 
m isrepresentation (tadlees) and an y one that has, as a consequence o f such a 
m isrepresentation, fa lle n  into  error w o uld  have the righ t to v o id  the contract, and c la im  
fo r dam ages or co m pensatio n .115
111 Addeep. op. cit.. P54.
" 'U sed  taghreer.
113 Used tadlees.
114 Al-Sanhuri. Alwasiet fi Sharhe Iqanoun Al-Madani. op. cit., P109.
115 Ibid, PI 95.
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S in ce  the codes d id  not lis t  the m eans o f m isrepresentation, it  w o uld  be understood that 
an y action (p h ysica l or o ra l) in d u cin g  a person into  a sub stantial error w ith regard to a 
contract w ould  be considered as a m isrep resentatio n.116 In te re stin g ly, the m em orandum  
o f the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft117 argues that fraud is  a resu lt o f taghreer, b y stating that 
“taghreer w ould  be operative if  it generates a fraud against one o f the parties in d u cin g  
h im  to enter the contract w h ich  he w ould  not enter w ithout the use o f taghreer”. T h is  
contradicts the fo rm u latio n  o f the D ra ft’s a rtic le ,118 w h ich  co n sid ers fraud as a m eans o f 
taghreer. It w o uld  be u se fu l to add that ghish (cheating) is  a lso  considered a m eans o f 
m isrepresentation. A s  a general ru le  if  m isrepresentation or an y o f its aspects is  to be 
operative that sho uld  be the m ain  reason that the contracting p arty enters the co n tract.119
In  the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft, taghreer (m isrepresentation) -  i.e . u sin g  an y tric k e ry  to in d uce 
the other party, b y  m eans o f fraud, cheating, or ly in g  -  is  com parable to the use o f the 
term  taghreer w ith in  the O ttom an Jo u rn al o f E q u ity .120 T h is  p o in t has its eq u ivalen ce  
under Sco ttish  contract law , w h ich  also  co n siders lie s  as m isrepresentation and fra u d .121 
It has been m entioned e a rlie r122 that the term  taghreer w o uld  be p a ra lle l to 
m isd e scrip tio n  in  the O ttom an Jo urn al. M isrepresentatio n can also  be considered if  an 
in sured  p arty d id  not d isclo se  v ita l in fo rm atio n  about h is health  situatio n in  order to 
in d uce the in su re r to enter into  the in suran ce co n tract.123 It is  c le a r that n o n d isclo su re  
here is  considered as m isrepresentation. B ased  on that, there has been a case in  w h ich  
the se lle r o f a restaurant w as in v o lv e d  in  m isrepresentation w hen he d id  not d isclo se  the
116 Jameel Al-Sharqawi. The General Theory of Obligation. Book 1. Sources of Obligations. Dar-Annahdah Al-Arabiya. 
Cairo. 1981. PI 35.
117 Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law. P85.
118 Article 124. Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
119 Addnasouri, Al-SImwarbi. op. cit., P31.
120 The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article 164.
121 Chapter Three of this Thesis.
122 Under chapter of “A Comparative Critical Analysis of the Concept of Error in the Islamic Contract Law. Khiyar 
Alwassf'.
123 Dawwcis. op. cit., P87.
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fact that he d id  not have the right to transfer the title  to the b uyer w hen they entered the 
co n tract.124 B o th  the Jo rdanian  125 and E g y p tia n  codes126 count in ten tio n al sile n ce  
regard in g  an actual fact or situatio n as a m isrepresentation if  it  can be proved that the 
in d uced  party w o uld  not have entered the contract had he know n about th is fact or 
situatio n.
T h e  P ale stin ia n  D ra ft127 has established a new  approach w ith  regard to sile n ce  and its 
connection w ith m isrepresentation. T h is  approach has adopted a s lig h tly  d ifferen t 
articu latio n  from  the Jo rd anian  and E g y p tia n  c iv il law . A rtic le  12 4  (2) o f the P a le stin ia n  
D ra ft states that in ten tio n al sile n ce, h id in g  or co n cealin g  a m atter, w o uld  be considered 
as m isrepresentation i f  it is  proved that the ind uced  p arty w ould  not enter the contract if  
he knew  about the concealm ent. D esp ite  th is slig h t d ifference o f a rticu la tio n , there w as 
no sp e cia l interpretation b y the m em orandum  o f the P a le stin ia n  D raft g iv in g  an 
understanding d istin ct from  that o f Jo rd an ian  or E g yp tia n  c iv il law . Th e author o f th is 
thesis recom m ends that the phrase “h id in g  or co n cealin g ” sho uld  be om itted from  the 
a rtic le , because its ad d itio n  co u ld  cause m isunderstanding. I f  the D raftp erso ns intend to 
co n ve y a p a rticu la r id ea it  w ould be recom m ended that th is be c la rif ie d  either in  the 
m em orandum  or w ith in  the code itse lf. T h e  m em orandum  w o uld  be the p rim a ry  source 
o f reference fo r the courts interpreting the code.
In  general, the three A ra b  leg al system s seem  to be clearer than E n g lis h  contract law  
w hen d ealin g  w ith  the issu e  o f silen ce  as m isrepresentation. Som e cases128 considered 
s ile n ce  as m isrepresentation and som e argued that silen ce  w o uld  never e sta b lish  a
124 Jordanian Cassation Court, Civil Cassation, 371/88. Bar Association Journal. Year 38. Issues 8 &9 1990. P1566.
125 Article 144. Jordanian Civil Law.
126 Article 125 (2). Egyptian Civil Law.
127 Article 124 (2). The Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
128 Hartog v. Colin & Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566.
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m isrep resentatio n.129 In  the sam e respect, S co ttish  contract law  c le a rly  and firm ly  
decided that sile n ce  cannot estab lish  a m isrepresentation as a general ru le , but it appears 
that there are m any cases in  w h ich  sile n ce  w as considered as m isrep resen tatio n .130 
E n g lis h  and Sco ttish  law  have no c le a r approach in  d ecid in g  w hether or not sile n ce  is  a 
m isrepresentation.
T h e  P a le stin ia n  D ra ft131 m entions a c ru c ia l point w ith  regard to dam ages or 
com pensation as a consequence o f m isrepresentation w hen132 it  has been decided that the 
m isrepresntee (mugharrar bihi or maghroor) has the rig h t to c la im  dam ages if  it is  
dem anded. In  general, the statem ent “if  it  is  dem anded” has not been fo llo w ed  w ith  a 
c la rific a tio n  o f w hen the dam ages can be dem anded. It w ould be u se fu l i f  the P a le stin ia n  
D ra ft or its m em orandum  c la rif ie s  the reasons or the causes that entitle  the 
m isrepresentee to c la im  dam ages. T h is  sub ject has not been m entioned at a ll under the 
Jo rd an ian  or E g yp tia n  c iv il codes. It m ight be u se fu l to m ention that A rtic le  1 1 9  o f the 
E g y p tia n  code states that if  a m in o r (under 18 ) used trick e ry  to h id e h is  m in o rity  he 
sho uld  be o b liged  to p ay com pensation or dam ages. T ric k e ry  m igh t or m ight not lead  
m isrepresentation. T h e  p o sitio n  o f A rtic le  1 1 9  is  not c le a r w hether th is case w o uld  be 
restricted  to m in o rs or w o uld  in clu d e  others w ho hide facts o r in fo rm atio n , in c lu d in g  
age. It is  im portant to m ention that intent is  c ru c ia l in  d e cid in g  w hether there is  
m isrepresentation. F o r tric k e ry  to be co nsidered as operative, it  is  subm itted that there 
sho uld  be an intentio n to in d uce the other p arty and to benefit from  th is inducem ent, 
le ad in g  to m isrep resen tatio n .133 O ne co u ld  therefore say that i f  there is  no intentio n to 
m isle ad  the other p arty then there is  no m isrepresentation. T h is  case m igh t occur w here
129 Keates v. Cadogan [1851] 10 C.B. 591.
130 Spice Girls Ltd (SGL) v. Aprilia World Sendee (AWS) [2002] EMLR 27, CA.
131 Article 124 (3). The Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
132 Ibid.
133 Egyptian Cassation Court, 0329/39. 8/2/1972.
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a shopkeeper tries to prom ote h is  goods b y  exaggerating w hen d e scrib in g  the features o f 
the goods in  order to attract c lie n ts, but does not go so far as to m isrepresent the 
ch ara cteristics o f the goods to those c lie n ts. It has been h e ld 134 that a b ro ker d id  not 
m isrepresent to h is  c lie n t w hen d e scrib in g  lan d  as good lan d , because the b uyer view ed  
the lan d  h im se lf from  a distance o f 800 m eters and agreed to b u y it. T h e  intentio n to 
e stab lish  m isrepresentation w as not proved because the broker gave the b uyer the 
opportunity to see the lan d  at first hand, taking  the chance that the b u yer w o uld  later 
refuse it.
A cco rd in g  to E n g lis h  and Sco ttish  contract la w , the latter case w o uld  be considered 
s im ila r to innocent m isrepresentation, as m entioned e a rlie r. A s  show n e a rlie r, innocent 
m isrepresentation under E n g lis h  law  o f contract is  a m isrepresentation w h ich  has not 
been m ade frau d u le n tly; co nseq uently th is type o f m isrepresentation w o uld  not resu lt in  
any dam ages as rem edy against the m isrepresentor. F o r exam p le, it  w ould  not be 
in clu d ed  in  an y o f the rem edies under s 2 ( 1 )  o f the M isrep resentatio n A c t 19 6 7. T h is  
type o f m isrepresentation w o uld  be expected w hen the m isrepresentor d e liv e rs a 
statem ent that he b e lieves h o n estly to be tru e .135 U nder S co ttish  law  o f contract the 
situ atio n  is  the sam e and it  has the sam e ru le s .136 O f course, th is does not m ean that 
Jo rd anian  and E g yp tia n  c iv il law s, and the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft reco gn ise  th is k in d  o f 
m isrepresentation. N o  m ention co u ld  be found o f the know n or c la ss ifie d  categories o f 
m isrepresentation d ire c tly  under the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft, or under the Jo rd an ian  and 
E g yp tia n  c iv il codes. In  general it  can be co ncluded  that the three le g a l system s137 used 
fraudulent and innocent m isrepresentation b y  im p lic a tio n  under in te n tio n a l or
134 Jordanian Cassation, Civil Cassation, 475/91. Bar Association Journal. Year 41. Issues 4 &51993. P645.
135 Chris Turner. Contract Law. 2nd Edition. Hoder Arnold, 2007. P223. ISBN 9780340941966
136 Manners v. Whitehead (1898) 1 F 171; 36 Sc LR 94; 6 SLT 190.
137 Palestinian Draft, Jordanian, and Egyptian Civil Law.
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u n in ten tio n al taghreer, but w ithout u sin g  an y o f the term in o lo gies used in  E n g lis h  or 
Sco ttish  contract law . It is  noticed that there is  no in d ica tio n  o f neg ligen t 
m isrepresentation under any o f the cases or artic le s w ith in  the P a le stin ia n , Jo rd an ian , or 
E g yp tia n  p ro v isio n s. G e n e ra lly  sp eakin g, none o f the three c iv il law s, w hether the D ra ft 
o r the codes, points out an y category o f m isrepresentation; neither do the academ ic 
com m entaries. It w ould be ad visab le  fo r the three A ra b  le g a l system s to e sta b lish  c le a r 
and c la ss ifie d  categories o f m isrepresentation in  order to ease d ealin g  w ith  expected 
le g a l effects o f m isrepresentation, and to enable the courts and the ju d ic ia l b o d y to create 
a c le a r d ifferen tiatio n  from  one to another. T h is  type o f im provem ent w o uld  have 
p o sitive  resu lts in  a le g a l system  in  the context o f error and m isrepresentation. T h is  
w ould  be advantageous fo r dom estic users, and it w ould  ease in tern atio n al trade w ith  
other co untries, w here traders w o uld  be fa m ilia r w ith  the concept o f m isrepresentation.
It is  also  w orth m entio ning  that a m ere statem ent o f o p in io n  is  not considered to be a 
m isrep resentatio n.138 T h is  w riter recom m ends a d ifferen tiatio n  betw een the o rd in a ry  
person’s statem ent o f o p in io n  and an expert’ s statem ent o f o p in io n  w h ich  can stro n g ly 
in flu en ce  the p arties to enter a contract, or at least create a greater m o tive fo r them  to 
estab lish  a contractual re la tio n sh ip .
4.1. Misrepresentation and the Third Party
T h e  P a le stin ia n  D ra ft139 stated that if  m isrepresentation (taghreer) w as estab lish ed  b y  a 
th ird  party, the m isrepresentee (;maghroor) has the rig h t to d eclare the contract v o id  i f  he 
proves that the other co ntracting  p arty knew  o r sho uld  have know n about th is 
m isrepresentation at the tim e o f the contract. B o th  the E g y p tia n  c iv il code 140 and the
138 Addnasouri. Al-Shawarbi, op. cit.. P31.
139 Article 125 (1). The Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
140 Article 126. The Egyptian Civil Law.
292
Jo rdanian  c iv il co de141 have adopted the sam e po int o f view  in  th is respect. It m igh t also  be 
sa id  that the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft adopted the Jo rd anian  and E g yp tia n  p ersp ective, as has been 
seen in  m any p laces in  th is chapter. O n the sam e po int, the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft142 has added 
an ad d itio n a l issu e  w ith  regard to gratuitous contracts. It is  stated that if  the m isrepresentee 
(,maghroor) m ade a gratuitous contract, he has the rig h t to v o id  the contract even if  the 
other contracting p arty d id  not know  about the m isrepresentation that w as m ade b y  a th ird  
party at the tim e o f co ntracting. U n der E n g lis h  law  o f contract the case w o uld  be s im ila r, 
except that, if  m isrepresentation is  m ade b y  a th ird  p arty, the th ird  p arty w o uld  be lia b le  to 
reco ver the lo ss o f the p rin c ip a l and he w ould  be com m itted to p ay dam ages if  the lo ss 
occurred fo r not u sin g  the m o n ey.143 T h is  is  not the case under S co ttish  law  o f contract, 
w here it  is  considered that if  the m isrepresentee entered the contract under erro r m ade b y  a 
th ird  party; th is w ould  not cause reductio n o f the co ntract.144 T h e  reason b ehind  th is 
exception is  to liberate  donors from  an y defect that co u ld  affect th e ir w ill.145 G e n e ra lly , the 
E g yp tia n  C a ssatio n  C o u rt146 considered ghish (cheating) as taghreer (m isrepresentation), 
and decided that w hen taghreer is  done b y a th ird  party w ith  the know ledge o f one 
contracting p arty, it  w o uld  be counted as if  it w as done b y the co n tractin g  party.
It is  c le a r now  how  c ru c ia l it  is  to have organised and c la rif ie d  categories o f 
taghreer/tadlees (m isrepresentation). It is  a lso  c le a r that error as a concept and category 
needs to be im p ro ved  and developed m ore than has been done through in  a ll three A ra b  
le g a l system s referred to, (P a le stin ia n , Jo rd anian  and E g yp tia n ). Th ese  tw o perspectives 
that w ould im p ro ve erro r and m isrepresentation p ro v isio n s under E g y p tia n  c iv il law  d id  
not prevent som e o f the E g yp tia n  com m entators p ressin g  fo r a rem o val o f the concept o f
141 Article 148. The Jordanian Civil Law.
142 Article 125 (2). The Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
143 First National Commercial Bank Pic v. Humberts [1995] 2 ALL ER 673.
144 Young v. Clydesdale Bank Pic. (1889) 17 R 231.
145 The Memorandum of the Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. P86.
146 Egyptian Cassation Court. Legal Rules Collection. 2-438-16. 18/5/1933.
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tadlees (m isrepresentation), and to concentrate o n ly  on ghalat (e rro r).147 In  other w ords, 
they suggested that m isrepresentation, under current p ro v isio n s, co u ld  be rep laced  b y 
error. T h e y  argued that error theory w o uld  be su ffic ie n t to co ve r the two areas o f law , 
and then there w o uld  be no need to deal w ith  m isrepresentation, e lim in a tin g  u n n ecessary 
d etails in  the la w .148 A s  reflected  in  som e le g a l authors’ argum ents, w h ich  seem  at tim es 
inco m prehensib le  and are not acceptable to th is w riter, it  can be noticed that E g y p tia n  
c iv il law  ju risp ru d en ce  underestim ated the p o sitio n  o f m isrepresentation w ith in  the law .
It has been said  that m isrepresentation (tadlees) is  a re flectio n  o f erro r (ghalat), and 
sho uld  not be ch aracterized  as an independent defect o f consent. T h is  is  ju s t if ie d  b y 
c la im in g  that tadlees w o uld  not render the contract vo id ab le  u n less it  resulted in  error 
fo r the other p a rty .149
F irs t o f a ll, it  is  true that ghalat co u ld  be established ind ep end ently because the 
contracting parties have an in co rrect b e lie f w ith  regard to the facts o f the contract. T h is  
occurs w hen the parties have a shared erro r (a com m on or m utual error), or w hen one 
p arty has erred b y an uninduced  u n ila te ra l error. T h e  in d uced  u n ila te ra l error sho uld  
have a counter-part facto r (the m isrepresentor) to m ake the inducem ent and p ush the 
other p arty in to  error. T h is  u su a lly  can be seen c le a rly  in  E n g lis h 150 and S co ttish 151 
contract law  on m isrepresentation and the category o f error or m istake. T h is  w as v e ry  
c le a r also  in  the context o f gharar/taghreer under Is la m ic  co n tract152 law . H o w ever, to 
say that m isrepresentation is  not a necessary part o f consent defect is  neither lo g ic a l nor 
re a listic . A s  is  w e ll kno w n, m isrepresentation leads to error, but it  is  d iff ic u lt  to im ag in e  
an y situ atio n  w hen an e rro r can lead to m isrepresentation. F o r the sake o f a ccu ra cy,
147 Mukhtar Al-Qadi. Origins of Obligations in the Civil Law. Dar-Annahdah Al-Hadeethah. 1967. P39-41.
148 Mahmoud Al-Sharoud. The Brief of the Will’s Defects. Dar Al-Ittihad Al-Arabi for Printing. 1988. P48. Para 13.
149 Mahmoud Al-Munji. Practical Cases Encyclopaedia (Vol. 9). A Case of Contract Voiding. 2nd Edition, Munsha'at Al- 
Ma’arif, Alexandria. 2002. P345.
150Peel, op. cit., P344.46
151 MacQueen, Thomson, op. cit., P I71.
152 Al-Saati, op. cit., P6.
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n o thing  has been found on th is point in  Jo rd anian  com m entaries, so it  is  d iff ic u lt  to 
anticipate w hether the P a le stin ia n  courts and com m entaries w o uld  be lik e ly  to fo llo w  
e ith er the E g yp tia n  o r the Jordanian perspective on th is point.
Furtherm ore, ghalat (error) as e xp la in ed  e a rlie r occurs w hen a person b e lieves 
som ething to be a fact w hen in  re a lity  it  is  not, or vice versa.153 E rro r can be established 
o r m otivated b y in te rn al and personal p sych o lo g ica l factors w ithout interventio n b y 
others. It can also  be established through the inducem ent o f others. O b v io u sly , the 
co n d itio n s fo r erro r to be established are d ifferen t from  the co n d itio n s required  fo r the 
establishm ent o f m isrepresentation. T h e  m isrepresentor, acco rd in g  to E g y p tia n  law , 
sho uld  use trick e ry  w ith  intent in  order to induce the other p arty to ach ieve  ille g a l g o als, 
and the trick e ry  sho uld  be in flu e n tia l in  p ersuading the party to enter into  the co n tract.154 
A cco rd in g  to Anwar Sultan, trick e ry  m eans an error that is  m ade b y  the m isrepresentor 
and m akes h im  lia b le  to pay co m pensatio n.155 E rro r co u ld  generate com pensation 
e sp e c ia lly  if  there w as an y fin a n c ia l lo ss. T o  co n sid e r m isrepresentation as an erro r from  
the m isrepresentor’ s sid e draw s attention to the need fo r c la rific a tio n  in  th is area o f law , 
in  order to develop a better understanding. In  general, it has been no ticed  that Jo rd anian  
and E g yp tia n  c iv il law s do not deal fu lly  w ith  error. T h is  m igh t be because they w ere 
in flu en ce d  b y Is la m ic  ju risp ru d en ce  that alm ost ignores the error issu e  w ith in  the law  o f 
contract. It c le a r that m ost co n ditio n s o f m isrepresentation are not present in  cases o f 
error. Therefo re, it  is  in su ffic ie n t to have ru le s that define erro r and m isrepresentation; 
further c la rific a tio n  and d etail is  necessary in  order to assist the contracting p arties to 
e sta b lish  how  to deal w ith  these situatio n s sho uld  they o ccur. It is  true that erro r and 
m isrepresentation are c lo se ly  connected and have m any areas in  com m on, but th is does
153 The Memorandum of the Jordanian Civil code. P143, 144.
154 Anwar Sultan, op. cit.. P 131.
155 Ibid, P I37.
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not m ean that one should  be replaced b y  the other. It is  a lso  true to say that 
m isrepresentation and error co u ld  cause co n fu sio n  in  som e cases, but th is m eans that 
law m akers, le g is la to rs, and com m entators sho uld  expend m ore effort in  addressing and 
re so lv in g  an y co n fu sio n  w hich  co u ld  o ccu r in  p ractice from  tim e to tim e.
Section 5: Conclusions and Recommendations
It w ould v e ry  m uch to be expected that the P ale stin ian  courts w ill not e stab lish  a 
d istin ctiv e  ju d ic ia l m ethod to be fo llo w e d  b y the P a le stin ia n  le g a l system . T h is  
expectation is  b u ilt  on the ju d ic ia l p ractice  in  the P a le stin ia n  courts, e sp e c ia lly  at the 
appeal and cassatio n  le v e l. These courts, as has been m entioned e a rlie r in  th is chapter, in  
m any instances re lie d  on E g yp tia n  and Jo rd anian  appeal and cassatio n courts and 
ju risp ru d e n ce , and in  som e cases d erived  th e ir judgem ents d ire c tly  from  the 
com m entaries fro m  the two le g a l ju risd ic tio n s . T h is  is  despite the fact that E g y p tia n  and 
Jo rdanian  c iv il law  have becom e detached from  the O ttom an Jo u rn al o f E q u ity , and 
consequently th e ir le g a l procedure w o uld  d iffe r from  that operating w ith in  P a le stin ia n  
c iv il law , w h ich  is  s t ill based on the O ttom an Jo urnal o f E q u ity . It sho uld  also  be noted 
that the D ra ft o f the P a le stin ia n  c iv il law  is  alm ost a ll d erived  fro m  the Jo rd an ian  and 
E g yp tia n  c iv il codes. It w ould  appear that no P ale stin ia n  com m entators are interested in  
p ro d ucing  e ith er a c r it ic a l a n a lys is  o f the P a le stin ia n  D raft or co m paring  ap p lied  law  
w ith  the proposed D ra ft; there are v e ry  few  va lu ab le  books o r a rtic le s p u b lish ed , to date, 
on th is point.
In  ad ditio n  the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft, w ith  its  o rig in s in  both E g y p tia n  and Jo rd an ian  law , 
does not e sta b lish  organised and sp e cific  categories o f erro r o r m isrepresentation, and 
th is w ill have a consequence fo r courts and com m entaries w ith in  P alestin e  in  tw o w ays.
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F irs t ly , it  is  c le a r that there is  co n fu sio n  am ong com m entators on the cases. T h is  is  
evidenced through ig n o rin g  the effects o f m isrepresentation on error, or argu in g  against 
the proposal that m isrepresentation co u ld  or sho uld  be replaced b y  error. S e co n d ly, erro r 
and m isrepresentation are d iscussed  from  one perspective o n ly , w ithout c la ss ify in g  them  
in to  c le a r categories w h ich  co u ld  deepen understanding o f th is area.
It is  recom m ended that the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft sho uld  be im p ro ved, tak in g  into  account the 
P a le stin ia n  le g a l enviro nm ent and the h isto ric a l background from  w h ich  it  has been 
derived. Th e  P a le stin ia n  D ra ft sho uld  develop its p ro v isio n s w ith  regard to erro r and 
m isrepresentation b y  d e fin in g  both o f them  w ith  th e ir categories. T h is  p ro vid es m ore 
opportunities fo r the com m entators and courts to estab lish  th e ir ow n le g a l o p in io n  in  th is 
area. It is  u sefu l fo r the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft to take guidance from  the Jo rd an ian , E g y p tia n , 
and O ttom an le g a l system s, but it  w o uld  be m ore u se fu l to d istin g u ish  it b y  creatin g  
c le a r borders betw een types o f erro r based on b ila te ra l and u n ila te ra l c la ss ific a tio n s, 
m akin g  them  easier to understand and a v o id in g  co n fu sio n  and unnecessary argum ents 
and consequent case law . Th e  sam e p o in t co u ld  be m ade w ith  regard to taghreer 
(m isrepresentation). It w o uld  be u sefu l fo r the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft to adopt one term  to 
express the m eaning o f m isrepresentation and to adopt a d e fin itio n  w ith  c le a r 
c la ss ific a tio n s or catego ries. It has been noticed that the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft does not deal 
w ith  the leg al effects o f m isrepresentation and error su ffic ie n tly . M e re ly  stating that a 
contract sho uld  be v o id  or vo id ab le  as a resu lt o f error o r m isrepresentation is  not 
su ffic ie n t in  order to e sta b lish  a robust le g a l fram ew ork and a ric h  le g a l b ackgro und fo r 
the com m entators, courts and p ractitio n ers. T h e  draft w o uld  be im p ro ved  b y  m ore 
d etails in  th is regard.
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It is  to be hoped that the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft w o uld  create o b vio us answ ers to m any 
questions about error and m isrepresentation, b y sp e cify in g  the m ain  categories and th eir 
le g a l effects, because it  is  not h e lp fu l to have o n ly  general ru le s, w ithout detailed  
guidan ce, w h ich  is  m issin g  in  the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft in  the area o f erro r and 
m isrepresentation. T h e  P a le stin ia n  D ra ft sho uld  in clu d e  ru les fo r re ctifica tio n  as a resu lt 
o f error, and e stab lish  ru les w ith  regard to the rem edies o f restitutio n and dam ages. T h is  
is  an opportunity w h ich  sho uld  be seized w h ile  th is law  is  s t ill in  draft fo rm , and can be 
e a s ily  am ended.
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Chapter Eight
Comparative Conclusions and Comments
Section 1: Comparative Conclusions
1.1. Different Approaches on Error/Mistake
It has been found that E n g lis h  and Sco ttish  contract law s have m any shared id eas in  regard 
to the concept o f erro r/m istake and its categories. H ow ever, th is is  not the case fo r a ll 
issues re la tin g  to m istake or error; fo r exam ple to categorise error, Sco ttish  law  o f error 
uses term s d ifferent from  those used under E n g lis h  law  o f contract. Sco ttish  contract law  
established a category o f erro r in  m otive w h ich  does not e x ist in  E n g lis h  contract law . 
Sco ttish  law  has established erro r in  intentio n as a c le a r and an independent category w h ich  
in clu d es erro r in  transactio n, d erived  from  Error in Negotio o f R o m an law . T h is  is  not the 
case in  E n g lis h  law , w here m istake in  intentio n is  not considered ind ep end ently but needs 
to be d erived  from  the category o f m utual m istake. Sco ttish  law  o f contract d iv id e s error 
into  m ore p recise  categories w here as in  E n g lis h  law  o f contract catego ries o f m istake are 
m ore general.
F o r exam p le, under S co ttish  law  error as to p rice  is  found c le a rly  c la ss ifie d  as essential
error, and d iscu ssed  ind ep end ently b y Sco ttish  le g a l w riters. U nder E n g lis h  law  it  is  m ore
d iffic u lt  to fin d  co n sisten cy in  cases o f essen tial m istake or its sub -categ o ry m istake as to
p rice ; cases o f error as to p rice  are d istrib uted throughout m any catego ries o f m istakes but
are not treated indep endently. In  th is respect, it  lik e ly  that S co ttish  contract law  w ill be
m ore e a s ily  understood and interpreted than E n g lis h  law . E sse n tia l erro r, one o f the m ost
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im portant categories o f erro r under E g y p tia n  c iv il law  and the D ra ft o f the P a le stin ia n  c iv il 
law  is  dealt w ith  s p e c ific a lly  in  both and indeed an A rt ic le  in  each is  devoted so le ly  to the 
concept o f e sse n tia lity. H o w ever, th is is  not established  under Is la m ic  contract law , 
because erro r w as not d iscu ssed  w ith in  Is la m ic  ju risp ru d e n tia l studies.
S co ttish  law  o f contract co ntains a m ore detailed  and p recise  d iscu ssio n  and c la ss ific a tio n  
o f error than the other le g a l system s d iscu ssed  here. D esp ite  th is, the m ost thorough 
d iscu ssio n  o f m istake and m isrepresentation and th e ir categories is  found in  E n g lis h  law  o f 
contract. T h is  is  true o f E n g lis h  academ ic w riters, com m entators, and case law , and to a 
lesser extent o f Sco ttish  law  o f erro r w h ich  how ever req uires to be updated and 
m odernised. T h is , in  th is author’ s o p in io n , w o uld  p ro vid e  an academ ic and ju d ic ia l b asis 
fo r o p in io n s in  co m m o n ly o ccu rrin g  cases. In  co m pariso n , Is la m ic , Jo rd an ian , E g yp tia n  
law s, the D raft o f the P a le stin ia n  c iv il law , and the C IS G  ru les do not draw  su ffic ie n tly  on 
academ ic d iscu ssio n . Judgm ents under S co ttish  law  o f error are d em onstrably m ore stable 
than th e ir counter parts under E n g lis h  law  o f m istake. E v e n  in  cases w here the facts are 
ve ry  s im ila r, co n trad icto ry ju d gm en ts are found in  disputes re la tin g  to m istake w ith  
consequent va ria tio n s in  case law . C o n tra d icto ry  d e cisio n s are also  found w here the sam e 
case has been under ju d gm en t b y  d ifferent ju d g e s or courts. Th ere  are tw o short 
co n clu sio n s from  th is: E n g lis h  law  o f m istake m ay be im p ro ved because greater freedom  
allo w s ju d g e s to th in k  m ore c re a tiv e ly  re su ltin g  in  im provem ent in  the ru le s. O n the other 
hand, in  th is situatio n E n g lis h  law  o f contract m ay suffer from  in s ta b ility  cau sin g  
un certain ty as to rem edy fo r a ll parties in  d ispute.
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1.2. Mutual and Common Mistake
A s  show n, E n g lis h  law  o f m istake la ck s c le a r c la ss ific a tio n , to d istin g u ish  d ifferen t 
concepts. T h is  is  in  contrast w ith other branches o f E n g lis h  law . M an y cases o f m istake 
can be co nsidered as breaches o f contract. In  general, it  is  noticed that E n g lis h  law  does not 
co n sid er m istake as part o f a com bined theory o f im p erfectio n s o f co nsent.1 D esp ite  the fact 
that E n g lis h  law  o f contract d iscu ssed  th o ro ug h ly the concept o f m istake and its related 
issu e s, it  is  suggested that the m ethod fo llo w ed  in  E n g lis h  law  leads to a m b ig u ity  and 
co m p le x ity  in  m any cases. E n g lis h  law  o f contract sho uld  be exam ined to c la r ify  th is 
subject and to d istin g u ish  betw een com m on and m utual m istake, there b eing  co n fu sio n  
w hen the latter term  is  used to in d icate  com m on m istake (shared m istake).2 A lte rn a tiv e ly  
the law  o f contract req uires a cle are r d e fin itio n  co m b in in g  both categories. Th ere  is  no 
c le a r ju s tific a tio n  fo r the tw o c la ss ific a tio n s, com m on and m utual m istake, w h ich  as show n 
e a rlie r are c lo se ly  related in  both case law  and acad em ic le g a l com m entary.
It is  v ita l to know  w hether a m istake occurred before or after the contract betw een the 
parties. T h is  can s ig n ific a n tly  affect the understanding o f com m on m istake in c lu d in g  the 
existence o f the subject m atter. T h is  author suggests that i f  com m on m istake as such 
o ccurs after the contract is  entered it  sho uld  be treated as n o n-perfo rm ance, or total fa ilu re  
o f co n sid eratio n , o r fa ilu re  o f d e liv e ry . O f course the case w o uld  be d ifferen t w hen 
com m on m istake as such occurs before the point o f entering the contract is  reached, w hen 
th is w ould  be treated as m utual m istake w h ich  is  connected c h ie fly  to o ffer and acceptance. 
S in ce  m istake w as estab lished  before the contract b ein g  entered and before the goods were 
a v a ila b le , there w o uld , at the outset, be no need to d iscu ss the co ntractual re la tio n , because 
no contract existed  to be d iscu ssed  o r disputed.
1 Green, op. cit., P66.
2 Wishar, op. cit., P249, Footnote 6.
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A s  d iscu ssed , under E n g lis h  law  o f contract, m uch debate is  caused b y  the issu e  o f 
com m on m istake as to the existence o f the subject m atter. W hen we go further to d iscu ss 
contract existence through existence or n o n-existence o f subject m atter, it  can be sa id  that 
the case w ould  be about an agreem ent to have a contract. It can be established  as a pro m ise 
to contract w h ich  w ill have d ifferen t approach, and d ifferent rem edies.
M a n y debatable cases have been cited  to support the co n clu sio n  w ith  regard to com m on 
m istake and its connection to the existence o f the subject-m atter. O ne d isputable case 
d iscu ssed  in  the e a rlie r chapter on E n g lis h  contract law  o f com m on m istake is  that o f 
“Couturier v Hastie”3: the p la in t iff  h av in g  agreed to se ll In d ia n  co m  to the defendant, the 
co m , unknow n to both p arties, began to p erish . T o  avo id  m ore harm  or lo sses the sh ip ’ s 
captain  decided to se ll the rest o f the co m . A s  a resu lt, the b uyer argued that the corn 
(subject m atter) stopped e x istin g  before the contract w as entered. B ased  on that, the b uyer 
argued that the contract w as v o id , and there w as no re sp o n sib ility  on h im  to p ay the p rice  
o f com . T h e  se lle r argued that the purchaser w as resp o nsib le  fo r p ayin g  the p rice  because 
he bought at a venture, so the r is k  w as h is . W hen the case w as presented before the H ouse 
o f L o rd s, it  w as held  that the b uyer w as not lia b le  to p ay the p rice . It w as a lso  held  that the 
contract w as expected to be about e x istin g  goods, but in  th is case the goods no lo nger 
existed. In  th is case also  the se lle r w as not required  to d e liv e r the goods. C le a rly , the 
ju d g e s d id  not in d icate  v o id a b ility  as a rem edy, so the judgem ent w as vague as to w hether 
there w as an y alternative rem edy such as dam ages. T h e  d ecisio n  d id  not m ention any k in d  
o f m istake, either com m on o r m utual.
3 (1856) HL Cas 673.
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Throughout th is case, the a p p licatio n  o f m istake as to the existence o f the sub ject m atter is  
irre le va n t.4 T h e  case c le a rly  reflected  s6 o f the S a le  o f G oods A c t 19 79  in  regard to 
perished subject-m atter but is  not concerned w ith  the existence o f sub ject m atter.
It is  interesting  to note that the defendant re ly in g  on the p ro visio n s o f E n g lis h  law  argued 
that w hen the property (sub ject m atter) is  not existent at the tim e o f agreem ent, there 
‘co u ld  be no contract o f sa le ’ .5 T h is  is  m entioned to illu stra te  how  com m on m istake 
attracted and raised  d ifferen t or even co n tro versia l argum ents, w h ich  co u ld  be s t ill open fo r 
m ore d iscu ssio n . It is  a lso  u sefu l to notice that som e w riters d id  not m ention com m on 
m istake as a recognised category under the E n g lis h  law  o f contract w hen they presented 
the fundam ental types o f m istake.6 T h is  b rings us b ack to the d iscu ssio n  on sectio n 6 o f the 
U K  S ale  o f G oods A ct (19 7 9 ), w h ich  w as m entioned e a rlie r to d ifferentiate  betw een the 
perished goods w h ich  d id  e x ist, and goods that had never existed.
Th e  author o f th is thesis noticed  that there w as no m ention o r suggestion about the 
p o ss ib ility  o f m isrepresentation or fraud from  the s e lle r’ s side. T h is  leads us to suggest that 
m isrepresentation sho uld  be in clu d e d  in  the argum ent. It w ould be stro n g ly recom m ended 
to co n sid er the case as u n ila te ra l m istake from  the b uyer (M ) and m isrepresentation (an y 
type) from  the s e lle r’ s side ( C D C ) . T h is  v iew  is  supported b y  R ic h a rd  Stone7 w ho states 
“the clearest type o f m istake w h ich  renders a contract fu n d am en tally d ifferen t from  w hat 
the parties thought they w ere agreeing to, and w h ich  w ill be regarded as rendering  the 
contract v o id , is  w here the parties have m ade a contract about som ething w h ich  has ceased 
to e xist at the tim e the contract is  m ade”. S u rp ris in g ly  Stone’ exp lanatio n  fo r h is  argum ent 
seem s co n trad icto ry, stating that “w here the sub ject m atter ceases to e x ist after the contract
4 Richards, op. cit.. P215-222.
5 Ibbetson. op. cit., P228.
6 Haigh, op. cit., P156.
7 Stone, op. cit., P284.
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is  m ade, the doctrine o f ‘fru stratio n ’ ap p lie s, rather than m istake” .8 Stone was 
e x p la in in g  com m on m istake and the n o n-existence o f the subject m atter ‘res extincta'. T h is  
exam ple illu stra te s in  practice the co ntro versies in  re latio n  to the understandings o f 
com m on m istake e sp e c ia lly  a m istake as to subject m atter. Stone d id  leave  the door open 
fo r co n tro versia l d iscu ssio n  as he is  not c le a r w hether he supports fru stratio n  in  such a 
situatio n, or fo llo w s h is  d e fin itio n  o f com m on m istake w hen the sub ject m atter ceases to 
exist. T h e  existence o f the subject m atter has also  been approached as an issu e  under the 
doctrine o f fru stratio n 9 w h ich  the author sees as m ore re levant to th is case than the doctrine 
o f com m on m istake.
In  general, there is  no c le a r route e sta b lish in g  a consistent v ie w  o f com m on m istake. E ve n  
the E n g lis h  D ic tio n a ry  o f L a w  does not e lucid ate  the context in  w h ich  com m on m istake 
ap p lies, d e fin in g  it  as “both parties m ake the sam e erro r to a fundam ental fact”.10 In  fact, 
though th is is  a broad d e fin itio n  it  is  lo g ic a l and in  p ractice  g ive s a m ore d e fin itiv e  
understanding o f com m on m istake. A  s im ila r d e fin itio n  states “both p arties to an 
agreem ent are under m isund erstanding  (sin g le  m istake shared b y  both)”.11 T h is  researcher 
has id e n tifie d  a d e fin itio n  stating ‘both parties are lab o u rin g  under the sam e 
m isco ncep tio n ’ , 12 thus co m b in in g  com m on and m utual m istake. T h is  in co n siste n cy  in  
d e fin itio n s e x p la in s w hy d ifferent understandings are adopted b y  som e com m entaries. T h is  
show s la c k  o f sta b ility  in  creatin g  co m m o n ly recognised  d e fin itio n s o f com m on and o f 
m utual m istake as d ifferent concepts.
T h e  m ain  suggestion to be m ade w ith  regard to com m on m istake is  to s im p lify  the 
understanding o f th is concept b y separating com m on m istake as a shared m isun d erstan din g
8 Ibid, Footnote 21.
9 Furmston, op. cit., P85-95.
10 Curzon. op.cit.. P279.
11 Martin, op. cit.. P344.
12 Abbott, op. cit., P502.
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betw een co ntracting  p arties, from  the id e a o f the subject-m atter b ein g  perished or no lo n ger 
in  existence. A  d istin ctio n  m ust be draw n betw een two types o f com m on m istake: a case 
w here co ntracting  parties fa ll under the sam e m istake in  w h ich  case both w o uld  be 
exem pted from  th e ir le g a l duties; and a case w here the sub ject-m atter is  com pro m ised and 
one p arty has to bear the re sp o n sib ility  acco rd in g  the circum stan ces in  each case.
A s  has been show n under E n g lis h  contract law , in  Sco ttish  contract law , p roblem s also  
rem ain  in  understanding m utual e rro r.13 14T h e  sam e elem ents and the sam e le g a l effects are 
found in  m utual erro r/m istake under both Sco ttish  and E n g lis h  contract law , e v e n tu a lly  
rendering the contract vo id  ab initio.u Sco ttish  law  o f contract ho lds that if  erro r w as 
caused b y  a th ird  p arty, th is w ill not enable reduction to be o p erative .15
A s  Is la m ic  ju risp ru d e n ce  does not co ntain  any c le a r v iew  about the concept o f m istake 
under contract law  it  is  u n clea r w hether Is la m ic  law  holds an established  v ie w  w ith  regard 
to m utual and/o r com m on error. T h is  author w ould recom m end that M u slim  sch o lars 
develop a th eo retical fram ew ork o f erro r based on the structure o f E n g lis h  contract law . 
T h is  w ould  enable sch o lars to develop a strong cle a r argum ent w ith  regard to an y case o f 
error w h ich  m ay o ccur. T h e  situ atio n  under the C IS G  is  s im ila r to the Is la m ic  one, because 
C IS G  does not d iscu ss error ru les in  a d irect w ay and m utual or com m on erro r are not 
m entioned under an y o f C IS G  ru le s. A rt ic le  1 1 9  in  the draft o f P a le stin ia n  contract law  
defines m utual error as erro r shared betw een two contracting p arties. T h e  draft co n sid ers a 
contract that in v o lv e s  th is k in d  o f erro r to be vo id .
13 Rahmatian. op. cit., P42.
14 Hec. Bum Murdoch English Law in Scots Practice. The Juridical Review. 1909-1910. P61.
15 Young v. Clydesdale Bank Pic. (1889) 17 R 231.
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1.3. Unilateral Error
In  E n g lis h  contract law  u n ilatera l error concerns the perform ance o f the contract that w as 
not im plem ented and the dam ages that m ay be c la im e d  for the n o n -p erfo rm an ce.16 T h e  case 
under Sco ttish  contract law  seem s to be to ta lly  d ifferent, as it  is  c le a r that here the rem edy 
w o uld  be to declare the contract v o id .17 18U n ila te ra l error is  not considered under Is la m ic  
contract law  e x p lic it ly , but it  can be d erived  im p lic it ly  from  the ru le s o f khiyar alwasf.x% 
T h is  type o f error is  a lso  not d iscussed in  the C IS G  ru les.
1.4. Un-induced Unilateral Error
In  E n g lis h  law  trad itio n , the party entering a contract under a reasonable error created b y 
h im /h e r w ould  be com m itted b y the contract and the other p arty m igh t be e lig ib le  fo r 
d am ages.19 20Th e thorough d iscu ssio n  o f the Sco ttish  contract law  on u n -in d u ced  u n ila te ra l 
erro r in  Stewart v Kennedy20 leads to an in terestin g  co n clu sio n , n a m e ly, that the p arty w ho 
is  in v o lv e d  in  the u n -in d u ce d  error m ay not fin d  that the rem edy is  to set aside the contract. 
T h is  m eans that such an erro r co u ld  resu lt in  no le g a l rem edy fo r the m istaken party. T h is  
type o f in  not m entioned under both Is la m ic  contract law  and the C IS G  ru les. A rt ic le  1 2 1  
o f the P a le stin ia n  D ra ft m entions th is type o f erro r but w ithout d e ta ils.
1.5. Essential Error
A s  noticed e a rlie r in  th is research, under the E n g lis h  law  o f contract m istake, w h ich  need 
not be essen tial, w ill be operative regard less o f the extent o f the m istake w h ich  v itiate s the 
co ntract.21 U nder Sco ttish  law  o f contract, erro r m ust be essen tial and goes to the root o f 
the contract. U n der Is la m ic  contract law , there is  no such catego ry as error, because
16 Webster v. Cecil 1861, 30 Beav. 62.
17 Steuart's Trustees v. Hart. (1875) 3 R 192.
18 For more details see: Chapter Five, A Comparative Critical Analysis of the Concept of Error and Misrepresentation in 
Islamic Contract Law. Section 2: Khiyar Alwassf.
19 Murdoch, op. cit., P61.
20 1890 17R (HL) 25.
21 Murdoch, op. cit., P60.
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Islamic jurisprudence contains no discussion of the concept of error. This author’s analysis 
shows that fundamental breach in Article 25 CISG causes loss for the buyer preventing 
him from enjoying his contractual expectations, although the seller would not have been 
aware that this would be the result.22 This would be considered as an essential mistake 
under English and Scottish contract law. The Palestinian Draft of Civil Law23 considered 
essential error as the main category among the other types of errors.
1.6. Mistake as to Identity
Under English contract law, the most important point when discussing mistake as to 
identity is that there is considerable controversy. This issue is connected to the theory of 
mistake as to identity. The author finds that as a general rule the seller is responsible for his 
transaction once he has decided to deal with the buyer at face value.24 In practice this rule 
contradicts the case where fraud was considered as a reason to void the contract under 
mistake as to identity of the other contracting party, even when this fraud established 
mistake as to identity where the contract was done face to face.25 In cases of this kind if the 
innocent party can prove that the identity of the other party was vital to the business, the 
contract is void.26
This is also true under Scottish law of contract; when essential error as to identity occurs 
this would prevent the contract being formed. In this regard, J M Thomson argued that 
cases of error as to identity (personal attributes) would rarely go to the root of commercial 
contracts.27 Under English contract law, error as to identity will generally operate when the
22 Schwenzer, op. cit., P437.
23 Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. Article 120.
24 Para 922[2004] 1 A.C. 919. Shogun Finance Ltd v. Hudson. House of Lords. 2003 July 14, 15; Nov 19.
25 Ingram v. little [1961] 1 QB 31.
26 Haigh, op. cit.. P158.
27 Thomson, op. cit., P140.
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court is convinced that the party in error considered the identity of the other contracting 
party as a vital motive for entering the contract.28 A similar situation can be seen under the 
Draft of Palestinian Civil Law.29 Error as to identity is not mentioned under any category 
either in Islamic contract law or within the CISG rules.
1.7. Error as to Law
In fact English law states that payment made under a mistake of law would not of itself be 
a ground for recovery. On the contrary, if prima facie is involved in a payment made under 
a mistake of fact it would be recoverable.30 With regard to the same issue Lord Goff 
concluded that no principle in English law means that, a contract being void, money paid 
was irrecoverable based on mistake of law if the contract had been completely performed 
within the agreed terms.31 Under Scottish law of contract, it has been noted that under the 
law of error a payment would be recoverable, but notably this rule was not derived from 
contract law, but it was supported by the equity rules of condictio indibiti which require the 
repayment of money where this money has been paid under the mistaken impression that 
the party is legally committed to pay.32 According to Ali Haydar, Islamic law of contract 
recognises this kind of error, and he mentions a similar case under the concept of error in 
Islamic contract law.33 In comparison, Scottish and Islamic contract laws have very similar 
attitudes towards the law of error. CISG rules have no indication in respect of error as to 
law. It is noticed that the Draft of Palestinian Civil Law has established a special position34 
for error as to law, but defined it did differently from English, Scottish, and Islamic 
contract laws. Interestingly, the draft focused directly on error as to law rather than on
28 Gloag. op. cit. P443.444.
29Al-Far, op. cit., P80.
30 The law commission report, law commission No 227, restitution: mistakes of law and ultra vires Public Authority 
Receipts and Payments, 30lh September 1994.
31 Law Reform Commitee. Singapore Academy of Law, op. cit., PI 2.
32Baird’s Trustees v. Baird. (1877) 4 R 1005. See also: British Hydro-Carbon Chemicals Ltd v. British Transport 
Commission. 1961 SLT 280.
33 Harder, op. cit., P50.
34 Palestinian Draft of Civil Law. Article 121.
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error as to fact. It is important to note that the draft states that error as to law has the same 
conditions as for error as to fact.35
Section 2: Different Approaches to Misrepresentation
It is been found that misrepresentation under Scottish contract law has been investigated 
more thoroughly than in English law. Under Scottish contract law, there is a very thin line 
between fraud and misrepresentation. It can be seen that there is a tendency by Scottish 
scholars or writers to relate fraud and misrepresentation more closely than is the case with 
English law. It appears that the Scottish definition of misrepresentation is very similar in 
practice to the English definition of operative misrepresentation, but in fact this is not so. 
The reason for this brief conclusion is derived from Prof Joe Thomson’s discussion of 
inaccurate statement of fact as one of the factors of operative misrepresentation under 
Scottish contract law. It is noticed that under English contract law the definition is quite 
different: English contract law uses “false statement of fact” as part of its definition,36 not 
“inaccurate statement”, as is used in the Scottish definition. In fact, saying that the 
statement is not accurate is different from saying that the statement is false.
According to the Ottoman Journal of Equity, misrepresentation (gharar, taghreer) under 
Islamic contract law means that the description of the item sold to the buyer is contrary to 
its real description.”37 This definition tells us that misrepresentation under English contract 
law and gharar I taghreer under Islamic contract law has the same meaning. But another 
definition of gharar/taghreer under Islamic jurisprudence, which defines it as deception,38 
brings the definition of misrepresentation closer to Scottish contract law which has tended 
to make misrepresentation closer to fraud than English law does.
35 Ibid.
36 J. Cartwright, Misrepresentation (London, Sweet and Maxwell. 2002) PI.
37 Article 164.
38 Al-Saati, op. cit., P6.
309
Under International contract law (CISG) it is also evident that the court39 used the word 
“misrepresented” to indicate the “fraudulent seller”, establishing a new link between fraud 
and misrepresentation under the CISG. In other words, it means that there is a possibility 
of using the terms misrepresentation and fraud interchangeably. This gives a strong 
indication that the concept of misrepresentation, if there is any, under CISG rules 
corresponds more closely to the concept under Scottish contract law, rather than under 
English contract law. A similar situation is established under the Draft of the Palestinian 
Civil Law, where the fraud is considered as a means of taghreer.40 This indicates that the 
view of the Palestinian Draft with regard to misrepresentation is more similar to Scottish 
than English contract law.
2.1. Remedy for Fraudulent Misrepresentation
It has been shown that English contract law and Scottish contract law have different points 
of view in relation to damages as a remedy for fraudulent misrepresentation. Under English 
contract law, damages can be applied even if the contract has not yet been concluded;41 the 
justification for this is simply that there would not be any loss as a result of the contract, 
because the contract does not exist.42 The case under Scottish contract law is different 
because for damages to be applied as a remedy the contract needs to have be concluded or 
already in existence.43 This applies both to fraudulent misrepresentation, and to negligent 
misrepresentation.44 Furthermore, damages could be claimed by the misrepresentee when 
the misrepresentation is fraudulent or negligent.45 According to the Ottoman Journal of 
Equity, if the contract o f sale involved fraudulent misrepresentation, then the
39 See C L O U T  case No. 168. Germany: O b e r lc m d e sg er ich t, op. cit., P 89.
40 Article 124. Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
41 Reid, op. cit.. P10.
42 MacQueen, op. cit., P14.
43 C le l la n d  v. M o rto n , F r a s e r  a n d  M ill ig a n  VPS 1997 SLT (Sh Ct) 57.
44 S 10 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985.
45 Thomson, op. cit., P279.
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misrepresentee has the right to void the contract.46 Under the CISG there is no clear 
category or clear legal effects o f the vendor’s misrepresentation, whether fraudulent or 
negligent.47 This would make it more difficult to find a standard remedy for 
misrepresentation (fraudulent or negligent); as a result the remedy in each case would be 
subject to the rules of the domestic legal system where this type o f misrepresentation 
occurred.
The memorandum of the Palestinian Draft48 argues that fraud is a result of 
misrepresentation (taghreer), by stating that “taghreer would be operative if it generates a 
fraud for one of the parties and induces him to accept a contract which he would not accept 
in the absence of taghreer”. This contradicts the formulation of the article in the Draft,49 
which considers fraud as a means of taghreer. In this case the Palestinian draft considers 
misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation as synonymous, so that, the Palestinian 
Draft would consider50 the contract as voidable if it involves fraudulent misrepresentation.
2.2. Silence and M isrepresentation
In this thesis, the author found that silence usually cannot establish or cause 
misrepresentation under English common law.51 52However, in Bradford Third Equitable 
Benefit Building Society v. Borders52 another view proposing silence to be a case of 
misrepresentation contradicts this rule. The author o f this thesis agrees with the logic of 
considering silence as misrepresentation. This view relates to the fact that if certain 
information was not disclosed it could lead to a danger of misleading. For example, if a 
person makes a statement which is initially true he would have a duty to correct it if later,
46 The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article 357.
47 Joseph Lookofsky, op. cit., P280.
48 Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law. P85.
49 Article 124. Draft of the Palestinian Civil Law.
50 Ibid.
51 K e a te s  v. C a d o g a n  (1851) 10 C.B. 591.
52 [1941] 2 All ER 205.
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as a result of a change in circumstances, it becomes false. Likewise if a person creates a 
partial statement which is correct in itself but would be misleading because it lacks some 
information, he is at fault of misrepresentation.53 Some cases54 considered the probability of 
considering silence as misrepresentation and some argued that silence would never 
establish misrepresentation.55 This is interesting because it shows the extent of controversy 
among academic writers on one hand; on the other hand there is much controversy among 
judges between different cases. It shows that every case could be treated sometimes 
entirely differently from the previous or the later ones, and in some cases there is no 
recognised standard upon which to base a decision.
In the same respect, as a general rule Scottish contract law clearly and strictly decided that 
silence cannot establish a misrepresentation, but it appears that many cases have 
considered silence as misrepresentation.56 English and Scottish law have no clear approach 
in deciding whether or not silence is misrepresentation. Neither the CISG nor Islamic 
contract laws discuss the issue of silence, simply because they do not have any clear 
concept of misrepresentation. The situation under the Draft of Palestinian Civil Law is 
different. The draft is clearer than English and Scottish contract law when dealing with the 
issue of silence as misrepresentation. Article 124 (2) of the Palestinian Draft states that 
intentional silence to hide or conceal a matter would be considered as misrepresentation, if 
it is proved that the induced party would not enter the contract if he knew about this matter. 
In general, the three Arab legal systems seem to be clearer than English contract law when 
dealing with the issue of silence as misrepresentation. Of course, this does not mean that 
Jordanian, and Egyptian civil laws, and the Palestinian Draft, recognise this kind of 
misrepresentation. This concept is not identified or classified directly in under any
53 Bradgate. Brownsword and Flesner, op. cit., P95.
54 H a r to g  v. C o lin  & S h ie ld s  [1939] 3 All ER 566.
55 K e a te s  v. C a d o g a n , op. cit.
56 S p ic e  G ir ls  L td  (S G L )  v. A p r il ia  W o r ld  S e n d e e  (AWS) [2002] EMLR 27. CA.
312
categories of misrepresentation in the Palestinian Draft, or the Jordanian and Egyptian civil 
codes.
2.3. M isrepresentation and Opinion
Under English contract law mere opinion would not be considered as a misrepresentation,57 
unless this opinion was established fraudulently;58 if the opinion was provided by a person 
with experience or knowledge of the subject of the contract, this would be an essential 
factor in considering liability.59 The opinion would also be considered as misrepresentation 
if  the party intended to express his opinion wrongly.60 Here Scottish contract law61 adopts 
the same view as English contract law. Islamic and CISG rules do not discuss any aspects 
of the relation between opinion and misrepresentation. The Palestinian draft does not 
consider a mere statement of opinion to be misrepresentation.62
2.4. Misdescription and Misrepresentation
According to section 2(1) of the English Misrepresentation Act 1967 fraudulent 
misrepresentation would be established when the representor’s action is based on deceit.63 
It can be concluded that under Islamic contract law if khiyar alwassf (misdescription) 
includes gharar, it would be considered parallel to fraudulent misrepresentation under both 
English64 and Scottish65 contract law. This view leads to the conclusion that khiyar alwassf 
on its own is non-fraudulent misrepresentation. Therefore, most Muslim scholars do not 
realise the importance o f differentiating, as Ali Haydar does, between misdescription that 
involves gharar (intentional or fraudulent) and misdescription without gharar
57 Samuel, op. cit., P325.
18 Cartwright, Misrepresentation, Mistake, and Non-Disclosure, op. cit., PI 10.
?9 M u tu a l L ife  a n d  C i t i z e n ’s  In s C o  L td  v. E va tt. [1971] AC 393.
60 May, Brown, op. cit., P503.
61 MacQueen, op. cit., P I9.
62 A d d n a s o n r i, A l-S h a w a r b i, op. cit., P31.
63 Zhou. A Deterrence Perspective on Damages for Fraudulent Misrepresentation, op. cit., P85.
64 H IH  C a s u a lty  & G e n e r a l  In su ra n c e  L td  v. C h a se  M a n h a tta n  B a n k  [2003] U.K.H.L. 6 .
65 B o y d  &  F o r r e s t  v. G la s g o w  & S o u th  W este rn  R a ilw a y  C o  1912 SC (HL) 93.
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(unintentional or innocent), when deciding the proper remedy to be used when this case
occurs.
Misdescription is obviously a concept equivalent to misrepresentation under English and 
Scottish law. For example the Ottoman Journal (as a codified Islamic law) cites a case 
where the seller66 described a cow as being in milk but it was discovered that she was not. 
Similarly English law cites a case in which the seller described oats as “good old oats”67 
but in fact it was discovered that they were new. Both examples are obviously about 
description. In general the facts were similar, but the remedies were different. In the 
Islamic case the buyer is entitled to cancel the contract (void the contract), but is not under 
English. Neither legal system gives the option of considering unilateral error where 
misdescription occurs. This omission should be rectified. Interestingly, the law in both UK 
legal systems as enacted in Trade Descriptions Act 1968 explains the rules in the context 
of misdescription. This law was enacted to replace the Merchandise Marks Acts 1887 to 
1953 to prevent misdescription in trade and business. It is designed to disallow false or 
misleading indications in the pricing of all categories of goods. This law strengthens for 
the requirement that information about goods must be clear and well advertised.68 In 
Scotland this law will be applied under the Food and Dmgs Act 1955, and the Food and 
Drugs (Scotland) Act 1956; if this is not the case the contract must specify any variation in 
the description of the goods.69
Similarly, misdescription could be comparable to what was established under the rules of 
the International Sale of Goods (CISG) about misdescription occurring during the
66 Article 313. The Ottoman Journal of Equity.
67 S m ith  v. H u g h e s  (1871) LR 6  QB 597.
68 Trade Descriptions Act 1968. Chapter 29. PI.
69 Ibid, Section 2 (5). Chapter 29. P3.
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contract’s implementation.70 The CISG also requires the goods to conform to the 
description that was agreed in the contract.71 It is important to note that there is no direct 
mention connecting misdescription and misrepresentation in Islamic and international 
contract laws. The Palestinian draft has not discussed misdescription as the legal systems 
cited in this thesis do.
2.5. Non-disclosure and Misrepresentation
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the contracting parties would not have a commitment to 
non-disclosure under English and Scottish contract law. Two situations would be excluded 
from the previous non-disclosure rule. The two cases are well established under both the 
English and Scottish laws of contract,72 where non-disclosure would be essential in 
insurance contracts, where the insured party must disclose all the material facts to the 
insurer. The duty of disclosure would include any kind of material fact whether major or 
minor.73 The same duty would be required in a contract where there is a fiduciary 
relationship between the contracting parties, again under both Scottish74 and English75 laws 
of contract. The case is totally different under the Islamic law of contract where the 
contracting parties have to disclose all the facts connected to any type of contracts. If any 
of these facts was not disclosed, this would be considered as misrepresentation or fraud 
(taghreer) which is strictly prohibited (haram).76 The duty of disclosure in the CISG is 
established within the concept of good faith which is connected to non-conformity in 
accordance with Article 40 CISG.77 Under the Palestinian draft non-disclosure is also 
considered as misrepresentation.78
70 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (1980). Article 35.
71 Ibid, Article 35.
72 Soyer, op. cit.. P9.
73 MacMillan, Lambie, op. cit., P90.
74 Ibid.
75 MacIntyre, op. cit., P157.
76 H a y d e r , op. cit., P I91.
77 A k a d d a f , op. cit.. PP33.34.
n D a w w a s<  op.cit., P87.
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Clearly, English, Scottish, and Islamic law have similar rules in relation to defect. Under 
Islamic contract law if the buyer discovers a defect in the item sold and the defect has been 
removed before the item is returned, there is no option of defect. If the buyer insists on this 
option he will be obliged to cover the expense of the delivery and transportation.79 The 
author finds this case comparable to the English case established by the House of Lords 
relying on the s.35 (6) (a) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. The House of Lords decided that 
the buyer had no right to refuse the goods that had been repaired by the seller before the 
buyer received them.80 A similar situation occurs with regard to the procedures that should 
be followed when there is a claim about a defect before the court. Under Islamic law, the 
existence of defect must be proved at the time of the trial. This means that the buyer must 
show the defect in the item sold, whether or not the defect is old, but if the buyer cannot 
prove the existence of the defect he will not be able to continue with the case. Under 
English and Scottish contract laws similar procedures are required if a person refuses 
goods and claims compensation because of the defect.81
The right of retaining the sold item is implied within Scottish and English law, particularly 
in consumer law. Consumers may refuse any defective goods (return the goods) within any 
sale contract. Damages (compensation) may also be sought in respect of any value lost as a 
result of the defect.82 The Ottoman Journal rules are similar if the defect happened after
2.6. Defect and Misrepresentation
79 H a y d e r , op. cit.,P194.
80 R itc h ie  v. L lo y d  [2007] UKHL 9. Elements of the law of contract recent developments 2008. P3. 
http://www.londonextemal.ac.uk/current_students/programme_resources/laws/llb_diplaw/recent_dev/elements_law.pdf. 
Accessed at 10/8/2008.
81 Reforming the Law on Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods. An Introduction to the Law Commissions’ Project.20 
February 2008. P2. Para 1.8.
82 Hans Schulte-Nolke, Christian Twigg-Flesner and Martin Ebers. EC Consumer Law Compendium - Comparative 
Analysis -. Prepared for the European Commission under Service Contract No. 17.020100 / 04 / 389299: “Annotated 
Compendium including a comparative analysis of the Community consumer acquis”. April 2007. P 662.
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theitem sold was purchased, and the buyer discovered another old defect which existed 
before the sold item came into his possession.83
In England and Scotland, goods should be free from any defect, and this would be required 
even if not specified as part of the contract or transaction.84 In the Sale of Goods Act 1979, 
it is stipulated that in Scotland (only), when goods are sold according to a sample, the 
goods should match the quality of the sample which established the standard of the 
goods.85 Obviously the goods must be free from both flagrant and hidden defect. By 
comparing these rules, it has been found that the Ottoman Journal of Equity deals with 
defect in almost the same way as UK’s rules do. It can be concluded that defect as a 
technical term would not be parallel to error or misrepresentation under any of the legal 
systems mentioned in this thesis.
2.7. Disclosure o f Defect and M isrepresentation
Under the English and Scottish Sale of Goods Act,86 a defect will be considered as existent 
if it makes the goods unmerchantable, even if not visible under initial inspection. The 
goods will not be merchantable if they are not fit for purpose.87 Under English and Scottish 
law, the defect will not be considered if the seller has drawn the buyer’s attention to the 
defect before they enter the contract.88 In both laws, declaring the defect to the buyer 
relates to the concept of disclosure where non-disclosure may lead to misrepresentation or 
fraud. As has been shown, Islamic law also deals widely with defect under khiyar al- ayb. 
It has also been shown that this option can be treated as a case of misrepresentation or 
fraud in hiding the defect, but not as a result of the defect itself. When the defect is
83 The articles from 345.
84 Section 15 (3 ) Sale of Goods Act 1979.
85 Ibid. Section 15B (c).
86 Ibid. Section 15 (2 ) (c).
87 Ibid. Section 14 ( 6 ).
88 Ibid, Section 14 (a).
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discovered the buyer has the right to rescind the contract and return the item sold himself 
or through his agent. The sold item can also be returned to the seller or his agent and the 
buyer has the right to recover the money.89 This leads to another point mentioned in the 
Ottoman Journal which states “if the seller discloses the defect in the item sold at the time 
of the contract, and the buyer accepted the item, then he has no right to use the option of 
defect”.90
Under English law there is no duty on the party to disclose the defect. For example91 a 
person selling pigs’ is not responsible for fraud even if he knew that the pigs had a fault 
(e.g. fever), and he did not disclose this fact to the buyer. This case is applicable in the 
rules both of law and of equity.92 The exception to this rule is a relationship between the 
parties relying on confidence and trust. In other words, the party must disclose all the facts 
about the contract if the other party is a close relation (e.g. son, father or guardian); if this 
is not done the concealment would be considered as a fraud.93 The main assumption in 
Islamic law is that the seller has a duty to disclose the defect. Otherwise, it will be taken as 
a misrepresentation (taghreer). Taghreer here seems to be comparable to fraudulent 
concealment which is applicable when the party is committed to a duty of disclosure under 
Scottish law.94 An English case95 can be cited to show that in some instances fraudulent 
concealment would be equivalent to fraudulent misrepresentation where the duty of 
disclosure is required.
Defect in Islamic law of contract is a technical reason to establish misrepresentation or 
fraud, but it would not be parallel to either of them. If a buyer, having bought a property,
xy H a r d e r , op. cit., P I92.
90 The articles from 341.
91 [W a r d  v. H o b b s  (1878) A.C. 13].
92 O'Donovan. Op. cit., P338.
93 Law of Contract Business Law Including Company Law. P37. Accessed at 7/10/2008.
94 English and Scottish Law Commissions. Insurance Contract Law. Misrepresentation and Non Disclosure. Issues Paper 
1. September 2006. P I02. Para A 25.
95 C o n  Ion v. S im m s  [2006] EWCA Civ 1749.
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resells it to another buyer who takes possession of it, and then discovers a defect pre-dating 
the sale, the second buyer has no right to return the property to either of the former 
sellers.96
As shown, the Ottoman Journal discussed very specific details with regard to the option of 
defect and decided that, in the case o f a long standing defect being discovered, the buyer 
has the right to choose either to return the defective item or to accept it as it is according to 
the agreed price. In this case the buyer does not have the right to retain the item sold and 
also expect the seller to refund the lost value caused by the defect.97 English and Scottish 
law, according to a shared consultative paper, suggests that a buyer’s complaint in relation 
to the merchantability o f goods (not defective products) would depend on the terms of the 
contract he made with the producer including the price agreed. This paper suggests that if 
the item has already been resold several times to other buyers, successive buyers have then 
no right to complain against the producer.98 9The duty o f disclosing the defect under CISG 
comes under the concept of good faith which is connected to non-conformity in accordance 
with Article 40 CISG." If the seller fails to disclose the defect, this would be counted as 
fraudulent misrepresentation.100 The non-disclosure or concealment of a defect can create 
misrepresentation or fraud, by one party and error by the other. Islamic law of contract 
deals with defect as a result of gharar or taghreer (misrepresentation or fraud), but does 
not discuss defect as a result of error or mistake, this important aspect should be added to 
the Islamic legal view as a complementary part of gharar or taghreer which is 
misrepresentation.
96 H aydcir . op.cit., P193.
97 Article 337.
98 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission. (LAW COM. No.82) (SCOT. LAW COM. No.45). Liability 
for Defective Products. Report on A Reference Under Section 3(1) (e) of the Law Commission Act 1965. Presented to 
Parliament at June 1977. P I6 . Para 46.
99 A k a d d a f, op. cit.. PP33.34.
100 Garro. op.cit.. P260.
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As shown, fraud is defined as “an intended misrepresentation of a material fact, made 
knowingly, with intent to defraud.”101 According to this definition, misrepresentation is an 
instrument of fraud, and word misrepresent would bear the same meaning as defraud. 
Fraud is said to occur when one party uses deceit or misrepresentation to gain greater 
advantage from the terms of contract than the other party.102 Furthermore, it is noticed that 
key words regarding misrepresentation could be ‘intentional or unintentional’ putting 
misrepresentation into the precise category of fraud and deceit. Instead of using the term 
fraudulent misrepresentation, some common law commentators used intentional 
misrepresentation as equivalent to deceit; thus the party who entered into a contract 
because of intentional misrepresentation or deceit, here using intentional interchangeably 
with deceit, would not be committed to any legal obligation, there being no agreement 
because the intention of each party was different.103
This author finds that Lord Herschell104 in English law, expressed an opinion in terms, 
which defined fraudulent misrepresentation as synonymous with fraud. According to him 
certain factors must be involved: to decide that the fraud is created the party must know 
that the representation is false and believes it to be untrue. From this it is clear that Lord 
Herschell, equated fraud with misrepresentation. His opinion was about “fraudulent 
representation”, but when he cited examples of fraud he used the word “misrepresenting”. 
He spoke of “fraudulent representation” as “fraud” and considered that misrepresenting a 
statement is fraud. Another opinion from the law commission, which quotes Scott 
regarding the definition of fraud, supported this. The commission suggested that ‘fraud 
includes any dishonest conduct which causes, or exposes another to the risk of, financial
101 Robert W., op. cit., P97.
102 Miceli. op. cit.. P93.
103 Robert W., op. cit., P100.
104 D e r r y  v. P e e k  (1889) 14 App Cas 337.
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loss’; it can be added that lying could be included within this definition.105 The Law 
Commission of England which was used as a reference in the previous opinion stated that 
“if the defendant’s dishonest act is a misrepresentation, and there is the necessary intent to 
make a gain or cause a loss, there will in any event be liability for the new fraud 
offence.”106
Section 3: Comments on Error and M isrepresentation in Islamic Contract Law
3.1. Differences between Qur’anic Rules and Scholars’ Understanding under Islamic 
Law
This author finds differences between the terms in the Qur'an and the terms used by 
Arab/Muslim law scholars with regard to error or mistake. This is at variance with the fact 
that the Qur'an is the source of Islamic law, and the main background of correct and 
professional Arabic. As a general rule, it is concluded that the context of indication to error 
in the Qur'an differentiates between mistaken and intentional belief: the former could be 
forgiven and rectified where as the latter involves practical action which would be 
reckoned and incur blame.107 This type could be comparable to intentional 
misrepresentation or fraud under English contract law.108
3.2. Concentration on Gharar (misrepresentation) rather than Khata’a (error)
This author noticed that jurisprudence under Islamic law does not discuss the concept of 
error, but instead focuses on gharar (misrepresentation). Also, Muslim scholars do not 
define gharar sufficiently clearly to distinguish it from the other concepts. They confuse 
uncertainty and gharar, Islamic jurisprudence does not differentiate between fraud,
105 The Law Commission (LAW COM No 276). Fraud, Report on a reference under section 3(1 )(e ) of the Law 
Commissions Act 1965. July 2002. Para 7.6. P58.
106 Ibid. Para 8.12. P83.
107 Q u r  'an.33:5.
108 James Karp, Elliot I. Klayman, Frank F.Gibson. Real Estate Law. 5th Edition. Dearborn Real Estate Education. 2003. 
P203. ISBN:0793149568.
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misrepresentation, cheating, and deception. In other words, tadlees, gharar, ghabn and 
ghish are given the same meaning and the same connotation in schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence using different words for the same meaning as also occurs in other 
languages. Islamic jurisprudence deals widely with misdescription (khiyar al wasf) and its 
remedies. Based on that, it is noticed that the remedies which are provided by the Ottoman 
Journal as explained by Ali Haydar in respect of misdescription based on gharar is similar 
to the case of unilateral mistake without deceit under English law.
The author has shown that Islamic law gives the party who is affected by misdescription 
the right to cancel the contract and return the item to the seller, or keep it without any 
reduction of the price. The author has also found that this case corresponds with the 
application of English rules to unilateral mistake. However, English rules suggest that the 
mistaken party may accept the contract if he discovered the mistake. In other words a 
misrepresentation renders the contract voidable at the option of the representee;109 as shown 
in the Ottoman Journal of Equity; English contract law gives the purchaser who finds any 
misdescription the right to terminate the contract especially in the case of considerable loss 
of profit.110 In this situation misdescription is treated similarly to the practical application of 
the Islamic concept of khiyar ahvassf (option of description).111 Furthermore, similar 
evaluation of the concept of misdescription in the provisions of the International Sale of 
Goods “CISG” shows it to be comparable to that explained in the rules of misdescription 
occurring during the implementation of contract.112
Thus, it can be concluded that gharar as a meaning of misrepresentation is not clearly 
classified as a specific category such as innocent, negligent or reckless, and fraudulent. The
109 S tra ch a n  & H en s  h a w  L td  v. S te in  In d u sr ie  (U K ) L td  (1998) 87 B.L.R. 52.
11()Poikela. op. Cit.,P244, 245.
111 The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article 95.
112 CISG, op. cit.. Article 35.
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Islamic rules with regard to gharar are stricter than those o f misrepresentation under 
English law. Islamic law does not distinguish minor from excessive gharar as categories of 
misrepresentation are classified under English law. This is justified because gharar as 
misrepresentation under Islamic law is considered principally as ‘serious moral wrong’.113 
Minor misrepresentation and its effect under English and Scottish law are different from 
minor gharar under Islamic contract law. As mentioned earlier most Muslim scholars 
consider the contract as valid if it involves only minor gharar because they interpret the 
concept of gharar as risk or uncertainty. This means that they allow minor risk or minor 
uncertainty. This thesis adopts a new view in defining gharar by considering it as 
misrepresentation which is haram (prohibited).114
The author finds that taghreer relates to the description of the item; it can affect the price, 
but is not per se about the price. “taghreer: is describing the item sold to the buyer contrary 
to its real description.”115 This leads us back to the author’s definition of khiyar alwasf as 
misdescription. Here if the gharar involves deception, it will be equivalent to fraudulent 
misrepresentation under both English116and Scottish117 law in cases where deceit is 
involved. This supports the proposal discussed earlier that taghreer, tadlees, deceit, and 
misrepresentation bear the same meaning under the Islamic contract law. In other words, 
most Muslim scholars use different expressions referring to the same meaning. For 
example, it is possible to find one scholar using a certain word to refer to 
misrepresentation, while others use the same word to mean fraud. It can be concluded that 
there are different understandings of the concept depending on the school to which the 
scholars loyal.
113Rayner, op. cit., P206.
114 H a r d e r . op. cit.. P191.115 The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article 164.
116 H IH  C a su alty ' &  G e n e r a l  In su ra n ce  L td  v. C h a se  M a n h a tta n  B a n k  [2003] U.K.H.L. 6.
117 B o y d  & F o r r e s t  v. G la s g o w  & S ou th  W este rn  R a ilw a y  C o  1912 SC (HL) 93.
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3.3. A New Understanding and Reformulation of Gharar
The differences between the concepts of gharar show an urgent need to reformulate and 
unify its understanding as one concept and using one term.118 Considering the issue as a 
whole it is clear that if khiyar alwasf involves gharar, then it will correspond exactly to 
fraudulent misrepresentation in both English and Scottish contract law. This echoes Ali 
Haydar’s distinction between kiyar alwasf on its own, and khiyar alwasf that involves 
gharar.
Reformulating gharar will strengthen the pragmatism of Islamic law to include generally 
accepted traditions and customs,119 enabling Islamic law to be improved without 
contradicting the Qur’anic rules; allowing variation from time to time, or from place to 
place.120 English law of Equity is similarly pragmatic when dealing with a wide range of 
legal cases as they occur. But here, English courts making decisions based on equity can 
release two different decisions for the same case depending on the discretion of the judge 
or the court. This would depend on the circumstantial conditions in each case. The main 
difference is the dependence of Islamic law on the Qur'an as divine authority; no decision 
can be issued against its teaching. Simply, this is not required in English law of Equity.
Section 4: Comments on Error and Misrepresentation in the CISG
The author has found that the CISG rarely deals with mistake or error directly.121 A reading 
of article 8 (1) of the CISG122 shows that there are some signs implying the concept of 
mistake or error. These signs concentrate on the understanding of statements by one of the 
contracting parties. A study of the concept of error within the CISG reveals a serious
118 O b a id u lla h , op. cit., Para 3.1.2.
119 Q u r ’a n  7:199.
noD w e e k a t. The Percentage of the Commercial Profit from the Q u r ’an  and the Life. op. cit.
121 Charters, op. cit.. P I7.
122 For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to 
his intent where the other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was.
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problem; its definition of mistake is ambiguous, as is the distinction between common, 
mutual, unilateral, or any other category of error. If a case o f mistake is solved, further 
investigation is required as to misrepresentation this being connected to the concept of 
mistake. Even if it is possible to find the concept o f misrepresentation, the problem of 
categorizing the types o f misrepresentation remains. It is noticed that the CISG has no 
clear categories and has not defined the legal effects of misrepresentation at any level, 
innocent, fraudulent or negligent.123
The CISG does not establish the concept of mistake and misrepresentation as English and 
Scottish contract law do. On the international level, this may cause complications to the 
contracting parties as there is no international court to deal with such cases. The CISG has 
not set up any legal body to deal with resulting disputes. This author finds that there is a 
strong link between the interpretations of intent in Article 8 of CISG and some rules in 
Scottish contract law. The main purpose of the rules o f error under Scottish law is to solve 
disputes concerning the contracting parties’ intents and their expression.124 Both are about 
understanding whether the wording of the contract expresses the underlying intent 
accurately. This approach is established and reflected in the Islamic-Arabic definition of 
error, which concentrates also on the intent of the person; error would be established when 
someone intended to do something but unintentionally did something different.125 It is 
concluded that the historical legislative track of the CISG does not give an impression that 
the drafters intended to give the contracting parties the right to rely on their national rules 
of mistake in all the disputable cases or situations.126
123Lookofsky, op. cit., P280.
124 Rahmatian. op. cit.. P36.
125 Ib in  M a n th o u r , op. cit., PI 193.
126 Ferrari, Verona, op. cit., P62.
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This study finds that the CISG rules greatly lack clarity as to the interpretive rules 
including those relating to mistake and misrepresentation. This has led to a circular 
argument about error and validity, because it is not clear whether the concept of validity 
should be interpreted only according to the CISG rules applying the concept of uniformity, 
which could include the concept of error by implication.
The rules and the articles of the CISG are not sufficiently clear or precise to fill the gap 
between domestic laws and the CISG rules. This would affect the procedures followed by 
domestic courts when applying their national legal rules to the CISG cases presented 
before them. However, it is found that within the original structure of the CISG there is 
discretion contained in the wider context of the rules considering mistake as part of the 
CISG. This discretion suggested that mistake could occur during the contract formation, or 
during the “sale of goods” process.127
This lack of clarity among the scholars with regard to error under the CISG is created by 
the drafters who were not clear enough in this regard. They also did not establish obvious 
boundaries for remedies of mistake; nor did they solve the question o f whether cases of 
error should be ruled by the CISG or by national legal norms.128 Conflict is to be expected 
between the CISG rules and national rules of mistake. A different opinion states that the 
CISG rules are capable of dealing with mistake related to the performance capacity of the 
party, and the conformity of the goods.129 The author sees no stability between the 
commentators’ argument with regard to the issue o f mistake and its relation with the CISG; 
some consider mistake as contained within the CISG rules, and others consider the issue of 
mistake to be absent from the CISG.130 The author also finds that the drafters of the CISG
127 Zeller, op. cit., P77.
128 Weitzmann, op. cit., P265-290.
129 Schlechtriem, Butler, op. cit., P43.
13(1 “Checklist on the CISG”, op. cit.
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were not aware of the relation between the articles of the CISG and the concepts of mistake 
and misrepresentation in national legal systems. Furthermore, it is clear that the court used 
the word “misrepresented” to indicate “fraudulent seller”, establishing a new link between 
fraud and misrepresentation under the CISG rules. In other words, it is possible to deal 
with misrepresentation and fraud as equivalent.
Article 35 (1, 2),o f the CISG discusses the concept of the quality of goods; Article 35 (1) 
states “The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and description 
required by the contract and which are contained or packaged in the manner required by 
the contract.” This Article deals with the issue of description in the same way as the 
Islamic law deals with khiyar al-wasf (option of description). The same article treats goods 
delivered and not meeting the description specified in the contract as a misdescription; this 
is comparable to misrepresentation. A study of section (2) (a) of Article 35 provides a 
wider usage of misdescription (misrepresentation) as an applicable concept. It expects that 
goods which do not conform to the contracting description should -at least- be fit for the 
ordinary uses of goods with same description. This provides a broad interpretation of 
misdescription imposing more conditions on the contracting parties when they carry out 
their contractual obligations. Section (2) (b) of Article 35 of the CISG elaborates on this, 
stating that goods should serve the specific purpose agreed with the seller “expressly or 
implicitly”. An exception to this is a situation where has been implied that the buyer did 
not rely, “or that it was unreasonable for him to rely” on the seller’s assessment.
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Section 5: Comments on Error and Misrepresentation in the Draft of Palestinian  
Civil Law
5.1. Types o f Error
In the Palestinian Draft there is no direct mention of error as to motive, error as to 
intention, common mistake, mutual mistake, or error in expression. Error as to quality of 
an item is categorized literally in Scottish contract law131 and is also mentioned directly 
under mistake as to the subject matter within the English contract law.132 It is clear that the 
Palestinian Draft has included this type of error as one the most important error, classifying 
it as an error that prevents the consent o f the parties. The author finds that the category of 
mistake as to fact is not mentioned directly, either in the Palestinian Draft, or in the 
Jordanian/Egyptian civil codes. This type of error is not independently classified but can be 
derived by implication from the cases of error and its categories. In principle English and 
Scottish contract laws, particularly the English; have discussed the subject of error and its 
categories more widely than is the case with the Palestinian Draft. As mentioned earlier, 
the Palestinian Draft discussed three categories of error with a brief explanation being 
given for every one of them.
5.2. Error as to Law
Following the earlier discussion, there is no possibility to regard unilateral error under the 
category of error as to law in the Palestinian Draft. It can also be noted that the Palestinian 
Draft does not discuss the possibility o f misrepresentation or fraud under the category of 
error as to law. The author would recommend consideration should be given to the
131 More details can be found under sub-title of Error as to Quality of Item. A Concept of error in the Scottish Contract 
Law.
132 More details can be found under sub-title of Mistake as to Subject-Matter. A Critical Analysis of the Concept of 
Mistake in English Contract Law.
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hypothesis of misrepresentation, as implied in Article 121 of the Palestinian Draft, which 
discusses induced or uninduced unilateral or mutual error.
Section 6: A Unified Islamic-Anglo Legal Framework of M isrepresentation
The author has taken the opportunity to establish a new legal framework combining the 
concept of misrepresentation under English law, and gharar, taghreer, khiyar alwasf under 
Islamic law. This framework relies on a new understanding of the concept of 
misrepresentation or fraud under Islamic contract law as an equivalent concept to that of 
misrepresentation under English law. This framework is based on the comparative critical 
analysis of English and Islamic contract laws in this thesis. In order to establish a new 
Islamic-Anglo doctrine o f misrepresentation some main issues need to be clarified. Firstly, 
it is concluded that there is no differentiation between misrepresentation and fraud under 
Islamic contract law. Secondly, Muslim scholars do not agree on a unified Islamic 
definition of misrepresentation or fraud. Thirdly, different words are used to indicate 
misrepresentation or fraud under Islamic contract law.
Tadlees is one example of this. Assayyid Sabiq stated that tadlees is haram (prohibited) 
because it contains taghreer and ghish (cheating).133 The Islamic Research & Training 
Institute134 introduces many different interpretations and translations: it interprets tadlees as 
fraud135 corresponding to Ibin Manthour’s interpretation;136 it interprets tadlees as 
misrepresentation,137 while also referring to it as “option of cheating” which allows the 
party to rescind the contract;138 it considers ghabn as fraud,139 following the definition
133 S a b iq , op . c i t ., PI 16.
134 This institution attracts and employs Muslim scholars from different Islamic and Arabic countries that come from 
various Islamic doctrines. It is expected to be one of the best Islamic institute who is interested in improving and 
developing the Islamic banking and finance, in addition to issue a lot of researches and papers in this area depending on 
many of high qualified academic staff and practitioners.
135 A li, A h m a d , op. cit.. P53.
136 Ib in  M a n th o u r . op. cit., P1408.
137 A li.  A h m a d , op. cit.. P53.
138 Ibid, P304.
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provided by Ibin Manthour.140 To explain why ghabn is prohibited in Islamic contracts, the 
same paper points out that “ghabn in transactions implies deception, misrepresentation, 
and cheating.”141
The term taghreer is also used to denote fraud or misrepresentation under Islamic contract 
law. In explaining taghreer, Ali Haydar defined it as fraud (khida ’a); the defrauder is 
called the misrepresentor (mugharrir) and the person who falls under the fraud is called the 
misrepresentee (maghroor)142 or (mogharrar bihi). The Ottoman Journal of Equity states 
that “taghreer: is describing the sold item to the buyer contrary to its real description.”143 
Under this definition taghreer and misdescription bear the same meaning, so 
misdescription (khiyar al-wasf) under Islamic law is equivalent to fraud or 
misrepresentation. This is supported by Abdul-Rahim Al-Saati, when he stated that the 
verbal noun of gharar is taghreer, “it means deception or misrepresentation.”144 Abdullah 
Hasan considered khiyar al-tadlis and khiyar al-taghreer as “option of fraud”. He stated 
that the defrauded party would be able to rescind the contract if he could prove that he had 
entered into it misled by deceit or wilful misrepresentation by the other contracting party.145 
It is clear that the core issue in khiyar alwassf is describing the item contrary to its real 
description. This would be considered as an intentional action from one party (seller) to 
another (buyer). In this case khiyar alwassf directly means misrepresentation. Thus, it is 
not possible to consider khiyar alwassf as an error except in one case which would be an 
induced unilateral error. Therefore, khiyar Alwassf (option of description) should be 
translated as misdescription; it would have the same meaning as misrepresentation.
139 Ibid.,P53.
140 Ib in  M a n th o u r , op. cit., P 3211.
141 A l i ,  A h m a d , op. cit., P21.
142
143
H a r d e r , op. cit., P264.
The Ottoman Journal of Equity. Article 164. 
1 A l-S a a ti ,  op. cit., P6 .
' H a j H a s a n , op. cit., P59.
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Interestingly, the question of misdescription was addressed under English law in Trade 
Descriptions Act 1968. This Act explains the rules of misdescription, replacing the 
Merchandise Marks Acts 1887 to 1953 which prevent misdescription in trade and business. 
It is designed to disallow indications that are false or misleading in respect of the prices of 
goods and enhances the requirements for information about goods to be clear and 
advertised.146 Clearly this Trade Description Act deals directly with the rules of 
misrepresentation, and prohibits false or misleading indication, and the concealment o f the 
information. This research has made it clear earlier that false statement constitutes 
misrepresentation under English law; and non-disclosure has also been considered as a 
type of misrepresentation. When these facts are brought together, the logical conclusion is 
that Islamic and English contract law both consider the terms misdescription and 
misrepresentation as having the same meaning, khiyar Alwassf under Islamic law is 
equivalent to misdescription under English law which means misrepresentation. This 
author finds that khiyar Alwassf should be classified as unintentional misrepresentation 
under the Islamic law; which corresponds to innocent misrepresentation under English law. 
Establishing the unintentional misrepresentation, there should be intentional 
misrepresentation under Islamic law as corresponds to fraudulent misrepresentation under 
English law.
This author believes that the terms gharar or taghreer convey the same meaning as 
intentional misrepresentation under Islamic law, or fraudulent misrepresentation under 
English law. As mentioned earlier, taghreer is the verbal noun of gharar, the past tense of 
gharar is gharra; in Arabic-English translation gharra means misled, or deceived.147As a 
result, gharar is translated as a misleading or deception.148 Both could be considered as
146 Ibid, Chapter 29. PI.
147 R o h i B a a lb a k , op. Cit., P292.
148 R a h m a n , op. cit., P274.
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exactly meaning fraudulent misrepresentation under English law.149 Under the Islamic law, 
fraud or deceit conveys the meaning of gharar and cheating.
Relying on Arabic-Arabic dictionary, the author has shown by his analysis in this thesis, 
that the verb gharra means to misrepresent or defraud.150 In this way, misrepresentation 
and fraud convey the same concept under the Islamic law. As this thesis has shown, in 
translating misrepresentation, English-Arabic dictionaries use khida ’a, tadlees (fraud) and 
kathib (lying), and releasing a false statement of fact by the misrepresentor to induce the 
other party to achieve the misrepresentor’s desires.151 This meaning is also translated as 
misleading.152
The finding of this thesis proves that gharar corresponds more closely to the concept of 
fraudulent misrepresentation under English contract law than to other similar concepts. It is 
clearly understood that misrepresentation under English common law is considered as false 
representation of a given fact in order to induce the party to enter the contract. This 
definition, as shown earlier, was considered as a fraud made intentionally (knowingly), or 
recklessly, or without believing it as a correct fact.153
In discussing the English approach to fraud and misrepresentation, some notable opinions 
and discretions considered material misrepresentation as a type of fraud under English law. 
Lord Diplock supports this approach in association with Raymond Jack, both considering 
that material misrepresentation has many factors in common with fraudulent 
misrepresentation, which would be treated under tort of deceit.154 Interestingly, when the
149 Martin, Oxford Dictionary of Law. op. cit., P344.
150 Ibin  M a n th o u r , op. cit., P I487.
151 F a ru q i, op. cit., P460.
132 Ibid, P459.
133 Curzon, op. cit., PI 83.
134 Gao Xiang and Ross P.Buckley. A Comparative Analysis of the Standard of Fraud Required under the Fraud Rules in 
Letter of Credit law. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law. [Vol 13:293. 2003]. P323.
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case of Banco Santander S.A. v. Bayfem Ltd.155 was disputed before the court, it was stated 
that some documents presented were fraudulent; the fraud was established in a judgment of 
the Queen’s Bench Division which was supported by the Court of Appeal. Furthermore, 
the two courts agreed with Lord Diplock’s interpretation which considered material 
misrepresentation as a type of fraud according to the regulations of letters of credit under 
the law of the UK.15 56
Intending to create an Islamic-Anglo legal framework of misrepresentation, this author 
suggests two categories of misrepresentation. The first category is an intentional 
misrepresentation, which is equivalent to fraudulent misrepresentation under English 
contract law, and Khiyar Alwassf that involves gharar or taghreer under Islamic contract 
law, because gharar or taghreer exactly means deception. The second category is 
unintentional misrepresentation, which is equivalent to innocent misrepresentation under 
English law and Khiyar Alwasfwithout gharar or taghreer under Islamic law.
Section 7: Summary of the Conclusion
The great importance of error and misrepresentation, or gharar (taghreer) has been shown 
under the cited legal systems within this thesis. It is also shown that error and 
misrepresentation play a vital role in setting up the contract. In practice, error and 
misrepresentation and their similar concepts would be considered as key concepts in or to 
understand the legal remedies regarding many contractual disputes. This author strongly 
believes that there are many similarities between the cited legal systems concerning error 
and misrepresentation; but many serious differences can be noticed among them.
155 [1999] EWHC 284.
156 Xiang. Buckley, op. cit., P324.
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As shown with reference to the Islamic-Anglo approach, the author strongly believes that a 
new approach can be adopted to redefine the concept o f misrepresentation in the future, in 
English, Islamic, Scottish, Palestinian, and the CISG contract laws. This approach suggests 
that misrepresentation should be classified under only two main simple categories: 
intentional misrepresentation to include fraud and deceit, and unintentional 
misrepresentation to include error.
English, Scottish, Islamic, Jordanian, Egyptian, and the Draft of the Palestinian civil law 
almost agree about the main elements of essential error as a vitiating factor of the contract. 
The Islamic contract law discussed the option of rescission only when related to 
misrepresentation from one party and an induced unilateral error from the other party. As a 
result, it can be strongly concluded that all the legal systems cited in this thesis can interact 
with each other, and exchange experiences. It can be also noted that every legal system has 
different perspectives towards and issues with error and misrepresentation. However, for 
each one of them there is a possibility to derive great benefits from sharing experience with 
the other legal systems; thus improving different aspects and ideas. There is an also strong 
ground for developing the interactivity between the legal systems in the future especially in 
the areas of error and misrepresentation.
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